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“Interoperability” means the ability for two different and independent ICT systems to 
exchange information and use that information. Having multi-dimensional aspects for 
the economy and society, the regulation of interoperability is the subject matter of 
various legal disciplines, i.e. intellectual property legislation, competition law and 
sector-specific rules e.g. the Electronic Communications Regulatory Framework 
(ECRF), under EU law. Lack of coherency among such disciplines is a compelling 
reason to find out the best possible rules to deal with the lack of interoperability and 
accompanying concerns, including vendor lock-in, switching costs, hindrance of 
innovation and information flows. On the other hand, each ICT industry has its own 
rules and standards, which also impacts interoperability. Against this background, 
drawing the boundaries for the regulation of ICT interoperability becomes more 
demanding. 
 
This study aims to find out whether, or to what extent, ICT interoperability needs to be 
regulated under EU law, considering the abovementioned concerns. Starting with an 
investigation of the given legal disciplines with a focus on their measures dealing with 
lack of interoperability, this study primarily conducts blackletter (doctrinal) analysis 
based on multi-disciplinary research. After completing the blackletter analysis, the 
research continues with multiple case studies based on two emerging technologies 
‘cloud computing’ and the ‘Internet of Things’ (IoT). These case studies relying on 
distinct industrial settings, have unravelled the real-life situation from the underlying 
architectural layers and their interdependencies. Cross analysis of the industrial settings, 
contributed to the doctrinal findings not only verifying but also advancing them with 
complementary results, pointing to meaningful and constructive outputs towards a 
holistic and layered regulatory treatment of ICT interoperability. 
 
Overall, the research concludes with important findings regarding how to regulate ICT 
interoperability at the EU level. First and foremost, it has been established that the EU 
legal framework is of a limited nature, offering partial solutions and with shortcoming 
to the lack of interoperability. Secondly, it is found that interoperability is a concept not 
to be isolated from but to be elaborated with, other related concepts i.e. information 
flows, and problems i.e. gatekeeping, from a holistic and layered perspective. Thirdly, 
it has been ended up the ICT interdependencies, which have fully surfaced in the case 
study research, would be best addressed through a ‘layered regulatory model’ that can 
favourably respond to both ecosystem and non-ecosystem industrial settings. Fourthly, 
in dealing with the lack of interoperability and related concerns, the term ‘gatekeeping’ 
has been revitalised and embedded into this layered model, invigorating this holistic 
and ex-ante policy approach. Last but not least, the proposed ‘layered regulatory model’ 
would not only replace the core principles of the ECRF but also expand the EU 
regulatory vision with the necessary flexibility to cope with the ever fast changing ICT 
dynamics, going beyond interoperability-based problems. 
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1.1. Background and purpose of the research  
“Interoperability” is defined as “the ability to exchange information and mutually use 
the information which has been exchanged”.1 It has a crucial meaning for the 
information and communication technologies (ICTs),2 which is an umbrella term used 
to mean any technological platform, device or application by which the “information” 
is created and shared. Electronic file and mail exchanges, video streaming, music 
downloads are realised through interfaces3 that enable interoperability between 
software/hardware components of non-homogenous ICT systems. Interoperability is 
generally considered to promote socially desirable goals such as fostering competition 
and innovation, enhancing consumer satisfaction, and promoting economic growth.4 
Lack of interoperability would have significant consequences for the society and 
economy, with potential restraints over competitive and innovative market forces. 
Closely related to this, ‘interoperability’ is governed by means of many rules and 
precedents concerning intellectual property rights (IPRs), competition law and sector-
specific (electronic communications) regulations. 
 
1  Directive (EC) 2009/24 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the 
legal protection of computer programs [2009] OJ L 111 (‘Software Directive’), recital 10.  
2  Although ICT might have various meanings peculiar to the context, this study uses this term to 
cover all kinds of (analog/digital) technologies used to create and share information depicting the 
underlying networks and services. For detailed information about the ICTs including nature and 
evolution of the underlying (ICT) networks/services, see the section ‘2. Interoperability in the field 
of ICTs’ below. 
3  To achieve interoperability, interfaces must be accessed and/or be already opened to third parties 
in three forms: application programming interfaces (APIs), protocols, and data file formats 
(Malcolm Bain, ‘Patents and FOSS’ in Noam Shemtov and Ian Walden (eds), Free and Open 
Source Software (OUP 2013) 161; Robert S. Sutor, ‘Software Standards, Openness, and 
Interoperability’ in Laura DeNardis (eds), Opening Standards: The Global Politics of 
Interoperability (The MIT Press 2011) 215. 
4  Pamela Samuelson, ‘Are Patents on Interfaces Impeding Interoperability’, [2009] 93 Minnesota 
Law Review 1943, 1943-1944. 
 
2 
Each body of the legal regulations have different objectives and means to accomplish 
such objectives, which have distinctive features. While IPR rules aim to encourage 
original creations, certain types of IPRs i.e. patents, copyrights, trademarks offer pre-
defined tools and mechanisms to protect IPR holders against unauthorised uses by third 
parties. European Union (EU) competition law focuses on consumer welfare and 
protecting competition usually through punitive ex-post interventions, such as 
remedies addressing ‘abuse of dominance’. As far as the electronic communications 
regulatory framework (ECRF)5 is concerned, a more complicated body of rules is 
figured based on more specific objectives e.g. ensuring ‘end-to-end connectivity’, as 
well as ex-ante powers handed over to the regulators, revealing a more intrusive and 
straightforward nature, also reflected in dealing with the lack of interoperability. 
Lack of interoperability causes some problems, often surrounding the concept of lock-
in,6 which is reflected in the consumers’ inability to switch to one platform from another 
or a competitor being kept out of the market because of the network effects and/or path 
dependence.7 Interoperability might have either positive or negative co-relation with the 
 
5  Among the sector-specific regulations, the ECRF is the most relevant example regarding ICT 
interoperability as embodying ex ante tools and mechanisms to deal with the interoperability. 
Going beyond interoperability and entailing a great many issues (e.g. authorization, universal 
service, consumer rights, access and competition), the ECRF represents the mainstream regulatory 
framework with regards to regulation of the ICT networks/services. While it originates from the 
2002 regulatory framework consisting of 5 main directives (as well as regulations, 
recommendations, etc.), 4 of these directives were consolidated recently (December 2018) under 
a single directive titled the ‘European Electronic Communications Code’ (EECC). For more details 
and distinctive aspects of the ECRF, see the section ‘6.1. Main elements of ECRF’. 
6  Lock-in occurs in the case when users are confronted with a walled garden (i.e. proprietary 
platform) under which they are forced to use one company’s products which might be incompatible 
with those of competitors. Lack of interoperability is one of the driving strategies for 
(vendor/technological) lock-in, particularly on the part of dominant players. For more information 
regarding vendor/technological lock-in, see the section ‘3.1.2. Main concerns surrounding lack of 
interoperability’.    
7  Network effects mean an increase in a product’s value when the number of the users of that product 
is multiplied, representing more connected consumers to the same network. High-technology 
markets well represent strong network effects. For detailed information about network effects and 
the accompanying path dependencies see the section ‘2.1.5. Network effects’. There is also an 
apparent link between the network effects and the vendor lock-in. For products with network 
effects (the purchase of a product increases its value to existing purchasers), greater sales volumes 
can increase the likelihood of consumers being locked into existing suppliers - especially if the 
 
3 
network effects. Dominant firms usually try to create their (firm-level) network effects 
and limit the interoperability to the extent that enables them to maximize brand loyalty 
and customer base. This strategy often contrasts to industry-level network effects and 
wider benefits to be reaped from broader interoperability. No legal system attempts to 
optimize the level of interoperability. Notwithstanding, diverse legal and non-legal rules 
and fragmented markets increasingly pose interoperability-based problems, which 
would have far-reaching implications e.g. not only economics based (mostly 
competition oriented) outcomes, but also further consequences related to hindered 
information flows. In conjunction with this, a set of concerns being drawn at the outset 
of this study shed a broader light on the interoperability discourse and demonstrate that 
ICT network/service providers tend to erect artificial gateways to control access and 
interoperability, resulting in gatekeeping roles and functionalities.8  
While interoperability is by and large is attributed to lock-in and related problems e.g. 
switching costs, potential problems need to be extended to social production and 
democratic culture within and across the societies. In particular, with the advent of the 
digital technologies as well as internet connectivity, lack of interoperability would 
mean lack of communication and information channels across different platforms, 
apps and services. While the end-to-end connectivity is based on the global 
communication standards and an interoperable landscape, this is not the case when we 
mention about the media and information flows particularly when protected with the 
IPRs. The resultant picture would be better captured by the term ‘gatekeeping’ based 
on the lack of interoperability and surrounding problems. From this point of view, the 
 
supplier uses non-standard interfaces and sells complementary services (Ian Brown, ‘Regulations 
and the Internet of Thing (IoT)’, (2015) GSR15 discussion paper, 23 <http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-
D/Conferences/GSR/Pages/ GSR2015/GSR15-discussion-paper.aspx> accessed 9 October 2020). 
8  See the sections ‘3.1.3. Brief analysis of major concerns on the cumulative ground of 
‘gatekeeping’’and ‘8.4.2. Revitalising gatekeeping and gatekeeping activities’. 
 
4 
thesis invokes this term to explain the interoperability related concerns and problems 
on a cumulative ground. Conversely, distinct bodies of law fragment such problems 
providing for crystallised tools and means. Most remarkably, the EU legal system offers 
distinctive solutions originating from different legal bodies, which mostly consider ‘lack 
of interoperability’ as a subordinate problem to other widely acknowledged matters of 
concern. 
For instance, IPR rules mostly have an indirect and passive impact over 
interoperability i.e. limited to ‘reverse engineering’ under copyright regime, not 
securing a guaranteed access to the interfaces that ensure interoperability between the 
computer programs. Competition law measures, based on Articles 101-109 in the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), are invoked to ensure and 
enhance interoperability in case of the anti-competitive effects, e.g. likelihood of 
market foreclosure. After fulfillment of certain thresholds and criteria, such practices 
could be addressed by the competition law remedies, including mandatory sharing 
(access/interoperability) and pricing obligations imposed on the dominant market 
players. This could be exemplified by the Commission’s Microsoft decision whereby 
certain interface specifications are mandated to be disclosed to ensure viable 
competition in the server operating system (OS) market. Under the ECRF, the legal 
logic and framework differs in the sense that the consumers are put to the center, 
although competitive mindset is still kept and combined with the tools to protect 
consumer interests. Thereunder exist certain ex-ante obligations and measures, e.g. 
regarding ‘interconnection’ and ‘conditional access’, which constitute a consolidated 
framework along with partial solutions concerning ‘interoperability’. 
This dissertation attempts to revisit the EU legal framework and ultimately aims to 
refashion the applicable rules and regulations with a view to deal with the lack of 
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interoperability and accompanying problems. Thereby, it is aimed that major concerns 
are clarified, the existing loopholes are unravelled, and the appropriate tools are 
developed to cope with the interoperability-based problems. This study aims not to 
crystallise interoperability problems in technical terms, but to embrace them from a 
broader perspective of legal regulation on a sound and widely applicable basis. In this 
regard, a multi-disciplinary (doctrinal/traditional) legal research is done along with the 
multiple case studies based on Cloud Computing and Internet of Things (IoT), which 
represent the ever-faster growing technologies that have the potential to challenge the 
current ICT regulations, including interoperability rules and solutions. Having said 
that, and to be built on the findings of both the doctrinal analysis and case study 
research, it is intended that a policy approach be developed and ending up with a new 
regulatory model based on a normative perspective.   
1.2. Context, perspective and research questions 
At the core of this study lies the debate as to whether and to what extent interoperability 
information, basically application programming interfaces (APIs), would be the 
subject matter of regulatory concerns and interventions. To respond to this question, 
this study endeavours to search out the existing EU regulations based on the tripartite 
legal framework, incorporating IPR rules, competition law and sector-specific 
regulations. In this regard, Chapters 4, 5 and 6 are dedicated to multi-disciplinary legal 
research, starting with the IPRs and proceeding with competition law and the ECRF 
rules. In so doing, both the distinctive and overlapping aspects of the related EU legal 
regimes are investigated, ending up with a coherent and holistic perspective. Out of 
this research, the findings denote insufficient and partial interoperability solutions, 
which are summarised below.    
 
6 
Within the context of IPR rules, the abovementioned limitedness is noticeable under 
Software Directive 2009/24/EC, which regulates the conditions, scope and limits of the 
copyright regime for computer programs in the EU. For instance, decompilation (a type 
of reverse engineering)9 is legally justified only for the purpose of achieving 
‘interoperability’ under Software Directive.10 However, this exceptional right is unique to 
copyright protection11 and reveals a costly solution for the software developers, which 
does not match the benefits of the open standards or common protocols. These latter 
options could be realised through opening the APIs, which are however protected by the 
copyrights12 alongside other potential IPRs e.g. patents. A practical result is the fact that a 
human-readable form of computer programs (source codes) could be identified just by 
reverse engineering; yet, this is not a sustainable and long-term business model.13 
This discrepancy, between acknowledging interoperability as a reason for 
decompilation and the copyrightability of APIs, reinforces the idea that IPRs could be 
used as an effective shield over the APIs. Not only copyrights, but also patents and 
trade secrets are effectively used to prevent third parties (e.g. software developers) 
from having access to the key interfaces, which would otherwise allow competitive 
markets for derivative products. Firms may seek the protection of patents for interface 
 
9  Regarding the definition, scope and purpose of ‘reverse engineering’ and of ‘decompilation’, see 
the section ‘4.1.2. Reverse engineering and ensuring interoperability under EU copyright law’. 
10  See the Software Directive, recital 15 and art 6.  
11  EU copyright rules for computer programs just allow interoperable solutions under the strict 
conditions of ‘reverse engineering’ which is translated as ‘the right to decompilation’ under the 
Software Directive. On the other hand, neither the EU patent regime, nor other IPRs, have such an 
unequivocal right enabling interoperability.  
12  Under the EU legal system, whereas ideas and principles that underlie a software are excluded 
from copyright protection (enshrined by the Software Directive), APIs are not covered under this 
exemption. The ruling in SAS Institute Inc v World Programming Ltd affirmed neither the 
functionality of a computer program, nor the programming language and the format of data files 
used in a computer program constitute a form of expression and accordingly do not enjoy copyright 
protection under the EU Software Directive, while APIs are not contained within the same 
category of an un-copyrightable form of ideas (Case C-406/10 SAS Institute Inc v World 
Programming Ltd [2012] 3 CMLR 4). 
13  See Sally Elizabeth Weston, ‘The Legal Regulation of Interoperability in an Oligopolistic Market’ 
(PhD thesis, Bournemouth University 2015), 35. 
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designs for anti-competitive purposes, that is, as a tool for blocking competitors from 
developing compatible platforms (e.g. game consoles) for controlling the market for 
complementary products (e.g. videogames).14 However, this turns out to create an 
environment conducive to the gatekeeper positions for the protected software, and 
threatening consumer benefits to be derived from follow-on innovation. That being 
said, if the aftermarket(s) build on a proprietary platform, which is encumbered by 
IPR-protected APIs that deter third-party access/interoperability, the ultimate goals of 
IPRs, particularly the end of ‘follow-on innovation’, becomes compromised.  
Lack of interoperability would likewise pose a situation in contradiction with the 
competition law aims. This is more persuasive from the perspective of enabling 
aftermarket competition and enhancing consumer surplus. Particularly, exclusionary 
abusive conducts, e.g. the refusal to supply interoperability information, perpetuated 
by dominant players, would create lock-in that is hazardous to consumer welfare, thus 
creating a contradiction with the EU competition rules. This concern has so far led the 
EU Courts and the Commission to intervene into many cases by mandating access to 
interface specifications, such as in Microsoft.15 Not only refusal to deal, or other 
abusive behaviours, but also collaborative and concentrative undertakings are 
comprehended by the EU competition law tools, when they affect competitive markets 
by degrading intra, or inter platform, interoperability. Clearly, while interoperability 
is not an aim of the EU competition law by itself, it emerges as an important means to 
break off lock-ins and to eliminate anti-competitive effects e.g. caused by the network 
effects.   
 
14  See Samuelson (n 4) 1979. 
15  Case COMP/C-3/37.792 - Microsoft [2004] OJ L 32/23 (‘Commission’s Microsoft decision’), 




While IPR rules aim at protection of original creations, technical inventions etc. by 
encouraging product differentiation and innovation, competition law rules underscore 
consumer welfare, often through effectively competitive markets. Out of the interactions 
between these two bodies of law, conflicting results would come up in the sense that 
IPR exceptions, including reverse engineering, would not permit incrementally created 
innovations, as opposed to the competition law interventions. Although no hierarchical 
relationship exists between the two, under certain circumstances the latter might have a 
superior effect by dictating mandatory sharing or interoperability, particularly where the 
former (IPR rules) is not responsive and/or capable enough. On the other hand, an 
obligation by competition law measures might be problematic in scope and effect, such 
as in the Microsoft case where the antitrust standards were unevenly changed and false 
positive debates inflamed.16 Last but not least, accompanying lengthy processes have 
the potential to cause prohibitive costs for the market players should they rely on the 
interoperability information and seek a regulatory response. 
After all, the question emerges as to whether the emergent gap would be filled by the 
ECRF rules. The ECRF rules and measures consist in far more crystallized rules that 
enable a number of end-goals and ensuing interoperability based remedies in several 
contexts. In this regard, ensuring adequate access and interconnection is of high 
importance, as this goal requires industry-wide interoperability e.g. enabling the end-
users to communicate with each other. In the absence of such rules, end-to-end 
 
16  Inge Graef, ‘Tailoring the Essential Facilities Doctrine to the IT Sector: Compulsory Licensing of 
Intellectual Property Rights after Microsoft’ [2011] 7 Cambridge Student Law Review 1, 18; Alan 
Devlin, Michael Jacobs and Bruno Peixoto, ‘Success, Dominance and Interoperability’ [2009] 84 
Indiana Law Journal 1157, 1177. See also Kathryn McMahon, ‘Interoperability: “Indispensability” 
and “Special Responsibility” in High Technology Markets’ [2007] 9 Tulane Journal of Technology 
and Intellectual Property 123, 161-6, where the author underlines that the approach followed in 
Microsoft focused on the “distortion of market structure” rather than foreclosure and anti-
competitive effects with an implication of “imposition of special responsibility” (emphasis added). 
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connectivity would no longer exist, having far-reaching negative outcomes, which 
could be extended to the provision of EU-wide communications services and cross-
network online transactions. While this end-goal goes beyond the competition law and 
IPR-oriented rules with a stricter agenda and safeguards, the reflections on 
interoperability regulations are limited under the ECRF. That is to say, interoperability 
remedies are envisaged to realise certain ends, including voice-based/conventional 
interconnection, conditional access to the set-top boxes, etc. and do not reach out to 
overall ICT services and networks e.g. interconnection of software governed 
platforms, being limited to electronic communications networks and services. 
Under this light, an increasing need arises concerning more effective tools to ensure ICT 
interoperability under the EU legal system. Incorporating various concerns based on 
technological lock-in, switching costs, network effects, etc., this featured need has 
significant repercussions for a ‘holistic’ ex-ante approach against the shortcomings of 
competition law and IPR rules. This tentative conclusion reflects the general findings of 
the multi-disciplinary blackletter analysis done in Chapters 4, 5 and 6, which primarily 
seek to answer whether and to what extent interoperability-based problems are addressed 
under the status quo. In this context, not only the insufficiency of the existing solutions, 
either statutory or based on case law, against the major concerns surrounding ICT 
interoperability, but also the non-holistic character of the available rules and regulations is 
underscored as a deficiency of the EU legal system. 
Whilst examination of the EU legal framework represents the first step, this (both 
‘descriptive’ and ‘exploratory’) analysis poses a need for filtering through an 
additional analysis based on the real-life (industrial) practices. To have a more 
elaborate picture of the legal framework vis-à-vis the ICT industries, case study 
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research has been considered crucial against the plausible need for a holistic and ex 
ante regulation. That is to say, it is acknowledged that the tentative conclusion of 
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 needs to be verified and enriched by the case studies. To that effect, 
“cloud computing” and “IoT” have been selected for the purpose of case study which 
constitute the subject-matter of Chapter 7. The analytical lens used in the multiple case 
studies has been broadened in Chapter 8 (Conclusion) to take a further step towards 
finding out the appropriate policy approach and regulatory model. 
Against this background and contextual analysis, several research questions emerge, 
including but not limited to: (i) Would the existing EU legal framework be sufficient 
to deal with the lack of interoperability and related concerns such as vendor lock-in, 
hindered innovation and information flows in the field of ICTs? (ii) What kind of a 
policy approach (ex-ante or ex-post; holistic or disaggregated; bottom-up or top-down) 
would be appropriate in dealing with the lack of interoperability and accompanying 
problems that characterise the emerging ICT landscape? (iii) What elements or 
responsive tools would need to be incorporated for the regulation of ICT 
networks/services and ultimately to be embedded in a regulatory model? 
While some more questions would be added on top, these research questions represent 
the major/pioneering ones. Among these, while the first one is addressed under the 
blackletter/doctrinal analysis, appropriate responses to the other two questions are 
mostly found out during and subsequent to the case study research. Thus, these two 
research components of blackletter analysis and case studies have ‘complementary’ 
aspects within this study. For instance, significant inputs are drawn from the initial 
(blackletter) analysis towards the holistic ‘policy approach’ in the sense that very 
nature and would-be characteristics of this approach have started to emerge. Along the 
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same lines, completion of the case studies has brought out a significant contribution to 
the construction of the ‘regulatory model’ based on the ‘layering’ approach. Drawing 
a set of progressive steps, all the components of the research could be found in Figure 
1 below. 
 
Figure 1: Progressive steps of the research 
Source: Constructed by the author 
1.3. Research methodology  
The research methodology pursued in this study is built upon the combination of 
‘doctrinal (blackletter) analysis’ with ‘case study’ research. The former (doctrinal) 
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analysis aims to examine the relevant legal texts and case law, as well as secondary 
sources like books, journal articles, working papers, reports and newsletters, in seeking 
to discuss and clarify the scope and boundaries of the EU legal framework concerning 
ICT interoperability. On the other hand, the latter (case study) research has been 
employed in order to expand and enrich the findings of the former analysis towards 
the designation of the policy approach and development of the regulatory model in the 
end. It is envisaged that on the ‘positive’ ground of the doctrinal analysis, the multiple 
case studies would bring out new ‘normative’ elements along with new inputs as to 
the intended regulatory design.      
Based on the combinative approach explained above, this study aims to find out 
whether current rules and precedents under EU law are sufficient to cope with the 
highlighted concerns given the real-life situations, with a view to build up an 
appropriate regulatory model. To that effect, the multiple cases worked out in Chapter 
7 lay the groundwork to reach out to new outputs concerning a pertinent regulatory 
approach, as well as to validate the former findings.17 Given this fact, this study could 
arguably be said to employ both ‘deductive’ and ‘inductive’ logic in its endeavour to 
filtering out the appropriate policy approach, based on both the doctrinal findings and 
case study research. Notwithstanding, the ‘inductive’ aspects come to the fore as the 
consecutive steps followed in the study draw up a progressive research ending up with 
a new regulatory model. 
 
17  These two components are important in the sense that case study researchers are supposed not just 
to make an in-depth analysis of real-life situations, but also to reach out to tested and generalisable 
theoretical propositions based on rigorously selected cases and well-structured design. While the 
theoretical propositions need to be incorporated into the case study research, construction of a new 
generalisable theory or normative framework is also expected to come up following the case 
studies. This approach results in placing more emphasis on inductive exploration, discovery, and 
in holistic analysis presented in thick descriptions of the cases (Helena Harrison, Melanie Birks, 
Richard Franklin and Jane Mills, ‘Case Study Research: Foundations and Methodological 
Orientations’, (2017) 18 Forum: Qualitative Social Research ˂http://dx.doi.org/10.17169/fqs-
18.1.2655˃ accessed 9 October 2020). 
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From this viewpoint, the constituent elements of this research effectively complement 
each other. The initial aim followed in Chapters 4 - 6 has been to elaborate the EU rules 
and precedents concerning ICT interoperability. In this regard, existing rules, remedies 
and mechanisms prevailing under IPR rules, competition law and sector-specific 
regulations are investigated with the aim to identify the loopholes existing in the EU 
framework. This multi-disciplinary (doctrinal) analysis, although having the potential 
for elaborate outputs,18 might be limited and insufficient on its own to build up a new 
regulatory model intended to apply to a very broad context like ICTs, given the 
descriptive nature of this research. In fact, identification of causal mechanisms would be 
more clarified through case studies, which generally seek to take account of as much as 
possible about a given phenomenon and, thus, are likely to capture the processes that 
link various factors to one another in time.19 
This study thus attempts to surmount any potential limitedness of blackletter analysis 
with the aid of case studies,20 filtering out the real-life scenarios, in combination and 
interplay with the former analysis. Thereby, not only is the integrity of the research 
components, but also the anticipation of progressive research outputs, maintained. 
Notwithstanding, it is worth underlining that the doctrinal analysis in this study has 
gone further than the pure description of the law, in the particular sense that it unravels 
 
18  Regarding the details of doctrinal analysis and its interplay with non-doctrinal research 
methodologies, see Terry Hutchinson ‘The Doctrinal Method: Incorporating Interdisciplinary 
Methods in Reforming the Law’ 3 [2015] Erasmus Law Review, 130-138.  
19  Lisa L. Miller, ‘The Use of Case Studies in law and Social Science Research’, [2018] 14 Annual 
Review of Law and Social Science 381, 385.  
20  It is acknowledged that when information is plentiful and concepts abstract, it is important to 
utilize processes that help interpret, sort, and manage information and that adapt findings to convey 
clarity and applicability to the results (Harrison et al (n 17)). Likewise, Yin asserts that, “a case 
study is an empirical method that 
- investigates a contemporary phenomenon (the “case”) in depth and within its real-world context, 
especially when 
- the boundaries between phenomenon and context may not be clearly evident” (Robert K. Yin, 
Case Study Research and Applications: Design and Methods (6th edn, Sage 2018), 15.  
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the narrow mindset and fragility of the EU legal framework against the ICTs and their 
interoperability and upholding a holistic viewpoint for the layered technologies. This 
tentative conclusion towards holistic and multi-layered policy approach has served as 
the stepping-stone for the following case study research. Case study research, delving 
into the real-life scenarios and interactions between the ICT layers and players, has 
laid the ground for the development of a regulatory model in the end. Given the 
structure, scope and purpose of the overall research, below it is explained what 
particular meaning and characteristics the selected cases have within the meaning of 
methodological approach.  
1.4. Case selection 
Primarily exploratory and explanatory in nature, case study is used to gain an 
understanding of the issue(s) in real life settings and is recommended to answer ‘How’ 
and ‘Why’, or less frequently ‘What’, research questions.21 Following this spirit, case 
study research in this thesis has been conducted to exemplify, search and shape out the 
interoperability-based problems, along with the possible solutions for the real-life 
situations. By looking at the most representative cases of the multi-layered ICT 
interoperability, this study aimed to combine the positive findings of the doctrinal 
analysis with real-life constructivism. This ‘constructivist’ approach reminds one of, 
and resembles the approach of, Merriam, who acknowledges that case study research 
can use both quantitative and qualitative methods and that when working on qualitative 
 
21  Helena Harrison et al (n 17). See also Yin (n 20) 13; Gary Thomas, How to do your case study 
(2nd edn, Sage 2016), 36-37; Malcolm Tight, Understanding Case Study Research: Small-scale 
Research with Meaning (Sage 2017) 45-49. 
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case studies, methods aim at generating inductive reasoning and interpretation, rather 
than testing hypothesis.22 
From this viewpoint, this study attempts to use the case studies primarily to take a 
further step towards the investigating and filtering of the industrial settings and 
practices, in order to find out whether interoperability is a stand-alone concept and 
could be achieved by self-regulatory mechanisms or it does need coercive means to 
cope with the surrounding problems access seekers face. That being said, case studies 
have been conducted for two main reasons; namely, to search out (i) to what extent the 
plausible need for a holistic policy approach has a matching response from the 
industrial settings (more relativist), and (ii) what regulatory repercussions ICT 
interoperability would have in the selected industrial settings (more interpretivist and 
constructivist). 
In particular the latter question involves an ‘inductive’ logic and endeavour, in the 
sense that details of the intended holistic regulatory model are aimed to be built upon 
the revelatory aspects of the case studies. Within this context and rationale, ‘Cloud 
Computing’ and the ‘Internet of Things’ have been selected as to constitute the 
backdrop for the case study research. Below, brief information about these two 
technological phenomena (cases) are given. 
 
22  Harrison et al (n 17), referring to Sharan B. Merriam, Qualitative research: A guide to design and 
implementation (2nd edn, Jossey-Bass 2009). Remarkably, Yin, a pioneering figure in this field, 
advocates a structured process concerning case study research and focused on the formal 
propositions and theoretical foundations, his realist and sometimes deterministic approach is 
contrasted with other scholars’ constructivist, pragmatic and/or interpretivist methodological 
approaches. For more details regarding the philosophical variations of case study approach 
incorporating realist - postpositivist / pragmatic - constructivist / relativist - 
constructivist/interpretivist approaches, see Harrison et al (n 17). 
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1.4.1. Cloud Computing 
Cloud computing, broadly speaking, is the storage of data and processing in a location 
which is not the user’s own computer, or the provision of computer resources on-
demand over the internet.23 Cloud facilities offer many advantages to users, such as 
remote storage, easy and ubiquitous accessibility, the storage or processing of (very) 
large amounts of data which would not be possible on a user’s device, the opportunity 
to collaborate with other users privately and remotely etc.24 The central feature of 
cloud computing is that existing and novel computing applications are increasingly 
being performed in a “cloud’ online, e.g. not on users’ own hardware.25 Cloud 
computing is thus considered as a new wave of technological development combining 
different services in a manner that arguably revolutionizes computer and internet 
usage.26 
In providing cloud services e.g. storage, security, messaging, reporting, cloud 
providers rely on the physical link and broadband connectivity provided by the internet 
service providers (ISPs).27 They also use and rely on additional software and hardware 
elements taken from the software developers, virtualisation providers, vendors e.g. 
original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) and security (anti-virus) companies. All 
these latter services could be classified as the internal elements within the cloud 
architecture, constituting the major cloud layers of applications, platform and 
 
23  Angela Daly, Private Power, Online Information Flows and EU Law: Mind the Gap (Hart 
Publishing 2016) 120. 
24  Ibid. 
25  Jasper P. Sluijs, Pierre Larouche and Wolf Sauter, ‘Cloud Computing in the EU Policy Sphere: 
Interoperability, Vertical Integration and the Internal Market’ [2012] 3 JIPITEC 12, 13.  
26  Ibid. 
27  Mehmet Bilal Unver, ‘What cloud interoperability connotates for EU policy making: Recurrence 




infrastructure. Whereas, the broadband connectivity between the cloud facilities and 
the users, as well as the internet hubs, is referred to as the external access/network 
layer underlying these cloud layers.28 
Against this background, cloud interoperability represents a common thread across the 
internal/external layers that constitute the cloud architecture. To mention a fully-
fledged cloud interoperability, cloud users should be able to exchange, port and use 
their data, applications and software tools across different clouds. This could be 
enabled by means of cross-layer interoperability within and across the cloud systems. 
Hence, achievement of cloud interoperability needs to be secured across all the layers, 
e.g. application, platform, infrastructure. However, proprietary protocols and the 
absence of common standards in the cloud industry would prevent this and preclude 
the interoperability across the distinct cloud systems. As a matter of fact, there is only 
one standard, that of Open Virtualization Format (OVF), adopted by the industry 
stakeholders, which is commonly used by the cloud providers and truly fitting into the 
meaning of ‘common standard’. 
All the facts mentioned above, point to a need to make research of this subject matter, 
namely ‘cloud computing’ in relation to interoperability. This selection would enable 
a fulfilling analysis, concerning not only the possible scenarios based on (non-
)interoperability and the accompanying legal and non-legal solutions, but also of the 
potential causal mechanisms that would pave the way for construction of a regulatory 
model. Related to this, cloud-based interdependencies are also note-worthy from the 
holistic perspective featured in this study. That is to say, cloud computing offers a 
 
28  For detailed information regarding internal/external elements, or layers of the cloud architectures, 
see the section ‘7.1.2. Technical and economic underpinnings’. 
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fertile environment for the examination of the cross-layer interactions and 
accompanying interoperability gaps and problems, allowing a generalisable picture for 
the regulatory design. Given this fact, cloud computing has been selected as one of the 
cases to be examined on top of the doctrinal analysis.     
1.4.2. The Internet of Things 
The Internet of Things (IoT) represents another fertile and dynamic environment for 
the analysis of interoperability related problems. A world of networked smart objects, 
including cars, refrigerators, health care services, wearable devices are depicted by the 
term the ‘IoT’, which builds and thrives on diverse industrial settings e.g. home 
appliances, smart city, transport, logistics, agriculture, traffic management, monitoring 
of production cycles and telemedicine. In such a landscape, the IoT devices and the 
governing software are distinguished through data sensors e.g. RFID chips, that 
communicate constantly and seamlessly with each other. On top of this, Internet 
Protocol (IP) connectivity makes the IoT platforms more effective, responsive and 
data-driven e.g. coupled with big data management. Global figures show that 
connected products and devices have already exceeded the global population and are 
expected to reach 50 billion by 2020, up from 25 billion in 2015.29 Given this fact, the 
IoT seems to mark a distinctive revolution along with cloud computing, which supplies 
the necessary platforms, software tools and applications that are necessary for 
processing the data gathered from the smart/connected things.  
 
29  KPMG, Securing the benefits of industry digitisation (A Report for Vodafone, 2015) 5 
˂https://assets.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmg/uk/pdf/2017/02/vodafonewebaccess.pdf˃ accessed 
9 October 2020. 
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Against this background, cloud services underlie the IoT platform and applications in 
general. The IoT also relies on other supportive or underlying networks and services 
e.g. broadband connectivity and local area networks, which represent access and 
perception layers. On top of these, applications are run, revealing another layer that 
needs to speak to the lower layers. Interoperability across these layers of perception, 
access and cloud and application is inherent in the concept of the IoT.  Meaning, for 
an IoT system, all these layers need to operate in a systemic and organised manner, 
based on the agreed standards. 
From a broader perspective, absent or hindered interoperability could discourage IoT 
users, including manufacturers, from purchasing new products and, at the extreme, 
fully stop them using the IoT devices.30 Notwithstanding, the IoT industry is currently 
driven more by proprietary standards than by open standards.31 Google (Brillo and 
Weave), Samsung (SmartThings), Apple (HomeKit) and Amazon (Alexa) run their 
unilateral programs to bring out new IoT solutions,32 which seem to dominate the IoT 
landscape,33 as these market players have a great many leverages to attract user groups 
into their ecosystems. Moreover, the solutions developed by many IoT alliances e.g. 
IETF and OneM2M, often appear incompatible with each other, and this is considered 
able to create switching barriers commonly referred to as the “lock-in” problem.34 
 
30  Mehmet Bilal Unver, ‘Turning the crossroad for a connected world: reshaping the European 
prospect for the Internet of Things’ [2018] 26(2) International Journal of Law and Information 
Technology 93, 97. 
31  BEREC, Report Enabling the Internet of Things (BoR (16) 2016) 41 (‘BEREC Report’) 
<http://berec.europa.eu/eng/document_register/subject_matter/berec/reports/5755-berec-report-
on-enabling-the-internet-of-things> accessed 9 October 2020. 
32  Unver (n 29) 100. 
33  See Jat Singh and Julia Powles ‘Why the internet of things favours dominance’ (Guardian, 24 July 
2015) <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/jul/24/internet-of-things-centralisation-
dominance> accessed 9 October 2020. 
34  BEREC Report (n 31) 39. 
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Against this background, attention needs to be paid to the IoT settings, where 
interoperability is at stake, whether self-regulated e.g. governed by myriad of 
ecosystems, or exposed to the proprietary systems and accompanying problems e.g. 
lock-in, switching costs and market foreclosure. Having said that, diversity of IoT 
systems and settings hosting distinct standards and of interoperability solutions, has 
been regarded as worthy of investigation. Thereby, it is hoped that more light is shed 
on the multi-layered IoT architectures and prevalent industry settings, from which 
significant reflections could be derived. To sum it up, considering that the IoT offers 
an important medium for the interoperability gaps and regulatory challenges, which 
could lead up to generalisable findings, it has been selected as one of the two cases to 
be investigated.     
1.5. Limitations and jurisdictional choice 
As the subject-matter of the thesis is universal in a technological sense, the outcomes 
and findings would be considered as extra-territorial by nature, in particular from a 
normative perspective. Notwithstanding, the examination of the related (primary and 
secondary) resources, including the conclusive analysis of the case law, has been 
conducted on the basis of EU pillars, norms and regulations. While the case study 
research has been fulfilled following the globally acknowledged technological 
patterns, standards and facts, the analysis of the real-life situations has also been 
filtered mostly through the EU regulatory framework, particularly competition law and 
the ECRF rules. Given this fact, this could be argued as posing a limitation, in terms 
of scope and boundaries. 
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In this study, findings from the multidisciplinary doctrinal analysis serve as a stepping 
stone for the remainder of the research as could be seen through the normative 
framework drawn at the end of this study. From this point of view, EU legal framework 
enables a research ground on which the interoperability discourse would be checked and 
filtered out, considering the wider set of legal rules and principles adopted and 
implemented under EU law. Originally, many EU rules and principles are often based 
on or inspired of their US law counterparts such as some exceptional rights under IPR 
law, essential facilities doctrine under competition law, access obligations under sector-
specific regulations. EU law and institutions, while standing on this basis, forge ahead 
by enacting new rights and obligations i.e. regarding data portability, AI, which poses a 
widened legal response and measures. Furthermore, one could find more crystallised 
formulation of these rules and principles under EU law, particularly when it comes to 
competition law and sector-specific regulation. From the interoperability point of view, 
more clustered and detailed features of the EU legal system incorporating the relevant 
case law e.g. regarding refusal to supply, merger cases, offers a wider and promising 
ground on which a tripartite and comprehensive research would be done. 
Wider rules and measures potentially mean wider contours whereby ICT interoperability 
could be elaborated and investigated ending up with broadly minded evaluation of the 
gatekeeping roles and functionalities. This is particularly persuasive in view of the 
competition law and sector-specific regulations so far. For instance, in EU Microsoft 
case, the reason for finding the abuse of dominance was Microsoft’s refusal to provide 
the competitors with interoperability information, whereas the US Microsoft case was 
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not built upon such a discourse.35 By the same token, after Trinko case36 in the US, it 
became much harder to consider any denial of access to essential facilities including 
interfaces as anti-competitive or abusive, as opposed to the EU competition law wisdom 
that keeps access and interoperability obligations alive and sustainable.37 Last but not 
least, this wisdom is supported with the ECRF based rules and safeguards in the EU, 
whereas neither access remedies nor net neutrality obligations prevail in the USA. In 
fact, except with the intellectual property legislation and case law, regulation of 
interoperability has become much obscured and/or underdeveloped within the US law. 
Status quo on the US side thus makes it difficult to cultivate a research regarding ICT 
interoperability from a multi-disciplinary perspective.  
Given this fact and the fact that any proposed regulatory model needs to take account of 
the prevailing legal standards and thresholds to the most possible extent, the EU law has 
been chosen as the jurisdictional ground for research. Notwithstanding, regarding IPR 
rules and exceptions concerning interoperability, US legislation and case law has been 
referred when it is found useful to compare and contrast the justification(s) behind the 
applicable safe harbours. In particular, the US perspective to embed the competitive 
safeguards into the intellectual property legislation and case law would offer a 
comparative outlook enriching the perspective, as reflected in the Chapter 4.38 Notably, 
several doctrines i.e. fair use, merger, patent misuse, developed under the US case law 
pave the way to a favourable interpretation for enabling interoperability. On the other 
hand, in the EU law related problems are elaborated from a wider viewpoint in the sense 
 
35  United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 36 (D.D.C. 2000) at 45. See also Mark Geier, 
‘United States v. Microsoft Corp.’ [2001] 16(1) Berkeley Technology Law Journal 297, 310. 
36  Verizon Telecommunications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP 540 U.S. 398, 2004 
(‘Trinko judgement’). See infra note 459. 
37  See the section ‘5.3.1.3. Refusal to license/supply interoperability information’. 
38  See the section ‘4.2.3. Comparative analysis through the Nintendo case’. 
 
23 
that other legal disciplines i.e. competition and sector-specific laws, are mobilised and 
invoked to deal with the concerns surrounding the lack of interoperability. This provides 
a wider spectrum of laws and problem solving mechanisms, making the EU law befitting 
for a research based on multi-disciplinary analysis. 
It also needs to be underlined that the research conducted in this study does not only 
mean doctrinal (blackletter) analysis but also entails multiple case studies that aim to 
develop a more filtered understanding as to the ICT interoperability. Albeit with the 
effort to generalise case study research as well as the proposed regulatory model, 
technology-based framework depicted here would arguably pose some limitations, as 
well. This argument potentially stems from the very nature of the case study research 
in that two technological phenomena of cloud computing and the IoT are examined. 
Some limitations might be posited since these technologies are not necessarily 
representative of all ICTs and industry settings despite the rationale for them being 
selected relates to their being widely adopted, usage and direct relevance to ICT 
interoperability. 
However, this plausible limitation is highly obscured because of the universal character 
of the ICT layers and interdependencies, based on which several research outcomes are 
developed. In so doing, some concepts e.g. ecosystem, interdependency and coopetition 
are revisited, many others e.g. layering, gatekeeping are revitalised and 
reconceptualised. This model is then built up so as to apply to all the ICT networks and 
services which rely on the well-known layered Internet Protocol (IP) stack, starting with 
the bottom, infrastructural, layer to the upper, application and content layers.39 Invoking 
 
39  For the details of the layered IP stack, see the section ‘2.2.3. Architectural underpinnings of the 
internet: Layered IP Stack’. While this IP stack implies technological layers as reflected in the 
proposed layered model, the distinctive nature of the proposed model should also be noted, in the 
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the layering approach with some additional elements e.g. ‘gatekeeping’, the proposed 
regulatory model comes up with a holistic design and generalisable nature. Overall, it is 
considered that the selection of multiple cases, along with the interlinks between 
themselves and with other ICTs being highlighted and being translated into the 
regulatory model, is believed to mitigate potential arguments of limitations and secure 
the integrity of the research. 
1.6.  Structure, outline and main findings of the research 
1.6.1. Structure and outline  
The thesis commences with the conceptual framework, under which ‘interoperability’ 
and related concepts are expounded. Based on this conceptual framework, the study 
fleshes out the extent of legal regulation of interoperability, and carries on with 
multidisciplinary doctrinal analysis and case studies respectively. Built upon the 
cumulative findings and the filtered policy approach, the study ends up with the 
proposal of a regulatory model. Reflecting this, the thesis is comprised of eight 
chapters, being structured as follows: 
The first, or Introduction chapter consists of the explanation of the background, 
purpose and scope of the thesis, including the research questions, methodological 
approach, components and end goals of the research. In so doing, a brief picture is 
given regarding the doctrinal analysis based on the most featured aspects of the status 
 
sense that economic aspects of the ICT networks/services are also incorporated into this model. 
Interdependency of ICT layers is taken as the baseline to have a coherent idea of regulatory 
modelling, whereby each layer is acknowledged as a separate (and where necessary, inter-
connected) unit for regulatory obligations, in conjunction with the gatekeeping activities. In this 
regard, ‘layering’ denotes the technological layout on which the more economic concept of 
‘gatekeeping’ is taken as the key concept for ex ante regulation. 
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quo and the case study research along with the revelations from the industrial settings. 
Drawing on these, progressive steps and step-by-step findings are also explained, in 
the Introduction. 
The second and third chapters draw a general framework to clarify the fundamental 
concepts and the technological underpinnings of the study, and their interplay 
throughout the thesis. The second chapter deals with the underlying technical and 
economic concepts and their definitions, whereas the third chapter is focused on the 
regulation of interoperability in the EU legal fora.  
The second chapter starts with the definition and underpinnings of ‘interoperability’ 
and deepens with the related concepts, including open and proprietary interfaces, 
standards and network effects, and ending up with the main characteristics of ICT 
networks and the internet’s architecture e.g. technical layers. Thereunder, key market-
based and technological developments e.g. convergence and all-IP migration are also 
explained, along with their implications concerning interoperability. By this means, it 
is aimed to ensure a deeper understanding is constructed regarding the evolution of the 
ICT networks, IP-based ecosystems and technological layers. 
In this respect, particular attention is paid to ‘convergence’ which increasingly 
refashions the interoperability needs and requirements as are reflected in our everyday 
lives. It is emphasized that from micro level devices e.g. smart meters, to macro level 
e.g. next generation networks, interoperability is key to the convergence, which is 
taking place at the IP level and having an impact on all the related markets, e.g. 
telecommunications, broadcasting and information technologies (IT). Within this 
landscape, every sector still continues to be regulated with separate rules and measures, 
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although this is open to criticism and needs to be checked out from an overall ICT 
perspective. 
The subsequent (third) chapter sheds light on the relevant concerns surrounding the 
lack of interoperability and the so called gatekeeping concept, and touching base 
regarding the interoperability-oriented regulations within the EU legal system. 
Commencing with framing the identified concerns, this chapter clarifies the most 
prevalent gatekeeping problems caused by the lack of interoperability. Not only 
competition concerns e.g. vendor lock-in, switching costs and market foreclosure, but 
also techno-social concerns e.g. end-to-end connectivity, hindered innovation and 
information flows are highlighted in this context. Then the focus is shifted to how these 
problems are met and responded to by the policy makers under the distinct bodies of 
EU law. In this section, IPR rules, competition law and sector-specific rules (ECRF) 
are examined from the perspective of interoperability, at a rather introductory level. In 
addition, EU data protection rules are fleshed out, with the emphasis being on ‘data 
portability’, given the fact that this recently introduced right enables the consumers to 
port their data from one platform to another, based on the common data processing 
systems, and which is closely related to interoperability.  
The following three chapters (Chapters 4, 5 and 6) make an in-depth analysis of the 
EU rules and precedents governing ICT interoperability under the specified three legal 
regimes, namely IPR rules, competition law and the ECRF. In these chapters, whether 
and to what extent the (non-)interoperability is given a response from relevant legal 
regimes is investigated. In so doing, quite a detailed doctrinal (blackletter) analysis is 
conducted to clarify the scope and limits of each legal regime. Not only legal texts 
(hard and soft law) and case law, but also previous research and publications, including 
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journal articles, books, reports and newsletters, are reflected on, in order to deepen the 
discussion. In this regard, one chapter is dedicated to each legal regime, based on the 
respective analysis of the investigated primary and secondary resources.  
IPR rules constitute the subject-matter of Chapter 4, embracing all the related IPR 
types, namely copyrights, patents, databases and trade secrets. These IPRs are mainly 
analysed from the EU legal perspective, and where necessary with references to US 
case law and legislative measures e.g. Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). 
Copyrights, patents, trade secrets and databases are thereby investigated as to whether 
and to what extent interoperability is enabled under each IPR regime, within the EU 
framework. EU IPR rules and the applicable exceptions such as the decompilation 
right are found not to be promising in this respect, particularly for the overprotected 
interfaces that would otherwise serve opening up the ICT markets to innovative new 
entries.   
In this regard, it is concluded that not only copyrights but also other IPR types pose 
strict and insurmountable barriers to interoperability, although no IPR rule is designed 
to augment entry barriers or anti-competitive conducts. Patents, databases and trade 
secrets are designed to protect their owners from unauthorised third-party uses, and do 
not touch upon many of the highlighted concerns surrounding lack of interoperability. 
Given this fact, the role of IPRs becomes controversial, as over-protection of interfaces 
is not deterred by EU IPR rules, which are usually fragile and not supportive of follow-
on innovation e.g. not filtering out the artificial/overzealous IPR uses that hamper 
innovation. Summing up, after a detailed analysis of IPR rules at the EU level, it is 
found that such rules do not ensure guaranteed and effective access to the APIs, which 
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are key to ensuring a competitive and innovative market, and thus revealing a gap from 
the interoperability perspective.   
A comparable, even more detailed analysis has been conducted under Chapter 5, 
capturing EU competition rules. Under this chapter, it is clearly established that 
ensuring and/or advancing interoperability does not constitute an aim of EU 
competition law, but could be considered as such under certain circumstances, often 
arising out of the refusal practices which are likely to lead to market foreclosure and 
consumer harm e.g. because of the access denied interfaces. As detailed in this chapter, 
EU competition law measures provide wide-ranging tools and tests that can be applied 
to deal with the identified concerns in relation to lack of interoperability. 
After the comprehensive analysis, it is found that, unlike with the Article 101 of the 
TFEU and merger control mechanisms, implementation of Article 102 of the TFEU 
poses some uneven standards that would make it difficult for timely and effective 
intervention against the gatekeeping roles and functionalities, broadly speaking. Not 
only the criteria e.g. regarding ‘dominant position’ and the tests e.g. to control abusive 
behaviours invoked by the EU competition rules, but also the lengthy processes and 
the underlying costs e.g. regulatory and enforcement, are found to be prohibitive for 
the related parties. It is thus concluded that, although often based on the case-specific 
analysis and data; competition law exercises, particularly involving Article 102 of the 
TFEU, which aims to address ‘abuse of dominance’, would not cope with the ICT-
based interoperability challenges in a timely and effective fashion.  
The ECRF’s perspective and rules are elaborated in Chapter 6, where main 
characteristics of this regulatory framework, including the interoperability aspects, are 
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investigated. To have a deeper look through the interoperability aspects, firstly main 
pillars and the evolution of the ECRF are examined, incorporating the policy 
objectives and major regulatory tools and mechanisms. In this regard, both the 
remedies imposed on operators that have ‘significant market power’ (SMP) and those 
of a generic symmetric/horizontal nature are examined to have a broader viewpoint. 
After all, it is seen that, interoperability-specific remedies are limited and subordinated 
to the access and interconnection remedies that are designed mainly to protect 
consumer interests and to ensure market competition. 
It is also concluded that while this denotes a good ‘mix and match’ regulatory 
structure, under which are captured both competitive and other regulatory goals, 
potential gaps are discernible in view of the ever fast changing ICT markets which 
depend on increasing interdependencies. Given the IP convergence and the multi-
layered nature of ICT networks/services, the promulgated policy objectives and 
measures of the ECRF are found not to respond to the so-called interdependencies that 
characterise a holistic landscape. In fact, the fragmentation in regulatory mind-set risks 
the gatekeeping problems being fragmented and even aggravated, given the 
competition and techno-social concerns and the shortcomings of competition law 
mechanisms as well as IPR rules. 
Summing up, the doctrinal research of this study values and surfaces the finding that 
regulatory governance of ICT interoperability should subsist within a holistic policy 
approach. Following this standpoint, it is considered the multiple case studies would 
bring out some new and verifying outputs, furthering this groundwork 
multidisciplinary research towards a crystallised policy approach. It is in the case study 
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research where the ICT interdependencies are revisited through architectural analysis 
of emerging technologies, arriving to new findings, as explained below. 
1.6.2. Main findings  
After having a tentative conclusion at the end of doctrinal (blackletter) analysis, 
Chapter 7 consists of case study research, seeking to test the former findings and to 
further these findings with additional inputs based on the industrial settings. To that 
end, two distinctive but complementary fields, namely Cloud Computing and the IoT, 
have been chosen. In this regard, it is aimed to find out the industrial responses to lack 
of interoperability and accompanying concerns. Case study research is mainly led by 
the analysis of the cloud and the IoT architectures, their technological and economic 
underpinnings, including industrial processes like standardisation, which have been 
investigated to gain a fulfilling answer, as against the fragmented legal solutions 
mentioned above. 
Case studies are primarily conducted to verify the former findings gathered from the 
doctrinal analysis. However, this does not fully reflect the Chapter 7, which also aims to 
check and find out the gaps relating to ICT interoperability arising out of industrial 
practices, towards development of the ultimate regulatory model. Crucially, a 
progressive and multi-faceted research has been conducted throughout the case studies, 
revealing a set of naturally constructed research components for the overall study. This 
natural progression is also hidden within the fact that each case study has resulted in 




It is found that, despite the absence of common standards, cloud computing settings 
point to a thriving industry because of the utility type functioning, ever-faster 
enhancing cloud adoption and the surrounding ecosystems. However, the IoT settings 
demonstrate that interoperability gaps, mainly stemming from silo type proprietary 
systems, bearing noticeable risks that threaten the potential ecosystem settings. These 
distinctive findings from the case studies demonstrate that industrial settings do not 
necessarily reflect the ecosystem characteristics e.g. based on coopetition among the 
ICT stakeholders, and often require a regulatory touch, via which both ecosystem and 
non-ecosystem settings are captured. Summing up, the case studies not only verified 
the former findings and supported the plausible need for a holistic regulatory approach, 
they also helped carving out new concepts e.g. co-opetition against the layer 
interdependencies.       
Chapter 8 (Conclusion) filters the findings gathered from the previous chapters. To 
build on and also respond to them, layering theory has been analysed in conjunction 
with the established competition law and regulatory concepts e.g. market definition, 
dominance, essential facilities. While the deficiencies of the established concepts and 
regulatory patterns are derivable from the doctrinal study (see Chapters 4, 5 and 6), 
the ‘layering theory’ is featured in Chapter 8, for it fits well with both ecosystem and 
non-ecosystem settings having the potential to respond the layer interdependencies as 
well as gatekeeping activities. This stems mainly from the fact that the ‘layering’ 
concept is very conducive to architectural interdependencies, allowing both a 
holistic/integral viewpoint and individual treatment of each layer; ‘access’, 




Layering theory while implicating the finding of the regulatory layout for the intended 
model, paves the way also to find and figure out the way how the gatekeeping roles 
and functionalities are addressed. Having said that, one could find the widely 
comprehensible gatekeeping activities as addressed with an appropriate matching 
between these underlying concepts, namely the ‘layering’ and ‘gatekeeping’. At this 
point, both concepts transform into key technical terms and thrusts of the model 
characterising the normative approach to be followed. From this vantage point of view, 
the ‘gatekeeping’ concept, which has been referred at the outset of the study, is 
revitalised to embrace and respond to the interoperability-centric concerns and 
problems. Hence, this concept has been put at the centre of the proposed ‘layered 
regulatory model’, with the view to filter and sort out the related problems not strictly 
limited to, but also surrounding, the lack of interoperability. 
According to this, gatekeeping activities are accepted to exist and be captured by the 
layered model, as long as they mean an “access and interoperability restriction at the 
expense of limiting the consumer choices”. While it is proposed that such kind of 
restrictions be prohibited as the starting point or principle, the accompanying 
principles of transparency, fairness and accountability are also incorporated thereupon. 
Furthermore, a following set of remedies have also been designated, considering the 
potential failure(s) to comply with these principles. Having these instruments, the 
European Commission at the EU level and NRAs at the national level, are expected to 
firstly designate the gatekeeping activities at each layer and if necessary, at 
multiple/cross layers and intervene in them in coordination with the stakeholders. 
Thereby, it is aimed that the proposed model embraces all the IP, or broadly speaking 
ICT, layers with responsive principles and remedies that target at gatekeeping 
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activities. While the proposed model embodies a comprehensive viewpoint as to 
tackling the gatekeeping activities, interoperability lies at the centre, representing the 
core thread of the interdependent layers as well as the primary source for the related 
concerns.   
1.6.3. Contribution to knowledge 
As stated above, interoperability related concerns are dealt with from a holistic 
viewpoint in this research, which goes beyond the existing literature and research for 
they have a narrow-minded approach. Although having a lot of references to the 
previous research in the field of interoperability, this study upholds an expansive 
outlook from interoperability towards gatekeeping activities, which marks a 
remarkable distinction from the existing works. As a matter of fact, existing scholarly 
works mostly focus on the interoperability concept and seek out the possible ways as 
to how to improve interoperability within the boundaries of certain bodies of law or 
industrial solutions.  
One research strand compares and contrasts the existing legal disciplines i.e. 
competition and copyright laws, with a view to find out the best potential solutions 
from a multidisciplinary point of view.40 Here is where this study has common aspects 
with the previous literature, given the Chapters 4, 5 and 6 which respectively examine 
the EU IPR rules, competition law and ECRF, elaborating on such literature. 
Notwithstanding, this study expands the multidisciplinary research reflecting on three 
disciplines, as opposed to the existing works which mainly opt and examine two, 
 
40  Ashwin van Rooijen, The Software Interface Between Copyright and Competition Law: A Legal 
Analysis of Interoperability in Computer Programs (Kluwer Law International, Information Law 
Series, Vol. 20, 2011); Weston (n 13); Aaron K. Perzanowski, ‘Rethinking Anticircumvention’s 
Interoperability Policy’ [2009] 42 University of California Davis Law Review, 101-172. 
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mostly competition and IPR laws.41 Conceiving and considering regulation of 
interoperability ‘outside of the box’, this thesis aims to explore, expand and refashion 
the status quo, not narrowing down the research to be conducted into the existing legal 
boundaries.  
Another research strand aims to investigate the extent to what certain industry or 
industries have solved the need to interoperability within their dynamics e.g. 
collaborative actions, de jure or de facto standards.42 This group of researches often 
select an ICT industry to delve deeper into the practices of the industry stakeholders 
by which to investigate the market forces or self-regulatory measures e.g. code of 
conduct, often seeking out whether any coercive rule is needed. This thesis benefited 
also from these group of researches and the relevant literature, given the Chapter 7, 
which focuses on cloud and IoT interoperability. On the other hand, this study differs 
from these previous works by avoiding a technologically oriented approach, although 
being inspired of the technological layers and their interaction. While the ICT 
standards and protocols are discussed across this research, they do not mean the core 
activity of research in view of the scope and purpose of the case studies based on the 
cloud and IoT interoperability.  
While interacting with the given research strands, this study broadens the horizon and 
proposes a regulatory model that would widely respond to the interoperability-based 
needs and concerns. It is the concluded that, as opposed to the insufficient, partial and 
 
41  See ibid. While there are some references to ECRF under the researches of Van Rooijen and 
Weston, these references mainly aim to open a parenthesis for the ex ante approach pursued by the 
given sector-specific regulation, not delving into the ECRF. Both end up with their respective 
proposals mainly focused on the copyright legislation, which means a stark distinction comparing 
to this thesis, for being confined to the understanding of the IPR laws and doctrines.   
42  See the sections ‘7.1.3. Interoperability debate in the cloud context’ and ‘7.2.4. Interoperability 
debate in the IoT context’. 
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limited solutions derived from the EU legal framework as well as those of the industrial 
practices, a holistic and multi-layered framework needs to be embedded into the 
proposed model. Thereby, the proposed ‘layered regulatory model’ has been devised 
to have a dynamic nature and functioning for the ‘layered’ structure that is capable to 
embody and address the so called ‘gatekeeping’ activities. Commencing with a set of 
principles and leaving the corresponding remedies to the overall implementation 
process, the model opts for a bottom-up approach, instead of imposing top-down and 
form-based rules. Furthermore, involvement of all the stakeholders in the regulatory 
process is emphasized so as to filter and sort out the interoperability-based concerns 
and accompanying gatekeeping problems, which all are intended to be captured by the 
proposed model. 
Against this background, the contribution to knowledge brought by this thesis entails 
two main elements. Firstly, it is proposed that all the ICT layers and activities are 
treated in a homogenous and holistic manner through ‘layered regulatory model’ 
proposed at the end of this study. Secondly, the proposed model builds on the so called 
‘gatekeeping’ concept, which is revitalised in this study, creating a new horizon for ex 
ante regulation of ICT layers and activities. 
While the previously proposed layered models have overlapping aspects with the 
‘layered regulatory model’, the complete and adaptive nature of this newly proposed 
model should be emphasized. IP stack (layers) being embedded into this model 
represents the common aspect with the previously proposed model, as discussed in the 
last chapter (Conclusion). However, conditions for regulatory intervention under the 
newly proposed model are distinctive in the sense that the onus in this new framework 
is the gateways, or technically speaking the interfaces, being exploited to the harm of 
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consumers across the layers. From this point of view, ‘gatekeepers’ not only 
controlling the media and information flow, but also access to infrastructural, physical 
and software interfaces are captured in the definitional framework. According to the 
proposal, exploitation of the underlying controlling mechanisms, i.e. IPRs, 
technological protection measures (TPMs), AI-based algorithms for restricting 
consumer choices would mean presence of gatekeepers and point to a necessity to ex 
ante regulation. 
Within this normative framework, all the players (gatekeepers) across the layers are 
instructed not to ‘restrict access and interoperability’, should this result in limited 
consumer choices and freedom. In this vein, it is key to keep in mind that not only 
reduced consumer surplus from the competition law perspective but also the hindered 
access to informational resources needs to be taken of utmost account, since these 
cumulatively constitute the ground of gatekeeping activities. Here, the most featured 
aspect of the contribution to the knowledge surfaces whereby the interoperability is 
expanded from a technical term to a techno-social conception, as detailed in the last 
chapter. 
Flowing this spirit, it is aimed that the broadly minded interoperability concerns within 
the meaning of gatekeeping concept are diagnosed and deterred effectively. While 
further principles, e.g. transparency, non-discrimination, accountability, and 
corresponding remedies are also set out within the framework of the layered regulatory 
model, these rules do not mean direct and straightforward intervention unless contrary 
practices endure, and ecosystems that are characterised by coopetition or equivalent 
self-regulatory measures are not in place. Should the so called potentially gatekeeping 
practices do not denote any restrictive activity e.g. for the existent ecosystem 
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structures, this needs to be taken into consideration to mitigate the potential remedies, 
as per the proposed model. Having said that, although having an ex ante nature, newly 
proposed remedies are designed as circumstantial obligations to be imposed on the so-
called gatekeepers. In this context, emphasis is given to the collaboration of the 
gatekeepers with the regulators, which will determine the extent of the applicable 
obligations, alongside other factors e.g. coopetition, ecosystem and non-ecosystem 
structures. 
Summing up, it is suggested that gatekeepers operating in each layer (‘access’, 
‘middleware’, ‘application’ and ‘content’) be subject to the governing principles along 
with the potentially applicable remedies under the given circumstances. Crucially, the 
governing principles (‘prohibition of restriction of access and interoperability at the 
expense of limiting consumer choices’, ‘transparency’, ‘non-discrimination’ and 
‘accountability’) are applicable to all the ICT players, regardless of market power. 
However, the extent to what the remedies are going to be applied to the ICT players, 
specifically the ‘gatekeepers’, will be set out within the experimental and learning 
process of the model. From this point of view, the proposed model is both dynamic 
and holistic in nature.  
As elaborated in the Conclusion, the dynamic nature of the model would bring out 
some more discussion in terms of implementation of the principles and remedies. 
Considering this is inevitable and healthy for the prospect of the proposed model, 
further research is always welcome with regards to how to interpret and implement the 
‘layered regulatory model’ within the context of hidden aspects of algorithmic, 
artificial intelligence (AI) and data driven services, applications, and its implications 






2. Interoperability in the field of ICTs 
2.1. Conceptual framework of interoperability 
Interoperability is a topic directly related to ICTs and their governance. As ICTs 
expand at an ever-growing pace, interoperability has also an expanding and sometimes 
complicated nature. Below, interoperability is first examined as a core ICT concept, 
and then investigated from technical, economic and legal perspectives. In this regard, 
basic information about the related concepts, including network effects, 
standardisation and ICT networks and services, are given, along with the examination 
of the architectural thrusts of the internet and internet (IP) based convergence. 
2.1.1. Definition of interoperability 
ICTs depict a world of digitised and connected devices, systems and networks, which 
interact with each other towards the same goal of ensuring a communication and/or 
data exchange. This is ensured through using the same language adopted by the parties 
or end points. This language, taking distinct forms of bilateral cooperation and 
recognition, results in the information being sent and received by the parties and 
understood and transformed into different implementations, including voice, video and 
data streams. In many cases, this is realised by means of standards being arrived at 
after long-lasting technical processes and wider scale adoption. For instance, the world 
wide web (WWW) hosts myriad web resources e.g. text documents, images, on top of 
the internet. Both the internet and the WWW represent distinct global networks 
running over standardised protocols e.g. TCP/IP for the former and HTTP for the latter. 
In both cases, the exchange of data through the protocols is referred to and echoed in 
the “interoperability” between the end points. 
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Interoperability is defined as “[t]he ability to transfer and render useful data and other 
information across systems, applications or components”.43 Interoperability is also 
defined as “[t]he ability for two different and independent software applications to 
exchange information without loss of data, semantics or metadata”.44 Other 
definitions45 denote a similar meaning and scope, which is also reflected in the 
Software Directive (2009/24/EC) reading as follows: 
The function of a computer program is to communicate and work 
together with other components of a computer system and with users 
and, for this purpose, a logical and, where appropriate, physical 
interconnection and interaction is required to permit all elements of 
software and hardware to work with other software and hardware and 
with users in all the ways in which they are intended to function. The 
parts of the program which provide for such interconnection and 
interaction between elements of software and hardware are generally 
known as ‘interfaces’. This functional interconnection and interaction 
is generally known as ‘interoperability’; such interoperability can be 
defined as the ability to exchange information and mutually to use the 
information which has been exchanged.46 
 
43  Urs Gasser, ‘Interoperability in the digital ecosystem’ (2015) GSR15 discussion paper, 2 
<http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Conferences/GSR/Pages/GSR2015/GSR15-discussion-
paper.aspx> accessed 9 October 2020; John Palfrey and Urs Gasser, Interop: The promise and 
perils of highly interconnected systems (Basic Books 2012) 5; John Palfrey and Urs Gasser, 
‘Fostering innovation and trade in the global information society: The different facets and roles of 
interoperability’ (2011) NCCR Trade Regulation Working Paper No. 2011/39, 3, 
<https://www.wti.org/media/filer_public/f7/a7/f7a7ae35-d43a-4e82-8cef-
4ca26b7bb778/gasser_and_palfrey_final.pdf> accessed 9 October 2020.  
44  Sutor (n 3) 215.  
45  There are alternative definitions made so far, among which one refers to “[t]he capability to 
communicate, execute programs, or transfer data among various functional units in a manner that 
requires the user to have little or no knowledge of the unique characteristics of those units” 
(Samuelson (n 4) 1946-1947). For the definition introduced by the Institute of Electrical and 
Electronics Engineers (IEEE) see IEEE, Standards Glossary, 2016, <https://www.standardsuniv 
ersity.org/article/standards-glossary/> accessed 9 October 2020. 
46  Software Directive, recital 10. 
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Interoperability does not require that two systems be identical in design or 
implementation, only that they can exchange information and use the information they 
exchange.47 As a result, interoperability allows programmers to develop their software 
using the formerly accepted format and with no need for decryption or rewriting a 
similar code. Overall, interoperability, either relating to global IP-based platforms or 
to the local networks e.g. data centres, would be said to have the same functionality: 
interaction between software, often together with hardware, components of non-
homogenous systems to share and re-use information for a mutually defined 
objective.48 As this interaction takes place within and across the ICTs, ‘ICT 
interoperability’ could be acknowledged as the same as ‘interoperability’. 
Nevertheless, in the title and many parts of this study, the former is opted for rather 
than the latter, so as to emphasize the link between ‘ICT’ and ‘interoperability’.49   
Interoperability might vary from context to context,50 although the same principles 
apply in relevant cases. Word processing programs could be considered as an example 
to comprehend interoperability and the consequences of its absence. It might well be 
possible to save a document created using one word processing software package in 
 
47  Samuelson (n 4) 1947. 
48  “Interoperability” has a meaning distinct from “compatibility” and “co-operation”. Devices, 
systems and networks are considered as “interoperable” when they execute together a common 
task going beyond being compatible and cooperative. Technically, “compatibility” is a specific 
form of interoperability that represents certain choices in the development of a system. For 
example, in 2014, the EU authorities put into force a Directive (Directive 2014/53/EU of the 
European Parliament and of the Council, 2014 O. J. L. 153/62) that called for the use of a common 
standard for mobile phone chargers, which set out a narrow solution (design choice) as to the 
“compatibility of the cables that provide power to mobile devices” (Gasser (n 43) 3). 
49  From a broader viewpoint, this preference could be argued to be crucial, as a definition of 
‘interoperability’ is not standard in dictionaries. For instance, ‘interoperability’ is defined as “the 
ability of computer systems or software to exchange and make use of information” by the Oxford 
Dictionaries (See Oxford Dictionaries <https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/interop 
erability> accessed 9 October 2020, whereas Cambridge Dictionary defines it as “the degree to 
which two products, programs, etc. can be used together, or the quality of being able to be used 
together” (Cambridge Dictionary <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/inte 
roperability> accessed 9 October 2020). 
50  See Sara Gabriella Hoffman, Regulation of Cloud Services under US and EU Antitrust, 
Competition and Privacy Laws (PL Academic Research 2017) 129. 
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another file format and to use this file with different software, but one might lose some 
or all of the text formatting in the case that the word processing programs are not 
interoperable.51 The same logic and principles apply to the online music industry,52 
which has so far been fraught with a variety of encryption methods such as digital 
rights management (DRM)53 techniques. Aiming at protecting the native users from 
unauthorised access, DRM tools might go beyond this, creating a barrier for 
interoperability and the development of digital music content. All these examples show 
that interoperability between the competing platforms e.g. music distribution channels 
and software e.g. word processing programmes etc. is not granted at all, but needs to 
be achieved via the collaboration between the parties. 
Achievement of interoperability would stimulate new entries to the relevant market, 
reducing the up-front costs for investment and switching costs. This means more 
competition in the relevant markets. The current evolution and state of the mass 
computer market illustrates interoperability’s pivotal role in ensuring market 
competition between all of the actors involved.54 Going through a long-lasting journey, 
the computer industry emanated from the monolithic systems e.g. mainframe computers 
of earlier decades and reaches to today’s modular systems consisting of heterogeneous 
components e.g. memories, monitors and hard drivers, created by different 
manufacturers. In the 1970s, once a company purchased a computer system, the 
company was essentially “locked in” to that system, as the system was not compatible 
 
51  Palfrey and Gasser (n 43) 2011 4. 
52  Palfrey and Gasser (n 43) 2011 4. 
53  DRM means “[a] bundle of software, services and technologies that confine use of digital content 
to authorised consumers, and manages consequences of that use throughout the entire life cycle of 
the digital content” (Carlisle George and Navin Chandak, ‘Issues and Challenges in Securing 
Interoperability of DRM Systems in the Digital Music Market’ [2006] 20(3) International Review 
of Law Computers & Technology 271, 272). 
54  Simone Aliprandi ‘Interoperability and Open Standards: The Key to True Openness and 
Innovation’ [2015] 3(1) International Free and Open Source Software Law Review 5, 5-6. 
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with the products manufactured by other companies and the conversion costs were 
high.55 Although ‘lock-in’ was extremely profitable for dominant vendors, such as IBM, 
its competitors and users suffered from high prices, indifferent service, limited choice 
and slow innovation.56 Under various tensions related to such experiences and with huge 
increases in software development and an accompanying demand, the IT industry was 
driven by dramatic changes toward more interoperable solutions. 
From this point of view, interoperability serves as a key driver for the development of 
the ICT industry, going beyond what is understood from its basic definition. It is 
noteworthy that know-how aggregation and specialisation in wide-ranging ICT areas 
are being transformed into useful and innovative products through interoperability. 
Today, interoperable hardware and software products manufactured by different 
vendors are configured to speak to each other, resulting in far-reaching implications 
from a self-feeding loop of innovation. Given these consequences, interoperability is 
widely seen as the life blood of the ICT industry,57 as well as considered to promote 
socially desirable goals, such as fostering competition and innovation, enhancing 
consumer satisfaction and promoting economic growth.58 From a broader perspective, 
adverse consequences in the absence of interoperability towards information flows and 
ultimately cultural production and participatory democracy need to be added as follow-
on challenges.59 
 
55  Jonathan Band and Masanobu Katoh, Interfaces on Trial 2.0 (The MIT Press 2011) 1. 
56  Ibid. 
57  Ian Walden, ‘Open Source as Philosophy, Methodology, and Commerce: Using Law with 
Attitude’ in Noam Shemtov and Ian Walden (edbs), Free and Open Source Software (OUP 2013) 
32. 
58  Samuelson (n 4) 1943-1944. 
59      See the section ‘3.1.2. Main concerns surrounding lack of interoperability’. 
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2.1.2. Underlying elements of interoperability 
Interoperability builds on common, or mutually acknowledged, protocols, interfaces 
and standards, being used across from telecommunications networks to the everyday 
used IoT devices e.g. smart TVs and thermostats. ICT systems’ ability to read each 
other’s data formats and structures (syntactical interoperability) and understand them 
(semantic interoperability) as well as being connected to each other technically defines 
their interoperability. In order to secure interoperability, as often achieved via 
standards, the data formats and structures which underlie the functionalities of an ICT 
system must be available to other ICT system(s), and, they need to understand each 
other to fulfil a common task. 
Interoperability can occur when the maker of one ICT system develops ‘interfaces’ 
that enable the exchange of data between the entity it is developing and the entities 
with which its entity will interact.60 The interfaces used to ensure interoperability 
among ICT systems are called “application programming interfaces” (APIs), which 
represent a software package running over pre-defined protocols.61 While there are 
some other types of interfaces e.g. user interfaces,62 interoperability is achieved 
through “APIs”, which reveal wide-ranging examples of usage in a very extensive area 
e.g. from computer software to next generation networks (NGNs). For instance, the 
APIs of the popular image-editing program Adobe Photoshop enable third parties to 
 
60  Samuelson (n 4) 1947. 
61  ICT interfaces (or APIs) could be considered as the informational equivalents of the standard plug 
and socket designs that designers of electric appliances must use in order for their appliances to 
successfully interoperate with the electric grid (Samuelson (n 4) 1947). 
62  Nicolo Zingales, ‘Of Coffee Pods, Videogames, and Missed Interoperability: Reflections for EU 
Governance of the Internet of Things’, (2016) TILEC Discussion Paper (DP 2015-026), 7; Van 
Rooijen (n 40) 14. 
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create image effect filters that can be used within Photoshop, and the open source web 
browser Mozilla Firefox enables others to create plug-ins through its APIs.63 
APIs thus function as gateways of the software, or computer, programs. Yet APIs may 
not be “open” to third parties, such as the widely used archive file format called RAR 
which is built upon closed interfaces. On the other hand, accessing APIs is not 
imperative for the third parties to achieve interoperability, so long as underlying 
protocols and the data formats are disclosed with this purpose.64 
Instead of opening APIs, using standardised or mutually agreed protocols is often an 
effective means to secure interoperability. A protocol defines the format and the order 
of messages exchanged between two or more communicating entities, as well as the 
actions taken on the transmission and/or receipt of a message or other event.65 
Adoption of common protocols would enable interoperability being ensured among 
the parties with no further effort concerning conversion, decryption, etc. Alternatively, 
through a common data format, it is possible to achieve interoperability in the sense 
that even though applications may be written in different languages, they would have 
the same data structure and could be understood on the part of the developers.66 
Alternative ways could be used to achieve interoperability in order to enable that the 
machine-readable “object code” of the underlying software are decoded. Notably, 
programmers can generally design the internal structure of programs to implement 
interfaces and encode those designs in human readable “source code” in many different 
 
63  Van Rooijen (n 40) 14. 
64  See Bain (n 3) 161; Sutor (n 3) 215. 
65  Hilde Marita Oen, ‘Interoperability at the Application Layer in the Internet of Things’ (MSc 
Thesis, Norwegian University of Science and Technology 2015), 11. 
66  Ibid, 42. 
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ways.67 To reach out to the source codes, access seekers would attempt to reverse 
engineer the usually disclosed object codes that conceal the internal design of the 
underlying software. This, however, is a very costly and time-consuming method to 
achieve interoperability, as detailed below. 
2.1.3. Open and proprietary systems 
ICT interoperability stretches along a spectrum, along which different business 
strategies are developed. At one end of this spectrum exists entirely closed systems that 
reveal no APIs, whereas the other end of the spectrum is represented by the systems that 
expose all details of their internal design, such as in case of open source software 
(OSS).68 While Apple’s iTunes platform, which features digital music and video content 
that is exclusively open to iPod, iPad and iPhone customers represents the former, 
Google’s Android-based platforms e.g. Google Chrome, Google Play and Google Maps 
are open to everyone, either an Android user or not, and exemplifies the latter.  
From this point of view, codes that underlie the software programs could be either 
‘open’ or ‘closed’, depending on what policy a software developer adopts as to 
accessibility (openness) of the source codes to third parties. In the case that the 
underlying source codes are protected with no controlling software or application, this 
is depicted by OSS, including open APIs. Control over the interfaces is realised mostly 
through IPRs, consisting of copyrights, patents and trade secrets, with the view to 
encapsulate the kernels, the internal design of the software and to close it off against 
third party access. This situation is referred to as “proprietary” software, or business 
models vis-à-vis the “non-proprietary” ones. While these two distinctions, ‘open – 
 
67  Samuelson (n 4) 1948. 
68  Samuelson (n 4) 1952. 
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closed’ and ‘proprietary – non-proprietary’, are not fully overlapping, in many cases 
the OSS represents ‘non-proprietary’ software, just like the ‘proprietary’ software is 
often manifested in the closed systems.69 Notwithstanding, neither ‘non-proprietary’ 
nor ‘open’ software products/systems are necessarily free of charge for third-party 
access seekers e.g. licensees.  
As mentioned above, IPRs are the basic and most effective means to protect the 
software against third-party usage. In addition to the IPR protection, sometimes a TPM 
is put in place by the IPR owner to restrict third party accesses.70 TPMs, whose primary 
objective is to protect digital copyrighted materials, could be exemplified by DRMs. 
For example, copy protected CDs typically have DRM-based proprietary systems to 
ensure that the discs can be played only on record label specific software players. The 
use of TPMs/DRMs serves to ‘lock’ users into a particular software, and results in 
users’ devices being restricted to certain platforms e.g. such as the iTunes store being 
limited to iPod/iPhone/iPad users. This may bring about limited functionality of e.g. 
handset devices via their original design, leaving users much less able to use their 
devices as they may wish.71 In order to jailbreak these devices, however, and to load 
on an alternative OS and/or access to an alternative app store, certain TPMs need to be 
circumvented.72 In most cases, bypassing a TPM/DRM is legally considered as an 
 
69  It should also be noted that copyrights, and sometimes patents, come up with the codes written by 
the developers which usually have a licensing policy. Open source licences are common on various 
ways, e.g. freely (FOSS), permissive, reciprocal, which manifest a wide range of licensing policies 
run by the software community. For detailed information regarding the interplay between software 
OSS and licencing approaches see Ross Gardler, ‘Open Source and Governance’ in Noam 
Shemtov and Ian Walden (eds), Free and Open Source Software (OUP 2013) 37-68. 
70  The legal definition of a TPM is given under Article 6(3) of Directive 2001/29/EC [Directive (EC) 
2001/29 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information 
society [2001] L167/10 (‘InfoSoc Directive’) art 6(3)]. This Directive basically states that a TPM 
is any technology (software or hardware) which restricts access to a copyrighted material without 
the consent of the copyright holder. 
71  Daly (n 23) 95. 
72  Daly (n 23) 94. 
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individual offence in addition to any IPR infringement that could be potentially 
claimed.73  
The OSS movement, which favours open production processes, marks a contrast with 
proprietary business models, resulting in an inescapable correlation between 
‘interoperability’ and ‘openness’. The OSS developers’ policy is based on distribution 
of the software in source codes, aiming at an environment whereby reverse engineering 
is obviated and further applications and services are built on the original software 
easily. Moreover, open source developers employ license agreements that not only 
permit the creation of derivative works e.g. via Berkeley Software Distribution (BSD) 
licences, but also typically require the licensee to distribute the modified programs to 
the public only in source code e.g. via General Public License (GPL).74 
Open interfaces are brought to the life via open source movements and open 
standardisation.75 Standards developed primarily by the ICT industry through open 
processes such as USB interconnections, Ethernet, XML and Wireless LAN 
technologies, are designed to have open interfaces.76 Most successful open interfaces 
are developed out of neo-traditional standard setting organisations (SSOs) that 
 
73  Notably, Article 6(2) of the Directive 2001/29/EC (Infosoc Directive) bans the manufacture, 
import, distribution, sale, rental and advertisement of TPM-protected technologies, devices or 
components, which “(a) are promoted, advertised or marketed for the purpose of circumvention 
of, or (b) have only a limited commercially significant purpose or use other than to circumvent, or 
(c) are primarily designed, produced, adapted or performed for the purpose of enabling or 
facilitating the circumvention”.  
74  Nicos L. Tsilas, ‘Open Innovation and Interoperability’ in L. DeNardis (eds), Opening Standards: 
The Global Politics of Interoperability (The MIT Press 2011) 109. See also Band and Katoh (n 
55), 183-184. 
75  For more information regarding standardisation, open standards and their implications for 
interoperability see the section ‘2.1.4. Standardisation’.  
76  See Jay P. Kesan, ‘Open Standards’ (2018) University of Illinois College of Law Legal Studies 
Research Paper No. 18-38, 5-7. <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3260138> accessed 9 October 2020. 
See also Comptia, European Interoperability Framework: ICT Industry Recommendations, (White 
Paper, 2004) 14, <http://www.urenio.org/e-innovation/stratinc/files/library/ict/15.ICT_standards. 
pdf> accessed 9 October 2020. 
 
49 
distance themselves from bureaucratic procedures. With such processes ending up in 
open software and interfaces, IPRs are pooled into a more dynamic process to enable 
interoperability and follow-on innovation. While a positive correlation between the 
interoperability and follow-on innovation is remarkable based on the standards, 
counter arguments could be raised should the standards be determined in a very 
deterministic and restrictive manner. Likewise, closed and proprietary systems, albeit 
with limited interoperability, could stimulate innovation alongside the OSS based 
standards and/or protocols.77      
2.1.4. Standardisation 
ICT interoperability is intrinsically coupled with the standardisation. It is common for 
the companies that generate revenue from consulting and integration of services to 
promote standards as an important way of accomplishing interoperability, to create 
standards’ initiatives that target a competitor’s existing product in an effort to 
commoditize it and then to lobby governments to mandate that newly developed 
standard.78 Although a standard could be mentioned theoretically, even in the case that 
two firms agree on a format or protocol; standardisation is a multi-party, cooperative 
and continuous or dynamic) process in its ideal manifestation. 
From this point of view, standardisation ideally takes place when the stakeholders are 
involved in a learning, sharing and production process, whereby every participant’s 
IPRs are disclosed under fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms in 
order to create a technology or product that enables interoperability.79 By standardising 
 
77  See Van Rooijen (n 40) 31-37. 
78  Tsilas (n 74) 108. 
79  Unver (n 30) 98. 
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competitors’ products and creating multiple standards, whose IPRs are often licensed 
on royalty-free terms and which are implemented in OSS, new value is provided to the 
customer.80  
In ICT standards, succeeding technologies and platforms grow upon basic sets of 
standards, which are created either through the SSOs or led by the market forces, which 
denote de jure and de facto standards respectively. Usually de facto standards are 
conferred in a situation of natural monopoly, arising out of the market conditions that 
are initially competitive amongst different technologies, with agreement among 
producers on the standard technology arriving without a formal process.81 In the case 
of de jure standards, a natural monopoly on technology is agreed upon by a body that 
may be an association and which is perhaps, but not necessarily, with a public interest 
mandate, of some combination of technology users and suppliers.82 While de jure 
standards are truly represented by telecom standards such as ISDN, GSM, LTE; 
Windows OS, JavaScript, the QWERTY keyboard and HTTP illustrate de facto 
standards. Mass customer demands and the accompanying spillover effects over the 
complementary products make the dynamic ICT industries more prone than other 
industries to de facto standards. 
Another categorisation could be done according to whether standards are “open” or 
“proprietary”. A proprietary standard exists when the functionality of a technology is 
controlled by a single entity, or by a private, small group of cooperating entities, and 
 
80  Tsilas (n 74) 108. 
81  Rishab Ghosh, ‘An Economic Basis for Open Standards’ in Laura DeNardis (ed.), Opening 
Standards: The Global Politics of Interoperability (The MIT Press 2011) 78. 
82  Ibid. Bodies with some level of formal process for defining such standards include, but are not 
limited to, the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), the European Telecommunications 
Standards Institute (ETSI), the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), the World 
Wide Web Consortium (W3C), and the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). 
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the rights to the specific technology are available only to the rights holder(s). 
Proprietary does not necessarily mean “closed”; it mostly indicates that a quicker and 
an internalised process is used to develop the standard.83 We see that these types of 
technologies, like Windows OS, become a de facto standard as they are widely used 
after being created. Notwithstanding, de facto or proprietary standards, for the popular 
and mass demand stemming from the developer/user side, could undergo an openness 
process before the industry SSOs.84    
On the other hand, open standards from the beginning develop in an environment 
where no underlying technology dominates the adoption process, such as in the 
creation of the Extensible Markup Language (XML), a specification developed by the 
WWW Consortium. Open standards emerge when the situation of natural monopoly 
on the technology is accompanied by full competition in the market for products and 
services based on the technology, with no a priori advantage based on the ownership 
of the rights for the rights holder.85 This occurs when access to the technology is 
available to all potential economic actors on equal terms, providing no advantages for 
the rights holders.86 For these reasons, open standards give users certain flexibility, 
agility and diversity to develop derivative products. 
 
83  Jim Markwith, ‘Key intellectual property issues in acquisitions involving open source software’ 
[2008] Computer and Telecommunications Law Review 45, 47. 
84  See ibid, reading; “[I]n fact, proprietary standards can be instrumental in achieving interoperability 
in various situations. They can also evolve into open standards. For example, pursuit of a 
proprietary standard by a group of companies may make the most sense under certain 
circumstances because the standard can be developed and adopted more quickly than in the open 
standards process and because only a few organizations will rely on the standard to achieve 
interoperability. Later, if that proprietary standard becomes more well known and implemented by 
other organisations under reasonable licensing terms, it may rise to the status of a de facto industry 
standard. At such point, it may also be contributed to by an open standard organisation, such as 
the ITU, ISO, IEEE, ECMA, or ETSI, for formal adoption as an open standard in order to achieve 
even wider acceptance and implementation. Two examples of this are: (1) the Open XML File 
Formats, which were developed by Microsoft, later adopted as an open standard by ECMA 
(ECMA-376), and (2) PDF, which was developed by Adobe, became a very popular proprietary 
standard, and has been adopted as an open standard by ISO”.  
85  Ghosh (n 81) 79-80. 
86  Ghosh (n 81) 79-80. 
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There are many definitions of “open standards” made by different entities. Among 
them, the definition of the European Interoperability Framework (EIF), adopted by the 
European Commission (Commission), could be given as a prominent example which 
enlists the following criteria for a standard to be considered as “open”:87 
- The standard is adopted and will be maintained by a not-for-profit organisation, 
and its ongoing development occurs on the basis of an open decision-making 
procedure available to all interested parties, in a consensus or majority decision 
etc. 
- The standard has been published and the standard specification document is 
available either freely or at a nominal charge. It must be permissible to all to 
copy, distribute and use it for no fee, or at a nominal fee. 
- The intellectual property - i.e. patents possibly present - of (parts of) the 
standard is made irrevocably available on a royalty free basis.  
Although open standards are defined and championed by many as being freely used 
and distributed, many SSOs that develop ‘open’ standards, including the ETSI, IEEF, 
IETF, ISO/IEC, ITU, OMA, ANSI and ECMA, do not mandate IPR-free standards or 
royalty-free IPR licensing.88 Many industry-wide open standards are being 
implemented through FRAND licensing. This might be deemed to create a balance in 
order to establish and drive market competition between IPR owners and 
implementers. It is argued that, by mandating royalty-free licensing and unfettered 
sublicensing and by prohibiting other reasonable licensing terms, royalty-free 
 
87  European Commission, European interoperability framework for pan-European eGovernment 
services (Version 1.0) 2004, 9. Rearding other definitions of “open standards”, see Kesan (n 76) 
2-15; Tsilas (n 74). 
88  Kesan (n 76) 4; Tsilas (n 74) 112. See also Aliprandi (n 54) 17-20. 
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standardisation would likely deter IPR holders from participating in and contributing 
to the standards development process.89        
From this vantage point of view, it is note-worthy that the standardisation process is 
not entirely immune from anti-competitive concerns. In fact, there sometimes arises 
risk of collusion e.g. companies using the SSO to facilitate price fixing, as well as risk 
of exclusion e.g. companies using the SSO to freeze out a competitor, whilst adopting 
a standard.90 In order to eliminate such risks, the SSOs often apply a number of 
safeguards including mandating the participants in the standardisation process to 
disclose their IPRs, which are essential to the standard setting, and to commit to license 
such essential IPRs under FRAND terms. However, this does not necessarily reflect 
the situation for all the SSOs. Moreover, the SSOs do not impose an obligation on IPR 
owners to conduct a search for, or guarantee the disclosure of all IPRs they own that 
may be essential to a given standard.91 Last but not least, while the EU competition 
rules, Article 101 and 102 of the TFEU, have a mitigative effect, it would be far-
fetched to assume anti-competitive risks being dissipated at all in SSO processes.92  
 
89  Tsilas (n 74) 112. According to Tsilas, this would, first, deprive such standards of the best 
technological solutions and secondly, would allow the key IPR holders (who would not be subject 
to the organisation’s IPR policies) either to refuse to license their essential technology, or to 
impose unreasonable terms and conditions on implementers of the standard (Tsilas (n 74) 112). 
90  Erica S. Mintzer and Logan M. Breed, ‘How to Keep the Fox Out of the Henhouse: 
Monopolization in the Context of Standards-Setting Organizations’ [2007] 19(9) Intellectual 
Property & Technology Law Journal 5, 5. 
91  Damien Geradin and Anne Layne-Farrar, ‘The Logic and Limits of Ex ante Competition in a 
Standards Setting Environment’ [2007] 3(1) Competition Policy International 78, 85; Damien 
Geradin and Miguel Rato ‘Can Standards-Setting Lead to Exploitative Abuse? A Dissonant View 
on Patent Hold-up, Royalty-Stacking and the Meaning of FRAND’ [2007] 3(1) European 
Competition Journal 101, 110-111. 
92  See Unver (n 30) 98-99. For discussion of the abusive conducts arising out of the formal standards 
setting processes and their implications, see Geradin and Layne-Farrar (n 91) 79-106; Piotr 
Staniszewski, ‘The interplay between IP rights and competition law in the context of 
standardization’, [2007] 2(10) Journal of Intellectual Property Law and Practice, 666-681; Adam 
Biegel, Rod Ganske and Jon Jurgovan, ‘Broadened Antitrust Liability for Abusing Standards-
Setting Process’  [2006] 18(12) Intellectual Property & Technology Law Journal, 4-6. See also the 
section ‘5.2. Article 101 TFEU’. 
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2.1.5. Network effects 
As could be derived from the framework above, both standards and IPRs are important 
tools for innovation and competition, and their intrinsic values vary for each market. 
They can serve for a market being built up or expanded, with substitutable products 
surrounding the created standard. While their purposes and functionalities differ from 
each other,93 both are covered by the term “network effects”. ICT platforms reveal 
network effects, which entail directly or indirectly enhanced benefits for the prevailing 
and prospective users on the same network platform.94 In the case of 
telecommunications services e.g. voice telephony, adding new customers to a network 
increases the surplus of other subscribers who are able to call and be called by the new 
customers and therefore affects customers’ demands.95 When IT or software markets 
e.g. social networking sites are considered, similar findings could be reached. For 
example, Facebook now has more subscribers by far than any other social networking 
site and is valuable to its users precisely because so many of their friends and 
acquaintances are on it.96 
The network effects described above are represented by direct network effects, when 
consumer utility directly depends on the market size, independently of charging 
method. There also exist indirect network effects, which are generated indirectly 
 
93  See N. Pires de Carvalho, ‘Technical Standards, Intellectual Property and Competition - An 
Holistic View’ [2015] 47 Washington University Journal Law & Policy 61, 65, reading; 
“[p]aradoxically, intellectual property is the product of market regulation - in the sense that the 
acquisition, use and loss of rights are established by law - for the sake of market freedom, whereas, 
by a vivid contrast, standardization is the product of market regulation that to a large extent curtails 
rivalry in invention and in offering competing products and services to consumers”. 
94  Martin Peitz and Tommaso Valletti, ‘Reassessing competition concerns in electronic 
communications markets’ [2015] 39 Telecommunications Policy 896, 898. 
95  Jong-Hee Hahn, ‘Nonlinear Pricing of Telecommunications with Call and Network Externalities’ 
(2002) 2 <http://www.krannert.purdue.edu/centers/ijio/Accepted/1720.pdf> accessed 9 October 
2020. 
96  Jonathan E. Nuechterlein and Philip J. Weiser, Digital Crossroads: Telecommunications Law and 
Policy in the Internet Age (2nd edn, The MIT Press 2013) 7. 
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through market mechanisms such as economies of scale, scope and density. In 
industries that display strong initial direct network effects, a critical mass of users is 
needed for users to receive sufficient value from the use of products, such as the 
telephone, fax machine or social networking services.97 In industries that display 
strong indirect network effects, a critical mass of complementary products e.g. 
hardware and software are needed for users to receive sufficient value from the use of 
computers, video games, or video or music players.98 
A remarkable level of interdependence among the ICT players is a result of the 
industry-level network effects, as depicted in the ‘interconnection agreements’99 
signed between the telecom operators. Central to interconnection agreements is the 
fact that interconnecting networks yield positive network externalities in which the 
value of the network to each customer increases as the number of customers 
increases.100 Therefore, the total value of a customer joining the network depends on 
not only the private benefits but also the external benefits of being able to send and 
receive call(s) from any other parties within the network.101 An operator lacking an 
interconnection with other operators would be able to just serve its own subscribers 
 
97  Jeffrey L. Funk ‘Standards, critical mass, and the formation of complex industries: A case study 
of the mobile Internet’ [2011] 28(4) Journal of Engineering and Technology Management 232, 
232. 
98   Ibid. 
99  “Interconnection” can be defined as the commercial and technical arrangements under which 
service providers can connect their equipment, network and services, to enable their customers to 
have access to the customers, services and networks of other service providers. When operators 
agree in order to provide interconnection between their networks, this agreement is called an 
‘interconnection agreement’, an agreement that stipulates the rights and obligations of each 
contracting party with regards to interconnection (See Colin Blackman and Lara Srivastava, 
Telecommunications Regulation Handbook (10th Anniversary edn, International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development / World Bank, Infodev and ITU, 2011) 123-125 
<https://www.itu.int/pub/D-PREF-TRH.1-2011> accessed 9 October 2020. See also the section 
‘6.2.1.1. Interconnection’. 
100  Mehmet Bilal Unver, ‘Essential Facilities Doctrine under EC Competition Law and Particular 
Implications of the Doctrine for Telecommunications Sectors in EU and Turkey’ (MS Thesis, 
Middle East Technical University 2004), 68. 
101  Ibid. 
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and lose consumers who would opt larger networks which are interconnected with 
others and thus benefit from network effects, via outgoing and incoming traffic. Hence, 
interconnection between telecommunications networks serves to externalise network 
effects from the operator-level to the industry-level, along with the corelated consumer 
surplus.   
As a result of (extended) network effects, a self-perpetuating innovation could be 
mentioned on the part of the dominant platform or network owner as this would 
influence both preferences and predictions of the related parties e.g. end-users, 
software designers. This self-reinforcing process is echoed with market tipping as well 
as representing the technological lock-in. Eventually, one network or platform 
amongst a number of competitors could win the race for the vast majority of 
consumers, even though the winning product may not be superior to its rivals.102 In 
such a situation, as new and innovative technologies might not be optimally 
disseminated, there is a risk of welfare losses because of the selection of the inferior 
technology by the users.103 
Dissemination of a network product might depend on various causes that are 
conducive to the process of open innovation and its constitutive elements. Successful 
 
102  IPRs in interface information that belong to dominant companies can be used to prevent the 
emergence of superior technology which is not compliant with the de facto industry standard 
(Weston (n 13) 46). 
103  Van Rooijen (n 40) 28. In network industries, existing direct and indirect externalities, when 
equipped with other predatory actions i.e. degradation of interoperability, often cause market tipping 
towards the dominant product and make other products excluded from the market. Commission’s 
findings concerning Microsoft’s refusal to supply interface information related to Windows OS 
illustrates this. In that case, by denying compatibility to Solaris (Sun’s operating system), Microsoft 
was not only maintaining the market position of its work group server software but also protecting 
itself from any threat that would emerge out of (horizontal) competition in that market (Maria J. Gil-
Moltó, ‘Economic Aspects of the Microsoft Case: Networks, Interoperability and Competition’ 
(2008) University of Leicester, Working Paper No. 08/39, 13 




development and take-up processes might first benefit from a level of 
interoperability, which steers the users into a proprietary ecosystem based on the 
network effects.104 On the other hand, the emergent network effects could find a way 
to carve industry-level standards and products in time.105 
From a broader point of view, open innovation and open standards would drive 
stakeholders towards a comparable result of achievement of network effects, such as 
in a great many OSS and open business models i.e. based on Google’s Android OS. 
Linux could be given as an example for an OSS that creates network effects extending 
to secondary markets. In fact, any organisation or individual can use Linux (demand-
side) and offer Linux-compatible software application (supply-side). Any party can 
bundle the Linux OS, subject to the rules of the open source community that maintains 
the OS kernel.106 Promoting Linux and other OSS, IBM mostly pursues a policy of 
industry-level network effects, e.g. by transferring the IPRs regarding its Eclipse 
software development tools, to an independent foundation based on the open source 
community.107    
 
104  This strategy was perfectly pursued by Microsoft following the launch of its Windows-based OS, 
which ultimately gained a prominent reach by means of compatible software and applications. The 
network externality benefits of using Windows and Windows-compatible software, which gained 
an early advantage in installed base and availability of complementary goods, enabled the platform 
to lock several would-be contenders, such as Geoworks and Next, completely out of the market 
(Melissa A. Schilling, ‘Protecting or diffusing a technology platform: tradeoffs in appropriability, 
network externalities, and architectural control’ in Annabelle Gawer, (ed.), Platforms, Markets 
and Innovation (Edward Elgar 2009) 196.     
105  See supra note 84. 
106  Thomas R. Eisemann, ‘Geoffrey Parker and Marshall Van Alstyne, Opening platforms: how, when 
and why?’ in Annabelle Gawer (eds), Platforms, Markets and Innovation (Edward Elgar 2009) 
132. 
107  See ibid, 143. 
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2.2. Main characteristics and evolution of ICT networks  
2.2.1. Architectural underpinnings of the internet: Layered IP Stack 
Architectural and functional underpinnings of the internet have a crucial role for the 
operation of ICT networks and services. Basically, the internet aims to provide 
universal communication services to applications running on the hosts attached to 
distinct but interconnected networks.108 Having said that, the internet’s architectural 
design reveals a unique set of principles e.g. packet-switching,109 by which global IP 
connectivity is ensured and consisting of the governing protocols across the 
technological (software) layers. The lack of a hierarchy behind the internet, coupled 
with a layer-based and modular structure, ensures permission-less and limitless 
innovations induced by the layered IP stack. 
The internet is standardised by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF).110 The 
internet, based on the standardised TCP/IP stack, or simply saying IP stack, relies on a 
unique ‘protocol layering’. “TCP/IP”, started in the early 1970s to serve as the main 
protocol stack (suite) used in the global internet and it was afterwards in 1978 that it 
split into two main protocols, the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and the Internet 
 
108  Barbara van Schewick, ‘Internet Architecture and Innovation’ (The MIT Press 2012) 83.   
109  Ian Walden ‘Access and Interconnection’ in Ian Walden (eds) Telecommunications Law and 
Regulation (4th edn, OUP 2012), 400. How the internet works through packet-switching between 
two hosts is explained by Yoo as follows: 
In the typical Internet transaction, a process generates a message and transfers it to 
the OS running on the host. The OS divides the message into packets configured for 
the Internet and hands them off to the first-hop router of a communications network. 
The sending communications network will convey these packets to the receiving 
communications network, which in turn passes them to the receiving host’s 
operating system. The OS then passes them to the process running on the receiving 
host. (Christopher Yoo, ‘Protocol Layering and Internet Policy’ [2013] 161 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1707, 1719). 
The technological process commencing with the circuit-switched networks ending up with 
(packet-swictched) NGNs is explained in the section ‘2.2.3. Transition from legacy networks to 
NGNs’. 
110  Toni Janevski, NGN Architectures, Protocols and Services (John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 2014) 29.   
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Protocol (IP). The “TCP” part of the TCP/IP stack governs the assembly and reassembly 
of the data at each end, including checking for errors such as missing data, whereas the 
“IP” part is responsible for routing data from one node to another.111 These elements of 
the internet enable a computer in one corner of the world to find a different computer in 
another corner of the world and exchange information that can be understood by the 
applications software loaded onto the computers at each end of the transmission.112 
To provide universal communication services across distinct, interconnected 
networks, the internet’s architecture partitions network functionality into certain 
layers, with one or more protocols implementing the functionality assigned to each 
layer.113 This, being expressed by the term ‘protocol layering’, underlines the logic 
and principles governing the internet. TCP/IP, representing the most acknowledged 
protocol suite, is based on a four-layer stack (suite) adopted by the IETF. Not only this 
but also other protocol suites have been developed through the scientific collaboration 
and standardisation efforts so far. 
In this study, TCP/IP is referred to as the main protocol stack (suite) as it is far more 
used for transmitting data packets through the internet, when compared to other 
protocols.114 For various reasons, e.g. global network effects, the challenges from 
proprietary protocols, TCP/IP works and is now the de facto standard for open 
 
111  Nuechterlein and Weiser (n 96) 167. 
112  Ibid, 165. One end host (computer) might be a powerful server running on the UNIX OS, and the 
other might be a Windows-based PC, or an iPad running iOS, or an Android smartphone. The 
critical point is that all “computers” connected to the internet speak the same IP-based logical-
layer language (Ibid, 165-166). 
113  Van Schewick (n 108) 84. 
114  The ‘layered regulatory model’ proposed at the end of the study builds upon a layering structure, 
if not a protocol layering one can figure out purely in a technical sense. Notwithstanding, the 
proposed model by and large reflects on this TCI/IP protocol suite, along with some modifications. 
With regard to further details, see the section ‘8.4.1. Main features of the model’. 
 
60 
systems.115 Although the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) Model was in use at the 
same time after being developed by the International Organization for Standardization 
(ISO), TCP/IP became more widespread, enabling multi-vendor interoperability.116 
The OSI Reference Model consists of seven specific layers to describe networked 
systems, including three upper layers (application, presentation, session) 
corresponding to the application layer of the IETF’s TCI/IP suite. Seemingly, for the 
lack of software supporting the model, OSI has not achieved a widespread adoption 
unlike with its first rival, TCI/IP.117 There are key principles for TCP/IP layering that 
are also crucial to understand the ICT interoperability, as reflected below. 
To implement the partitioned services or roles of the internet, each layer uses the 
services provided by the layer below. As widely acknowledged, the lowest layer is 
called the physical layer, denoting the bottom layer,118 although it is not covered by 
the original TCP/IP stack. The TCP/IP stack contains the sequentially structured four 
layers: data link layer, network (Internet) layer, transport layer and the application 
 
115   [T]he dominance of TCP/IP over proprietary suites such as DECNET and SNA/APPN can be 
largely explained by: (1) the increasing rejection of manufacturer-dominated, that is, proprietary, 
standards; (2) the increasingly widespread demonstration of the benefits and ease of use of open 
standards; and (3) the failure of some major industry players to adapt to the new more decentralised 
environment (Stanley M. Besen and George Sadowsky, ‘The economics of Internet standards’, in 
Johannes M. Bauer and Michael Latzer (eds.), Handbook on the Economics of the Internet 
(Edward Elgar 2016) 211, 216).  
116   For detailed information about the standards that raced to govern the internet, incorporating their 
developmental processes and the factors for their success or failures, see Ibid 213-217; Rachelle 
Miller, ‘The OSI Model: An Overview’ (SANS Institute Information Security Reading Room, 
2019) ˂https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/standards/osi-model-overview-543˃ 
accessed 9 October 2020. 
117  Some believe that the outcome of TCP/IP-OSI war was largely the result of the fact that TCP/IP 
was deployed first and developed an early lead, which, through network effects, created a 
‘bandwagon’ that OSI could not overcome; whereas others have argued that TCP/IP was, in many 
ways, superior to the OSI model (Besen and Sadowsky (n 121) 214).    
118  Yoo (n 109) 1747; Martin Fransman, The New ICT Ecosystem: Implications for Policy and 
Regulation (Cambridge University Press 2010) 8-11; Rohan Kariyawasam ‘Defining Dominance 
for Bits and Bytes: A new Layering Theory for Significant Market Power?’ [2005] 26(10) 
European Competition Law Review 581, 587; Kevin Werbach ‘Breaking the Ice: Rethinking 
Telecommunications Law for the Digital Age’, [2005] 4 Journal on Telecommunications and High 
Technology Law 59, 66-67; Craig Mc Taggart, A Layered Approach to Internet Legal Analysis, 
[2003] 48 McGill Law Journal 571, 582. 
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layer.119 Coupled with the physical layer, the five-layer internet architecture resembles 
an hourglass run by the protocols across the layers. The Internet Protocols covering 
IPv4 and IPv6, or Internet Protocol (IP), simply saying, enables the network to run an 
arbitrary variety of transmission technologies, which is facilitated by a thin, simple 
layer in the middle of the protocol stack, like the thin waist in an hourglass, and as 
illustrated in Figure 2.120  
 
Figure 2: The Hourglass Model of the Internet Protocol Stack 
(Source: Yoo (n 109) 1751) 
Layers, while defining the value chains through which products and services are 
ultimately delivered to end-users,121 also ensure interoperability between the end 
points by the virtue of governing protocols and interfaces. Fundamentally, all of the 
layers are software code that manipulates bits of information to form a network 
 
119  Four layers (link, application, network, application) identified by the IETF denote the software 
layers that serve on top of the physical layer, representing the Internet architecture. This physical 
layer, included into the so-called IP stack (suite) in the shown figure below (Figure 2), should not 
be understood as a standardised element, but as a scholarly addition by which the infrastructural 
elements are highlighted as the baseline for all the upper-software layers.  
120  Yoo (n 109) 1751. 
121  Werbach (n 118) 67. 
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communications system.122 Even the physical layer, the most rigidly fixed, includes 
software and protocols that define how information travels across physical links.123 
While every layer, including the data link and physical layers, is represented by various 
protocol(s), the internet (network) layer is exclusively run by the IP. Physical and data 
link layers are managed at the core of the network, where the central routers hand over 
the traffic and transmit the bits within the IP cloud. However, the upper layers i.e. 
transport and application layers, are controlled totally at the hosts. Inter-connections 
and the flow of information amongst the layers are ensured via the interfaces, the so 
called protocols, that serve the interdependence between layers, which do not have to 
coordinate with each other. For interoperability to be achieved across the layers or 
simply saying for the internet connectivity, the protocols serve as the interfaces to let 
in and across the layers enabling the functionality of the whole system. They enable 
flows of information across the layers which would otherwise be inhabited and 
controlled by the potential gatekeepers.. 
2.2.2. Convergence 
During the legacy period of earlier decades, voice telephony services used to be, and 
are still partially being, offered over the circuit-switched analogue networks,124 while 
the conventional way to provide internet access services was through cable networks. 
Around two decades ago, internet access commenced to be offered through PSTN-
based dial-up mode, which is an overlay method on top of the telephone networks and 
 
122  Werbach (n 118) 67. 
123  Werbach (n 118) 67. 
124  A circuit switch sets up a dedicated transmission path from the calling party to the recipient for 
the duration of a call. Circuit-switched networks are networks which establish an end-to-end 
transmission path in order for a communication to be transmitted from one end to the other, as is 
illustrated by conventional (PSTN) telephone networks (Walden (n 109) 400).  
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based on circuit-switch technology. In the cable networks, the single purpose earlier 
was offering dedicated television, pay TV) services, in rivalry with the free-aerial TV 
services that were open to everyone. Cable networks were offering TV services to their 
customers, similar to the terrestrial and satellite networks that were dedicated to 
broadcasting radio and television signals. Likewise, voice telephony was the primary 
goal of the legacy PSTN networks that were running through a set of principles, such 
as Time Division Multiplexing (TDM), which allows the creation of channels within 
a transmission stream over the telephone lines. 
Vertical integration of the telecommunications industry over the course of the 20th 
century was one of the thrusts behind this single-minded approach. In this structure, 
traffic was subject to a variety of different rules and pricing regimes because of the 
legacy business structures and technologies, such as TDM.125 As a result, each phone 
company operated as a “silo” of its own, determining the suite of services it would 
offer to customers and managing the internal addressing and directory processes as 
integral to those offerings.126 Hence, the model of telecommunications was point-to-
point communications on a two-way switched network, with its own technology e.g. 
TDM based circuit-switch, its own firms, its own services and its own framework. This 
‘silo’ model was reflected on in the 1996 US Telecommunications Act, whereby 
‘telecommunication services’ are regulated under Title I Act, while Title II is dedicated 
to regulating the broadcast services, and Title III the cable services. As the decades 
passed, along with the increasing convergence of networks, services and terminals, 
this single-minded, application-specific, vertically integrated logic or convention has 
 
125  Werbach (n 118) 62.  
126  Werbach (n 118) 62. 
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vanished, making the regulatory systems, like the US Telecommunications Act, 
outdated. 
For more than two decades, by means of digitalisation, cable networks are able to 
provide both voice telephony - globally known as Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) 
- and broadband internet, in addition to TV services. Similarly, it is possible to deliver 
all data, including TV services, along with voice telephony, over the legacy PSTN 
networks. Using the same physical medium as the telephone networks, the internet has 
gone through a radical innovation based on “convergence” through two facts: (i) 
digitisation and (ii) IP connectivity. 
In this new era we see various kinds of content e.g. voice, data and video) being 
transmitted through the internet, within the form of bits, short for “binary digits”, 
corresponding to an abstract mathematical representation of the two states of the 
circuits, which are “on” and “off”, for describing anything from the sound of a voice, 
to a video clip, to a thousand-page document.127 While this means digitisation, IP 
connectivity ensures the so-called binary digits go through the internet architecture, 
namely internet protocol (IP) suite or layered IP stack, as explained below.128 Based 
on these thrusts, IP convergence not only enables the signal transmission in a 
compressed and speedy manner, but also builds up an interoperable ecosystem 
surrounded by the internet.129   
 
127  Nuechterlein and Weiser (n 96) 160. 
128  For the details of the layered IP stack, see the section ‘2.2.3. Architectural underpinnings of the 
internet: Layered IP Stack’. 
129  Regarding the multi-dimensional analysis of convergence, see J. M. Bauer, M. P. C. Weijnen, A. 
L. Turk, and P. M. Herder, ‘Delineating the Scope of Convergence in Infrastructures’ in W. A. H. 
Thissen and P. M. Herder (eds), Critical Infrastructures State of the Art in Research and 
Application (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003) 209-232. For discussion of the convergence 
dynamics with a policy elaboration on Internet regulation see Philip Weiser, ‘Networks 
Unplugged: Towards A Model of Compatibility Regulation Between Information Platforms’ (29th 
TPRC Conference, Washington, September 2001).  
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The internet runs on top of the standardised protocols, mainly based on Internet 
Protocols (IP), which secure interoperability across the globe. As long as these 
protocols are adopted and implemented, all sorts of digital content can be transmitted 
over any kind of physical infrastructure, whether wired (cable, copper, fibre) or 
wireless (mobile, terrestrial, satellite). In this environment, cable can deliver voice and 
internet services as well as television service; wired telephony providers can deliver 
voice service and internet service; wireless telephony providers can also deliver 
internet service, streaming video and other services; and voice service, audio or video 
broadcasts, streaming video, audio downloads and more services can be delivered over 
the internet, provided by ISPs – over cable, DSL or mobile technologies or modems.130 
The convergence, as exemplified above, is truly realised by the virtue of IP which 
permits multi-level interactions between the networks, terminals and services, as 





Figure 3: Before convergence 
 
 
130  Douglas C. Sicker and Lisa Blumensaadt, ‘Misunderstanding the Layered Model(s)’ [2006] 4 














































Figure 4: After convergence 
(Source: ‘EU Telecommunications Regulations & Law’ Conference Proceedings, Brussels, June 2002). 
The internet should be understood as a conceptual aggregation of many individual 
networks, most of which are privately owned, using a common protocol and addressing 
scheme in the allocation of IP addresses to each connected device and for transporting 
packets of 1s and 0s between computers and other smart devices.131 In the internet 
environment, computing or information technologies are thus coupled with electronic 
communications, previously called “telecommunications”. Going through the 
convergence, internet and surrounding technologies denote a historical process which 
also characterises the transition from legacy networks to the NGNs, as explained 
below. 
2.2.3. Transition from legacy networks to NGNs 
ICT networks enable their users to communicate and/or exchange data with each other. 
Out of the wide-ranging ICT networks, some rest on their one-way, point-to-
 
131  Nuechterlein and Weiser (n 96) 19. For an alternative definition of the ‘internet’ see Rohan 
Kariyawasam, ‘Interconnection, Access and Peering: Law and Precedent’ in I. Walden and J. 
Angel (eds), Telecommunications Law (Blackstone Press Limited 2001) 185, reading; “The 
internet is the interconnection of a whole range of packet-switched networks, some of which are 
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multipoint, connections, while some others mean mutual, point-to-point, connections. 
Use of a decoder to receive digital signals and translate them into analogue signals on 
the TV screen is an example of the former, whereas voice telephony taking place 
through point-to-point (P2P) connections, represents the latter. At the heart of both the 
one-way and P2P access/interconnection lies ‘interoperability’ across the converging 
networks i.e. broadcasting, electronic communications and the computing (IT) 
networks. While IP convergence involves a wider range of interoperability, the basic 
or primitive forms of ICT networks also rely on and operate based on interoperability.   
In a circuit-switch, legacy telephone network (Public Switched Telephone Network, 
known as a PSTN), the signals are controlled and switched at the central (core) 
network, with interoperability between the end-users being secured through the 
switching and routing capabilities of the networks and with the help of electric and 
electromagnetic transmission.132 Today’s circuit switches are essentially very large 
computers that, in addition to establishing circuits for given calls, perform a variety of 
other “intelligent” functions, including call forwarding, caller identification, call 
waiting and billing.133 Whereas all these functionalities take place within a hierarchy, 
all management is conducted at the centrally owned and controlled network exchanges. 
Unlike circuit-switched networks, “connectionless” packet-switching technologies do 
not set up a dedicated circuit for the duration of a communication. Instead, the 
transmitted information is converted into discrete digital packets, and the packet switch 
sends each of them separately from the others, potentially along different transmission 
paths.134 In packet-switching technology used for broadband data transmission, all data 
 
132  Nuechterlein and Weiser (n 96) 25.    
133  Nuechterlein and Weiser (n 96) 29. 
134  Nuechterlein and Weiser (n 96) 30. 
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packets follow the shortest possible way to arrive at the identified destination (after-
by-after). This brings enormous efficiency and flexibility, enabling the network 
operators to manage all end-to-end data transmission within the same network 
management system. Packet-switched technologies are increasingly being used to 
carry voice, as well as data, and operators are using packet-switched architectures 
when modernising their backbone and access networks to NGNs.135 
The internet is made up of interconnected, or linked, packet-switched networks, 
representing the very evolution from circuit-switched networks into a globalised form. 
Standardised internet architecture and connectivity is also crucial for the development 
of NGNs. The choice of the internet as a single packet-switching technology for the 
ICT world has raised the need for the standardised integration of different 
architectures, concepts, approaches, and services found in traditional and modernised 
types of telecommunications.136 Such need and accompanying efforts have ended up 
with the standardisation process of the so-called NGNs in the first decade of the 21st 
century.137 ITU, having a pioneering role in this process, defines “NGN” as follows: 
NGN is a packet-based network able to provide telecommunication 
services to users and able to make use of multiple broadband, QoS-
enabled (quality of service) transport technologies and in which 
service-related functions are independent of the underlying transport-
related technologies.138     
 
135  Walden (n 109) 400. 
136  Janevski (n 110) 69. 
137  Janevski (n 110) 69. 
138  ITU-T Rec. Y.2001. See also ˂http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/studygroups/com13/ngn2 004/working 
_definition.html> accessed 9 October 2020. 
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While the era of broadband internet access represents a transition from application-
specific homogenous service provision; traditional circuit-switched voice telephony 
and TV broadcasting on the one side, best-effort internet on the other, to IP-based 
heterogenous service provision,139 with the emergence of NGNs means standardised 
QoS-based networking capabilities furthering the so-called transition.140 The most 
prominent and innovative aspect of these newly emerging networks is their potential 
to drive the all-IP migration based on the QoS parameters. 
NGNs, whether fixed or mobile, represent a new upgrade of networking technologies, 
if not a revolution.141 Significant changes are brought about by the NGNs surrounding 
decoupling of the services from the networking and accompanying advantages that 
enable the service providers to provide multiple service packages, consisting of voice, 
data and video, in a far more efficient and high-speed manner.142 In a NGN 
environment, networks are simply configured to convey data, while services are 
controlled by software programs embedded in ubiquitous computers.143 This process, 
echoed with the ‘decoupling’, facilitating triple or quadruple play service provision, 
enables third party application service providers to more effectively compete with the 
operator of the physical network in the provision of services.144 All these 
 
139   See Volker Stocker ‘Interconnection and Capacity Allocation for all-IP Networks: Walled Gardens 
or Full Integration?’ (43rd TPRC Conference, Arlington, September 2015) 3. 
140   According to legacy models enforced by the “best effort” principle, TCP/IP based passive traffic 
management is performed by communicating edges (Ibid). On the other hand, differentiated traffic 
services based on active traffic management, incorporating virtualisation of network functions and 
capacity allocation between different service types manifest the multi-purpose NGNs, also 
representing the so-called all-IP process. 
141   See Janevski (n 110) 69-70. 
142   Decoupling thus marks a core difference from the legacy (internet overlay) networks, which are 
modernised to provide internet services, although being originally designed to support specific 
services, such as voice telephony over PSTN and TV broadcasting over terrestrial, satellite and 
cable networks. In a NGN environment, networks will simply be conveying data while services 
are going to be controlled by software programs embedded in ubiquitous computers. 
143  See Wolfgang Reichl and Ernst-Olav Ruhle, NGA, IP-Interconnection and their Impact on 
Business Models and Competition [2008] 69, 1st Q Communications & Strategies 41, 49-50. 
144  J. Scott Marcus and Dieter Elixmann, ‘Regulatory Approaches to NGNs: An International 
Comparison’ [2008] 69, 1st Q Communications & Strategies 19, 21.  
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developments denote the trajectory of how the IP convergence evolves along with the 







3. Legal regulation of interoperability 
3.1. General overview 
3.1.1. Interoperability debate  
As many firms attempt to exercise proprietary control over the interfaces they run, how 
to ensure interoperability becomes one of the Gordion knots to be solved in the field 
of ICT. Crucially, interoperability information is non-rivalrous in many cases,145 
potentially drawing the boundaries of follow-on innovation and market competition. 
From a broader perspective, one could also say that transmission of information to the 
third parties in an uninterrupted and seamless way would serve a great many concerns 
being resolved surrounding cultural freedom and social production. On the other hand, 
interoperability debate and related solutions seem to have been portrayed within 
ascertained boundaries of each body of law, i.e. under IPR, competition and sector-
specific rules.  
From the IPR viewpoint, the interoperability debate basically means whether and to 
what extent copyright or patent or trade secret holders ought to permit their IPR-
protected assets being used/accessed by third parties. Not only IPRs themselves, but 
also DRMs and TPMs, which are categorised differently yet legally protected,146 
exemplify the tools for retaining the interfaces, via which incumbent firms could close 
up their systems to third parties. This however would mean technologically blocking 
new entries and/or derivative products, particularly when IPR-protected assets depict 
a marketplace.   
 
145  See Kevin Coates, Competition Law and Regulation of Technology Markets (OUP 2011) 237. 
146  See supra note 73. 
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Against this background, it becomes questionable when the rights holders conceal the 
interface specifications by distributing software only in object code, and using legal 
mechanisms e.g. copyright, patent, and anti-circumvention laws to prevent any 
decryption or decompilation which aims at uncovering such specifications.147 
Therefore, the issue from the IPR perspective revolves around how IPR exceptions are 
established statutorily and by precedents, incorporating the counter-legal mechanisms 
that would preclude reverse engineering, etc.  
From the competition law perspective, the question turns into whether lack of 
interoperability in different settings e.g. abuse of dominance, collaborative and 
concentrative acts would result in exclusion of the potential or actual competitors in 
an ICT market - which would presumably be occupied by dominant firm(s) that rely 
on critical (often IPR-protected) assets, software or a platform. This might create a 
tension from the competition point of view, since in such cases APIs might function 
as the ‘gateways’ for the third parties to interoperate with and compete against the 
incumbent networks. Such tension is often augmented in the face of network 
industries, which are exposed to ‘network effects’ and may not be subject to ex-ante 
regulations. 
Ex-ante interoperability rules are embedded within the context of sector-specific 
(electronic communications) regulations, as exemplified by the ECRF. The ECRF 
itself is originally structured and built on the premise of achieving interoperability 
between networks and services for the well-being of EU citizens and consumers. 
Mirroring the end of ensuring access and interconnection at the highest possible level, 
interoperability has so far been emphasized under the ECRF, through specified rules 
 
147  Band and Katoh (n 55) 184. 
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i.e. mandatory access to CASs and mechanisms i.e. standardisation. That is to say, a 
number of ex-ante interoperability-based measures are embedded under the ECRF, to 
be invoked in tandem with the ex-post competition rules. Below, firstly, the main 
concerns surrounding lack of interoperability are given, and then introductory 
information about each EU legal regime is given respectively. 
3.1.2. Main concerns surrounding lack of interoperability  
ICT interoperability entails various technical parameters based on the real-life 
situation, user needs and requirements. So, lack of interoperability emerges as a 
common problem for ICT networks and services, which essentially depend on 
seamless and uninterrupted communication and data exchange. However, this is not 
the default or inherent situation found in many cases because of the proprietary/closed 
systems, accompanying abusive behaviours, exploitation of consumer loyalty and/or 
inertia, network effects, etc. While these factors are conducive to the lack of 
interoperability and its adverse effects, the potential outcomes include but not limited 
to vendor lock-in, switching costs, restricted follow-on innovation, hampered end-to-
end connectivity, lessened cultural production and freedom.       
Often representing network industries, ICT networks/services manifest either de facto 
or de jure standards and/or path dependencies caused by network effects. This situation 
first and foremost brings out the very possibility of ‘vendor lock-in’. Vendor, or 
technology, lock-in means a product being opted for by the consumers when they are 
reluctant to switch from that product, even for a better one, either due to switching 
costs or because they are lazy (euphemistically called “end-users inertia” by the 
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Commission).148 While vendor lock-in is not necessarily unwanted in every situation 
e.g. for small and medium size enterprises’ market penetration and innovation, 
switching costs following up vendor lock-in would be criticised for many reasons. 
Switching costs are mentioned as a barrier for a firm to overcome when it wishes to 
enter a market after a small but permanent price increase.149 There is theoretical and 
empirical research showing that consumer switching costs confer market power on 
firms.150 Given this fact, switching costs might have an impact of slowing or 
preventing market entry as well as creating consumer harm, particularly when the 
impact stems from the consumers sticking to technologically inferior products 
available in the relevant market. The systemic impact arises from the struggle over 
interoperation and compatibility, when firms are likely to exploit captive markets by 
raising prices to locked-in consumers to the height of switching costs - this can lead 
them to compete extensively by investing in incompatibility.151 Having said this, a 
clear link could be established between lock-in risk, reinforced by the switching costs, 
and market tipping/foreclosure that resulted from network effects; where in many 
cases these consequences are driven by the lack of interoperability. 
Lack of interoperability across the ICT networks, including the IoT and cloud 
platforms, might have anti-competitive effects particularly in the presence of network 
effects. This risk is directly corelated to the scenarios when consumers face 
interoperability problems because of the incompatible files, devices and/or software 
 
148  Suiyi Zhang, ‘How have network effects affected the European Commission’s enforcement of 
competition law in technology enabled markets?’ [2015] 36 European Competition Law Review 
82, 85. 
149  Tom Björkroth, ‘Loyal or Locked-in – And Why Should We Care?’ [2013] 10(1) Journal of 
Competition Law & Economics 47, 54. 
150  Ibid, 47. 
151  Jonathan Cave, ‘Prisoners of Our Own Device - An Evolutionary Perspective on Lock-in, 
Technology Clusters and Telecom Regulation’ (SSRN, 15 August 2009) TPRC 2009 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1995551> accessed 9 October 2020. 
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that are used by the service e.g. cloud providers.152 Such problems would surface more 
should customers opt switching from one provider to another. Normally, the fact that 
a cloud computing provider decides to choose a specific antivirus software could be 
interpreted as a choice over which customers should not have a say.153 Thus, not only 
security programs but also other software used by the cloud users would confer lock-
in risk for the consumers, unless switching costs are eliminated by fierce competition 
or statutory portability mechanisms. Similar concerns are valid for the IoT context, 
whereby the consumers would be hindered from moving to a new platform because of 
the switching costs.154 As this is usually attended by the proprietary and non-
interoperable platforms, competitors would then be excluded e.g. in the absence of 
countervailing buying power that ameliorates the network effects. 
 
152  The essence of the problem is that each vendor’s cloud environment supports one or more OSs 
and databases, incorporating a cloud API and a specific licensing model (Bill Claybrook, ‘Cloud 
interoperability: Problems and best practices’, (Computerworld, 1 June 2011) 
<http://www.computerworld.com/article/2508726/cloud-computing/cloud-interoperability--
problems-and-best-practices.html> accessed 9 October 2020). Therefore, undertakings may 
exploit the fact that their customers have been locked into their cloud computing service and 
impose the use of their own software (Laise Da Correggio Luciano and Ian Walden, ‘Ensuring 
competition in the Clouds: The role of competition law?’ (SSRN, 7 April 2014) 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1840547> accessed 9 October 2020).  
153  Luciano and Walden (n 152) 274. In fact, in case a cloud customer adapts their systems to work 
with one particular cloud service, they may not be able to choose an equivalent service from a 
different provider without having to adapt their systems again for the new provider. In order to 
make the cloud systems interoperable with each other, issues such as transport protocols, encoding 
syntaxes for communication messages or data, semantics, and organisational and legal policy 
issues need to be addressed. (ECIS, ‘Special paper on cloud computing: Portability and 
interoperability of software and data across cloud services’ (27 June 2016), 
<http://www.ecis.eu/2016/06/special-paper-on-cloud-computing-portability-and-
interoperability/> accessed 9 October 2020. See also Andrea Renda, ‘Competition, neutrality and 
diversity in the cloud’ 85 [2012] Digiworld Economic Journal 1st Q 23 28-30; Sluijs, Larouche 
and Sauter (n 25) 18.     
154  Karen Rose, Scott Eldridge and Lyman Chapin, ‘The Internet of Things: An Overview’ (Internet 
Society, 2015) 47 <http://www.internetsociety.org/sites/default/files/ISOC-IoT-Overview-
20151221-en.pdf> accessed 9 October 2020. For example, in the home automation market, light 
bulbs from one vendor may not be interoperable with a light switch or control system manufactured 
by another (Ibid).  
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In the case of contestable markets, which are depicted by low barriers to entry and exit 
along with short-term prices and price-sensitive consumers,155 such problems would 
not exist nor does a disruptive effect emerge over the competitive functioning of the 
markets. Against such a potential for competition and when switching is easy and fast, 
lack of interoperability would no longer have the effect of preventing new entries 
and/or innovation. In most cases, ICT markets are not representative of contestable 
markets because of the network effects and the potential for market tipping; and lack 
of interoperability thus would bear far-reaching negative implications in these 
markets.156     
On the other hand, interoperability-based problems in the ICT sector are not limited to 
vendor lock-in, switching costs, etc. As a matter of fact, the interoperability-centric 
problems are not exclusively related, or conducive, to anti-competitive behaviours 
and/or the hampered follow-on innovation. Alongside the competition and innovation 
related concerns, some other consequences would also result from lack of 
interoperability surrounding restricted consumer choices and information flows. A 
broader viewpoint is compelling to understand such adverse effects and consequences 
which often go beyond the conventional understanding of consumer harm and reach 
out to media pluralism, cultural diversity, etc.   
In this regard, ‘end-to-end connectivity’ or broadly speaking ‘any-to-any 
communication’ is the first and foremost issue that needs to be underlined and 
addressed. In fact, without the interoperability standards/protocols, any person could 
 
155  José Alberro and Rainer Shcwabe, ‘The Theory of Contestable Markets and its Legacy in Antitrust 
Practice’, [2016] 16(1) Economics Committee Newsletter 20, 21. 
156  In order to deter such potential outcomes, statutory rights and obligations, particularly ‘data 
portability’, should be underlined as lessening the risk of vendor lock-in, or of switching costs. 
For detailed information regarding ‘data portability’, see the section ‘3.2.4. Data protection rules: 
Right to data portability’. 
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not communicate with anyone else. Expressed with the term ‘end-to-end connectivity’, 
this situation confers interoperability a crucial meaning and purpose. By the same 
token, the ECRF has a number of obligations inclusive of interoperability, mostly 
echoed by the ‘interconnection’ imposed on the telecom operators that ensure end-to-
end connectivity. Under the ECRF there also exists another obligation based on 
interoperability, aiming at the transmission of digital TV signals through the set-top 
boxes, i.e. CAS systems, on a fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory basis. This latter 
obligation, unlike interconnection, aims at enhancing media plurality and cultural 
diversity.157  
Interconnection and CAS obligations aim to address interoperability-based concerns 
not necessarily related to market competition or innovation. While they might have 
competitive implications, these obligations mainly address the concerns surrounding 
the media plurality and diverse cultural productions which can be extended to 
participatory democracy.158 Access and interoperability obligations under the ECRF, 
as examined above, serve such concerns being mitigated in relation to the intermediary 
network and platforms that control the information flows.  
‘Information flow’, which was first conceptualised by Elkin-Koren,159 has a 
particularised meaning for this study by which to emphasize information being 
disseminated and exchanged across the end points. The exclusionary effect of the IPRs 
 
157  See the section ‘6.2.1.2. Conditional access obligations’. 
158  See N. Elkin-Koren, ‘Cyberlaw and Social Change: A democratic approach to copyright law in 
cyberspace’ [1996] 14 Cardozo Arts and Entertainment Law Journal 215, 231, referring to Seyla 
Benhabib, ‘Models of Public Space: Hannah Arendt, the Liberal Tradition, and Jürgen Habermas’ 
in Craig Calhoun (eds) Habermas and the Public Sphere (MIT Press 1991) 87, reading; “when 
democracy is defined not merely by formal political institutions, but as a process of “discursive 
will formation,” participation is no longer confined to a narrowly defined political realm, but is 
instead perceived as an activity that can be realized in the social and cultural spheres as well” 
159  Ibid, 257. 
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surfaces here since the access-denied (or restricted) content is often not tangible nor in 
a bounded form but would often have a fluid form transcending the boundaries of ICT 
networks/platforms. This transition, namely from the ‘stock’s to ‘commodity 
flow’s,160 needs to be noted as a key change driven by the ever fast evolving ICTs and 
the accompanying ‘networked information economy’.161 In this regard, commodified 
information coming up with the fluidity through codes and bits bring out the question 
as to the appropriateness of the stock-focused property regimes including IPR rules, 
particularly against the key role of information flows in the digital age.162 While 
responding this question goes beyond the scope of this study, it is noteworthy that the 
construction of information is not reflected merely through classification, but also 
through the network of links that creates the path which leads to the information.163 
Having said that, not only (theoretical) access rights164 or permitted circumvention of 
 
160  James G.H. Griffin, ‘A call for a doctrine of “information justice”’ [2016] 1 Intellectual Property 
Quarterly 44, 45-46. 
161  According to Benkler, “radical decentralization of intelligence in our communications network 
and the centrality of information, knowledge, culture, and ideas to advanced economic activity are 
leading to a new stage of the information economy - the networked information economy” (Yokhai 
Benkler, The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom 
(Yale University Press 2006) 32).  
162  Griffin describes this contradictory situation along with a unique exposition inspired of quantum 
theory: 
The increasing convergence of capital and information, and their quantum states in 
the information society, undermines the traditional notion of bounded property. In 
addition to that, the information itself is increasingly digital and thus potentially 
literacy in character, which paradoxically presupposes a greater degree of bounded 
proprietary protection. However, the reality is that the growth in copyright scope 
matches directly - an exponentially - with the desire to increase protection of 
information concerning content use. Thus, any increase in the copyright’s 
proprietary protections and consequent bounding is intimately tied with the quantum 
aspect of legal protection not just being bounded but also being a flow. (Griffin (n 
160) 46-47). 
163  Elkin-Koren (n 158) 238. 
164  Marcella Favale, ‘The Right of Access in Digital Copyright: Right of the Owner or Right of the 
User?’ [2012] 15(1) The Journal of World Intellectual Property, 1-25; Zohar Efroni, Access-Right: 
The Future of Digital Copyright Law (OUP 2011) 146-149; Marlize Conroy, ‘Access to Works 
Protected by Copyright: Right or Privilege’ [2006] 18(4) South African Mercantile Law Journal, 
413-422; Jane C. Ginsburg, ‘Essay: From Having Copies to Experiencing Works: The 
Development of an Access Right in U.S. Copyright Law’ [2003] 50 Journal of the Copyright 
Society of the U.S.A., 113-132; Stephen B. Popernik, ‘The Creation of an Access Right in the 
Ninth Circuit's Digital Copyright Jurisprudence’ [2013] 78(2) Brooklyn Law Review, 697-740. 
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access controls e.g. as enshrined under DMCA under certain conditions,165 but also, 
even more importantly, information flows across the technological layers, networks 
and platforms gain importance in the current ICT landscape. 
Decentralisation and diffusion of power is not the same thing as less power exercised 
over human beings; nor is the same thing as democracy.166 Power does no disappear 
in a digital networked world, and shifts from the arbitrary will of specific individuals 
and the imperatives of large bureaucratic organisations to the channelling effects of 
software code, surveillance technologies, and information networks.167 Although we 
are increasingly integrated into information networks in some ways, we are also 
alienated from them in others,168 which would mean restricted information flows as 
well as increased control over content.   
As underlined by Elkin-Kohen, concentration of ownership and control over content 
may reduce pluralism and result in a “marginal” or “meaningless” diversity of the type 
of content created.169 Control over content may affect the extent to which people can 
 
165  17 U.S. Code § 1201 (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), (i), (j). 
166  Jack M. Balkin, ‘Information Power: The Information Society from an Antihumanist Perspective’ 
in Ramesh Subramanian and Eddan Katz (eds), The Global Flow of Information: Legal, Social, 
and Cultural Perspectives (New York University Press 2011) 232, 240. 
167  Ibid, 239-240. Proliferation of power, as elaborated and put forward by Karl Marx, Max Weber 
and Michel Foucault, would have different forms and appearances, which seems to continue in the 
internet driven world. Although not directly covered within the subject-matter of this study, the 
idea of power proliferation is note-worthy. As emphasized by Balkin, a proliferation of power 
perspective argues that the information technologies which human beings implement to transfer, 
store, and analyse information do not necessarily bring a net increase in either human freedom or 
human empowerment (Ibid, 239). 
168  Ibid, 240. 
169  See Niva Elkin-Koren, ‘It’s all about control: Rethinking copyright in the new information 
landscape’ in N. Elkin-Koren and N. Weinstock Netanel (eds), The Commodification of 
Information (Kluwer Law International 2002) 79, 102. Elkin-Koren explains the relationship 
between the power (or concentration of ownership) and control over content as follows:  
“… those who control the means of arranging and tagging information possess the 
power to impose specific meanings. The more control one has over information 
resources, the more one is able to impose her meanings and force users to conform 
to those meanings” (Elkin-Koren (n 158) 238-239). 
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appropriate content and adapt it to reflect their own agenda.170 From the viewpoint of 
information flows, this would also lead up to the information asymmetries as well as 
non-transparencies on the part of the dominant information actors or agencies. 
Ultimately, this would encourage these actors/agencies to be gatekeepers that have the 
capacity to exploit the consumers and maximize capital flow from this.  
As far as informational goods are concerned, the viewpoint one should have needs to 
be elaborated with civic virtue because information users would better be captured by 
the term ‘citizens’ rather than ‘consumers’. Information flow concerns would thus 
need to be taken of utmost account also considering the enabling tools of 
‘interoperability’ against the gatekeeping roles and functionalities. While 
interoperability measures would increase the spectrum for information goods, its 
absence would mean not only heightened control mechanisms but also lacking links 
between the parties that would impart and receive the information. Considering this 
and other consequences resulting from lacking interoperability, one could draw out a 
number of concerns in relation to interoperability.  
In the figure below, could be seen the manifestation of the major concerns that 
potentially result from the lack of interoperability. 
 




Figure 5:  Major concerns surrounding lack of interoperability 
Source: Constructed by the author 
3.1.3. Brief analysis of major concerns on the cumulative ground of 
‘gatekeeping’  
 
As the above figure denotes, ‘lack of interoperability’ would cause several concerns. 
Such concerns could be analysed within two main groups, based on their most salient 
aspects, more explicitly, for predominantly having an economic, mostly competition-
oriented or non-economic, mostly techno-social nature.171 The former group reflect 
the concerns surrounding vendor lock-in, network effects and (hindrance of) follow-
on innovation, whereas latter group of concerns i.e. end-to-end connectivity, media 
 
171  ‘Techno-social’ is one of the key attributes used in this study inspired by the work of Frischmann, 
and Selinger who authored a book called ‘Re-Engineering Humanity’. In their book, they define 
and frequently refer to the term of ‘techno-social engineering’. According to their definition, 
techno-social engineering refers to “processes where technologies and social forces align and 
impact how we think, perceive and act” (Brett Frischmann and Evan Selinger, Re-Engineering 
Humanity (Cambridge University Press 2018) 4-5). Based on this definition, the techno-social 
concerns is conceptualised to mean the concerns mostly manifested in algorithmic/AI-driven 
software that manipulates online users affecting their behaviours and choices leading up to unfair 
outcomes and/or transformative effects.  
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pluralism and information asymmetries, is constructed separately for the arising 
informational, societal and epistemological consequences out of the underlying ICT 
architectures. We cannot radically isolate these concerns since these information or 
media related aspects also entail economic factors or implications, if not to the same 
degree one would expect of the former group of concerns. 
 
Hereby, it is important to distinguish that every ingredient of the emergent ‘network 
information economy’ is not calculable and would not fit into the traditional market 
economy or competition law and policy mindset. Pursuing competition law terms, one 
should need to look to the ‘consumer welfare’ or to ‘total welfare’ according to the US 
antitrust law, seeking out an answer as to whether there exists any potential or actual 
consumer harm for the conduct, agreement or merger scrutinised. If an action of a 
dominant firm is likely to harm consumers by reducing the ‘consumer surplus’ which 
is mostly calculable, then that firm falls into the spotlight of the competition or 
regulatory authorities. On the other hand, this could hardly be gauged against the latter 
concerns which potentially and primarily mean restrictions over information flow and 
freedom.  
 
Should we reconsider the ‘consumer welfare’ from a broader viewpoint elaborated 
with the civic virtue around the information flows, a distinction between the 
abovementioned concerns would be easier. Benkler’s discursive analysis concerning 





To understand the effects of concentration, we can think of freedom 
from constraint as a dimension of welfare. Just as we have no reason to 
think that in a concentrated market, total welfare, let alone consumer 
welfare, will be optimal, we also have no reason to think that a 
component of welfare – freedom from constraint as a condition to 
access one’s communicative  environment – will be optimal.172          
 
Flowing from Benkler’s point of view, it should be noted that the welfare components 
are not limited to the consumer welfare or surplus that is calculable and is 
acknowledged necessary to find out the Pareto efficiency or optimality. In fact, 
defining an optimal person extends to civic virtue that is not quantifiable and largely 
related to existence of participatory culture and democracy within a society. Citizens 
develop their ideas, shape their positions, identify their interests, and ascertain their 
identity in the public sphere, which represents the main scene of our democratic life.173 
 
It is recognizable that digital fences are heightened in the internet era, which brings 
out significant costs and consequences as opposed to the supposed outcomes of 
internet freedom and liberties.174 That is to say, in the digitised IP world, stronger 
 
172  Benkler (n 161) 157. 
173  Elkin-Koren (n 169) 101. 
174  The advent of internet marked emergence of a concern on the part of the rights holders for the ease 
and low cost of access to and copy of the available materials online. The perceived internet threat 
was based on the rhetoric “as copying costs approach zero, intellectual property rights must 
approach perfect control” (See James Boyle, The Public Domain: Enclosing the Commons of the 
Mind (Yale University of Press 2008) 61). The repercussions were largely reflected in the Clinton 
Administration’s ‘Report of the Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights’ published in 
1995, called ‘White Paper’, that preceded the DMCA and set out the copyright and information 
policy principles of the US while entering the internet era. As well established by Vaidhyanathan, 
1995 White Paper represented four surrenders of important safeguards in the copyright system: 
- The surrender of balance to control: As a result of the chief piece of legislation 
in subsequent years, the DMCA; content providers can set the terms for access 
to and use of a work. 
- The surrender of public interest to private interest: The rhetoric of “intellectual 
property” in the 1990s was punctuated by appeals to prevent theft and efforts to 
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effects could be found out in overzealous use of IPRs and TPMs, which often function 
as newly erected digital fences enabling ‘perfect control’,175 and are ironically 
protected by the modernised copyright and patent laws.176 In effect, such heightened 
digital fences i.e. through highly increased TPMs and IPRs, mean barriers preventing 
free flow of information177 having the potential to affect participatory democracy as 
well as cultural production.178 These informational barriers, which would mean a strain 
over the democratic culture,179 augment the concerns categorised in the latter group.  
 
From this vantage point of view, one might ask to what extent all the major concerns 
referred above are addressed under the status quo. Or it would be asked how far these 
concerns and their omnipresence are infused under the EU regulatory thinking. 
Leaving these questions to the relevant parts of the thesis, suffice it to say, co-existence 
 
extend markets. There was little public discussion about copyright as a public 
good that can encourage a rich public sphere and diverse democratic culture. 
- The surrender of republican deliberation within nation-state to unelected multi-
lateral nongovernmental bodies: WIPO and WTO assumed a greater role in 
copyright policy as multinational media companies sought global standards that 
satisfied their ambitions. 
- The surrender of culture to technology: The DMCA forbids any circumvention 
of electronic locks that regulate access to copyrighted material” (Siva 
Vaidhyanathan, Copyright and Copywrongs: The rise of Intellectual Property 
and How It Threatens Creativity, (New York University Press 2001) 159-160). 
175  Boyle (n 174) 60-62; Lawrence Lessig, Code; version 2.0 (Basic Books 2006) 176-180. According 
to Lessig, the ‘perfect control’ which he coins with ‘trusted systems’ “provide the authors with the 
same sort of protection [of copyright laws]”. He puts forth his firm and substantiated reasoning as 
follows: 
Copyright orders others to respect the rights of the copyright holder before using his 
property; trusted systems give access only if rights are respected in the first place. 
The controls needed to regulate this access are built into the systems, and no users 
(except hackers) have a choice about whether to obey them. The code complements 
the law by codifying the rules, making them more efficient. (Ibid, 179)  
176  Vaidhyanathan (n 174) 159, 174-175; Lessig (175) 186; Boyle (n 174) 61, 100-101. 
177  Niva Elkin-Koren, ‘Copyrights in Cyberspace - Rights without Laws’ [1998] 73 Chicago-Kent 
Law Review, 1155, 1192. Regarding free flow of information, see Elkin-Koren (n 169) where it 
is argued that “control rather than remuneration becomes the focus of legal disputes concerning 
copyright” (p. 84) and “this transforms copyright law from a law that sought to serve policy goals 
and secure incentives for creators into a law that facilitates control in information markets” (p. 
106). 
178  See Elkin-Koren (n 158) 267-268. 
179  See Emily B. Laidlaw, Regulating Speech in Cyberspace; Gatekeepers, Human Rights and 
Corporate Responsibility (Cambridge University Press, 2015) 33, 46; Balkin (n 166) 240, 244-5. 
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of both competition and techno-social concerns highlighted above compels regulatory 
thinking to have a broader mind-set. While the following chapters aim at filtering out 
all the available measures and shortcomings, suffice it to say here that there is a 
pressing need to comprehend all the major concerns under a common ground. At this 
point, this thesis takes a step further to synthesise these concerns on the cumulative 
ground of ‘gatekeeping’.  
 
‘Gatekeeping’ has been used as a term mostly in field of media and communication 
studies, since it has been conceptualised by Kurt Lewin180 and David Manning White, 
who first applied gatekeeping theory in journalism research.181 White analysed how a 
single editor of a local newspaper selected which stories were and were not covered, 
and found that the news was heavily influenced by the individual preferences of the 
editor.182 The people that are in a strong position to influence this selection process 
have been conceptualized as gatekeepers: they control gates in the communication 
channels through which news flows into society.183 While this type of gatekeeping 
suggests an ‘intermediary’ role, this should not be considered as the defining aspect, 
since these actors do not necessarily operate on a multi-sided platform or network. 
Rather, their exploiting the so called ‘gates’ as a controlling mechanism is crucial to 
understand this concept. 
 
 
180  Lewin, who coined gatekeeping, was interested in understanding how widespread social changes 
can be promoted, and studied this by analysing the factors that influence food consumption habits 
(Kasper Welbers, ‘Gatekeeping in the Digital Age’ (PhD Thesis, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam 
2016) 26, referring to K. Lewin ‘Frontiers in group dynamics II: Channels of group life; social 
planning and action research’ [1947] 1(2) Human Relations 143-153). 
181  Ibid, 3. 
182  Ibid. 
183  Ibid, 1. 
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This notion of ‘gated’ and controlling access to it seems to be key also in view of the 
‘network gatekeeper theory’ developed by Barzilai-Kahon, who introduces his theory 
of ‘network gatekeeping’ based on the concept of ‘information control’.184 According 
to her, network gatekeeping is best conceptualized through information control lenses, 
and carries three main goals: (a) a “locking-in” of gated inside the gatekeeper’s 
network; (b) protecting norms, information, gated, and communities from unwanted 
entry from outside; and (c) maintaining ongoing activities within network boundaries 
without disturbances.185 Based on this premise, gatekeeping activities, according to 
Barzilai-Kahon, include, among others, selection, addition, withholding, display, 
channelling, shaping, manipulation, repetition, timing, localization, integration, 
disregard, and deletion of information.186 
 
In view of the human rights to be used by the gated and the emerging impact on the 
‘democratic culture’, Laidlaw constructs a new definition of gatekeeping resulting in 
a model of ‘internet information gatekeepers’.187 This rights-oriented notion of 
gatekeeping builds upon the traditional gatekeeping concept, together with a 
classification of micro and macro gatekeepers, to be determined according to the extent 
to which (i) the information has democratic significance and (ii) the reach or structure 
 
184  Karine Barzilai-Nahon, ‘Toward a Theory of Network Gatekeeping: A Framework for Exploring 
Information Control’ [2008] 59(9) Journal of the American Society for Information Science and 
Technology 1493, 1496. See also Karine Barzilai‐Nahon, ‘Gatekeeping: A critical review’ 2009 
43(1) Annual Review of Information Science and Technology 1, 44.  
185  Ibid, 1496. According to the author, “In a network context, this definition [of gatekeeping] is 
translated to treat gatekeeping as a type of control exercised on information as it moves in and out 
of gates, and provides one of the broadest views of gatekeeping” (Ibid, 1496). 
186  Ibid. The mechanisms include, for example, channelling i.e. search engines, hyperlinks; censorship 
i.e. filtering, blocking, zoning; security i.e. authentication controls, integrity controls and access 
controls; value-adding i.e. contextualisation, customisation, personalisation; infrastructure i.e. 
network access, network configuration; user interaction i.e. add-on, navigation tools; editorial 
mechanisms i.e. technical controls, content controls, design tools of information content (Ibid, 
1498). 
187   Laidlaw (n 179) 47.  
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of the communicative space.188 While this definition and classification would serve 
reinvigoration of the concept against the far-reaching consequences, particularly in 
relation to protection of human rights, subtle differences seem to exist between the 
traditional gatekeeping concept or the network gatekeeping concept theorised by 
Barzilai-Nahon and the one developed by Laidlaw in terms of their approach to the 
access and information controls employed by the gatekeeping firms. Among these, 
Barzilai-Nahon’s theory comes to the forefront providing an interdisciplinary layout 
and perspective as to the information controls, also laying the foundation for Laidlaw’s 
model. On the other hand, Laidlaw’s attempt to create a socio-legal framework 
governing the gatekeepers and their activities is notable, although open to critique for 
the featured remedial mechanisms conflated with the extra-legal tools and their 
complicated interplay.189 
 
As the above analysis suggests and summarised by Helberger et al., two major types 
of gatekeepers can be roughly distinguished: (i) gatekeepers which control access to 
information and (ii) gatekeepers which have a facilitating role through control of 
critical intermediary resources or services that are necessary to link users and content, 
to mediate between the different players in the information chain, to produce, transport 
and distribute content, etc.190 While the former aspect is represented by those who are 
in the position to have an editorial control over the information to be published either 
 
188  Laidlaw (n 179) 57. According to the Laidlaw’s model, “Whether human rights responsibilities 
should be incurred and the extent to these responsibilities depends on the extent to which the 
gatekeeper controls the deliberation ad participation in the forms of meaning-making in democratic 
culture.”. This model results in and merges up with the proposed ‘corporate social responsibility’ 
(CSR), meaning that businesses are responsible for human rights within their ‘sphere of influence’, 
a concept which is articulated in the UN’s framework of CSR (Laidlaw (n 179) 47). 
189  See Laidlaw (n 179) 259. The debate over this concept and its potential role against the ultimate 
findings is left to the Chapter 8, as the gatekeeping conception becomes more crucial and surfacing 
following the doctrinal analysis and the case studies.  
190  Natali Helberger, Katharina Kleinen-von Königslöw and Rob van der Noll, ‘Regulating the new 
information intermediaries as gatekeepers of information diversity’ [2015] 17(6) Info 50, 52. 
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online or offline (traditional gatekeeping concept), the latter matches the more 
structural network gatekeepers like CAS providers i.e. cable or pay-TV platform 
owners, or the ISPs that control the means of access to the information. Remarkably, 
as the recent literature emphasizes,191 gatekeeping activities are more visibly seen 
through the digital platforms which maintain control over ‘access by third-party firms 
to its users’ or ‘access to content, products and/or services’.192  
 
From a broader viewpoint, this gatekeeping notion which also surfaces in a recent EU 
consultation paper,193 needs to be expanded to all across the IP layers and the networks, 
services, applications and content provided through them. In this regard, not only video 
streaming platforms, e.g. Netflix, Amazon Prime, YouTube, social media platforms, 
e.g. Facebook, Twitter, search engine/app store/browser providers, e.g. Google’s 
 
191  Peter Alexiadis and Alexandre de Streel, ‘Designing an EU Intervention Standard for Digital 
Platforms’ (EUI Working Paper RSCAS 2020/14) 5 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3544694> accessed 9 October 2020 
192  According to this rather narrow definitional framework introduced by Alexiadis and De Streel, in 
the former scenario, the gatekeeper controls access by third-party firms to its users. For example, 
an online social network has, to some extent, control over access to its users by online advertisers, 
particularly for those consumers who spend most of their time on that social network. In the second 
scenario, the gatekeeper controls access to content, products and/or services. For example, a search 
engine controls the access of users to web content via its ranking algorithm, while a music 
streaming service controls access to its large catalogue of music titles through its personalised 
recommendations, etc. (Ibid, 5). 
193  The Commission, on 2nd June 2020, published a consultation document by which to seek the 
stakeholders’ views as to the regulation of digital platforms for their gatekeeping functionalities. 
Commission, emphasizing wide-ranging capabilities of such platforms, e.g. access to large 
amounts of data and leveraging this into new advantages/markets, bundling a broad range of 
platform and other digital services into a seamless, data-driven offer, put forth three policy options 
for ex ante regulation. These include, (i) revise the horizontal framework set in the Platform-to-
Business Regulation (EU) 2019/1150; (ii) adopt a horizontal framework empowering regulators 
to collect information from large online platforms acting as gatekeepers; and (iii) adopt a new and 
flexible ex ante regulatory framework for large online platforms acting as gatekeepers (See 
European Commission, Digital Services Act package ex ante regulatory instrument for very large 
online platforms with significant network effects acting as gate-keepers in the European Union’s 
internal market, Document Ares (2020) 2877647, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=PI_COM%3AAres%282020%292877647> accessed 9 October 2020). 
While there is not a draft published yet, it seems that first option along with some elements from 
other options seems to be forging ahead, given the recent news leaks (Dr2 consultants, ‘The Digital 
Services Act – How does it affect businesses in the EU?’ (14 September, 2020) 
<https://dr2consultants.eu/digital-services-act-how-does-it-affect-businesses-in-the-eu/> 
accessed 9 October 2020. 
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Chrome, Apple’s iTunes, Microsoft’s Edge, but also content distribution networks, 
e.g. Akamai, Cloudflare Polish, and connectivity providers, e.g. Virgin, BT, Three, 
need to be considered. 
 
For the purpose of this study, ‘gatekeeping’ or ‘network gatekeeping’ is used to 
describe the digital gateways employed across the IP layers through which information 
flows and users’ access to informational or infrastructural resources are controlled. 
Most remarkably, this study invokes and relies on this concept with a view to address 
all the underlying concerns on the basis of access and interoperability constraints. In 
so doing, this study not only highlights well-known problems of network effects, 
vendor lock-in, market foreclosure, etc. but also indicates that this term could be a 
component of a wider normative framework.194 
 
While gatekeeping or network gatekeeping is not acknowledged as a technical term 
within the EU legislation or precedents,195 the recent EU proposal could change the 
status quo, conferring this term a statutory meaning to approach a range of controlling 
powers in the ICT landscape. Marking a more distinctive path, this study invokes this 
term as one of the key concepts around which interoperability is revitalised along with 
a normative framework in the end. 
 
194  See the section ‘8.4.2. Revitalising ‘gatekeeping’ and gatekeeping activities’. 
195  See also Alexiadis and De Streel (n 191) 5. 
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3.2. Pertinent legal regimes and rules 
3.2.1. Intellectual property rights (IPRs) and legislation 
In the 1970s, the arrival of computer products for mass markets – notably personal 
computers and computer games – put paid to “first generation” notions that functioning 
elements and above all “computer programs”,196 could be adequately protected within 
the framework of IPRs.197 While these legal mechanisms have remained vital, they have 
come to be underpinned, first by copyright in software and, to an increasing extent, also 
by patents on inventive techniques associated with programming.198 This trend has 
become an overarching reality following the mass production of computer hardware and 
software and the accompanying pressure coming from the manufacturers.199     
Accordingly, computer programs were regarded and protected as ‘literary works’200 
under international copyright law, particularly within the context of the 1979 
 
196  [A] computer program is a list of instructions or statements for directing the computer to perform 
a required data-processing task. There are various types of programming languages that can be 
written for a computer, but the computer can only execute programs which are represented 
internally in binary form (e.g. a series of 1s and 0s). Programs written in other languages must be 
translated to the binary representation before they can be executed by the computer. The binary 
code representation is also known as machine language. For example, a machine language 
instruction may add two numbers, move data from one memory location to another, or determine 
whether a number is equal to zero. A machine language instruction such as the bit (binary digit) 
sequence 01101011 might correspond to the instruction to ‘add the contents of one register to 
another’. Very few programmers can readily understand machine language, and almost no program 
would currently be written directly in this form (John Abbott, ‘Reverse Engineering of Software: 
Copyright and Interoperability’ [2003] 14 Journal of Law and Information Science 7, 9).  
197  William Cornish, David Llewelyn and Tanya Aplin, Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, 
Trade Marks and Allied Rights (8th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2013) 818. 
198  Ibid. 
199  Ibid. See also Pamela Samuelson, ‘The Past, Present and Future of Software Copyright 
Interoperability Rules in the European Union and United States’ [2010] 34(3) European 
Intellectual Property Review, 229-236.  
200  Any work not dramatic or musical and is written, spoken or sung, denotes ‘literary works’ in 
general. Either expressed in print or writing, such works are regarded as ‘literary works’ insofar 
as they involve “skill, labour and judgement” within the legal understanding (e.g. under the UK 
Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988).  
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International Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works.201 
This was also embraced by the World Trade Organization (WTO) Trade-Related 
Aspect of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement202 which entered into force 
as of 1st January 1995. The written program code, both object and source codes, is thus 
protected under copyright law by analogy with other literary works, such as the text of 
a novel or poem.203 As interfaces denote the occurrence of transferring data or 
instructions repetitively between elements of a computer system,204 they could 
normally be considered as part of software or computer programs, subject to the same 
copyright protection. However, this is still questionable given the EU legislation that 
favours interoperability and creates exceptional rights along the same lines. The 
Software Directive (2009/21/EC) represents the most significant means to ensure 
interoperability in association with the software related copyrights, at the EU level. 
The Software Directive grants copyright protection to the “expression in any form of 
a computer program”, whereas “ideas and principles which underlie any element of a 
computer program, including those which underlie its interface, are not protected”.205 
Based on the legal doctrine known as the idea expression dichotomy,206 the written 
program code, both source and object codes, could be categorised under the latter and 
considered as protected under EU copyright law. Along the same lines, APIs are 
 
201  Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (as amended on September 
28, 1979), ˂http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/berne/˃ accessed 9 October 2020. 
202  Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (‘TRIPS Agreement’) is a 
multilateral agreement, Annex 1C of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO, setting out 
the minimum standards of legal protection and enforcement for a number of different forms of 
IPRs. See WTO, TRIPS, ˂https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips_01_e.htm˃ 
accessed by 9 October 2020. 
203  Simoneta Vezzoso, ‘Copyright, Interfaces, and a Possible Atlantic Divide’ [2012] 2 Jipitec 154 
˂https://www.jipitec.eu/issues/jipitec-3-2-2012/3444/vezzoso.pdf˃ accessed 9 October 2020. 
204  See Weston (n 13) 234. 
205  Software Directive, art 1(2). 
206  The main rationale behind the idea/expression dichotomy is that it is socially desirable to allow 
for the free use of the fundamental building blocks, the “ideas” of knowledge production, within 
the area of copyright protection. 
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expected to be covered by this copyright regime as they represent the expressive 
elements of a computer program which are supposedly “original” within the meaning 
of the Software Directive.207 
From this general standpoint, the so-called idea/expression dichotomy and the 
exclusion of functional/expressive elements from copyright protection would apply to 
the methods in APIs as well as the kernels of the computer programs. Yet software 
interoperability is underscored in the Software Directive, which grants an exception to 
the codes that are indispensable for the achievement of interoperability: 
The unauthorised reproduction, translation, adaptation or transformation 
of the form of the code in which a copy of a computer program has been 
made available constitutes an infringement of the exclusive rights of the 
author. Nevertheless, circumstances may exist when such a reproduction 
of the code and translation of its form are indispensable to obtain the 
necessary information to achieve the interoperability of an 
independently created program with other programs. It has therefore to 
be considered that, in these limited circumstances only, performance of 
the acts of reproduction and translation by or on behalf of a person 
having a right to use a copy of the program is legitimate and compatible 
with fair practice and must therefore be deemed not to require the 
authorisation of the rights holder.208   
 
207  Software Directive, art 1(2). According to the Software Directive, “a computer program shall be 
protected if it is original in the sense that it is the author’s own intellectual creation. No other 
criteria shall be applied to determine its eligibility for protection” (Software Directive, art 1(3)). 
208  Software Directive, recital 15. 
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The given emphasis and the exceptional situation concerning interoperability is 
reflected in Article 6(1) of the Software Directive, titled ‘Decompilation’. Article 6(1) 
limits the application of the so-called exceptional decompilation right to ‘reverse 
engineering’ with the aim of ensuring mutual functionality of non-interoperable 
computer programs. According to this provision, authorisation from the rights holder 
of a computer program is not required for reproduction or translation of the program 
in question, provided that these acts are “indispensable to obtain the information 
necessary to achieve the interoperability of an independently created computer 
program with other programs”.209 It is acknowledged that the issue of ‘functionality’, 
which ensures the compatibility of computer programs, lies at the core of the 
Directive’s rationale to set out the decompilation right.210 
On the other hand, there is an ongoing debate over the so-called functional behaviours 
of a computer program that covers the APIs and whether such interfaces could be 
deemed as an exception, as ideas and/or principles underlying the computer program 
in question. This question is remarkably important as APIs would then be imitated or 
reproduced, if not copied, by third parties who could create derivative software on top 
of the existing products. On the other hand, the Court of Justice (CoJ)’s ruling in SAS 
Institute Inc v World Programming Ltd (SAS v WPL) affirmed that either the 
functionality of a computer program, or the programming language and the format of 
data files used in a computer program, do not constitute a form of expression and 
 
209  Software Directive, art 6(1). 
210  Hart describes the level of compatibility intended by the Software Directive as ‘multi-vendor 
interoperability’. He however stresses that the Directive’s wording does not refer to the full 
functioning of all the elements of the programs with which the independently created program is 
required to interoperate (Robert Hart, ‘Interoperability Information and the Microsoft Decision’ 
[2006] 7 European Intellectual Property Review 361, 362). 
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accordingly do not enjoy copyright protection under the Software Directive, yet the 
Court did not touch on the APIs within the same category.211 
While the EU copyright regime is blurry in terms of ensuring a safe harbour for the 
APIs, patentability of software, including interfaces, is less controversial in view of 
the European patent regime. Patents are granted for “any inventions which are 
susceptible of industrial application, which are new and which involve an inventive 
step”212 and software products could be covered under this via a broad interpretation. 
However, ‘programs for computers’ are in the list of the subject matter or activities 
which are explicitly excluded from patent protection under the European Patent 
Convention (EPC).213 As this exclusion applies “only to the extent to which a 
European patent application or European patent relates to such subject-matter or 
activities as such”,214 computer programs that are claimed ‘as such’ would not be a 
patentable invention. Overall, the reading of “as such” made by the Board of Appeal 
of the European Patent Office (EPO) is in the sense that a patent cannot be granted if 
the software is a mere implementation of an invention with no technical teaching. 
However, there will be no bar to patent protection for those inventions that are 
implemented through computer programs, if that implementation represents the 
solution to a technical problem.215 From this point of view, the application of software 
architecture to a specific technical invention, of a technical character, may be 
 
211  See the section ‘3.1.3. Copyrightability of interfaces: Analysis through the lens of Softwarová and 
SAS v WPL cases’. 
212  EPC, art 52(1). 
213  In Article 52(2), the EPC excludes the following from patentability: 
(a) discoveries, scientific theories and mathematical methods; 
(b) aesthetic creations; 
(c) schemes, rules and methods for performing mental acts, playing games or doing business, and 
programs for computers; 
(d) presentations of information. 
214  EPC, art 52(3). 
215  Zingales (n 62) 9.  
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patentable as part of a bigger patentable concept, but the scope of protection is limited 
to this specific application.216 
Given the fact that patents are application-specific, when access to the information 
contained in the interfaces does not imply the “making” or the “using” of the patented 
invention, there would be no patent infringement.217 On the other hand, patent protection 
for a single software component could prevent the ‘making’  or ‘using’ of the whole of 
a complex program including the temporary uses required for decompilation or reverse 
engineering.218 Given this fact, patentability of computer programs would have 
unpredictable effects in hindering interoperability. Moreover, within a computer 
program there often exists patented applications/inventions and copyrighted software 
elements. The more complex a program is, the more difficult it will be to access 
interfaces through reverse engineering.219 This complexity is augmented by other IPRs 
such as trade secrets, sui generis databases, etc. which reside and operate collectively in 
the creation and implementation of the software.220  
From this point of view, overuse of copyright, patents and other IPRs might have 
hazardous effects on market competition and innovation, resulting in the aggravated 
concerns surrounding lacking interoperability. While IPRs might be over-protectionist 
 
216  Begoña G. Otero, ‘Compelling disclosure of software interoperability information: A risk for 
innovation or a balanced solution?’ in G. B. Dinwoodie (eds), Intellectual Property and General 
Legal Principles: Is IP a Lex Specialis? (Edward Elgar 2015) 82-83. 
217  Ibid. Patent infringement might take place when a third party makes or uses a patented invention 
without receiving the permission from the patent proprietor. According to the TRIPS Agreement, 
given that a patent is an exclusive right, the patent proprietor has the right to prevent third parties 
who do not have the owner’s consent from doing the following acts: 
- making, using offering for sale, selling, or importing for these purposes the patented product, or 
- where the subject-matter of the patent is a process, using offering for sale, selling or importing 
for these purposes at least the product obtained by the patented process. (TRIPS Agreement, art 
28(1)). See EPO, ‘Fundamentals of infringement’ <https://e-courses.epo.org/wbts_int/litigation/ 
FundamentalsOfInfringement.pdf> accessed 9 October 2020. 
218  Weston (n 13) 241. 
219  See Samuelson (n 4) 1961. 
220  For detailed information about other types of IPRs and their relation to interoperability, see the 
section ‘4. Intellectual property rights: European IPR regime’  
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and have potentially negative outcomes along with the interoperability-based 
concerns, a suspicion is valid as to whether statutory rules respond well to such 
concerns. Generally, interface IPRs e.g. patents might be considered as posing a 
serious risk for competition and follow-on innovation; when they are held by 
established firms with market power, and/or when there are incentives for firms to 
enforce interface patents, or copyrights, trade secrets, etc. in a manner that provides 
the opportunity for leveraging a dominant firm’s power in one market into that of an 
adjacent market, or last but not least, when exercise of such IPRs are essential to 
interoperability.221 The following Chapter 4 is dedicated to a comprehensive analysis 
of interoperability related IPR tools and safeguards within the meaning of the EU law.           
3.2.2. Competition law 
Competition law is concerned with promoting consumer welfare by stimulating and 
balancing static efficiency i.e. service and price based competition and dynamic 
efficiency i.e. innovation and facilities based competition.222 Competition law has a 
remedial concept regarding the monopolistic behaviours and surrounding hazards 
towards consumers by means of prohibition, prevention and punishment, where 
necessary. EU competition rules, having a central role for the functioning of the EU, 
are laid down in the Articles 101-109 of the TFEU. Article 101 prohibits anti-
competitive agreements, decisions and concerted practices, such as joint ventures, 
cartels or tacit collusions that impede effective competition in the relevant markets. 
On the other hand, Article 102 prohibits abuse of dominant position, whether through 
exclusionary practices, such as predatory pricing, refusal to deal and exclusive dealing, 
 
221  See Samuelson (n 4) 1945. 
222  Van Rooijen (n 40) 99.  
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or exploitative conducts e.g. unfair prices and degrading service quality. While these 
aim at protecting competition and enhancing consumer welfare predominantly through 
ex post remedies, the EU merger regime envisages ex-ante measures and procedures 
to pre-empt likely anti-competitive effects that would arise from mergers and 
acquisitions.223   
The primary purpose of Articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU on the one hand, and the 
2004 Merger Regulation on the other, is to preserve the competitive constraints to 
which firms are subject.224 Within the given context, national competition authorities 
and the European Commission at the EU level are equipped with a number of powers 
and tools aiming at supervising firms’ exercise of proprietary control over their 
resources, whereby the negative effects of overzealous exercise of IPRs are also 
considered.225 This prevailing role of the EU competition law could also be read 
through the TFEU provisions and foundational basis of the EU which relies on the 
freedom of persons, goods, services and capital.226 
From this point of view, it is acknowledged exclusionary conducts driven by hindered 
interoperability would harm competitive forces or restraints residing in the relevant 
market. When interfaces are concealed by IPRs or TPMs, an overzealous exercise of 
 
223  See Regulation (EC) 139/2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings [2004] OJ 
L24/1 (‘EU Merger Regulation’ or ‘EUMR’) which allows the Commission to prohibit or require 
modifications of mergers that ‘significantly impede effective competition’ (SIEC) in cases 
whereby a dominant position is created or strengthened. 
224  Pablo Ibáñez Colomo, ‘EU Competition Law in the Regulated Network Industries’ (2016) LSE 
Law, Society and Economy Working Papers 08/2016, 6 ˂ http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2747785˃ 
accessed 9 October 2020. 
225  See Van Rooijen (n 40) 99. 
226  According to Article 3 of TFEU, ‘the establishing of the competition rules necessary for the 
functioning of the internal market’ is set out as one of the areas whereby the Union has exclusive 
competence. This also relates to and is strengthened by the major freedoms that underlie the EU 
as a supra-national organisation. Article 26(2) of the TFEU states that “The internal market shall 
comprise an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services 
and capital is ensured in accordance with the provisions of the Treaties”. 
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the rights granted to the parties e.g. dominant undertakings, might be at stake making 
the competition authorities or the Commission concerned. This is more relevant in a 
case where distortion of competition happens such as in vendor lock-in following 
misuse of market power and/or network effects, along with the likelihood of lessened 
consumer surplus. Clearly, although not an aim of EU competition law itself, achieving 
interoperability has thus far emerged as an important means to break off lock-ins and 
to eliminate anti-competitive effects under the TFEU. 
Under this light, lack of interoperability between competing platforms, networks and 
services could become a source of concern particularly because of the potential 
network effects and the risk of exclusion in the relevant market(s). This situation might 
be aggravated by making use of IPRs over APIs which often function as a gatekeeper 
for the upstream ICT markets. If secondary (downstream) markets are locked into a 
proprietary platform particularly by means of using IPR-protected interfaces, the 
ultimate goals of IPR rules such as stimulation of follow-on innovation or original 
products becomes compromised, leaving a bigger room for competition law remedies. 
Following this spirit, Article 102 of the TFEU, which prohibits abuse of dominant 
position, has effectively been invoked against ‘exclusionary’ abuses e.g. involving 
hindered interoperability information. While Microsoft is known as the leading case 
regarding ‘refusal to supply interoperability information’, the precedents involving 
refusal to license practices trace back to the cases, Magill227 and IMS Health,228 where 
 
227  Joined Cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P, Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) and Independent 
Television Publications Ltd (ITP) v. Commission [1995] ECR I-743, [1995] 4 CMLR 718 (‘Magill 
judgement’). 
228  Case C-418/01 IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG v NDC Health GmbH & Co KG, Judgment of 29 
April 2004, [2004] 4 CMLR 1543 (‘IMS Health judgement’). 
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we see distinct criteria based on deterrence of new products, foreclosure of secondary 
markets, etc. 
The referred EU antitrust cases represent the cornerstone decisions setting out the 
“exceptional circumstances” that define abusive ‘refusal to license’ acts within the 
meaning of the Article 102 of the TFEU. According to the case law, refusal to license 
a dominant product that is protected by IPRs may amount to a finding of an abusive 
behaviour, providing that the ‘exceptional circumstances’ exist in the particular case. 
To reach such a conclusion, it needs to be established whether the following 
cumulative conditions have been met:229 
1. the refusal relates to a product or service that is objectively necessary to be able 
to compete effectively on a downstream market; 
2. the refusal is likely to lead to the elimination of effective competition on the 
downstream market; and 
3. the refusal is likely to lead to consumer harm. 
As hindered interoperability is meant to be the result of ‘refusal to licence or supply’ 
interfaces, the tripartite test stated above is of high importance in dealing with the 
abuses that involve interoperability information. Having said that, tripartite 
‘exceptional circumstances’ test needs to be emphasized in finding out whether a 
dominant undertaking’s ‘refusal to licence or supply interoperability information’ 
amounts to a violation of Article 102 of the TFEU. 
 
229  See Communication from the Commission-Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities 
in applying Article 82 of the Commission Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant 
undertakings, 2009, OJ C 45/7 (‘Commission Guidance’) para 81. 
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While the concerns shift from abusive market foreclosure to more sophisticated 
merger-specific concerns, the applicable test based on ‘significant impediment to 
effective competition’  (SIEC) and the underlying harm theories, would have a more 
pro-active nature focused on likely negative impacts on the market dynamics e.g. on 
price and innovation. The resorted remedies also differ in merger cases, being not 
limited to behavioural remedies but also consisting in structural ones. For instance, 
divestiture of the IPR portfolio underlying the videoconference communication 
services surfaced in the Cisco/Tandberg case, whereas more typical behavioural 
remedies were invoked in the Intel/McAfee, Microsoft/LinkedIn cases. While both 
structural and behavioural remedies aimed to enhance interoperability in the referred 
cases, one could not mention an ascertained and refined test with regards to the 
interoperability-based merger cases,230 as opposed to the ‘exceptional circumstances’ 
test applied under Article 102. The same discrepancy could be upheld for the cases of 
Article 101, which aims to assess the agreements, decisions and concerted practices 
that would have anti-competitive consequences, either by means of their object or 
effect.231 
Overall, albeit with some common elements i.e. market definition, various contexts of 
EU competition law e.g. Article 101, 102, have distinctive elements that need to be 
underlined. A detailed and comprehensive analysis is made in Chapter 5, particularly 
dealing with the refusal to supply and license cases with an emphasis to lack of 
interoperability. In this regard, a particular attention is paid to draw out the pitfalls as 
well as the proven benefits of the criteria, and tests e.g. exceptional circumstances, 
applied under Article 102 of the TFEU. In addition to this, Article 101 and merger 
 
230  See the section ‘5.4. Merger Regulation’. 
231  See the section ‘5.2. Article 101 of the TFEU’. 
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cases are also incorporated within the overall analysis, uncovering the reach and 
limitations of EU competition law.  
3.2.3. Sector-specific rules: Electronic communications law and regulations  
“Electronic communications networks”232 constitute the backdrop on which all kinds of 
ICT platforms, services and applications are run. In this scope are included all kinds of 
wired and wireless networks, like cable, mobile, etc., that enable end-to-end connectivity 
i.e. any-to-any communication, through transmission of voice, data and video. Through 
these networks are offered the “electronic communications services”, which were 
originally defined as “a service normally provided for remuneration which consists 
wholly or mainly in the conveyance of signals on electronic communications networks, 
including telecommunications services and transmission services in networks used for 
broadcasting, but excludes services providing, or exercising editorial control over, 
content transmitted using electronic communications networks and service”.233 
As can be seen, the core part of the ‘electronic communications services’ comes from the 
“conveyance of signals on electronic communications networks”, marking a distinction 
from the conveyance of the content via these networks/services. From this point of view, 
electronic communications law, or more specifically speaking the EU regulatory 
framework (ECRF), is built upon the idea of regulation of all transmission networks and 
services in a technology-neural and harmonised manner. While a significant overhaul of 
 
232  For more detailed information regarding ‘electronic communications networks’ see the section 
‘6.2.2.2. Introduction of new ECS categories’. 
233  Framework Directive, art. 2(c). The core part of this definition has been kept in the EECC, being 
rephrased as “service normally provided for remuneration via electronic communications 
networks” (EECC Directive, art 2(4)), with an enlarged scope and categories. See the section 
‘6.2.2.2. Introduction of new ECS categories’. 
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the ECRF has taken place recently with the EECC, this new consolidated Directive does 
not practically or radically change this main logic pursued so far.234 
The original ECRF, or the ‘2002 regulatory framework’, has entered into force 
incorporating a number of directives, regulations, Commission recommendations and 
decisions, to be applicable in the field of electronic communications.235 Such pieces 
of hard and soft law mean a toolbox delivering a number of regulatory tools and 
measures to cope with the structural, and to a lesser degree, behavioural market failures 
encountered in electronic communications markets. While the mainstream idea is to 
pre-empt the market failures, this is extended by a more consumer-centric, 
protectionist perspective, encompassing the issues of universal rights and data 
privacy.236 
From the competition policy point of view embedded into the ECRF, regulatory 
authorities (NRAs) define ex-ante markets in broader terms than their competition law 
counterparts,237 although they often use the ex post competition law terms and 
instruments e.g. market analysis and dominance. Their market analyses give some 
signals as to the prospective market failures, signifying a forward-looking approach 
based on the existing market data. At the end of this process, a number of remedies are 
supposed to be imposed on the dominant players or technically speaking operators 
 
234  For more detailed information regarding the ‘EECC’ see the section ‘6.2.2.1. OTT Impact and a 
new carve-out under the EECC’. 
235  For the details of the EU regulatory framework (ECRF) see the section ‘6. Sector-specific 
regulations: Electronic communications law’.    
236  Notwithstanding, interoperability is a matter of competition for the ICT markets, including those 
of electronic communications, and from this viewpoint this study elaborates the ECRF, focusing 
on the dimensions of competition and innovation at stake.    
237  Peter Alexiadis, ‘Balancing the Application of ex post and ex ante Disciplines under Community 
Law in Electronic Communications Markets: Square Pegs in Round Holes?’ (2012) 139 
˂https://www.gibsondunn.com/wp-content/uploads/documents/publications/Alexiadis-
BalancingtheApplicationofExPostandExAnteDisciplines.pdf˃ accessed 9 October 2020. 
 
104 
which enjoy ‘significant market power’ (SMP) to ensure an effectively competitive 
market functioning.   
While interoperability might appear as an issue of competition policy echoed by the 
remedies directed towards the dominant/SMP operators,238 it could also become a 
matter of standardisation policy aiming at promotion of common specifications and 
standards. For instance, Article 39 of the EECC encourages the use of the standards 
and/or specifications adopted by the European SSOs and entitles the European 
Commission to mandate a standard to the extent strictly necessary to ensure such 
interoperability and to improve freedom of choice for users.239  
Regardless of standards, some interoperability-centric obligations are remarkable 
within the context of the ECRF, particularly in two specific areas. Firstly, Article 62(1) 
of the EECC Directive imposes an interoperability obligation on CAS (set-top box) 
providers to ensure that technical services e.g. conditional access that enable digitally-
transmitted services to be received by viewers, are given to all access seekers 
(broadcasters) in a non-discriminatory way. Secondly, the interconnection obligation, 
which enables end-to-end connectivity as well as interoperable networks and services, 
is given special weight under various provisions e.g. Articles 3-5 of the Access 
Directive. While these are worth being elaborated, as reflected in Chapter 6,240 hereby 
suffice it to say that interoperability is one of the central tenets in the ECRF. Therefore, 
interoperability could be considered as one of the aims kept on by the ECRF from the 
 
238  EECC Directive, art 69 to 74 and art 76 to 81. 
239  Directive (EU) 2018/1972 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 
establishing the European Electronic Communications Code [2018] OJ L 321/36 (‘European 
Electronic Communications Code’ or ‘EECC’) art 39(3). 
240  See the section ‘6. Sector-specific regulations: Electronic communications law’. 
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beginning, which marks a distinction against other EU legal bodies e.g. IPR and 
competition law rules. 
Against this background, it needs to be noted down that the existing ex-ante 
instruments placed under the ECRF for the achievement of interoperability,241 add 
another important dimension to the ICT interoperability. This dimension is of a central 
importance because of the very nature of the ECRF and its role for the ICT 
networks/services. Chapter 6 offers a comprehensive analysis and enhanced debate 
regarding this role played by the ECRF to be followed by further regulatory 
discussions in the subsequent chapters. 
3.2.4. Data protection rules: Right to data portability 
EU data protection framework has undergone a big revision through the General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR) which entered into force on 25th May 2018. This 
Regulation introduced significant improvements concerning the rights of the 
individual users, namely ‘data subjects’, and the obligations of the entities that have 
the role of ‘data controller’ or ‘data processor’.242 The intention appears as not only 
protecting personal data243 but also boosting the data-driven economy, particularly to 
 
241  Such instruments were even enhanced in number and type within the context of the Commission’s 
ECC Proposal published in September 2016. For the details see the section ‘6.2.2. Introduction of 
new ECS categories and reach of interoperability problems’. 
242  See Articles 12-31 of the GDPR (Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of 
personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC [2016] OJ 
L 119/1 (‘General Data Protection Regulation’ or ‘GDPR’), art 4(1)).   
243  Under the GDPR ‘personal data’ is defined as “any information relating to an identified or 
identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable natural person is one who can be 
identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an 
identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the 
physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural 
person” (GDPR, art 4(1)). 
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allow a modernised data protection regime for all the parties.244 Given this fact, one of 
the initiatives under the Digital Single Market (DSM) Strategy for Europe was the 
enactment of the GDPR, through which a wide-range of new statutory rights are 
created, including the ‘right to data portability’ (RtDP). This right, regulated under 
Article 20 of the GDPR, has potential effects to reduce the switching costs. Not only 
this fact, but also the close link between the RtDP and interoperability makes this new-
born right important for the competitive supply of the data-driven ICT services. 
RtDP has two key elements: (1) the right of the data subject to obtain a copy of personal 
data from the data controller; and (2) the right to transfer that data from one data 
controller to another.245 Although aiming to enhance the data subjects’ controlling 
power vis-à-vis data controllers, the GDPR delimits the scope of the RtDP by adding 
that the controller would only transfer the data to another controller, where such a 
transfer is “technically feasible”.246 Another limitation relating to the RtDP is the 
restraint on the ‘personal data’. More explicitly, RtDP could be applied “where the 
data subject has provided the personal data on the basis of his or her consent or the 
processing is necessary for the performance of a contract”.247 
Thus, the RtDP has a limited reach as non-personal data e.g. data created for the 
purposes of management, analytics and/or advertising, is excluded from the scope of 
the Regulation. Last but not least, while the GDPR encourages “to develop 
 
244  See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of Regions COM (2015) 192 final. 
245  Aysem Diker Vanberg, ‘The Right to Data Portability in the GDPR: What Lessons Can Be Learned 
from the EU Experience?’ [2018] 21(7) Journal of Internet Law 11, 11. 
246  Aysem Diker Vanberg and Mehmet Bilal Unver, ‘The Right to Data Portability in the GDPR and 
EU Competition Law: Odd Couple or Dynamic Duo?’ [2017] 8 European Journal of Law and 
Technology 1, 2. 
247  The GDPR, recital 68 and art 20 1(a). 
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interoperable formats that enable data portability”,248 no obligation exists to secure 
‘interoperability’ for the transfers of data across different platforms under the GDPR. 
Even with standardised data formats, ‘interoperability’ could not be fully achieved via 
‘data portability’, as the former entails a higher requirement of technical, syntactic and 
semantic compatibility, going beyond the latter, namely the RtDP.249 
Granting enhanced control to the data subjects, the GDPR addresses the issue of data 
portability from the perspective of the end-user. Given this fact, the RtDP does not 
fully resolve vendor lock-in particularly in ICT markets where data hosting, processing 
and analytics is not just related to personal data.250 In fact, all the IoT-embedded 
information is not covered by the definition of ‘personal data’, and the non-personal 
data flowing through the IoT systems could have a strategic management purpose and 
cause a serious risk for lock-in unless the data at hand is portable across different 
platforms.251 
Vendor or technological lock-in would particularly take place in the case of two 
affiliated markets which affect each other.252 For example, some IoT products may 
operate in a two-markets setting where suppliers use free or low cost pricing to build 
a network or installed base of IoT products – perhaps at significant cost to the supplier 
– with the intention of monetizing the network through data analytics that are directed 
to customers on another side of the market.253 In such cases, hindering data portability 
by restricting data transfers via technical tools such as restricted APIs, imposed on 
 
248  The GDPR, recital 68. 
249  See also Unver (n 30) 106, reading; “it is apparent that ‘interoperability’ envisioned here is limited 
to data processing systems of the software platforms”.   
250  See Unver (n 30) 105-107. 
251  See also infra note 254. 
252  Gregory G. Wrobel, ‘Connecting Antitrust Standards to the Internet of Things’, [2014] 29(1) 
Antitrust ABA 62, 63. 
253  Ibid, 66. 
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collaborators and advertisers, could result in aggravation of the related concerns. 
Mandated data portability under the GDPR serves pre-emption of such potential 
problems at the outset. Nevertheless, the portability constraints relating to the non-
personal data, when considered and coupled with the broader interoperability 
concerns, would need to be handled from a broader competition and/or regulatory 
perspective.254  
4. Intellectual property rights: European IPR regime 
Intellectual property relates to information or knowledge which can be incorporated 
into tangible objects in an unlimited number of copies at different locations anywhere 
in the world.255 IPRs are rights “that exclude non-owners for a specific duration and 
over a specified breadth from commercially exploiting the IPR without the owner’s 
permission”.256 Intellectual property protects applications of ideas and information that 
are of commercial value.257 There exist a variety of IPRs, stretching across a wide 
range of generis and sui generis rights, including copyrights, patents, trade secrets, 
databases, etc. Patents give a temporary protection to technological inventions and 
design rights to the appearance of mass-produced goods; copyright gives longer-
 
254  While the lack of data portability has not been considered as an antitrust problem to be remedied 
so far, data portability would constitute the subject-matter of antitrust investigations, as happened 
in the Google case, where one of the scrutinized issues was ‘whether Google has restricted the 
portability of online advertising data to competing online advertising platforms’ (European 
Commission, ‘Antitrust: Commission Probes Allegations of Antitrust Violations by Google’ 
(Press Release, IP/10/1624, 30 November 2010), <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-10-
1624_en.htm> accessed 9 October 2020). Notwithstanding, a number of global players, namely 
Google, Microsoft, Facebook and Twitter have been involved in an open source project to facilitate 
portability of non-personal (See infra note 776).  
255  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) (Trade and Development 
Board Commission on Investment, Technology and Related Financial Issues), Competition Policy 
and the Exercise of Intellectual Property Rights (Report by the UNCTAD Secretariat, 2008), 3, 
˂http://unctad.org/en/Docs/c2clpd68_en.pdf˃ accessed 9 October 2020. 
256  Ibid, 4. 
257  Cornish, Llewelyn and Aplin (n 197) 6. 
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lasting rights in, for instance, literary, artistic and musical creations,258 trade secrets 
encompass manufacturing or industrial secrets and commercial secrets against 
unauthorized use of such information.259 Databases, representing a sui generis right, 
are compared to copyrights, yet have distinctive features based on recognition of the 
investment done for compiling data in the form of databases. 
The benefits attributable to IPRs, are not limited to, but include encouragement of (1) 
innovation by increasing the returns from research and development, (2) dissemination 
and (3) the further development of those inventions which have little value or are not 
commercially viable until improvements are made.260 One characteristic shared by all 
types of IPR is that they are essentially negative: they are rights to stop others doing 
certain things – rights, in other words, to stop pirates, counterfeiters, imitators and even 
in some cases third parties who have independently reached the same ideas, from 
exploiting them without the licence of the rights holder.261 Some aspects of intellectual 
property confer positive entitlements, such as the right to be granted a patent or register 
a trade mark upon fulfilling the requisite conditions, but these are essentially ancillary.262 
With all these aspects, IPRs create a private sphere for the rights holders with an ultimate 
view to enhance dissemination of knowledge and innovation, along with significant 
 
258  Cornish, Llewelyn and Aplin (n 197) 3. While there is a variety of IPRs, including industrial 
designs and trademarks, for the purpose of this study, the analysis has been dedicated to copyrights, 
patents, trade secrets and databases. 
259 World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO), ‘What is a Trade Secret?’ 
<https://www.wipo.int/sme/en/ip_business/trade_secrets/trade_secrets.htm˃ accessed 9 October 
2020. 
260  Ray Finkelstein, ‘Legal protection of business research and development: can it harm 
competition?’ in M Pittard, A L Monotti and J Duns (eds) Business, Innovation and the Law: 
Perspectives from Intellectual Property, Labour, Competition and Corporate Law (Edward Elgar 
2013) 252-253. 
261  Cornish, Llewelyn and Aplin (n 197) 6. 
262  Cornish, Llewelyn and Aplin (n 197) 7. 
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effects over the ‘global information infrastructure’.263 Having said that, copyright law is 
supposed to give us a self-regulating cultural policy in which the right to exclude others 
from one’s original expression fuels a vibrant public sphere indirectly driven by popular 
demand.264 By similar token, patent law is supposed to give us a self-regulating 
innovation policy in which the right to exclude others from novel and useful inventions 
creates a cybernetic and responsive innovation marketplace.265 
However, the fact that IPRs are prescribed in a manner offering an exclusive usage 
ironically poses a potential risk over social and cultural production as well as new 
entries to and competition in the relevant market(s).266 This is more compelling when 
the gateway type interfaces are not open to the third parties that would seek to develop 
derivative programs. To emphasize, not only original content or creations, protected 
by copyrights, patents, etc. and hosted by the ICT platforms, but also APIs that 
illustrate software-enabled gates for third party access to such platforms, are usually 
subject to the IPRs. At the centre of this debate lies the notion of interoperability, and 
its treatment under distinct IPR regimes. Below are analysed the main types of IPRs 
 
263  Robin Mansell and W. Edward Steinmueller, ‘Intellectual property rights: the development of 
information infrastructures for the information society’ (A study carried out for the STOA 
programme of the European Parliament, Final Report, 1995) 1-2 <http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/24969/> 
accessed 9 October 2020. 
264  Boyle (n 174) 7. It is rightfully established by the scholars that “[C]opyright law, (…) mediates 
two conflicting public interests: the public interest in maximizing the production of information, 
and the public interest in providing maximum access to information”. (Niva Elkin-Koren, 
‘Public/Private and Copyright Reform in Cyberspace’ (1996) 2(2) Journal of Computer-Mediated 
Communication, referring to Mark Rose, Authors and Owners (Harvard University Press 1992) 
140 <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1083-6101.1996.tb00059.x> accessed 9 October 2020). 
265  Boyle (n 174) 7. 
266  Notably, IPRs themselves would qualify as a barrier to entry under certain circumstances. This is 
argued to be so when the IPRs raise the costs of potential infringers per se (I. Eagles and L. 
Longdin, Refusals to License Intellectual Property: Testing the Limits of Law and Economics (Hart 
Publishing 2011) 99). According to Eagles and Longdin, this is most likely to occur when the right 
in question is used in such a way as to: 
a) inhibit the creation of new markets by limiting derivative or developmental use of protected 
products or processes; 
b) facilitate market segmentation by erecting geographic obstacles to product movement; 
c) permit rights holders to use the power conferred by the right to deter entry into markets not 
covered by the right, or requiring would-be entrants to enter all markets simultaneously or not 
at all (Ibid, 99-100). 
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under the EU legal framework, with an emphasis paid to copyrights, patents and 
trademarks, from the viewpoint of interoperability.             
4.1. Copyright 
4.1.1. General pillars of EU Copyright Law and its applicability to ICTs  
Copyright is a long-inherited and internationally acknowledged legacy right for protecting 
‘original’ creations. While the economic rationale for copyright law is to give an incentive 
to produce creative work i.e. literary and artistic works267 and avoid ‘underproduction’, 
the main rationale behind copyright and the conferred exclusive rights is to raise the supply 
of works closer to a socially desirable level.268 The Berne Convention269 represents the 
very first and widely ratified international treaty setting out the rights of the authors in their 
“literary and artistic works”. Comprising a non-exhaustive list of examples regarding 
literary and artistic works, and the rights of the copyright holders i.e. translation, 
reproduction, public performance, communication to the public, along with the applicable 
exceptions, the Berne Convention could be regarded as a baseline for the emergence of 
many national and regional copyright regimes. Based on similar pillars i.e. minimum 
rights, the EU copyright framework consists of a set of eleven directives and two 
regulations, which all together constitute copyright acquis.270   
 
267  Such kinds of works as progressively extended and categorised so as to cover dramatic and artistic 
works set the ground for delineated areas of protection; yet each area of copyright protection requires 
standard criteria, e.g. originality. Behind this lies the root requirement that sufficient “skill, 
judgement and labour”, or “selection, judgement and experience”, or “labour, skill and capital”, be 
expended by the author in creating the work (Cornish, Llewelyn and Aplin (n 197) 435). 
268  Weston (n 13) 197. 
269  Berne Convention for the protection of Literary and Artistic Works, (as amended on September 
28, 1979) (Berne Convention).  
270  See the European Commission, ‘Digital Single Market: The EU copyright legislation’ (28 August 2015) 
˂https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/eu-copyright-legislation˃ accessed 9 October 2020.  
 
112 
Within the context of EU acquis, the InfoSoc Directive271 plays a cornerstone role as it 
establishes the key rights and limitations with regard to the subject matter of the 
copyrights, to be adopted across the EU. The Directive harmonizes the basic economic 
rights (rights of reproduction, communication to the public, and distribution) in a broad 
and arguably ‘Internet-proof’ manner,272 and introduces special protection for DRM 
systems.273 The InfoSoc Directive features a horizontal harmonization instrument for 
copyright protection, not only in relation to the information society but also in general.274 
Based on Article 114 of the TFEU (ex Article 95 TEC) under EU law,275 the InfoSoc 
Directive also serves to fulfil the international obligations of the member states arising 
out of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Treaties i.e. the Berne 
Convention as well as the WTO Agreements i.e. TRIPS. When considered with other 
rights and directives i.e. the Software Directive, it is fair to say that the EU legislator is 
consistently focused on increasing the scope and intensity of protection, often further 
than the minimum standards of the Berne Convention and Rome Convention.276 
Besides the main rights stated above, TPMs also find a very first place for protection 
under the InfoSoc Directive. According to Article 6(1), Member States should provide 
“adequate legal protection against the circumvention of any effective, technological 
 
271  See supra note 70. 
272  However, the recitals 28 and 29 compromise this argument as the former reads: “Copyright 
protection under this Directive includes the exclusive right to control distribution of the work 
incorporated in a tangible article”. Whereas the latter reads: “The question of exhaustion does not 
arise in the case of services and on-line services in particular”.   
273  Mireille Van Eechoud, P. Bernt Hugenholtz, Stef van Gompel, Lucie Guibault and Natali 
Helberger, Harmonizing European Copyright Law: The Challenges of Better Lawmaking (Kluwer 
Law International 2009) 9. 
274  Bernd Justin Jütte, Reconstructing European Copyright Law for the Digital Single Market: 
Between Old Paradigm and Digital Challenges (Hart Publishing 2017) 112-113. Article 2 of the 
InfoSoc Directive illustrates this generic scope. Indeed, the reproduction right enshrined 
thereunder covers “direct or indirect, temporary or permanent reproduction[s] by any means and 
in any form, in whole or in part”. 
275  Article 114 of the TFEU grants powers to harmonize the laws of the Member States to the extent 
required for the functioning of the internal market (See Van Eechoud et al (n 273) 13). 
276  Jütte (n 274) 116-117.  
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measures” and other acts, such as the “manufacture, import, distribution, sale, rental, 
advertisement for sale or rental, or possession for commercial purposes of devices, 
products or components or the provision of services” in relation to TPMs.277 Article 7 
obliges Member States to provide for adequate legal protection against acts in relation 
to the removal of electronic rights-management information for the purpose of 
inducing, enabling, facilitating or concealing infringements of copyrights or related 
rights.278 Finally, Member States must provide for effective sanctions and remedies 
for copyright and related rights infringements.279 
While the scope of the InfoSoc Directive is related to information society issues 
covering a wide-ranging area, it should be noted that “computer programs”280 are 
specifically regulated under the Software Directive. Although there is no anti-
circumvention regime for the computer programs, expression of them is protected, 
being regarded as “literary works” in line with the international copyright legislation 
and paradigms.281 It has been held that the “expression” includes the source and object 
codes underlying a computer program, but not its functionality, programming 
language, individual or complex commands, graphic user interface or data file 
formats.282 Therefore, generated codes by the authors, i.e. software developers, are 
considered as ‘literary work’ within the meaning of European Copyright Law, as well 
as under the criteria acknowledged globally and in many developed and developing 
countries. For instance, under the 1998 UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 
(CDPA), “literary work” which in general is any work that is dramatic or musical and 
 
277  Jütte (n 274) 113. 
278  Jütte (n 274) 113. 
279  Jütte (n 274) 113. 
280  For description of computer programs see supra note 196. 
281  TRIPS Agreement, art 10; WIPO Copyright Treaty, art 4. 
282  Cornish, Llewelyn and Aplin (n 197) 821. See also the section ‘3.1.3. Copyrightability of 
interfaces: Analysis through the lens of Softwarová and SAS v WPL cases’. 
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which is written, spoken or sung, now explicitly includes a computer program and 
separately, preparatory design material for a program.283 
From the EU perspective, copyright protection is essentially based on the rights 
enshrined under the InfoSoc Directive and the Software Directive. While the former 
provides for a very broad definition of IPRs (copyrights and related rights), coupled 
with the effective endorsement of TPMs,284 the latter establishes a special treatment 
for the computer programs, which have a key role for the ICTs. Further to these, a new 
Directive, called the ‘Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market’,285 has 
come into force on 7th June 2019, incorporating new rules regarding text and data 
mining, collective rights management practices, protection of press publications, 
treatment of user-generated content, etc.286 The incorporation of these new copyright 
issues primarily reflects the need to align copyright acquis with the realities of the 
internet era, recalling the first legislative reactions to the advent of public internet.287 
The trend of enhanced controls through increased TPMs, IPRs and new statutory rights 
e.g. under DMCA, CDPA, InfoSoc Directive, EU Database Directive is an important 
factor to be taken into account concerning the development of information and 
innovation infrastructures, given the interlinks between the proprietary systems and 
network effects and the information flows. Information channels and platforms would 
 
283  The program must be recorded in writing or otherwise; but this is defined to include writing code, 
not necessarily by hand, and “regardless of the method by which, or medium in or on which, it is 
recorded” (Cornish, Llewelyn and Aplin (n 197) 435). 
284  Andrea Renda, Felice Simonelli, Giuseppe Mazziotti, Alberto Bolognini and Giacomo Luchetta, 
The Implementation, Application and Effects of the EU Directive on Copyright in the Information 
Society (CEPS Special Report, No. 120, November 2015), 125. 
285  Directive (EU) 2019/790 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on 
Copyright and Related Rights in the Digital Single Market and Amending Directives 96/9/EC and 
2001/29/EC [2019] OJ L 130 (‘Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market’). 
286  Regarding the details of the Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market, see CREATE, 
‘EU Copyright Reform’ <https://www.create.ac.uk/policy-responses/eu-copyright-reform/> 
accessed 9 October 2020. 
287  See supra note 174. 
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need to be compared to the economic goods and services in terms of the role they play 
and the impact they pose. In the face of the ‘networked information economy’ as 
elaborated by Benkler,288 this particular need surfaces and echoes in access and 
interoperability being blocked off for the “enclosure” of IPR-protected content.289  
In this enclosed world with IPRs and TPMs, a massive amount of internet content and 
information is excluded from the public domain,290 resulting in significant 
consequences exceeding the traditional consumer harm or losses and reaching out to 
lessened cultural production and participatory democracy. Within this broader debate, 
interoperability is of a key role connecting the networks, services and their users, and 
potentially diminishing the gatekeeping roles and functionalities that are often shielded 
by IPRs and TPMs. In this context, copyrights have an important stake as they are 
spontaneously born with the creation of the subject-matter and provide the rights 
holders with a legal protection against digital copying particularly on the internet. 
Technically speaking, the Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market 
maintains the legacy copyright principles and rules under the InfoSoc Directive and 
the Software Directive, including those related to interoperability. That is to say, 
interoperability regime of the EU copyright acquis has remained the same throughout 
the years, even after the recent changes in the EU law. Having said that, examined 
 
288  See supra note 161. Hereby it is remarkable to recognise that IPRs have a key role in this transition 
as they are “supposed to create a feedback mechanism that dictates the contours of information 
and innovation production” and from a broader perspective it could be said that they are “designed 
to shape out information marketplace” (Boyle (n 174) 7).  
289  The term of ‘enclosure’ is used by Boyle in his exposition concerning the IPRs and public domain 
in which expansion of the former at the expense of the latter is highlighted with the phrase, ‘second 
enclosure movement’. According to his analogy, this follows the first enclosure movement around 
feudal systems within which was existing concentration of economic in exchange for large-scale 
investment and management (Boyle (n 174) 42-45). 
290  Boyle (n 174) 46; Lessig (n 175) 186. 
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below are the key aspects of the European copyright system concerning 
‘interoperability’ with a focus on the Software Directive. 
4.1.2. Reverse engineering and achievement of interoperability under EU 
copyright law 
Within the EU legal system, a well-known idea/expression dichotomy291 could be said 
to have been directly translated into the copyright protection of ‘computer programs’, 
along with some exclusive rights attributed to the subject matter. The so-called 
copyrightable subject matter, is referred to as “the expression in any form of a 
computer program”, whereas “ideas and principles which underlie any element of a 
computer program, including those which underlie its interfaces” are excluded from 
copyright protection.292 While the existence of  an “author’s own intellectual creation” 
is considered to meet the ‘originality’ threshold for copyright protection,293 the rights 
holders are given a number of exclusive rights294 that are subject to certain exceptions 
regulated under Articles 5 and 6 of the Software Directive. 
Article 5(3) of the Directive allows any person to “to observe, study or test the 
functioning of the program in order to determine the ideas and principles which underlie 
any element of the program” without the authorisation of the rights holder. This practice, 
 
291  Separate treatment between expressive parts of computer programs and the underlying ideas and 
principles is usually simplified as the ‘idea/expression’ dichotomy. 
292  Software Directive, art 5(2). 
293  Software Directive, art 1(3), reading; “A computer program shall be protected if it is original in 
the sense that it is the author’s own intellectual creation. No other criteria shall be applied to 
determine its eligibility for protection”. 
294  Such rights cover “the right to … (a) … reproduction of a computer program … (b) the translation, 
adaptation, arrangement and any other alteration of a computer program and the reproduction of 
the results thereof, … (c) any form of distribution to the public, including the rental, of the original 
computer program or of copies thereof” (Software Directive, art 4).   
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called “black box analysis”,295 helps finding interoperable solutions across the 
mainstream platforms through observation and testing processes realised by the 
competing firms. This could be construed as a point of divergence from the established 
copyright paradigm and rules surrounding the idea/expression dichotomy. Taking a step 
further, Article 6 of the Software Directive establishes an exception directly aiming at 
interoperability. While Article 5(3) allows reverse engineering for a broader set of 
objectives mentioned above, Article 6 specifically addresses the issue of interoperability 
between computer programs. 
Article 6(1) of the Software Directive sets out the “decompilation” right which is often 
called “white box analysis”, as it allows for underlying source code to be analysed so as 
to find out the functionality of the program, namely how it works internally. Broadly 
echoed with the term ‘reverse engineering’, the so-called decompilation right is confined 
to the aim of ‘mutual functionality’ being achieved between computer programs.296 
According to Article 6(1), authorisation from the rights holder of a computer program is 
not required for reproduction or translation of the programme in question, provided that 
these acts are “indispensable to obtain the information necessary to achieve the 
interoperability of an independently created computer program with other programs”.297 
If the information necessary to achieve interoperability is readily available, the 
decompilation right would no longer be applied. Moreover, even if the given requisites 
are fulfilled, decompiling the program could not be done “for the development, 
 
295  This is considered as a type of ‘reverse engineering’ along with other acts, i.e. disassembly and 
decompilation, distinguished by certain technical and functional aspects. For detailed analysis of 
reverse engineering including typical examples see Abbot (n 196) 11-14. 
296  It is acknowledged under the Software Directive that “The function of a computer program is to 
communicate and work together with other components of a computer system and with users” 
(Software Directive, recital 10). 
297  The Directive restricts the application of the decompilation right to “the parts of the original 
program which are necessary to achieve interoperability” (Software Directive, art 6(1/c). 
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production or marketing of a computer program substantially similar in its expression, 
or for any other act which infringes copyright”.298 
The Software Directive, through the exceptions under Articles 5(3) and 6, purports to 
balance the rights between the copyright holders and licensees (access seekers) who 
would intend to have a back-up copy to come up with new ideas and/or create 
compatible programs. In this vein, when black box analysis is insufficient to achieve 
interoperability, reverse engineering is permitted if, in order to achieve interoperability 
of an independently created computer program with other programs, it is necessary to 
reproduce the code and translate its form.299 
Hereby, the goal of rewarding original creations of computer programs is weighed up 
against the creation of derivative programs by third party software developers that rely 
on interoperability information i.e. interface specifications. Thereby, the trade-off 
between the socially desirable goals is embodied through the exceptional reverse 
engineering rights, with the view to encourage computer programs that are 
interoperable with the existing ones. This allowance also relates to the fact that 
interoperability information is usually distributed to the public in object code and could 
not be learnt without disassembly, in other words, decompilation. In other words, it is 
envisaged that the opportunity cost for creating interoperable computer programs is 
reduced to a certain extent as to allow follow-on innovation and compatible computer 
programs. 
Conversely, the balanced approach based on a trade-off is seen in the Directive’s 
prohibiting the information obtained through decompilation “to be used for the 
 
298  Software Directive, art 6(2/b). 
299  Weston (n 13) 39. 
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development, production or marketing of a computer program substantially similar in 
its expression, or for any other act which infringes copyright” (Article 6 (2/c)). Given 
this fact, it could be stated that the effect of the Software Directive is not just to protect 
certain configuration of a program, but also the rights of the holder in reproductions, 
translations, transformations, changes, improvements etc. that in themselves constitute 
original works.300    
4.1.3. Copyrightability of interfaces: Analysis through the lens of Softwarová 
and SAS v WPL cases 
Whereas APIs directly serve interoperability being achieved between computer 
programs, it is worth questioning to what extent usage and dissemination of the 
interfaces is warranted under the EU copyright regime, namely under the Software 
Directive. It should be reiterated that it is already legitimate to achieve interoperability 
between computer programs by means of reverse engineering. It is thus clear that the 
Directive permits those who reverse engineer the object code to reach out for the 
underlying human-readable source code. However, a crucial question remains to be 
answered: are the interfaces identified through either black or white box analysis, 
protected the same as the copyright-protected subject matter, i.e. the internal 
programming or kernels of the computer program, under the Software Directive? 
The Software Directive, compromising between different aims and concerns, implicates a 
mid-way between the copyright holders and access seekers that want to develop 
compatible programs. While the latter firms are attempting to access the source code 
through black or white box analysis, they would reach out to the interfaces that underlie 
 
300  Weston (n 13) 204, referring to Begoña González Otero, ‘Compelling to Disclose Software 
Interoperable Information’ [2013] 16(1-2) The Journal of World Intellectual Property 5. 
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the computer programs they observe and/or analyse. Regardless of the ‘originality’, should 
they use an insubstantial part of the interfaces to create interoperable software, this would 
normally be accepted as concurring with the scope and purpose of the Software Directive. 
Thus, when the very aim of the Directive is taken into account, interfaces would need to 
be conferred an equivalent meaning and protection as the internal codes or kernels of 
software under the copyright regime of the Software Directive.301 
Having said that, it should also be born in mind that interfaces comprise not only the code 
that implements them but also the ideas, rules or principles in the specification of the 
interface.302 Although the source code and machine code of interfaces may not per se be 
outside the protection of copyright, there are certain aspects, such as specifications and 
protocols (the aspects relevant to standards) which are not expressions but the underlying 
ideas and principles.303 Whereas interface specifications, which can be regarded as the 
rules and methods underlying an interface and governing the program’s behaviour, could 
be said to fall outside the scope of the copyright protection, the“implementation”of an 
interface into a program’s code will arguably constitute a protectable expression as long 
as it meets the originality requirement.304 As could be inferred here, interfaces posit a 
shakeable ground for the purpose of copyrightability to which the EU precedents do not 
have a clear-cut response. 
 
301  On the other hand, this could be contested with the argument that the pro-interoperability approach 
of the Directive is compromised under Article 6 of the Directive, which limits decompilation to 
the licensees and/or equivalent rights holders [art 6/1(a)], with the limitation to “the information 
necessary to achieve interoperability [that] has not previously been readily available” [art 6/1(b)] 
and to “the parts of the original program which are necessary in order to achieve interoperability” 
[art 6/1(b)]. Likewise, the Directive bans usage of the obtained information “for goals other than 
to achieve the interoperability” [art 6/2(a)] and prohibits dissemination of such information 
“except when necessary for the interoperability of the independently created computer program” 
[art 6/2(b)] (See Otero (n 216) 88). 
302  Weston (n 13) 200. 
303   Weston (n 13) 200. 
304  Inge Graef, ‘How can software interoperability be achieved under European competition law and 
related regimes?’ [2011] 5(1) Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 6, 16.  
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The Softwarová305 judgement illustrates this elusive situation, where the CoJ was 
asked to determine whether the graphical user interface (GUI) of the computer 
programs would constitute an expression within the meaning of Article 1(2) of the 
Software Directive. As the question was related to the GUI, which is a user interface,306 
a possible answer would not directly solve the problems as to the APIs that ensure 
compatibility between the competitors. Nevertheless, some implications could be 
derived from the judgement. The CoJ made it clear that as a GUI does not enable the 
reproduction of a computer program it does not constitute a form of expression under 
the Software Directive.307According to the Court, the source code and object code of 
a computer program that permit reproduction in different languages constitute a 
protected form of expression.308 While the GUI is not found to be protectable under 
the copyright regime of the Software Directive, the Court did not exclude the 
possibility that the interfaces could be copyrightable within the meaning of the InfoSoc 
Directive, namely the ordinary and generic copyright regime of the EU. However, 
copyrightability of APIs was not the issue that has been resolved under the case. 
The issue has been brought before the Court by means of another case, SAS Institute 
Inc v World Programming Ltd (‘SAS v WPL’),309 which reveals a cornerstone decision 
for idea-expression dichotomy and copyrightability of software. The case arose out of 
the conflict that took place following a firm, World Programming Ltd (WPL), that 
developed a program that emulated the functionality of the popular statistical analysis 
 
305  Case C-393/09, Bezpečnostní Softwarová Asociace - Svaz Softwarová Ochrany v Ministerstvo 
Kultury [2011] ECDR 3 (‘Softwarová judgement’). 
306  GUIs, which are not seen as part of the code but only as a result of the code, are also referred to as 
the “look and feel” enabling communication and interaction between the user and the computer 
program (Weston (n 13) 208). 
307  Softwarová judgement, para 35. 
308  Softwarová judgement, para 35. 




program, SAS. Based on observing and testing SAS programming language and 
related manuals, WPL’s attempt was a target-based response to the market demand for 
ensuring SAS-based statistical operations be performed on alternative platforms. The 
fact that WPL had no access to SAS source code or to the internal design 
documentation of the program, either directly or through decompilation,310 makes the 
conflict interesting and potentially significant. After SAS sued WPL for infringement 
of copyright over its behaviour and the data formats of the SAS program as well as the 
SAS programming language, the case was taken to the CoJ for its interpretation under 
Article 267 of the TFEU. 
The CoJ affirmed that there has been no copyright infringement in line with the finding 
of the UK High Court. The CoJ held that “neither the functionality of a computer 
program nor the programming language and the format of data files used in a computer 
program in order to exploit certain of its functions constitute a form of expression”.311 
According to the CoJ, “to accept that the functionality of a computer program can be 
protected by copyright would amount to making it possible to monopolise ideas, to the 
detriment of technological progress and industrial development”.312 However, the 
Court statement pointed to the possibility that the access sought functional elements 
of the computer program in question would be considered as a subject matter of generic 
copyright protection i.e. under the InfoSoc Directive.313 
 
310  Samuelson (n 199) 229.  
311  SAS v WPL judgement, para 39. 
312  SAS v WPL judgement, para 40. It is conceivable that this viewpoint is complementary to the 
Softwarova ruling, where the CoJ, whilst not excluding the copyrightability of graphic user 
interfaces, found that such interfaces do not constitute a form of expression of computer programs 
but enable users making use of their features. 
313  SAS v WPL judgement, para 45. 
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The SAS v WPL case clearly shows that the ideas/expression dichotomy has been 
expounded by the Court with a favourable interpretation to enhance follow-on 
innovation, yet with no mention about the APIs. As explained above, the Software 
Directive sets out the rules for ensuring interoperability through reverse engineering 
bypassing the renowned copyright principle of the ideas/expression dichotomy. 
Copyrightability of interfaces being left unsettled both under the Directive and the 
CoJ’s jurisprudence in SAS v WPL, the functional character of APIs314 and the merging 
of ideas and expression on them,315 blurs the distinction based on the so-called 
dichotomy with respect to the APIs. Therefore, although the copyright regime of the 
Software Directive provides control over the information embodied in the subject 
matter per se,316 APIs would not be directly put into the same basket i.e. Article 1(2) 
of the Directive, considering their very functional nature and the inherent features of 
incorporating the non-expressive parts of the computer program. 
If Article 6 of the Software Directive indeed reflects such a policy by allowing access 
via decompilation of a program’s code to study its internal structure and other 
expressive aspects of program text, when this process is indispensable to achieving 
interoperability, it would make no sense to establish a right to access program internals 
and then to condemn the reuse of interface information discerned in this process as 
infringing when it is necessary to achieve interoperability.317 Assuming the case for 
IPRs in computer programs is to improve the creation, innovation and dissemination 
 
314  See also Vezzosso (n 203) 159, reading; “…[t]he functional character of APIs, being even stronger 
than with computer programs in general, would very often place them well below the originality 
threshold, and the general support in favour of interoperability expressed by the Software Directive 
could possibly present a further counterargument [against copyrightability of interfaces]”. 
315  Otero (n 216) 86, reading; “Since a computer program’s form of expression is functional, 
variations of its expression will not matter because these possible variations come from utility 
reasons and not the ’aesthetic freedom’ or whim of its developer. Therefore, expression and 
function merge. …”  
316  Otero (n 216) 86. See Software Directive, art 1(2). 
317  Otero (n 216) 86. 
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of knowledge to enable a competitive and prosperous software market,318 the 
functional character of the interfaces ought to be taken utmost into account, alongside 
the pro-interoperability policy of the Software Directive. Last but not least, any 
prospective interpretation and solution would rather be in harmony with international 
copyright legislation, particularly TRIPS and WCT provisions, which expressly 
distinguish ‘methods of operation’ from copyrightable subject matter.319 
4.2. Patents  
4.2.1. General overview of the EU patent regime  
Patents are granted to protect and stimulate inventions. Patents are of high importance 
in the high technology markets, as every ICT equipped device, including smartphones, 
computers and semiconductors are built on the patented technologies.320 In general, 
for an invention to be patentable, some conditions must be fulfilled. The inventor who 
meets these criteria obtains the right to exclude all others without licence from making, 
using or selling the invention in the particular jurisdiction, usually for 20 years.321 In 
return, patent holders are required to publicise (fully disclose) their inventions. There 
are several international conventions governing patents, among which, the most 
prominent ones are TRIPS and the UN WIPO Treaties. According to Article 27(1) of 
the TRIPS Agreement; “Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 2 and 3, patents shall 
 
318  Weston (n 13) 198. 
319  According to Article 9(2) of TRIPS Agreement and Article 2 of the WCT, copyright protection 
shall extend to expressions but not to the “ideas, procedures, methods of operation or mathematical 
concepts as such”. 
320  See Stefano Comino, Fabio M. Manenti and Nikolaus Thumm, ‘The Role of Patents in Information 
and Communication Technologies (ICTs): A Survey of the Literature’ (2017) Marco Fanno 
Working Paper N. 212, 3. According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) and the WIPO figures, about one third of the patent applications were filed 
within the ICT-related sectors (Ibid).  
321  Finkelstein (n 260) 249. 
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be available for any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of 
technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of 
industrial application”.322 Similarly, the Paris Convention,323 being administered by 
the WIPO, requires that 20 year patent protection be available for all inventions, 
whether of products or processes, in almost all fields of technology.324 
In addition to the abovementioned treaties, the EPC has also a key role in the regulation 
of patents across the EU.325 In EU Member States, inventors can apply through either 
the national or EPC route, which creates a twin-track system. The EPC route involves 
an application to the EPO in Munich, the inventor choosing (‘designating’) the 
European countries in which he wants a patent and paying the relevant fees.326 Both 
European and national patents are granted the same treatment in terms of effectiveness. 
However, there is neither an EU legal framework nor European court dealing with the 
patent related issues e.g. infringement and revocation. Therefore, national courts have 
competence in their jurisdiction to give an affirmative decision as to whether a patent 
has been infringed, without being bound up with the EPO case law. Because the EPC 
does not provide for any supra-national court to rule on European patents once granted, 
as its Boards of Appeals are merely internal judicial organs overseeing decisions in 
respect of the grant of patents, there is a serious risk of the courts of the Contracting 
States applying different standards in cases concerned with validity and 
infringement.327 
 
322  TRIPS Agreement, art 27(1).  
323  Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (as revised at Stockholm in 1967). 
324  Śaila Jaina and R. K. Jain, Patents: Procedures and Practices with Examples of Complete 
Specifications and Important Judgements (Universal Law Publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd. 2011) 174.  
325  Regulation of patents originally goes back to the 1883 Paris Convention for the Protection of the 
Industrial Property, which allows special agreements between the members insofar as they do not 
create a contrast with the Convention itself. 
326  Sir Robin Jacob, Daniel Alexander QC and Matthew Fisher, Guidebook to Intellectual Property, 
(6th edn, Hart Publishing 2013) 29. 
327  Hellen Norman, Intellectual Property Law, (OUP 2011) 83. 
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According to Article 52(1) of the EPC, European patents could be granted for the 
inventions “which are susceptible of industrial application, which are new and which 
involve an inventive step”.328 As defined by the EPC for patentability, the invention 
should possess novelty, an inventive step and industrial applicability, not consisting of 
excluded subject matter or any of the exceptions to patentability.329 According to 
Article 52(2) of the EPC, the following items in particular are not regarded as 
inventions for the purpose of patentability: 
(a) discoveries, scientific theories and mathematical methods; 
(b) aesthetic creations; 
(c) schemes, rules and methods for performing mental acts, playing games or 
doing business, and programs for computers; 
(d) presentations of information.   
While the above given non-exhaustive list denotes the excluded subject matter,330 
‘exceptions’ to patentability are placed under Article 53 of the EPC. Such exceptions 
include the inventions which are contrary to public order or morality, those involving 
plant and animal varieties or essentially biological processes for the production of 
plants or animals, and those incorporating the methods of treatment and diagnostic 
methods practised on the human or animal body.331   
 
328  EPC, art 52(1). 
329  EPC, art 52-57. See also Stavroula Karapapa and Luke McDonagh, Intellectual Property Law 
(OUP 2019) 401; Norman (n 327) 102. 
330  This could also be seen from the wording of Article (52/3) which reads as follows: 
“The provisions of paragraph 2 shall exclude patentability of the subject-matter or 
activities referred to in that provision only to the extent to which a European patent 
application or European patent relates to such subject-matter or activities as such”.   
331  EPC, art. 53. 
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4.2.2. Patentability of software and interfaces under the EU patent regime 
While there is no argument against the patentability of computer technology in the 
sense of hardware, significant issues arise on the software side.332 Principally, non-
patentable items under the EPC consist of a number of “subject-matter or activities as 
such”, including computer programs. Nevertheless, it is widely acknowledged that 
computer-implemented inventions could be covered by Article 52(1) of the EPC, 
which affirms patentability of industrial applications. Having said that, computer 
programs could not be patentable if they are meant to be inventions themselves. That 
is to say, software components of inventions could benefit from the European patent 
regime insofar as they are purported to be an industrial application. The key point that 
needs to be taken into account for patentability is the ‘technical character’ required for 
the computer programs. According to the EPC, they need to meet the criteria of 
‘novelty’, ‘inventive step’ and ‘industrial application’.333 
According to the EPO, the subject matter for which patent is sought must have a 
technical character, more precisely, involve a “technical teaching”; that is an 
instruction addressed to a skilled person as to how to solve a particular technical 
problem, rather than, for example, a purely financial, commercial or mathematical 
problem, using particular technical means.334 The Board of Appeal of the EPO set forth 
that a patent cannot be granted if the software is a mere implementation of an invention 
 
332  Cesare Bartolini, Cristiana Santos and Carsten Ullrich, ‘Property and the cloud’ [2018] 34 
Computer Law and Security Review 358, 369. 
333  Paul Van den Bulck, ‘Patentability of Software’ (ULYS Net), 
˂https://www.ulys.net/upload/conferences/doc/Patentability%20of%20Software.pps˃ accessed 
21 August 2018. See EPO, Patents for software? European law and practice (2009) 
˂https://tt.tecnico.ulisboa.pt/files/sites/41/PI-Pack-INPI-E-Patents-for-Software-EPO.pdf˃ 
accessed 9 October 2020. Similar criteria are also sought under the TRIPS and WIPO Treaties for 
patentability (See the section ‘4.2.1. General overview of the EU patent regime’). 
334  Van den Bulck (n 333). 
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with no technical teaching.335 However, there will be no bar to patent protection for 
those inventions that are implemented through computer programs, if that 
implementation represents the solution to a technical problem.336 Therefore, 
inventions having a technical character that are or may be implemented by computer 
programs e.g. refrigerators, washing machines, mobile phones, anti-lock braking 
systems (ABS) for cars, DVD players, medical imaging (X-Ray) and aircraft 
navigation systems, may well be patentable.337 
To put in a nutshell, patents could be granted for programming the software aiming at 
a computerised (industrial) solution. This very aim also goes for the ‘interfaces’ that 
either enable a computer program’s internal design or ensures its interoperability with 
other competing programs. Such interfaces are often distributed to third parties in 
object, machine-readable codes, so as to prevent unlicensed uses and copies. As the 
concealed, human-readable APIs could not normally be found out by executing 
commercially distributed object codes, access seekers would have to use reverse and 
social engineering i.e. observation and testing processes, to identify the interfaces at 
stake. To pre-empt such attempts from the outset, many software programmers and/or 
product designers hold patents, as well as copyrights, pertaining to such interfaces. 
The main factor that makes patents preferable is their power to enable the rights 
holders to far more easily detect and claim infringement against unlicensed 
products.338 Indeed, the exclusionary power of patents is strong and effective even 
 
335  See Case T 258/03, Auction Method/HITACHI [2004] OJ 2004, 575. 
336  Zingales (n 62) 9. 
337  Van den Bulck (n 333). 
338   See also Peter Drahos and John Braithwaite, Information feudalism (Eartscan Publications 2002) 
173, reading; “the companies that colonise the internet with these kinds of patents [i.e. 1-Click 
patent] and are able to enforce them using a combination of software tracking tools and the threat 
of litigation are in a position to become, in effect, the internet’s private regulators”. 
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when the technical design disclosed in the patent is only modestly innovative or an 
arbitrary variation on an existing technique.339 
The fact that ICTs are based on incrementally developed software that are highly 
dependent on abstract algorithms arouses a long-standing debate as to what extent 
software ought to be patented, incorporating the interfaces. On both sides of the 
Atlantic, patentability of software and related interfaces has thus far been a matter of 
conflict among access/license seekers and patent holders. The ease for rights holders 
to claim infringement does have an effect to dissuade third parties from making or 
using the patents.340 Moreover, there is not an exceptional right e.g. such as 
decompilation, for the purpose of  interoperability under the European patent regime 
as opposed to the copyright regime. As is well-known from the patent wars in the 
smartphone industry, patents are claimed by their owners as a strategic and pre-
emptive tool against their competitors.341 
Hence, the allowance of widespread software patents in both the European and global 
systems is open to criticism. The cumulativeness and complexity of innovation in ICTs 
makes the role of patents less clear-cut, provided that a strengthening of the protection 
they guarantee may have heterogenous effects on the different generations of 
innovators.342 The social value of early innovations is not only related to the utility 
generated from their use, but also to the positive externality they contribute to future 
 
339  Samuelson (n 4) 1962-1963. 
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applications/developments.343 From this viewpoint, it would be argued next generation 
inventions should be given leeway by the preceding ones. 
Patent related critics gain importance in conjunction with the surge in patents in the 
ICT field and their potential to be used against the potential infringers as a strategic 
tool. Thereby, IPRs’ passive and defensive role is turning into an offensive tool being 
aggressively used to keep out potential rivals from the relevant, mainstream or 
complementary, markets. This very impact potentially means unforeseen 
consequences for both consumer welfare and follow-on innovation, making a 
contradiction with the general meaning and purpose of the IPRs. Outnumbered patents 
for software-enabled products, sometimes resulting in patent thickets and hold-up 
problems, would need to be revisited from a socially oriented perspective.  
At the EU level, several attempts have been made to create an exceptional right within 
the European patent system in favour of interoperability, culminating with a Directive 
proposal on the patentability of computer-implemented inventions in 2002.344 During 
the negotiations on the proposed Directive, one of the spotted problems was the 
unfettered patent protection that would make acts initially permitted under the 
copyright acquis that allows reverse engineering in order to achieve interoperability, 
‘illegal’.345 To deal with this problem, it was envisaged that the conferred rights under 
Articles 5 and 6 of the Software Directive would not be affected by the patent rights 
to be granted under the proposed Directive. It was proposed that those benefitting from 
 
343  Comino, Manenti and Thumm (n 320) 5.  
344  European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on the patentability of computer-implemented inventions’ (2002/C 151 E/05) COM (2002) 92 final 
- 2002/0047(COD). 
345  Istvan Erdos, ‘A Measure to Protect Computer-Implemented Inventions in Europe’, [2004] 3 
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Articles 5 and 6 of the Software Directive would not require the authorization of the 
rights holder with respect to the right holder’s patent rights in or pertaining to the 
computer program.346 During the review of the proposal by the European Parliament, 
several amendments were made including an additional provision stating that the use 
of a patented computer program for the purpose of achieving interoperability would 
not be considered a patent infringement.347 However, the proposal was defeated by a 
vote of the European Parliament in July 2005. 
4.2.3. Comparative analysis through the Nintendo case 
While it might be argued that the fact that software patents are limited to the specific 
applications underlying certain inventions of technical character does not present 
major obstacles to market competition, their cumulative effect, in combination with 
copyrights, should not be underestimated, particularly in terms of interoperability. 
Their largely hidden nature would make potential infringements unrecognisable for 
the third parties creating a clear impact of blocking markets to competitors. This is 
well illustrated by the Nintendo348 case analysed below. 
4.2.3.1. Brief analysis of the case 
The Nintendo case, originated in the US, has arisen out of the patent, as well as 
copyright, infringement claim by Nintendo after a rival manufacturer, Atari Games 
(Atari), had produced game cartridges compatible with Nintendo Entertainment 
System (NES), namely Nintendo’s home video game console on which Nintendo 
 
346  Ibid. 
347  Graef (n 304) 15. 
348  Atari Corp. and Tengen Inc. v. Nintendo of America Inc. and Nintendo Co. Ltd., 975 F.2d 832, 
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games are authorised and played. While non-Nintendo games, or the games not 
licensed by Nintendo, were originally prevented from running on the NES platform 
(game consoles) via an authorisation technique called “10NES”, the game cartridges 
produced by Atari allowed its users to play Atari games on the NES. Following Atari 
launching its compatible game cartridges,349 Nintendo sued its rival for the 
infringement of its patents and copyrights for the authentication technique it had been 
running on the NES platform. 
Atari, who failed to maintain its already installed base against the exclusive contracts 
and more sophisticated videogames of Nintendo, brought antitrust files under the US 
Sherman Act. Claiming that such exclusive deals amounted to monopolization in the 
videogame console market, Atari took the issue with Nintendo’s misuse of “10NES”, 
particularly by means of a patented lock-out chip that operates through a dedicated 
computer program.350 The US District Court for the Northern District of California 
consolidated the two cases and preliminarily enjoined Atari from exploiting 
Nintendo’s copyrighted computer program by upholding that Nintendo had shown a 
likelihood of success on its copyright infringement claims.351 
The Federal Circuit, on appeal, affirmed the findings of the California District Court 
with the exception that Atari’s reverse engineering was found legitimate under “fair 
use doctrine”. Emphasizing that “an individual cannot even observe, let alone 
understand, the object code on Nintendo’s chip without reverse engineering”,352 the 
 
349  Normally an initiation technique (10NES) was originally designed by Nintendo with the aim to 
create a specific access code for the authorized games to run on the Nintendo platform. Atari 
succeeded to produce game cartridges generating a similarly functioning data stream to initiate 
10NES and allow Atari games to run on the NES consoles (Samuelson (n 4) 1965).  
350  Zingales (n 62) 20. 
351  Nintendo judgement, 1. 
352  According to the Court, “An author cannot acquire patent-like protection by putting an idea, 
process, or method of operation in an unintelligible format and asserting copyright infringement 
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Court also pointed out that “fair use did not give Atari more than the right to understand 
the 10NES program and to distinguish the protected from the unprotected elements of 
the 10NES program”.353 According to the Federal Circuit, the District Court’s finding 
of copyright infringement was affirmed by the fact that Atari’s Rabbit program, or 
chip, embedded into the Atari cartridges “incorporates elements of the 10NES program 
unnecessary for the chip’s performance”, thereby going beyond unlocking the 10NES 
program.354 
Following the Federal Circuit’s remind decision over the antitrust allegations, the two 
parties ended up with a settlement. However, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
took the antitrust issue, with a focus on Nintendo’s exclusive licences hindering access 
to its proprietary platform by third parties. The FTC’s challenging decision was 
followed by the same basis intervention of the European Commission, resulting in 
Nintendo’s changed licensing policies (with Sega and Sony, for they pursued similar 
strategies).355 Despite the lifting of restrictions in its licensing agreements, the 
Japanese company continued to rely heavily on lock-out chips by embedding 
copyrighted software into its consoles; it ensured that only cartridges containing the 
code for that particular Nintendo console could be played.356 Over time, this strategy 
triggered the hostility of the user community and led to widespread deployment of so-
called “modchips”, i.e. electronic devices which disable the encryption mechanisms 
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embedded in the console to enable the interoperability of videogames made or 
distributed by non-authorized developers.357 
Consideration of “modchips” under the circumvention provision, i.e. Article 6(2),358 
of the InfoSoc Directive has been addressed by the CoJ, following several cases filed 
before the national courts resulting in different rulings.359 Although the finding was 
inconclusive on the matter, the CoJ made clear that the legal protection offered by 
Member States must respect the principle of proportionality, not prohibiting devices 
or activities which have a commercially significant purpose or use, other than 
circumventing a TPM for unlawful purposes.360 
The Court’s reference to proportionality is practically meant “to examine whether 
other measures, or measures which are not installed in consoles, could have caused 
less interference with the activities of third parties not requiring authorisation by the 
rights holder of copyright, or fewer limitations to those activities, while still providing 
comparable protection of that rights holder’s rights”.361 Accordingly, the Court’s 
ruling could be interpreted in permitting the design of TPMs with a view to allow 
legitimate activities in view of the nature, costs and other aspects, but not illegal 
copying.362 In similar cases, access seekers are thus charged to demonstrate the TPMs 
they attempted to access are more intrusive than necessary to prevent circumvention 
 
357  Zingales (n 62) 22.  
358  See supra note 73. 
359  Nintendo Co Ltd and others v PC Box Srl, Case C-355/12, (23 January 2014) (‘Nintento 
preliminary ruling’). 
360  Zingales (n 62) 22. 
361  Nintendo preliminary ruling, para 32. 
362  The factors underlined by the Court to be taken into consideration include; “the relative costs of 
different types of technological measures, of technological and practical aspects of their 
implementation, and of a comparison of the effectiveness of those different types of technological 
measures as regards the protection of rights holder’s rights, that effectiveness however not having 
to be absolute” (Nintendo preliminary ruling, para 33).  
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and copyright infringements. The key complication in that respect is that the burden 
of proof for this inquiry is borne by the defendant (access seeker), who would usually 
not have sufficient evidence as occurred in the abovementioned case giving rise to the 
preliminary reference.363 
4.2.3.2. Beyond Nintendo: Balancing between legitimate rights  
Under the light of sequential conflicts and debates following the Nintendo case, the judicial 
solutions based on the ‘fair use’ doctrine and the legitimacy of ‘reverse engineering’ seem 
to have a balanced approach against the legally and economically justifiable rights. When 
tracing back to the roots of ‘reverse engineering’, one will meet the ‘fair use’ defence that 
was largely echoed in the US jurisprudence before being codified under Title 17, Section 
107 of the 1976 US Copyright Act (USCA).364 Initially framed under the Sega Enters. v. 
Accolade Inc.365 judgement, the ‘fair use’ doctrine has been built upon four factors, as 
translated under Title 17, Section 107 of the USCA. Before this codification, the courts, 
both in the Sega and Nintendo cases, recognized the unique characteristics of software and 
understood that if reverse engineering were not permitted, the developer would receive de 
facto protection over uncopyrightable ideas.366 As rooted in these US precedents, the 
 
363  Zingales (n 62) 23. 
364  Title 17, Section 107 of the USCA reads as follows: 
“The fair use of a copyrighted work… for purposes such as criticism, comment, news 
reporting, teaching, … scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In 
determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to 
be considered shall include: 
(i) The purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature 
or is for non-profit educational purposes; 
(ii) The nature of the copyrighted work; 
(iii) The amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a 
whole; 
(iv) The effect of the use upon the potential market or value of the copyrighted work”. 
365  Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d1510 (9th Cir. 1992). 
366  Band and Katoh (n 55) 19. 
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reverse engineering privilege more explicitly recognizes the value of interoperability and 
copyright’s role in promoting it.367 
When evaluating legitimate interests of the third parties for alleged copyright 
infringements, the ‘fair use’ doctrine goes beyond the boundaries of ‘reverse 
engineering’, even conceivable arguably to reach out to patent holders, under the US 
legal system.368 While the former is codified in the US Copyright Act (17 USCA § 107), 
the latter was permitted under a broadly-formulated provision under Section 103(f) of 
the DMCA (17 USCA § 1201(f)).369 Having served as a key tool for the permissibility 
of reverse engineering in the years preceding the DMCA, the ‘fair use’ defence 
complements other jurisprudence tools, i.e. merger doctrine, patent misuse and enabling 
internal safeguards for the IPR regime in the USA. 
On the other hand, IPR rules and specifically the patent regime in the EU lack internal 
safeguarding tools responding to actual or potential anti-competitive results that would 
arise from overprotection of interfaces and accompanying reasons i.e. anti-
circumvention rules. Alternative interpretative ways or solutions based on the 
‘proportionality’ principle, as implicated by the CoJ in the Nintendo proceedings, 
would require much more fine-tuning to respond to the legitimate interests of the 
access seekers, including reverse engineering for the patented products.370 While the 
 
367  Perzanowski (n 40) 116. 
368  See Samuelson (n 4) 2008, reading; “It is also conceivable although somewhat less likely, that 
U.S. courts will adopt the fair use defense proposal … to balance the patent holders’ and public 
interests at stake in cases involving patents affecting interoperability”.   
369  Section 1201(f) titled ‘Reverse engineering’ permits the development and use of technological 
means of circumventing a technological measure for the purpose of enabling interoperability, 
providing exceptions to relevant prohibitions i.e. on the circumvention of access controls and on 
the manufacture and distribution of devices that circumvent access controls and/or copy controls 
(See Band and Katoh (n 55) 82-83). 
370  The attempts in the EU aiming to ensure that patented software products are to be subject to reverse 
engineering exemption, such as copyrighted computer programs, have failed so far. See Graef (n 




CoJ’s way of interpretation would give way to less restrictive TPMs signalling a 
further leeway for interoperability, patent-based real life problems still prevail, 
threatening market entries and innovative derivations on top of the protected products. 
In this vein, the limitedness of reverse engineering to ensure interoperability of 
copyrighted computer programs as well as lack of internal safeguards, unlike in the 
US system, appear as the major deficiencies of the patent and more broadly IPR regime 
in the EU.371  
Patents’ monopoly granting features makes it more difficult for the competitors who 
lack US-like internal safeguards not to face infringement claims when they intend to 
reach interface information.372 Overprotection of interfaces which might serve as 
standards is a matter potentially going beyond the boundaries of the IPR regimes, with 
far-reaching implications as framed above that could be affiliated to patent protection.  
Overall, not only the EU copyright acquis but also the EU patent regime and related 
mechanisms fail to adequately address the indirect effect of proprietary controls over 
interface specifications on interoperability i.e. including market blocking and 
 
371  In lieu of such internal safeguards and more enhanced IPR protection, competition law tools are 
much more invoked in the EU, with a stronger role over the anti-competitive effects stemming 
from patent exploitation.  
372  On the other hand, it is also argued that the US anti-circumvention laws i.e. DMCA, are not 
sufficient in view of a number of shortcomings (See Perzanowski (n 40) 141-142). Perzanowski 
elaborates the shortcomings as follows: 
§ 1201(f) does note embrace all the interoperable technologies. Section 1201 (f) 
permits the circumvention of technological measures that protect computer 
programs, but not “works generally, such as music or audio-visual works … 
distributed in digital form” As a result, interoperable products that make use of 
technologically protected entertainment content or other works are open to attack 
under the DMCA. The disparity in the treatment of these two classes of interoperable 
technologies is the result of two problematic distinction. First, this inequality relies 
on a clear division between technological measures that protect computer programs 
and those that protect other copyrighted works. Second, it relies on a distinction 
between program interoperability and data interoperability. Both distinctions are the 
product of factual oversimplifications, and neither supports exempting one class of 
interoperable technologies while subjecting the other to DMCA liability 
(Perzanowski (n 40) 141-142). 
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foreclosure, particularly given the fact that patent protection of interfaces can hardly 
be justified by the purported goals i.e. promoting innovation and dissemination.373 
4.3. Trade secrets 
Trade secrets represent another major field of intellectual property protection when 
considering interfaces from the interoperability perspective. Given the fact that source 
code is considered to be the source of the originality as to the computer programs, 
authors/developers of computer programs tend to keep such code as trade secrets, as 
well as resting on copyrights and patents. Because of the difficulty of qualifying for 
patent protection and the thin scope offered by copyright protection, this represents a 
valuable and concrete opportunity for the software developers in terms of preventing 
interoperability.374 At the international level, a number of requisites are laid down by 
the TRIPS Agreement, regarding the information to be covered by trade secrets. 
According to this Treaty’s provisions, the presence of trade secrets is acknowledged 
so long as such information: 
(1) is secret in the sense that it is not, as a body or in the precise configuration and 
assembly of its components, generally known among, or readily accessible to, 
persons within the circles that normally deal with the kind of information in 
question; 
(2) has commercial value because it is secret; and 
 
373  See Weston (n 13) 288. 
374  Zingales (n 62) 11. 
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(3) has been subject to reasonable steps under the circumstances, by the person 
lawfully in control of the information, to keep it secret375 
As could be seen above, trade secrets are meant to protect commercially valuable 
information which is kept as confidential via reasonable steps. In this scope of 
protection, the existence of intrinsic innovation is not sought in the software products 
covered by trade secrets. Under TRIPS, the very nature of trade secrets seems to have 
been regulated with no certainty regarding the prospect of the information obtained from 
reverse engineering, even though this process is considered not to be affected by trade 
secret protection.376 Because trade secrets have acquired strong protection since 
codification in Article 39 of the TRIPS Agreement, demanding the protection of relevant 
technical information on software programs has thus far had the effect of adding another 
layer of protection to them, potentially with significant anti-competitive effects for the 
firms that need interoperability in order to compete in the same or an ancillary market.377 
Partially to respond to this as well as to ensure dissemination of knowledge and 
information, the European authorities recently enacted the Directive 2016/943.378 The 
referred Directive (Trade Secrets Directive) has entered into force on 8th June 2018, to 
be transposed by the Member States within a two-year period, with the ultimate aim of 
harmonization of national trade secret laws. 
 
375  TRIPS Agreement, art 39(2). Under the TRIPS provision, the protection of trade secrets against 
third parties’ unauthorised disclosure, acquisition or use is bound up with such acts taking place 
“in a manner contrary to honest commercial practices.”  
376  Weston (n 13) 230-232. 
377  Gustavo Ghidini and Emanuela Arezzo, ‘One, none, or a hundred thousand: how many layers of 
protection for software innovations?’ in J Drexl (eds), Research Handbook on Intellectual 
Property and Competition (Edward Elgar 2008) 363. 
378  Directive (EU) 2016/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council on 8 June 2016 on the 
protection of undisclosed know-how and business information (trade secrets) against their 
unlawful acquisition, use and disclosure (‘Trade Secrets Directive’). 
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First and foremost, the Trade Secrets Directive follows the three requirements set out by 
the TRIPS Agreement.379 Notably, protection for trade secrets diverges from copyrights 
and patents in the sense that a trade secret is only protected against “unlawful acquisition, 
use and disclosure”, which are specified under Article 4 of the Trade Secrets Directive. 
Notwithstanding, according to Article 3 of the Directive, “the acquisition of a trade 
secret shall be considered lawful when the trade secret is obtained by … (b) observation, 
study, disassembly or testing of a product or object that has been made available to the 
public or that is lawfully in the possession of the acquirer of the information, who is free 
from any legally valid duty to limit the acquisition of the trade secret”.380 
Having said that, alongside presumably the primary means of ‘independent discovery 
or creation’, ‘reverse engineering’ appears to be an alternative means to acquire the 
information to be covered by the trade secret.381 Information obtained from reverse 
engineering should thus avail of a similar protection under the Trade Secrets Directive. 
However, this is bound with the stipulation that such a trade secret “is lawfully in the 
possession of the acquirer of the information who is free from any legally valid duty 
to limit the acquisition of the trade secret”.382 Having said this, once the acquisition or 
use has happened, a possible conflict of interests would arise under the Software 
 
379  As per Trade Secrets Directive, all the following requirements should be met by the information 
as a ‘trade secret’: 
1) it is secret in the sense that it is not, as a body or in the precise configuration and assembly of 
its components, generally known among or readily accessible to persons within the circles that 
normally deal with the kind of information in question; 
2) it has commercial value because it is secret; and 
3) it has been subject to reasonable steps under the circumstances, by the person lawfully in 
control of the information, to keep it secret (Trade Secrets Directive, art 2(1)). 
Accordingly, commercially valuable business information or know-how may be protected as 
long as it is kept secret by the holder by way of, for example, non-disclosure or confidentiality 
agreements (Inge Graef, ‘Data as Essential Facility Competition and Innovation on Online 
Platforms’ (PhD Dissertation, KU Leuven Faculty of Law 2016) 144). 
380  Trade Secrets Directive, art 3(1/b). 
381  Trade Secrets Directive, art 3(1). 
382  Trade Secrets Directive, art 3/1(b). 
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Directive as well as the Trade Secrets Directive which aims to strike a balance between 
dissemination and retaining of the information given the specified statutory rights. 
In fact, a link could be established between the so called Directives on the proposition 
of “the possession of the acquirer of the information who is free from any legally valid 
duty to limit the acquisition of the trade secret”.383 The implicated requirement of “the 
free[dom] from any legally valid duty to limit the acquisition” would mean the ability to 
reverse engineer to the extent acknowledged and allowed under the Software 
Directive.384 It is remarkable that the Trade Secrets Directive implicitly points to the 
limits of lawful reverse engineering, while explicitly acknowledging the legality of 
reverse engineering as well.385 Given the fact that restrictions under Article 6 of the 
Software Directive could amount to such a “legally valid duty”, decompiled codes would 
be deemed outside of the ‘lawful acquisition, use and disclosure’ enshrined under the 
Trade Secrets Directive should they exceed the limits of the Software Directive.386 
Another limitation of the Trade Secrets Directive relates to the contractual rights and 
unfair competition laws, which are featured under this Directive in the sense that these 
safeguards would be pre-emptive over the lawful reverse engineering. In this respect, 
the Trade Secrets Directive clarifies that “reverse engineering of a lawfully acquired 
product should be considered as a lawful means of acquiring information, except when 
otherwise contractually agreed”.387 Also, it is noteworthy that national unfair 
 
383  Trade Secrets Directive, art 3/1(b). 
384  Remarkably, Article 6(2) of the Software Directive does not permit the information obtained 
through decompilation (a) to be used for goals other than to achieve the interoperability of the 
independently created computer program; (b) to be given to others, except when necessary for the 
interoperability of the independently created computer program; or (c) to be used for the 
development, production or marketing of a computer program substantially similar in its 
expression, or for any other act which infringes copyright.  
385  Trade Secrets Directive, recital 16 and art 3/1(b). 
386  Sally Weston, ‘Improving interoperability by encouraging the sharing of interface specifications’ 
[2017] 9(1) Law, Innovation and Technology 78, 85. 
387  Trade Secrets Directive, recital 16. 
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competition laws could make it difficult to reverse engineer the information that would 
normally be kept under the trade secrets. This is expressed as follows: 
In some industry sectors, where creators and innovators cannot benefit 
from exclusive rights and where innovation has traditionally relied upon 
trade secrets, products can nowadays be easily reverse-engineered once in 
the market. In such cases, those creators and innovators can be victims of 
practices such as parasitic copying or slavish imitations that free-ride on 
their reputation and innovation efforts. Some national laws dealing with 
unfair competition address those practices.388 
Considering that it is implied, both contract and unfair competition laws could offer 
some safe harbours for the trade secret holders, it is clear to say that reverse engineering 
of the related information could not be favourably treated under trade secret provisions. 
Although counter arguments would originate from the Software Directive which regards 
contractual provisions contrary to reverse engineering as “null and void”,389 the Trade 
Secrets Directive conferring an important role to unfair competition law rules, as well 
as contractual rights and obligations, would mean some potential conflicts yet to be 
resolved against lawful reverse engineering. Further to this, the possibility that Article 
8(1) of the Software Directive would be interpreted as favourable to contractual clauses 
and unfair competition law rules390 substantiates the potential conflicts referred to above. 
 
388  Trade Secrets Directive, recital 17. 
389  Permissibility of the contractual obligations contrary to the reverse engineering is challengeable, 
considering the fact that the Software Directive clearly bans “any contractual provisions contrary 
to” reverse engineering and acknowledging them as “null and void” (Software Directive, art 8/2). 
390  See Software Directive, art 8(1) reading; “[T]he provisions of this Directive shall be without 
prejudice to any other legal provisions such as those concerning patent rights, trademarks, unfair 
competition, trade secrets, protection of semi-conductor products or the law of contract”. 
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Under the light of the above information, attempts to reach to the APIs through reverse 
engineering could be doomed to failure against commercial practices e.g. license terms 
and contractual obligations, which might regard relevant information as trade 
secrets.391 Article 6 of the Software Directive does not give any express right to use 
the reverse engineered information, so arguably a clause preventing its use may not 
fall foul of Article 8 of the Software Directive as well as the Trade Secrets Directive.392 
That is to say, the uncertainty as to the legitimacy of reverse engineering under the 
given statutory provisions of the EU law would be a grave risk for the competitive ICT 
players in effect.        
4.4. Databases 
Another form of intellectual property applicable to ICTs are databases, which are 
regulated by the EU Directive 96/9/EC (‘Database Directive’).393 Under this Directive 
is created the sui generis database right, which differs from the conventional 
copyrights that build on the ‘originality’ criterion. When this criterion is met, copyright 
protection could be claimed along with the database right. Thus, a dual regime could 
be mentioned under the Database Directive whereby copyright is granted over the 
structure of the databases and the sui generis database right is provided to protect the 
content of the databases. 
Article 4(1) of the Database Directive confers copyright protection to those databases, 
which, “by reason of the selection or arrangement of their contents” are considered to 
constitute the author’s own intellectual creation. Therefore, the originality requirement 
 
391  This does not prevent the reverse engineering of the interface, but purports to restrict the use of 
the resulting information even where there is no copyright protection (Weston (n 13) 231). 
392  Weston (n 13) 231. 
393  Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on 11 March 1996 on the legal 
protection of databases [1996] OJ L 77 (‘Database Directive’). 
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in this copyrightable material is comparably less demanding than the normal standards. 
On the other hand, while “the copyright protection of databases provided for by this 
Directive shall not extend to their contents”,394 reproduction of data stored in a 
database may constitute an infringement of the copyright of the data contained 
therein.395 This result is bound with the pre-condition that the content is ‘original’ in 
representing the author’s own intellectual creation within the meaning of 
normal/conventional standards.396 
On top of the copyright granted for the databases themselves, a sui generis database 
right is conferred onto the same subject matter insofar as it involves “qualitatively 
and/or quantitatively substantial investment in either the obtaining, verification or 
presentation of the contents”.397 This right, which enables the author of the database 
“to prevent extraction and/or re-utilization of the whole or of a substantial part … of 
the contents of that database”398 is enforceable even though the subject matter of the 
right is not copyrightable.399 In any case, both the copyright and database right that are 
enshrined under the Database Directive do not affect any rights related to the data and 
 
394  Database Directive, art 3(2). Notwithstanding, according to the same Directive provision, the 
copyright in question should be interpreted “without prejudice to any rights subsisting in those 
contents themselves”. 
395  Zingales (n 62) 13. 
396  Such originality does not refer to the arrangement and selection of the data, which is the focus of 
the inquiry into the specific copyright protection for databases, but rather to their intrinsic nature 
as a “work of art” which may or may not belong to the database maker, depending on who created 
that data in the first place (Zingales (n 62) 13). 
397  Database Directive, art 7(1). 
398  For the purpose of the Database Directive, ‘extraction’ means “the permanent or temporary 
transfer of all or a substantial part of the contents of a database to another medium by any means 
or in any form” (Database Directive, art. 7/2(a)), whereas ‘re-utilization’ means any “form of 
making available to the public all or a substantial part of the contents of a database by the 
distribution of copies, by renting, by on-line or other forms of transmission” (Database Directive, 
art. 7/2(b)).  
399  Besides, according to the Database Directive, “the repeated and systematic extraction and/or re-
utilization of insubstantial parts of the contents of the database, implying acts which conflict with 
a normal exploitation of that database or which unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of 
the maker of the database” is also protected on the part of the author of the database (See Database 
Directive, art 7/5). 
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the content that makes up the databases. Enforceability of the database right relies 
upon the investment done by the author of the database. In four related preliminary 
rulings delivered in November 2004, the CoJ made clear that the substantial 
investment required for a database to be protected under the sui generis right must 
relate to the creation of a database as such and that investment in creating the materials 
which make up the contents of the database cannot be taken into account.400 
Given the breadth of the sui generis protection and the limited scope of the exceptions 
established or foreseen in the Directive,401 it is apparent that database protection is 
broad enough to potentially cover a vast amount of data mining activities, yet with the 
potential to raise significant obstacles to the deployment of data mining techniques as 
well.402 Since data access is not included within the sui generis database right, from 
the perspective of data mining and analytics, underlying elements of databases would 
pose important barriers for the third parties, even for the subscribers to the database. 
As these parties are banned from reaching out to the substantial parts of the contents 
of the database, their potential attempts to ensure interoperability would be ineffective. 
From this point of view, should we deem access to databases an inner boundary for 
data miners, interoperability or access to interfaces would be considered as the outer 
boundary. The former (inner boundary) would have the effect of a legal barrier in the 
sense that cutting edge technologies including cloud computing and the IoT platforms 
would rest on a variety of IPRs including databases, and potential attempts to ensure 
interoperability would fail in the end. For instance, in the IoT context, data access or 
mining could not succeed even after the achievement of interoperability i.e. in the case 
 
400  Graef (n 379) 139. 
401  Database Directive, art 8 and 9. 
402  Zingales (n 62) 14. 
 
146 
that interfaces that represent outer boundaries have been rendered available e.g. 
through reverse engineering.403 That is to say, APIs being available does not mean 
transcending inner boundaries of IPR protection, namely databases, which are covered 
by copyright and the sui generis right.404 
A similar situation could be mentioned about cloud computing, components of which 
are usually protected by the IPRs, including the sui generis database right. Whereas 
the Database Directive is cemented in the conventional paradigm that databases have 
a fixed structure and location where one accumulates and stores data, cloud computing 
would challenge this inherent understanding.405 While this would augment the 
problems surrounding the cloud-based access and interoperability across different 
jurisdictions, the main problem across the EU appears to be the difficulty of the re-use 
of the datasets because of the so-called inner boundaries.406 A report before the 
European Parliament points to this difficulty, qualifying the Database Directive “an 
impediment to the development of a European data-driven economy” whereby it is 
idealised that end-users have unrestricted data access, including re-use of the datasets 
covered by the databases.407 While it seems uneasy to establish a strong link between 
a data-driven economy and database protection, it is possible to say that sui generis 
database rights creates another layer of IPR protection for running the widespread ICT 
services such as cloud computing and IoT, potentially making it difficult data mining 
and access, and rendering attempts to ensure interoperability meaningless.   
 
403  Unver (n 30) 101-102. 
404  Unver (n 30) 102. 
405  Bartolini, Santos and Ullrich (n 332) 370.  
406  Notwithstanding, there seems to be no statutory barrier against data flow across the EU, 
particularly following the entry into force of the Regulation 2018/1807, which sets out several 
measures to ensure that every business and user is able to process and store any data across the 
EU. See also infra note 775.  
407  See Bartolini, Santos and Ullrich (n 332) 369, referring to the European Parliament, Committee 
on Industry, Research and Energy and Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer 
Protection, Report on Towards a Digital Single Market Act, 21.12.2015.  
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4.5. Assessment of intellectual property rights 
IPRs, built upon different types, along with accompanying rights, bring out distinct 
layers of protection over the software and hardware components of ICTs. Copyright is 
meant to encourage and stimulate original creations, incorporating both source and 
object codes that underlie the expressive elements of computer programs. Patents aim 
to protect technical methods that are meant to be inventions which are acknowledged 
to include written codes. Trade secrets, rather narrowly fashioned in nature, are 
designed to protect the commercially valuable information that is kept as a secret on 
the part of the owner. Databases, adding another, fourth layer of protection, are subject 
to the sui generis database right based on “a substantial investment in either the 
obtaining, verification or presentation of the contents”. 
Remarkably, while each category of IPR is formulated to build on a distinct purpose 
and scope, they create distinctive layers of protection along with the potential to 
exclude rivals from copying, making or using the subject matter of the right. Against 
this background, it is remarkable that a type of exclusionary effect is embodied in the 
IPRs, although this is less persuasive regarding the trade secrets. Given this fact, a 
long-lasting debate is at stake with regard to the extent to what IPRs should have such 
an effect over the rival technologies and would-be products. For instance, while there 
is no serious debate over the copyrightability of hardware elements, against the 
complex and abstract nature of the software, distinguishing the literary and expressive 
parts of software from the non-literary ideas poses a difficult task, having direct 
implications for the interfaces. In fact, although reverse engineering and decompilation 
are allowed under copyright acquis, how to treat the APIs discerned through these 
lawful acts is yet to be settled under EU law and jurisprudence. Whilst the EU 
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copyright regime is acknowledged to cover the source and object codes, uncertainty 
still exists concerning the nature of APIs which are the key to interoperability. 
Albeit with the uncertainty mentioned above, reverse engineering is permitted in the 
Software Directive, subject to certain restrictions. The effectiveness of this solution is 
however challengeable as not representing an unfettered right for access to the 
interfaces. There are, at least, three reasons why the reverse engineering exception may 
not go far enough to promote interoperability: 
(1) Some kinds of computer programs may enjoy dual protection under both patent 
and copyright law in some countries, 
(2) Copyright holders sometimes use TPMs to lock up their programs so that they may 
not be lawfully reverse engineered without breaking the lock to access them, 
(3) Would-be second comers sometimes require access to more information than 
just the object code owned by the first-comer in order to design an interoperable 
software product.408 
On top of these reasons, it should also be kept in mind that no one but the first intruder 
(access seeker) could benefit from this method of securing interoperability given the 
fact that dissemination of the decompiled information is prohibited by Article 6 of the 
Software Directive. Moreover, software interfaces could change frequently and pose a 
significant uncertainty for the competitors because of the emergent complexity and 
upfront costs. Thus, reverse engineering arises as an expensive, time-consuming and 
 
408  Eagles and Longdin (n 266) 52. 
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unsustainable option to be hardly deemed as a self-standing business model enabling 
interoperability in the ICT field. 
While the abovementioned uncertainties are not directly relevant to patents, computer-
enabled inventions that are protected by patents might be more restrictive than 
copyrights in terms of preventing third parties from re-using the protected software, 
including the APIs. Principally, when access to information contained in the APIs does 
not involve the “making” or the “using” of the patented invention, no patent 
infringement would take place. Given this fact, reverse engineering does not amount 
to patent infringement by itself; yet one could face up to an infringement claim by 
making use of the protected interfaces. While every interface could not benefit from 
the protection because of the threshold i.e. ‘technical effect’ within the meaning of 
invention, the position of the EPO has progressively moved, and more and more 
inventions related to computer programs have been successfully granted patent 
protection in the EU.409 
In view of these facts, the patents’ blocking power against the reusability of software, 
including the interfaces, could be significant. Essentially, patents may hinder 
interoperability information being discerned and reused by the third parties, and their 
cumulative effect would be augmented with other IPRs. In fact, proliferation of IPRs, 
particularly patents, often accompanies a situation where more parties have the right 
to exclude their rivals or opt to impose an excessive licence/royalty fee. Absent 
contractual commitments or licensing obligations i.e. which may be imposed by 
 
409  Bartolini, Santos and Ullrich (n 332) 370. 
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SSOs,410 means firms can usually charge higher royalty rates for licensing interface 
patents than for licensing other patents, regardless of the degree of innovation the 
interface patents may embody.411 This would mean a double-edged threat for the 
access seekers, having a deterrent effect on the dissemination of knowledge and 
innovation. Crucially, protection of IPRs come up with a remarkable cost as to 
information flows, as opposed to the very basis of the IPR regimes. Under a strict 
interoperability regime, the intended dissemination would not be realised, nor a diverse 
cultural production based on IPR-protected content. This is more persuasive for the 
EU legal system which does not have internal IPR safeguards, unlike the US 
framework, that enjoys a number of jurisprudential tools for mitigation of IPR-based 
anti-competitive effects i.e. patent misuse, fair use and merger doctrines. 
From a broader viewpoint, a similar handicapping effect could arise out of trade secrets, 
which are also regulated under EU law. While the act of reverse engineering to reach 
certain information that is already protected by trade secrets is first and foremost legal,412 
unfair competition law and contract law regulations are acknowledged to take 
precedence over the copyright rules and the exceptions under the Software Directive.413 
By the same token, the wording of the Trade Secrets Directive enables restricting re-use 
of the interfaces even where no copyright exists, should the interfaces reflect the 
acquired information under certain limitations e.g. limits regarding decompilation, 
national unfair competition and contract law obligations. 
 
410  Most SSOs encourage IPR owners involved in standardisation to disclose upfront i.e. prior to the 
adoption of a standard, the IPRs that they consider may be essential for its implementation (See 
the section ‘2.1.4. Standardisation’). 
411  Samuelson (n 4) 1963. 
412  Trade Secrets Directive, art 3/1(b). 
413  Software Directive, art 8. 
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Databases, subject to copyright protection as well as sui generis protection under 
certain circumstances, as set out under the Database Directive, would involve an added 
layer of protection, even though they do not pose a barrier to interoperability 
themselves. Notwithstanding, transcending the outer layers of protection, i.e. other 
IPRs than databases, by enabling interoperability does not warrant reusability of 
datasets included within the databases, as this means an infringement under the 
Database Directive. Therefore, reverse engineering and other attempts to ensure 
interoperability would enable data mining and access, yet not bring an effective result 
for the databases that are protected by the rights mentioned above, which represent the 
inner boundaries precluding access and/or copying. 
From an overall perspective, while the IPRs aim to prevent infringement by limiting 
the user’s ability to copy/lend/modify files and devices, their practical application 
often goes much further than this purpose, especially through preventing 
interoperability of file formats and devices.414 This problem is also a result of and/or 
supported by the creation and use of TPMs going beyond their anti-circumvention 
purpose e.g. through preventing the use of copyrighted works that are legal, such as 
fair use/dealing or copyright for private/research purposes.415 Given this fact, one 
could mention about an ‘indirect effect’ of implementing IPRs besides their directly 
attributable original purpose. Having said that, the effect of the IPRs embracing 
interfaces would entail ‘over-protection’ that goes beyond the very aim of the 
protection of the innovation, technical invention, commercial secret and valuable 
information by often displacing the rivals away from the potential competition. 
 
414  Daly (n 23) 97. 
415  Daly (n 23) 97. 
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Crucially, the indirect effect of controlling these interfaces impacts competition and 
innovation.416 The increasing number of IPR types and layers would have significant 
anticompetitive effects for the firms which need interoperability to sell products that 
either work with or compete with the protected program.417 The indirect effect of the 
protection of the interfaces via IPRs would emerge in the form of blocking the third 
parties from entering into the relevant market or competing effectively, at the expense 
of consumer benefits and choices being diminished. The indirect effects are extendable 
to the cultural production and participatory democracy given the major concerns and 
the inflexible legal regime regarding interoperability. While a fulfilling analysis of the 
negative impact of overzealous use of IPRs goes beyond the limits of this study, it is 
fair to say that IPR rules and safeguards including those related to interoperability at 
the EU level fail to adequately address the indirect effects of the control over interface 
specifications, on interoperability.418 
Against this background, the pro-interoperability policy of the Software Directive 
could potentially be taken as a leverage to figure out and meet the needs surrounding 
‘information flows’ and from a wider perspective, the ‘global information 
infrastructure’.419 Notwithstanding, the limited nature of the exceptional rights under 
Articles 5(3) and 6 of the Software Directive fall short of meeting these broadly 
minded information and interoperability needs as well as coping with the related 
concerns highlighted above. Given the wide range of underlying techno-social and 
competition concerns and the surrounding gatekeeping roles and functionalities, 
 
416  Van Rooijen (n 40) 203. 
417  See Ghidini and Arezzo (n 377) 363. 
418  See also Weston (n 13) 257. 
419  See Mansell and Steinmuller (n 263) 1. 
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existing tools and measures of the EU law, being not limited to the Software Directive, 
appear shortcoming to address the given concerns.   
5. EU Competition Law 
EU competition law is one of the areas where interoperability is regulated for the 
purpose of protecting, ensuring and restoring competition. In this regard, structural 
and/or behavioural measures are resorted to through a wide range of tools to deal with 
abuse of dominance, collaborative acts, i.e. agreements, concerted practices and 
market concentrations i.e. merger and acquisitions. These so-called situations are 
examined respectively under Article 101 and 102 of the TFEU and the 2004 Merger 
Regulation. Such instruments are invoked to investigate whether abusive behaviours 
e.g. refusal to supply, discrimination, tying; collaborative or concentrative 
undertakings under question pose any threat for competition over the relevant 
market(s). While the anti-competitive effects need not necessarily be actual or 
experienced, but exceed some thresholds in the sense that they create some risk and 
likelihood as to create unintended consequences e.g. reduced competition, lessened 
innovation, increased prices and/or deteriorated quality.    
Under EU competition law, in almost all cases, ‘market definition’ is the first step that 
needs to be fulfilled to identify the competitive products which are substitutable 
(interchangeable) with each other. Once the market is defined, it should be ascertained 
whether market power is foreseen to arise or already present in the relevant market(s). 
This latter step means designation of dominant undertakings, which has a key effect 
particularly to reach any finding of abuse of dominant position. During the assessment 
of abusive behaviours, the scrutiny is focused on the actual or realised conducts to 
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analyse whether any anti-competitive behaviour has taken place, whereas other 
analyses, i.e. under Article 101 of the TFEU or merger controls, mostly depend on an 
ex-ante assessment of the undertakings in question. Below, the competition law tools 
and remedies available under EU competition law are analysed along with the case 
law. In this regard, ‘market definition’ is analysed first, to be followed by Articles 101 
and 102 of the TFEU and merger controls. In so doing, the focus is intensified on 
interoperability-based concerns and remedies followed in the EU precedents, 
particularly CJ judgments.  
5.1. Market definition 
Structural and/or behavioural remedies to be invoked under EU competition law 
primarily depend on a ‘market definition’ that represents the first step. The relevant 
products market comprises all those products and/or services which are regarded as 
substitutable by the consumer by reason of the products’ characteristics, prices and 
intended use.420 The relevant market implies that “there can be effective competition 
between the products which form part of it”,421 revealing a dynamic concept in nature. 
Such dynamic features create a difficulty in demarcation of innovative i.e. ICT-based 
products, in a market.422 Further to this dynamic nature, multi-sided markets e.g. 
 
420  Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community 
competition law [1997] OJ C 372/03). 
421  Case 85/76 Hoffman- La Roche & Co AG v Commission [1979] ECR 461, [1979] 3 CLR 211, para 
28.  
422  Particularly analysing ‘competition in innovation’ is acknowledged as a very difficult task, 
incorporating ‘market definition’, along with the requirement towards competition law enforcers 
to make predictions on future and often uncertain developments (See Josef Drexl, 
‘Anticompetitive Stumbling Stones on the Way to a Cleaner World: Protecting Competition in 
Innovation Without a Market’ [2012] 8(3) Journal of Competition Law and Economics 507, 512).  
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online platforms similarly complicate the issue of market definition, which typically 
relies on one-sided approach based on a centralised product.423 
The primary tool to define the markets is testing the price elasticities of the relevant 
products. If the cross-price elasticities denote a set of products that consumers are 
willing to have within the price limits that exclude other products, such products could 
be said to demonstrate a market within the meaning of competition law. This is and 
figured and shaped out mainly through the ‘hypothetical monopoly test’. According to 
this test, the relevant products market includes all products to which consumers would 
most likely switch in response to a “small but significant and non-transitory increase 
in price” (SSNIP).424 This test simply measures substitutability by asking whether a 
‘small but non-transitory increase in price’ (usually 5-10%) of a one product will cause 
purchasers to purchase sufficient of another product instead to make the price increase 
unsustainable.425 The Commission has thus far tended to favour demand-side tests 
partly because the exercise emphasizes products markets from the viewpoint of 
consumers and user preferences.426 Therefore, supply-side substitutability, which 
means to evaluate capabilities of the undertakings to provide competing products, is 
of a subordinated role during the course of market definition. 
 
423  These difficulties are also highlighted by a recent report prepared for the Commission (See Jacques 
Crémer, Yves-Alexandre de Montjoye and Heike Schweitzer, Competition policy for the digital 
era (2019) 44-46 <http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/reports/kd0419345enn.pdf> 
accessed 9 October 2020. 
424  The Hypothetical Monopoly Test is a standardised tool in antitrust analysis, according to which, 
the relevant market includes all products to which consumers would most likely switch in response 
to a “small but significant and non-transitory increase in price” (SSNIP). According to the US 
Horizontal Merger and Guidelines (US Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, 
2010, para 4.1.1.), “…the test requires that a hypothetical profit-maximizing firm … that was the 
only present and future seller of those products (‘hypothetical monopolist’) likely would impose 
at least a ‘small but significant and non-transitory’ increase in price (‘SSNIP’)”.   
425  Alison Jones and Brenda Sufrin, EU Competition Law: Text, Cases and Materials (5th edn, OUP 
2014) 63. 
426  Steve Anderman and Hedvig Schmidt, EU Competition Law and Intellectual Property Rights: The 
Regulation of Innovation (2nd edn, OUP 2011) 39. 
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Not only the price elasticities of relevant products, but also consumers’ inaction, 
particularly against the switching costs, might be a significant factor affecting their 
preferences. The Commission, in its 2002 Guidelines regarding market analysis in the 
electronic communications sector, points out this issue as follows: 
Consumers who have invested in technology or made any other 
necessary investments in order to receive a service, or use a product, 
may be unwilling to incur any additional costs involved in switching to 
an otherwise substitutable service or product (…) Accordingly, in a 
situation where end users face significant switching costs in order to 
substitute product A for product B, these two products should not be 
included in the same relevant market.427 
From this point of view, ‘lack of interoperability’ between a dominant platform and 
complementary products e.g. apps and devices, might characterise the situation in the 
marketplace, so that the difficulty of switching across the platforms could be very 
determinant in market definition. A market power, usually a ‘dominant position’, could 
then be conferred onto the product in question, should the switching costs be dissuasive 
enough to deter end-users from opting for alternative products. This logic also 
represents the policy approach pursued by the Commission in many antitrust cases, 
including Hugin,428 Hilti,429 Volvo,430 Renault431 and Tetra Pak II.432 
 
427  Commission guidelines on market analysis and the assessment of significant market power under 
the Community regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services 
(2002/C 165/03) (‘Commission’s 2002 Guidelines’), para 50. 
428  Case 22/78, Hugin Kassaregister AB and Hugin Cash Registers Ltd v. EC Commission [1979] 
ECR 1869. 
429  Case C-53/92 P, Hilti v. EC Commission [1994] ECR I-667. 
430  Case 238/87, AB Volvo v. Erik Veng (UK) Ltd. [1988] ECR 6211, [1989] 4 CMLR 122 (‘Volvo 
judgement’). 
431  Case 53/87, CICCRA v. Renault [1988] ECR 6039 (‘Renault judgement’). 
432  Case C-333/94 P, Tetra Pak International SA v. EC Commission [1996] ECR I-5951. 
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Lack of interoperability often comes up with the related IPRs upheld for the products 
that constitute the primary (upstream) market on which the secondary (downstream) 
competition relies. This much more reflects the Hilti case, whereby the Commission 
defined the relevant market for the cartridge strips to be used in Hilti nail guns. The 
main specific source of dominant position appears to have been the patent protection 
on these cartridge strips, which was Community-wide at the time.433 By the same 
token, in Volvo and Renault, the relevant primary market was defined based on the 
products (car components) protected by IPRs. Arguably, this would not have been the 
case if the components, e.g. body panels protected by the design rights, were 
interoperable with those of competitors, although being IPR-protected.434 
While the EU precedents do not mean that the IPRs under scrutiny are directly and 
automatically to be translated to market power (e.g. dominance),435 there is an apparent 
risk that associated IPRs would cause definition of market(s) in a narrow fashion. 
Considering the Commission’s decisional practice, this risk is remarkably high in the 
case where interoperability is absent between the competing products. On the other 
hand, if the primary market is competitive, an undertaking could hardly exploit its 
position over customers in a secondary market by raising prices.436 That is to say, a 
correlation exists between definition of narrower markets and lack of interoperability, 
as being featured in IPR-protected dominant products.   
 
433  Francis Fishwick, ‘The Definition of the Relevant Market in the Competition Policy of the 
European Economic Community’ [1993] 63 Revue D'économie Industrielle 174, 176. 
434  Anderman and Schmidt (n 426) 46. 
435  See Christopher R. Leslie, Antitrust Law and Intellectual Property Rights: Cases and Materials 
(OUP, 2011) 54, where it is established that the vast majority of academic literature recognizes 
that a patent does not confer market power. See also infra note 415.  
436  Jones and Sufrin (n 425) 351.  
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5.2. Article 101 of the TFEU 
5.2.1. General overview 
Article 101 of the TFEU aims at determining whether any kind of collaboration 
between the undertakings is pro or anti-competitive. In this regard, Article 101(1) of 
the TFEU prohibits agreements and concerted practices between two or more 
undertakings “which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their 
object or effect, the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the 
internal market”.437 All vertical and horizontal agreements and concerted practices are 
encompassed by Article 101(1), which gives several non-exhaustive examples to 
illustrate anti-competitive collaborations. For Article 101(1) to be applied, there 
should be an ‘appreciable’ effect on interstate trade within the meaning of EU 
Competition Law.438 Agreements or decisions that are found to have such effects are 
declared as “automatically void” as per the Article 101(2) of the TFEU. 
As mentioned above, in an Article 101 case, it is sought to find out whether pro-
competitive effects outweigh the restrictive (anti-competitive) effects. Article 101(3) 
is the legal means enlightening this comparative exercise. According to Article 101(3), 
Article 101(1) might not apply to acts of collaboration in the cases that they contribute 
to “improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or 
economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit” and 
as long as such restrictions are “indispensable to the attainment of these objectives” 
and do not “eliminat[e] competition in respect of a substantial part of the products in 
 
437  Consolidated Version of the TFEU [2012] OJ C 326/49 (‘TFEU’) art 101(1). 
438  Anderman and Schmidt (n 426) 215.  
 
159 
question”.439 Following modernisation of the EU Competition Law tracing back to 
1999, the EU Commission has issued Guidelines to clarify implementation of such 
conditions based on a more ‘effects-based approach’,440 focusing on the concept of 
‘consumer welfare’. 
Article 101 is invoked by the Commission to assess the horizontal and vertical 
agreements including licensing e.g. technology transfer agreements to ensure that they 
do not contain any clauses that would be anti-competitive by object or by effect. In 
this regard, restrictions agreed on by the parties are assessed by the Commission as to 
whether they would potentially exclude the rivals from the possible channels of 
competition e.g. distribution, sale, marketing. Whereas this assessment used to be done 
on a formalistic approach until the late 1990s, this approach was replaced by an effects-
based approach in 1999 and 2004. A wide range of agreements potentially to be 
deemed as anti-competitive fall outside of Article 101(3) because of the more flexible 
and lenient rules adopted in time. The block exemptions441 issued by the Commission, 
serving this effects-based approach, have a wide coverage as they exempt a great many 
vertical agreements potentially to be prohibited under Article 101(1). In particular, the 
block exemption applies so long as 30% market share threshold is met and the 
 
439  TFEU, art 101(3). 
440  Drawing from the influence of the Chicago School’s antitrust analysis on US competition policy, 
the effects-based approach aims to avoid erroneous intervention against competitive and 
efficiency-increasing behaviour (avoiding type 1 errors or false positives) and to achieve an 
optimal level of enforcement of competition rules (Jones and Sufrin (n 425) 59). 
441  Block exemptions operate as a safe harbour, exempting agreements even if they infringe Article 
101 (Alison Jones and Brenda Sufrin, EC Competition Law: Text, Cases and Materials (4th edn, 
OUP 2011) 629), obviating individual assessment of the agreements that are covered by the block 
exemption regulations. Until May 2004, a notification system was in place, requiring individual 
notification of an agreement to the Commission, which was the only body with the power to grant 
an exemption under Article 101(3). However, since 1 May 2004 when Regulation 1/2003 came 
into force, the prohibition contained in Article 101(1) is automatically inapplicable ab initio to 
agreements and concerted practices that satisfy the conditions set out in Article 101(3), without 
the need for any decision to that effect (Joanna Goyder and Matthew O’Regan, ‘Market Conduct’ 
in L. Garzaniti and M. O’Regan (eds), Telecommunications, Broadcasting and the Internet: EU 
Competition Law and Regulation (3rd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2010) 4). 
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agreement does not contain any hardcore restraints i.e. imposing price or territorial 
restraints.442 
5.2.2. Standardisation agreements 
In the context of horizontal agreements, standardisation agreements have a significant 
stake, representing an important playing field for the market actors and incorporating 
significant interplay between IPRs, openness and interoperability. In principle, a rather 
positive stance is adopted by the EU Competition Law towards standard-setting 
agreements. According to the Commission’s Guidelines on the applicability of Article 
101 of the TFEU to horizontal co-operation agreements, it is affirmed that 
standardisation agreements are usually pro-competitive as they tend to promote the 
internal market, encourage development of new and improved products or markets and 
ensure interoperability and compatibility to the benefit of consumers.443 However, a 
partially cautious approach is reflected in the way standardisation takes place, 
particularly in view of the far-reaching implications on how competition and follow 
on innovation would be impacted by would-be standards. It is acknowledged that: 
Where participation in standard-setting is unrestricted and the 
procedure for adopting the standard in question is transparent, 
standardisation agreements which contain no obligation to comply with 
the standard and provide access to the standard on fair, reasonable and 
 
442  Jones and Sufrin (n 441) 629. 
443  European Commission, Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements (2011/C 11/01) 
(‘Commission’s 2011 Guidelines’), para 263. 
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non-discriminatory terms will normally not restrict competition within 
the meaning of Article 101(1).444  
From the viewpoint of the Commission Guidelines it is possible to derive that SSOs 
might pose some risks because of; the followed procedures, the degree of openness 
and transparency and possible restrictions to participation. Likewise, standards might 
incorporate a number of IPRs,445 which are naturally infringed until and unless rights 
holders accede not to claim as such. As a matter of fact, IPRs which represent the 
Achilles heel of the SSOs would affect not only the viability of would-be standards 
but also the interoperability of the potential products to be forged in the relevant 
market(s). Thus, interoperability is closely linked to and would be significantly 
affected by, the extent to which SSO processes are open and inclusive. 
The problem arises that the natural monopoly created via standardisation on the 
technology for interoperability, may have IPRs associated with it, and these rights may 
be owned by one market player or a consortium.446 In fact, interoperability related 
problems might arise should the IPRs embedded into a standard be hidden by the rights 
holder and kept outside of the SSO procedure - usually for extraction of larger royalty 
fees (the “hold-up” problem). Furthermore, rights holders can use their licensing 
policies to control further development of the standard, and to influence the market of 
products and services around the standardisation.447 Such problems are closely related 
 
444  Commission’s 2011 Guidelines, para 280. 
445  An analysis of the IPR databases of 11 of the most important SSOs by a group of scholars revealed 
that approximately 250 distinct standards include technologies that are covered by one or more 
declared IPR, and many of these standards are successful and widely employed (Pierre Larouche 
and Geertrui Van Overwalle, ‘Interoperability standards, patents and competition policy’, (2014) 
TILEC Discussion Paper DP 2014-050, December 2014, 6). 
446  Ghosh (n 81) 77. 
447  Ghosh (n 81) 77. 
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to the intellectual property incorporated into the standardisation processes, without 
access to which relevant standards could not be implemented. 
Such IPRs that are essential to using the standards i.e. standard essential patents 
(SEPs),448 are thus central to the standardisation process and could affect 
interoperability indirectly, but also significantly. Given the fact that exclusionary 
impact would come up with the closed standards, lack of interoperability would be an 
indirect result of the standardisation process. Having said that, lack of interoperability 
does not directly trigger enforcement of Article 101 by itself, yet this would happen 
through other factors such as limited openness and hampered innovation.  
5.3. Article 102 of the TFEU 
5.3.1. Abuse of dominant position: Main thrusts, types and conducts 
Whereas Article 101 of the TFEU deals with the agreements and concerted practices, 
Article 102 of the TFEU focuses on the unilateral and joint abusive behaviours, the 
latter being encountered quite rarely. Article 102 aims to prevent dominant 
undertakings from driving out their competitors from the marketplace and/or using 
their market power to make consumers’ conditions worse. Such conducts, which are 
deemed to have a commercially excessive nature and anti-competitive effect, are 
regarded as legally void insofar as that they meet the threshold of ‘abuse of dominant 
position’ under Article 102.449 Abuse of dominant position, as contemplated by Article 
 
448  Once a patented technology has been selected and implemented in the standard, the use of the 
patent covering that technology becomes essential – a SEP (Urška Petrovčič, Competition Law 
and Standard Essential Patents: A Transatlantic Perspective (Kluwer Law International BV 2014) 
29). 
449  Article 102 of the TFEU articulates the most common (non-exhaustive) examples of abuse of 
dominance. According to that article, “[s]uch abuse may, in particular, consist in: 
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102, encompasses both ‘exclusionary’ and ‘exploitative’ conducts. While the former 
category means conducts attempting to exclude competitors i.e. refusal to supply, 
discrimination, tying, the former covers misuse of market power to obtain extra gains 
from consumers i.e. unfair pricing and limiting supply to markets.450 Article 102 of the 
TFEU exemplifies abusive behaviours by giving a non-exhaustive list of conducts.451 
Article 102 covers exclusionary and exploitative type abusive conducts that are also 
based on the lack of interoperability. Stretching from de jure or de facto standards to 
non-standardised products, lack of interoperability could thus be the source of antitrust 
concerns that could warrant the application of Article 102. Broadly speaking, Article 
102 is considered to be an important last resort to prevent the worst excesses of a lack 
of interoperability, but only available where there is dominance.452 Practices of 
dominant undertakings, which aggravate the conditions of interoperability but also 
have not got a correcting response from either the market itself or coercive legal tools, 
could be challenged under Article 102 of the TFEU. However, interoperability is not 
an end goal of competition law tools itself; yet it could be considered as such where 
consumer harm emerges because of the dominant undertaking’s practices. 
This rule of thumb, first and foremost, is based on the presumption that ICT companies 
can freely decide on the degree to which their products and services would interoperate 
 
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading 
conditions; 
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers; 
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby 
placing them at a competitive disadvantage; 
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of 
supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no 
connection with the subject of such contracts.” (TFEU, art 102). 
450  See Anderman and Schmidt (n 426) 34. 
451  In this context, ‘unfair pricing’ and ‘limiting supply to markets’ are enshrined under Article 102(a) 
and Article 102(b) respectively, whereas ‘discrimination’ and ‘tying’ are put forth under Article 
102(c) and Article 102(d). 
452  Weston (n 13) 166. 
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with those of their rivals.453 Secondly, there might be some points at which lack of 
interoperability is likely to have anti-competitive effect, because of the likelihood that 
competitors might be driven out of the market, along with actual or potential consumer 
harm e.g. increased prices, reduced innovation. Against such circumstances, Article 
102 is the primary legal means to deter, and where necessary penalize, the so-called 
abusive behaviours. In ICT markets, signs of abuses would particularly come out with 
the gatekeeper positions created by network effects and/or de facto standards, which 
are typified by exclusionary behaviours targeting the foreclosure of competitors and 
incorporating ‘refusal to supply’, ‘tying’ and ‘discrimination’. 
In particular, ‘refusal to supply’ signifies so-called gatekeeper positions and 
foreclosure attempts based on hindering or restricting interoperability. For instance, in 
the case of a dominant product i.e. an operating system whose interfaces are kept 
closed after a long-lasting disclosure strategy, competitors might be seriously 
disadvantaged and/or face the risk of exiting the market. In such cases, risk of market 
foreclosure is usually followed by the consumers being locked into the dominant 
product. Given this fact, refusal to deal or supply, which also embodies discrimination 
to an extent, represents the most remarkable abusive conduct in relation to 
‘interoperability’. The focal point behind this proposition is that lack of 
interoperability mainly stems from restricted or withdrawn interfaces, also revealing 
an area of intersection between the exploitation of IPRs and antitrust interventions.454 
 
453  See Wolfgang Kerber and Heike Schweitzer, ‘Interoperability in the Digital Economy’ [2011] 8(1) 
JIPITEC 39, 43. 
454  ‘Tying’ and ‘exclusive dealing’ pose comparable anti-competitive effects. However, through these 
acts foreclosure happens by means of the existing contracts and their exclusionary terms and 
conditions, rather than the absence of interoperability. Furthermore, these two acts do not have a 
direct relationship with the usage and boundaries of IPRs. 
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As far as exploitative abuses are concerned, the most remarkable scenario would be 
consumers being worse off in terms of quality and price indicators. In such a 
marketplace, consumers do suffer from the absence of competitive restraints, often 
resulting in excessive prices and/or deteriorated quality. In such cases, market failures 
are by and large depicted by more structural problems, mostly requiring ex-ante 
measures such as open access requirements and price regulation, i.e. cost oriented 
prices, in the first place. Given this fact, Article 102 of the TFEU has so far been, and 
is still, predominantly used against ‘exclusionary’ abuses.455 From this point of view, 
‘refusal to supply’ is examined in this thesis as representing the typical exclusionary 
conduct mirroring interoperability-based abuses.456 In this context, firstly, ‘refusal to 
supply’ is elaborated under the light of EU precedents, comprising the most relevant 
case law i.e. ‘essential facility’ and ‘refusal to license’ cases. In so doing, ‘refusal to 
supply interoperability information’ is also dealt with as a subcategory of the ‘refusal 
to license’ cases under EU competition law.      
5.3.1.1. Refusal to supply 
5.3.1.1.1. Historical and jurisprudential background  
‘Refusal to supply’ is an old antitrust problem, built on precedents from the early years 
of the US Sherman Act. Evolving from U.S. v. Terminal Railroad Association,457 
refusal cases were brought before the antitrust courts, drawing on an evolutionary 
jurisprudence echoing the ‘essential facilities doctrine’.458 Following a nearly century-
 
455  Jones and Sufrin (n 425) 371. 
456  While in some other scholarly works (see Perzanowski (n 40) 152-154) are examined other abusive 
behaviours including ‘tying’, this is not found to be useful given the reasons in supra note 454.   
457  U.S.  v. Terminal Railroad Association 224 US 383 (1912). 
458  Regarding the evolution and usage of the doctrine, particularly under EU law, see Unver (n 100). 
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long collection of case law ending up with the US Supreme Court’s Trinko459 
judgement, remedying ‘refusal to supply’ by a monopolist firm was considered to be 
very exceptional. Since then, under US antitrust law, it is acknowledged this problem 
could be solved by antitrust mechanisms, provided that the specific problem has arisen 
from the withdrawal of a contract, namely when a dominant actor has decided to 
reverse away from dealing with its competitors.460 On the other hand, ‘refusal to 
supply’ has greater repercussions under EU competition law, involving not only 
cessation of supplies but also denial of new offers. 
Within the EU framework, Article 102 has been widely used to remedy dominant 
undertakings’ refusals to deal with their competitors, unless this is justified by an 
objective reasoning. This abusive behaviour, involving wide-ranging relationships 
consisting of competitors, customers and distributors, has been affirmed to potentially 
affect competitive functioning of the markets, under EU jurisprudence. Marking a 
contrast to the US law, the ‘essential facilities doctrine’ was more clearly 
acknowledged by the EU Courts, as having evolved through the case law based on 
‘refusal to deal’, which traces back to the Commercial Solvents461 case in the 1970s. 
In Commercial Solvents, which represents the leading ‘refusal to supply’ case under 
EU competition law, the condemned behaviour was a dominant company’s refusal to 
 
459  Trinko judgement (supra note 36) dismissing the application of the widely known essential 
facilities doctrine to already regulated industries, symbolizes a sharp end to the claims of 
mandatory access obligations under section 2 of the Sherman Act. In Trinko, the Supreme Court 
held that: 
One factor of particular importance is the existence of a regulatory structure 
designed to deter and remedy competition harm. Where such a structure exists, the 
additional benefits to competition provided by antitrust enforcement will tend to be 
small and it will be less plausible that the antitrust laws contemplate such additional 
scrutiny (Trinko judgement, para 412). 
460  See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 US 585 (1985).  




supply the raw material of amino-butanol, used for manufacturing ethambutol, which 
is an anti-tuberculosis drug. Commercial Solvents, a dominant company in the 
(upstream) market for amino-butanol, after having cut its supplies to its competitor 
Zoja, was found to have abused their dominant position, particularly as this happened 
following its subsidiary ICI starting to manufacture ethambutol. The CoJ’s judgement 
was based on the finding that:  
An undertaking which has a dominant position in the market in raw 
materials and which, with the object of reserving such raw material for 
manufacturing its own derivatives, refuses to supply a customer, which 
is itself a manufacturer of these derivatives, and therefore risks 
eliminating all competition on the part of customer, is abusing its 
dominant position within the meaning of Article 86 [ex-102].462 
Commercial Solvents was followed by further judgments with similar revelations in 
different contexts. In United Brands,463 a dominant company’s (United Brands) cutting 
off the deliveries of Chiquita branded bananas to its customer, Olesen, subsequent to 
its decision to promote and advertise a rival brand, was found as abusive under Article 
102.464 By the same token, in Telemarketing, the General Court (GC) condemned a 
dominant TV broadcaster’s tying up would-be telemarketing advertisements to the 
condition that its subsidiary was to be the contractor to answer the calls coming from 
 
462  Ibid, para 25. 
463  Case 27/76, United Brands v. Commission, [1978] ECR 207 (‘United Brands judgement’). 
464  The CoJ reached the following conclusion in finding an ‘abuse of dominance’:  
In view of these conflicting arguments it is advisable to assert positively from the 
outset that an undertaking in a dominant position for the purpose of marketing a 
product ... cannot stop supplying a long standing customer who abides by regular 
commercial practice, if the orders placed by that customer are in no way out of the 
ordinary (United Brands judgement, para 182). 
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the viewers. Considering this as a “refusal to supply the services of that [TV] station 
to any other telemarketing undertaking”, the European Court upheld the following: 
If, further, that refusal is not justified by technical or commercial 
requirements relating to the nature of the television, but is intended to 
reserve to the agent any telemarketing operation broadcast by the said 
station, with the possibility of eliminating all competition from another 
undertaking, such conduct amounts to an abuse prohibited by Article 86 
[now 102], provided that the other conditions of that article are satisfied.465 
As seen above, ‘refusal to deal’ was found to be abusive based on some behavioural 
elements seen in many EU precedents. In this regard, ‘termination of contract while 
entering into the downstream market’ (Commercial Solvents), ‘refusal to provide 
services to the customers who decide not to cooperate any more’ (United Brands) and 
‘reserving an ancillary market by tying up purchases to buying an ancillary product’ 
(Telemarketing) come to the fore in the antitrust liability arising from a dominant 
firm’s refusal to deal.  Additionally, it is noticeable that the European Courts ruling on 
antitrust liability sought that ‘elimination of all competition’ be risked following such 
a behaviour. Such case law infused the subsequent litigations based on ‘refusal to deal’ 
with wider implications, which are detailed below. 
5.3.1.1.2. Essential facilities doctrine and related cases  
While the mainstream ‘refusal to deal’ cases could be matched with common features that 
depend on ‘behavioural’ elements, another stream of cases emerge alongside these cases 
 
465  Case 311/84, Cenbtre belge d’études du marché, [1985] ECR 3261 (‘Telemarketing judgement’).  
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with more ‘structural’ aspects. The notion of ‘essential facilities’ and the need to open up 
such facilities to competition portrayed these cases, which have been mostly resolved by 
the Commission in the early 1990s, during the years when liberalisation figured on the EU 
agenda. In this emerging part of case law, Article 102 has been construed as containing an 
obligation for dominant undertakings to share access where a facility under their control 
is necessary for the exercise of activities in an adjacent market.466 
Signifying this approach, the London European/Sabena467 and British Midland/Aer 
Lingus468 decisions came up, laying down the milestones for a competition law ‘duty 
to deal’ by dominant companies. The former case originates from a dominant 
undertaking’s refusal to allow access to its computerised reservation system by another 
undertaking, which the Commission found abusive for it “could have resulted in 
London European [applicant] abandoning its plan to open a route between Brussels 
and Luton”. In the latter, the Commission found a dominant undertaking’s (Aer 
Lingus) refusal to interline469 with another undertaking (British Midland) on a certain 
route as an infringement of Article 102. In this latter case, as a matter of fact, Aer 
Lingus’s strategy had not resulted in British Midland’s departure from the route, and 
it is difficult to see that the interlining could be classified as an ‘indispensable’ input, 
or an ‘essential facility’.470 Moreover, it was not clear in both cases that the denial of 
access towards the new entrants threatened their survival as opposed to merely creating 
a competitive disadvantage.471 
 
466  Paul Nihoul and Peter Rodford, EU Electronic Communications Law: Competition and Regulation 
in the European Telecommunications Market (OUP 2004) 470. 
467  Decision 88/589 of 4 November 1988, London European/Sabena [1988] OJ L 317/47. 
468  Decision 92/213 of 26 February 1992, British Midland/Aer Lingus [1992] OJ L 96/34.  
469  ‘Interlining’ is a standard facility based on an international (IATA) agreement pursuant to which 
airline companies authorise each other, as well as travel agents, to offer their services via a single 
ticket.   
470  Jones and Sufrin (n 441) 487. 
471  Steven D. Anderman, EC Competition Law and Intellectual Property Rights: The Regulation of 
Innovation (Clarendon Press 1998) 201.  
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Subsequently, two interim Commission decisions; Sealink Harbours Ltd/B&I Line 
plc472and Sea Containers/Stena Sealink,473 could be said to have developed along the 
same lines. In these cases, which originated from the complaints of ferry operators who 
were not allowed, or allowed under onerous conditions, to use the port, the Commission 
found the dominant port owners liable for their actions, and concluded as follows: 
An undertaking which occupies a dominant position in the provision of an 
essential facility and itself uses that facility (i.e., a facility or infrastructure, 
without access to which competitors cannot provide services to their 
customers), and which refuses other companies access to that facility 
without objective justification or grants access to competitors only on 
terms less favourable than those which it gives its own services, infringes 
Article 86 [ex-102] if the other conditions of that Article are met.474  
One of the most peculiar characteristics of these harbour cases is the implicit ‘special 
responsibility’ resulting merely from controlling bottleneck-type facilities, which are 
by and large attributed to a ‘duty to deal’, without any behavioural considerations.475 
Behavioural elements, framing the ‘refusal to deal’ cases i.e. Commercial Solvents,476 
are far less emphasized in this continuum of case law. In contrast to the previous case 
law, risks over ‘elimination of all competition’ do not constitute a subject matter of the 
analysis conducted. While a number of related cases were handled by the European 
 
472  Case IV/34.174, B&I Line plc/Sealink Harbours Ltd. [1992] 5 CMLR 255.  
473  Case IV/34.689, Sea Containers/Stena Sealink [1994] OJ L 15/8.  
474  Ibid, para 66.  
475  See Pierre Larouche, Competition Law and Regulation in European Telecommunications (Hart 
Publishing, 2000) 204-211. See also Richard Whish, Competition Law (5th edn, Butterworths 
2003), 670, reading; “[U]ndertakings controlling a bottleneck might be considered to be ‘super-
dominant’, implying that they have a higher responsibility than the obligations attaching to 
‘merely’ dominant firms”. 




Courts in the 1990s, i.e. Magill477, Tiercé Ladbroke,478 Oscar Bronner479, the latter is 
widely acknowledged as the most remarkable EU case for drawing the scope and 
constraining the limits of the essential facilities doctrine, particularly for the tangible 
(physical) assets. 
Oscar Bronner originated from an attempt by a publisher of an Austrian daily 
newspaper, Oscar Bronner, to get access to the only existing nationwide delivery 
scheme which was run by another publisher, Mediaprint, who held dominance in the 
Austrian daily newspaper market. Having faced a refusal from Mediaprint, Oscar 
Bronner took legal action before the Austrian Court, which then applied to the CoJ 
with a preliminary question. The CoJ focused on the economic viability of access 
seeker(s) in the relevant market, and concluded that the following cumulative 
conditions need to be met for a refusal to grant access to an allegedly essential facility 
to be unlawful:480 
1) The refusal must be likely to eliminate all competition in the relevant market 
on the requesting party, 
2) The refusal must be incapable of being objectively justified, 
3) The facility in question must be indispensable in order for the business of the 
requesting person to be carried on (inasmuch as there is “no actual or potential 
substitute in existence”). 
 
477  See supra note 227. 
478  Case T-504/93, Tiercé Ladbroke SA v. Commission [1997] ECR II-923, [1997] ECR II-923, [1997] 
5 CMLR 309 (‘Tiercé Ladbroke judgement’). 
479  Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner GmBH & Co KG and Others v. Mediaprint Zeitungs-und 
Zeischiftverlag GmbH & Co KG and Others [1998] ECR I-7791, [1999] 4 CMLR 112 (‘Oscar 
Bronner judgement’). 
480  Ibid, para 41. 
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According to the Oscar Bronner case, a primary source, i.e. critical physical infrastructure, 
which is economically non-substitutable, is sought for a mandatory sharing, signifying a 
much higher (‘natural monopoly’ type) indispensability threshold. In fact, there arises an 
economics-based formulation of the ‘essential facilities doctrine’ comparable to the 
‘natural monopoly’ theory. Although considerable as a context-specific ruling, Oscar 
Bronner is noteworthy for drawing up the jurisprudential lines, not only for ‘essential 
facilities’ type cases, but also, much more broadly speaking, ‘refusal to deal’ cases. On its 
own facts, i.e. based on a privately owned physical infrastructure, Oscar Bronner appears 
as a perfectly justifiable decision, revealing a salutary reminder that the redress for refusals 
to supply under Article 102 is limited to those affecting the ‘process of competition’, not 
individual competitors.481    
5.3.1.2. Refusal to licence 
‘Refusal to license’ by a dominant undertaking represents an exclusionary abuse having 
unique features as well as building on the course of the ‘refusal to deal’ cases. Under EU 
competition law, ‘refusal to license’ ignites a more comprehensive scrutiny, when 
compared with conventional ‘refusal to deal’ cases. This stems from the very nature of 
the IPRs, which ban non-authorized use of the protected subject matter, which often 
consists of original (intellectual) creations or inventions based on some qualitative 
and/or quantitative work. Notably, a dominant undertaking holding an IPR, which is 
normally of an exclusionary nature, can not be considered as an abusive practice itself, 
as acknowledged by the CoJ.482 CoJ jurisprudence, while prepared to allow that even 
 
481  Eagles and Longdin (n 266) 169. 
482  In the IMS Health judgment, the CoJ held:  
According to settled case-law, the exclusive right of reproduction forms part of the 
owner’s rights, so that the refusal to grant a licence, even if it is the act of an 
undertaking holding a dominant position, cannot in itself constitute an abuse of a 
dominant position (IMS Health judgment, para 34). 
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dominant intellectual property owning firms should be free to choose their licensees, 
also concedes that ‘exceptional circumstances’ might nevertheless exist in which a 
refusal to license IPRs might constitute an abuse of dominant position.483 
Magill, a landmark judgement on ‘refusal to license’, for the first time set out the so-
called ‘exceptional circumstances’ that warrant sharing of dominant IPR-protected 
products. In the Magill case, three European television companies (RTE, BBC, and 
ITP) refused to disclose their weekly programme listings which a publisher (Magill) 
needed in order to create a weekly guide compiling all the programme listings at the 
time. Refusal to disclose such information was justified by the three television 
companies on the basis that their programme listings had been protected with copyright 
according to UK and Irish laws. The Commission held that the television companies 
abused their dominant position on the (downstream) market for weekly television 
magazines and regarded the non-disclosure as a prohibited conduct under Article 102 
since they hindered the creation of a new product, as well as retaining the downstream 
market to themselves. On appeal, both the GC and CoJ rejected the arguments related 
to copyright protection, upholding the Commission’s decision. 
The CoJ specified three reasons, naming them as the “exceptional circumstances” 
which render the television companies’ refusal to license unlawful. First, the television 
companies’ refusal prevented the appearance of a new product, a comprehensive 
weekly guide to television programs for which there was a potential consumer demand. 
Second, there was no objective justification for their refusal. Third, “the appellants, by 
 
For similar findings under US antitrust law, see Leslie’s (n 435) 167-176, reading; 
While exclusionary conduct can include a monopolist’s unilateral refusal to license 
a copyright, an author’s desire to exclude others from use of their copyrighted work 
is a presumptively valid business justification for any immediate harm to consumers 
(Leslie (n 435) 175). As well, this fact is upheld both in the Magill and Volvo 
judgments (Magill judgment, para 49; Volvo judgment, para 8).       
483  Eagles and Longdin (n 266) 161. 
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their conduct, reserved to themselves the secondary market of the weekly television 
guides by excluding all competition in that market [with reference to Commercial 
Solvents], since they denied access to the basic information which is the raw material 
indispensable for the compilation of such a guide.484  
The Magill judgement clearly builds on the previous case law regarding ‘refusal to deal’, 
such as in Commercial Solvents, incorporating the key elements such as ‘objective 
justification’, ‘elimination of all competition’ and ‘indispensability’,485 which reflect the 
baseline of ‘exceptional circumstances’ that is also applicable to IPR-protected 
dominant products. Further to these elements, the Magill judgement created the ‘new 
product’ test, a new element, to investigate ‘refusal to license’ cases within the context 
of ‘exceptional circumstances’. That is to say, the ‘refusal to license’ analysis has been 
taken up a notch by the CoJ, which went beyond the ‘refusal to deal’ analysis. 
The Magill judgment has had its repercussions in the subsequent Court decisions, 
including in Tierce Ladbroke486 and IMS Health, where Magill criteria were elaborated 
and reinforced. Particularly, IMS Health represents a landmark judgement, whereby 
the ‘exceptional circumstances’ test was revisited and demystified. In IMS Health, the 
conflict between the parties began after a new entrant PII, afterwards acquired by 
NDC, initiated to use a copyrighted database concerning pharmaceutical sales in 
Germany487 for its market sales’ services. During the judicial proceedings before the 
 
484  Magill judgement, paras 54-56. It is argued that by approving the holding of the GC on this point, 
the CoJ has effectively endorsed the basis of the ‘essential facilities’ doctrine promoted by the 
Commission, albeit under certain conditions (Anderman and Schmidt (n 426) 209). 
485  The last reason in the Magill ruling not only underlines ‘elimination of all competition’ in the 
downstream market but also points out that in order for a ‘refusal to license’ to be considered 
abusive, the IPR-protected facility to which access was denied should be an ‘indispensable’ input 
for carrying out an activity in the downstream market. 
486  Tiercé Ladbroke judgement, para 309. 
487  Such a database was called an 1860 ‘brick structure’ containing information gathered from 
pharmacies located in 1860 different geographical areas all over Germany.  
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national German court, a preliminary question as to whether the claimant’s (IMS) 
refusal to license could amount to an abuse was referred to the CoJ. Meanwhile, NDC 
applied to the Commission with the allegation that IMS breached Article 102. Despite 
the Commission’s finding as to the existence of ‘exceptional circumstances’ by 
mentioning that the so-called copyrighted database has been a de facto industrial 
standard,488 the GC suspended the Commission’s interim decision.489 
Rendering a preliminary ruling under Article 267 (formerly Article 234) of the TFEU, 
the CoJ stated that the ‘exceptional circumstances’ of Magill were to be applied 
cumulatively. According to the CoJ, in order for a dominant firm’s refusal to licence a 
competitor who is carrying out a business dependent on the former’s indispensable 
IPR to be an abuse, all the following three conditions have to be fulfilled:490 
1. the undertaking which requests the licence intends to offer, on the market for 
the supply of data in question, new products or services not offered by the 
copyright owner and for which there is potential consumer demand; 
2. the refusal is not justified by objective considerations; 
3. the refusal is such as to reserve to the copyright owner the market for the supply 
of data on sales of pharmaceutical products in the Member State concerned by 
eliminating all competition on that market.  
 
488  In finding abuse, the Commission interpreted the ‘exceptional circumstances’ of Magill as 
alternative (not cumulative) sets of conditions (Commission Decision 2002/165/EC, 2002 O.J. (L 
59) 18 relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 82 of the EC Treaty (Case COMP D3/38.044-
NDC Health/IMS: Interim Measure, para 180)). 
489  Case C-184/01 R, IMS Health v. Commission [2001] ECR II-3193, [2002] 4 CMLR 58 (26 October 
2001). On appeal, the CoJ upheld the suspension of the GC (See Case C-481/01 P(R), IMS Health 
v. Commission [2002] ECR I-3401, [2002] 5 CMLR 44) (11 April 2002). 
490  IMS Health judgement, para 52. 
 
176 
The EU Court seems to have carefully crafted the ‘exceptional circumstances’ within 
the specific context of the IMS Health case. First of all, ‘exceptional circumstances’ 
originating from Magill with regard to mandatory licensing were acknowledged to be 
applied ‘cumulatively’, not on an alternative basis. It was thereby affirmed that the 
‘new product test’ needs to be applied as an inseparable component of the so-called 
Magill-origin test. Secondly, well-established cumulative conditions of Magill were 
construed to be not exhaustive, but ‘sufficient’ for a mandatory licensing under Article 
102.491 That proposition seems to follow the purpose of Article 102(b), which is to 
prohibit abusive conducts by dominant firms where such conduct limits technical 
development of markets to the detriment of consumers.492 Last but not least, the Court 
has taken a wider perspective entailing horizontal competition along with no necessity 
of two market structures,493 which typically characterises the refusal to deal cases. 
Within the light of the Court’s interpretation, IMS Health could be said to have 
broadened the legal playing ground of the ‘exceptional circumstances’ test. 
5.3.1.3. Refusal to license/supply interoperability information 
Interoperability based antitrust problems are often visible with the exclusionary 
conducts of dominant undertakings, as typified with refusal to deal or license. While 
‘interoperability’ would be the subject matter of a great many conflicts between rivals 
e.g. quality degradation and security, the antitrust lens to be taken under Article 102 
would mainly look to the likelihood of market foreclosure and consumer harm. In the 
absence of any likelihood regarding exclusion of competitors and consumer harm, e.g. 
 
491  IMS Health judgement, para 38. 
492  Steve D. Anderman and John Kallaugher, Techonology Transfer and The New EU Competition 
Rules - Intellectual Property Licensing after Modernisation (OUP 2006) 286. 
493  Notably, the CoJ establishes that, “… for the purposes of the application of the earlier case-law, it 
is sufficient that a potential market, or even hypothetical market, can be identified” (IMS Health 
judgement, para 44). 
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risk of heightened switching cost, non-disclosure of interoperability information 
would not be considered as a competition law problem by itself. EU competition law 
and precedents, on this basis, reveal a case law concerning antitrust treatment from the 
refusal to disclose interoperability information.   
The first antitrust investigation took place in the IBM494 case, which was related to 
IBM’s “failing to supply other manufacturers in sufficient time with the technical 
information needed to permit competitive products to be used with System/370 
(interface information)”.495As this would deprive competing manufacturers of the 
related software and their updates, leading to potential competition problems, the 
Commission sent its statement to IBM, seeking a solution based on the disclosure of 
interfaces. After several rounds of negotiations, IBM committed to disclose the 
interface information under “reasonable and non-discriminatory” (RAND) charges to 
ensure the competing manufacturers would attach their hardware and software designs 
to IBM System/370 during a 5-year period. The case was resolved following IBM’s 
commitment being accepted by the Commission as to be enforced by 1 August 1984 
until the end of 1989. Throughout the process, the Commission aimed not only to 
ensure that “non-IBM suppliers would be able to remain System/370-compatible into 
the foreseeable future”, but also not to “have a negative effect on IBM’s interests in 
 
494  Case No IV/29.479 – IBM [1984]. 
495  The Commission alleged that IBM held a dominant position in the Member States at that time for 
the supply of the key products for its most powerful range of computers, the IBM System/370, and 
had abused that position contrary to Article 86 (ex-102), which in addition to the refusal to supply 
interface information, consisted of the following: 
(i) not offering System/370 central processing units (“CPUs”) without a capacity for main 
memory included in the price (“memory bundling”) 
(ii) not offering System/370 CPUs without the basic software included in the price (“software 
bundling”), and 
(iii) discriminating between users of IBM software in refusing to supply certain software 
installation services (“Installation Productivity Options” = IPOs) to users of non-IBM CPUs. 
(See EC Competition Policy Newsletter, 1998, No. 3, 




developing new products”.496 Later on, the settlement, or undertaking, as agreed by 
the Commission, was earmarked to have had positive effects as follows: 
The U/T [undertaking] therefore not only stimulated competition in that 
it removed a major obstacle for IBM’s competitors to offer innovative 
System/370 products at an earlier moment in time than they could have 
done in the absence of the U/T, if at all, but also because of this 
reinforced competition it put pressure on IBM to innovate and improve 
upon its own products.497 
In the subsequent period, interoperability again figured on the agenda of EU 
competition law with the Microsoft case, which relates to both ‘refusal to supply’ and 
‘tying’ practices of Microsoft.498 The case originated in December 1998 from Sun 
Microsystems’s (now ‘Oracle’) allegations based on Microsoft’s abuse of its dominant 
position. Sun, in their application, claimed that Microsoft had been leveraging its 
dominant position in the client PC OS market to work in the group server OS market, 
by refusing to supply the interface information (that serves interoperability between 
Windows PC OS and non-Microsoft work group servers) to them. The Commission 
opened up two investigations and sent three statements of objection, and at the end of 
a nearly 5-year scrutiny period, found a breach of Article 102 in April 2004, and 
ordered Microsoft to disclose the access-cut (withdrawn) interface information and 
with a fine of 479 million Euros. On appeal, the GC upheld the Commission’s decision 
along the same line of reasoning, arriving at the conclusion that Microsoft abused its 
 
496  Ibid. 
497  Ibid. 
498  While both Microsoft’s refusal to supply interoperability information and tying the purchase of 
Windows OS with that of Windows Media Player was at issue, this thesis focuses on the former 
practice within the meaning of Article 102. 
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dominant position by not disclosing its interfaces that would enable competitors to 
have interoperability with Windows OS architecture.499 
The Commission’s legal and economic assessment mostly depends on the indirect 
network effects,500 which were presumed to pose a ‘structural’ entry barrier.501 
According to the Commission, such barriers to entry, when combined with Microsoft’s 
refusal to continue to supply, namely withdrawal of interoperability information,502 
resulted in an abuse of dominance.503 This behaviour of Microsoft, in the 
Commission’s view, was found to be detrimental to the consumers, who would 
otherwise benefit from innovative products to be introduced by competing vendors.504 
In the Microsoft case, which marks a stark distinction from previous case law, an 
imminent risk of exclusion of competitor(s) and directly attributable consumer harm 
were not sought to reach to an antitrust liability.505 Relying on and giving an emphasis 
 
499  See supra note 15. 
500  While the direct network effects relate to the number of Windows based PC users and the value 
attributed to the network itself, the indirect network effects relate to the indirectly generated 
benefits via using the Windows OS, e.g. increase of software developers to write applications for 
the Microsoft Windows OS. The Commission explains the importance of the latter as follows: 
In essence, the dynamic between the Windows client PC operating system and the 
large body of applications that are written to it are self-reinforcing. In other words, 
applications developers have a compelling economic incentive to continue writing 
applications for the dominant client PC operating system platform (that is to say, 
Windows) because they know that the potential market will be larger (Commission’s 
Microsoft decision, para 458). 
501  McMahon describes the Commission’s approach as a structural one, underlining accompanying 
unpredictable consequences. She enunciates her view as follows: 
While structure can clearly affect outcomes, a focus on this issue alone without a 
closer examination of the impact of conduct on consumer welfare (and efficiency) 
is problematic in network environments and in competition law more generally 
(McMahon (n 16) 143).  
502  See the Commission’s Microsoft decision, para 524.  
503  See the Commission’s Microsoft decision, para 546. 
504  More explicitly, Microsoft’s denial of access to the interface information was characterised as 
‘limit[ing] the prospect for such competitors to successfully market their innovation and […] 
discouraging them from developing new products and therefore limit[ing] technical development 
to the prejudice of consumers’. In fact, the Commission’s analytical approach that radiates with 
establishing eliminatory risks on competitive structures and focuses on their indirect effects 
regarding future innovations, is linked to limiting technical development to the prejudice of 
consumers (within the meaning of Article 102(b) of the TFEU). 
505  This point of view is divulged by the Commission as follows: 
Furthermore, it is established in case law that Article 82 of the Treaty covers not 
only abuse which may directly prejudice consumers but also abuse which indirectly 
 
180 
to the wording of Article 102(b), the Commission was satisfied with the foreseeability 
of possible harms towards follow-on innovation rather than the hindrance of new 
product(s) in the particular case.506     
The Commission, not strictly confining itself to the already set rules of case law507, 
underscored the need to “analyse the entirety of the circumstances surrounding a 
specific instance of a refusal to supply”.508 Having particular concerns about the 
potential risk of ‘market tipping’ in the downstream (work group OS) market, the 
Commission seems to have developed a distinct ‘theory of harm’, getting away from 
the four-partite ‘exceptional circumstances’ test. The Commission’s deviation from 
the previous case law is however worth being criticised for the social and legal costs 
to be attached to it.509 
From a broader point of view, the Microsoft formula could be considered to reveal an 
uneven interoperability policy design towards strategically optimised competition law 
 
prejudices them by impairing the effective competitive structure as envisaged by 
Article 3 (f) of the Treaty (Commission’s Microsoft decision, para 704).  
Also see the GC’s Microsoft judgment, para 643. 
506  This approach is more visible in the abandonment of the ‘new product test’, if not fully, but within 
the context of Microsoft. According to the Commission; 
A detailed examination of the scope of the disclosure at stake leads to the conclusion 
that, on balance, the possible negative impact of an order to supply on Microsoft’s 
incentives to innovate is outweighed by its positive impact on the level of innovation 
of the whole industry (including Microsoft). As such, the need to protect Microsoft’s 
incentives to innovate cannot constitute an objective justification so as to offset the 
exceptional circumstances identified (Commission’s Microsoft decision, para 783). 
507  The Commission’s view on to what extent the established rules of case law must be taken into 
account in the decision making process could be seen in its following prescription: 
On a general note, there is no persuasiveness to an approach that would advocate 
the existence of an exhaustive checklist of exceptional circumstances and would 
have the Commission disregard a limine and other circumstances of exceptional 
character that may deserve to be taken into account when assessing a refusal to 
supply (Commission’s Microsoft decision, para 555). 
508  Commission’s Microsoft decision, para 558. See also the GC’s Microsoft judgment, paras 312-
336. 
509  For similar views see Christian Ahlborn, David S. Evans and A. Jorge Padilla, ‘The Logic & Limits 
of the “Exceptional Circumstances Test” in Magill and IMS Health’ [2005] 28 Fordham 
International Law Journal 1009, 1110.  
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goals. The optimised character of the interoperability solution of Microsoft is 
rationalised by the absence of substitutable tools to ensure interoperability. The 
Commission, in its comparative analysis refers to three categories of technical tools; 
the use of open industry standards supported in Windows; the distribution of client-
side software on the client PC; and the reverse engineering of Microsoft’s products, 
and concludes that none of them is a viable solution for the companies willing to 
compete with Microsoft on the work group server OS market.510 The GC’s analysis 
draws a similar and comparably clearer framework regarding Windows work group 
server OS interfaces. The Court considers ‘indispensability’ as a phenomenon having 
varying degrees and that the ideal level of interoperability is the one by which a server 
running a non-Microsoft work group server OS is able to act as a domain controller 
within a Windows domain using Active Directory and is capable of participating in 
the multimaster replication mechanism with the other domain controllers.511 Across 
this picture, it is fair to say that although the instruments invoked by the Commission 
originate from and subsist within the EU competition law, the idealised market 
structure and theory of harm behind this finding suggest a semi-regulatory policy for 
software interoperability. 
5.3.2. Commission Guidance on Article 102: Filtered criteria and effects-based 
approach 
The Commission initiated a soft law making process to demarcate the lines concerning 
the exclusionary abuses under Article 102 and ended up with the issuance of ‘Guidance 
on the Commission’s Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 102 of the EC Treaty 
 
510  See the Commission’s Microsoft decision, paras 667-691.  
511  GC’s Microsoft judgment, para 390.  
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to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings’512 i.e. ‘Commission 
Guidance’, in 2009. Reflecting the mainstream dynamic in the modernisation of EU 
competition law, the effects-based approach finds its expression regarding 
exclusionary type abusive behaviours within the ‘Commission Guidance’. The leading 
aim for adoption of this Guidance could be described as filtering the previous case law 
through a lens of an economics-based approach, rather than a formalistic approach 
based on the ordoliberal principles which were predominantly pursued throughout the 
decades since the first adoption of TEEC competition rules. Having said that, of more 
significance than the attempt in the Guidance to incorporate the prior case law into its 
methodology, is its emphasis on the integration of more econometric analysis into 
abuse cases, including refusals, through the adoption of an ‘effects-based approach’, 
an approach the Commission supposes to be more in tune with that of the United States 
and considered less prone to ‘type’ errors.513 
As a result of the effects-based approach being taken, ‘consumer welfare’ is conferred 
a more crucial role under the Guidance. Consumers are put at the centre, as it is 
affirmed that they need to be protected from the adverse effects stemming from a 
dominant undertakings’ exclusionary behaviours. Not in all cases of exclusion, but 
when a competitor who is as equally efficient as a dominant undertakings is excluded, 
a potential grounds for intervention will be relevant following the enforcement 
 
512  Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to 
abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, C(2009) 864 final, OJ C 45 
(‘Commission Guidance’).   
513  Eagles and Longdin (n 266) 177-178. There are two types of errors, false positives or negatives, 
mainly characterised by form-based approaches. Type 1 errors (false positive) and type 2 (false 
negative), representing over and early, or pre-mature, enforcement. Either situation (type errors) 
has potential to give way to social harms. While there might be instances of type 2 errors, where 
competition law fails to intervene despite the fact that consumer harm is very likely or has 
happened, the likeliness and would-be harms of type 1 errors are found more critical in general 
(See Peter Alexiadis, ‘Forging a European Competition Policy Response to Online Platforms’ 
[2017] 18(2) Business Law International 91, 94).  
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priorities enshrined under the Guidance.514 Furthermore, the Guidance acknowledges 
that ‘efficiencies’ would be put forth so as to justify the exclusionary behaviour and 
their constraints on competition, insofar as overweighing benefits are established to 
pass on to the consumers with no or minimised harm to competition. In this context, 
the dominant undertakings are required to demonstrate, with a sufficient degree of 
probability and on the basis of verifiable evidence, that the following cumulative 
conditions are fulfilled: 
- the efficiencies have been, or are likely to be, realised as a result of the conduct.  
- the conduct is indispensable to the realisation of those efficiencies.  
- the likely efficiencies brought about by the conduct outweigh any likely 
negative effects on competition and consumer welfare in the affected markets. 
- the conduct does not eliminate effective competition, by removing all or most 
existing sources of actual or potential competition.515 
Despite the acknowledgement of an efficiency defence, a pro-competitive stance built 
on the ordoliberal roots could still be inferred from the Commission’s Guidance. In 
this regard, the idea of the ‘protection of competitors’ is discernibly injected into the 
Commission’s effects-based approach that targets both ‘protection of competition’ and 
‘consumer welfare’.516 Particularly in the context of non-price based exclusionary 
 
514  See the Commission Guidance, para 23, reading as follows: 
With a view to preventing anticompetitive foreclosure, the Commission will 
normally only intervene where the conduct concerned has already been, or is capable 
of, hampering competition from competitors which are considered to be as efficient 
as the dominant undertaking. 
515  Commission Guidance, para 30.  
516  The paragraph below of the Guidance illustrates to what degree the Commission will take into 
account efficiency-based arguments, while considering the exclusionary conducts towards 
inefficient, or less efficient, competitors: 
However, the Commission recognises that in certain circumstances a less efficient 
competitor may also exert a constraint which should be taken into account when 
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conducts, the given ambiguity is much more visible, and is also reflected in the context 
of ‘refusal to supply’ behaviours. 
According to the Guidance, if a dominant undertaking has refused to supply or license 
to his competitors, this is considered as a significant reason to presume an existent 
‘consumer harm’ under certain circumstances.517 Should the so-called circumstances 
be proven to have existed, the dominant undertakings could be held liable for effective 
competition being eliminated owing to their refusal to deal with their downstream 
competitors regardless of the negative effects to the consumers.518 To cover all the 
relevant scenarios, the Guidance seems to have filtered the exceptional circumstances 
under which refusal to deal is to be regarded as an ‘abuse of dominance’. According 
to this consolidated formula, for a dominant undertaking’s refusal to supply to amount 
to an abuse the following conditions need to be met cumulatively:519 
1. the refusal relates to a product or service that is objectively necessary to be able 
to compete effectively on a downstream market; 
2. the refusal is likely to lead to the elimination of effective competition on the 
downstream market; and 
3. the refusal is likely to lead to consumer harm. 
 
considering whether particular price-based conduct leads to anticompetitive 
foreclosure (Commission Guidance, para 24). 
It is argued that the Commission Guidance seeks to blur this distinction between efficient and 
inefficient competitors by suggesting that the assessment of inefficiency is a dynamic concept, and 
that a rival firm that appears inefficient today might expect to become as efficient as its dominant 
rival over time (Derek Ridyard, ‘The Commission’s Article 82 Guidelines: some reflections on 
the economic issues’ [2009] 30(5) European Competition Law Review 230, 232). 
517  Commission Guidance, paras 87-88.   
518  Commission Guidance, para 85.   
519  See the Commission Guidance, para 81.  
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Under this comprehensive and generic formula, a divergence from the original strand 
of ‘exceptional circumstances’ must be noted whereby the conditions have a less 
sharpened and more simplified character. In addition, after a careful reading, it could 
be found that this tripartite test has remarkable traces leading out from the stand-alone 
formulation of Microsoft. For instance, for a finding of an abusive refusal to supply, 
‘indispensability’ is no longer required to be a featured aspect of the access denied 
asset.520 Instead, ‘objectively necessary’ is created as a comparably less bold 
requirement, reminiscent of Microsoft, where there was no reference to 
‘indispensability’ as opposed to previous case law i.e. Magill, IMS health or Oscar 
Bronner. Likewise, ‘elimination of effective competition’521 seems to be opted for 
instead of ‘elimination of all competition’ as the pre-requisite, demonstrating a 
loosening of grounds for finding an abuse, just like in the Microsoft formula. Along 
the same lines, ‘consumer harm’ is presupposed to arise “where the competitors that 
the dominant undertaking forecloses are, as a result of the refusal, prevented from 
bringing innovative goods or services to market and/or where follow-on innovation is 
likely to be stifled”.522 This point of view draws on the Microsoft judgement, where 
the main focus was on the ‘follow-on innovation’ rather than  the ‘new product test’, 
and the burden of proof was imposed onto the dominant firm for proving that 
mandatory sharing harmed its innovation incentives.523 It seems that the Guidance, 
without deeply questioning, seems to acknowledge this presumptive approach as the 
 
520  Commission Guidance, para 83.   
521  Commission Guidance, para 85.   
522  Commission Guidance, para 87.   
523  GC’s Microsoft judgement, paras 696-7, reading as follows: 
The Court finds that, as the Commission correctly submits, Microsoft, which bore 
the initial burden of proof, did not sufficiently establish that if it were required to 
disclose the interoperability information that this would have a significant negative 
impact on its incentives to innovate. 
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baseline for efficiency claims,524 whilst also bearing some risks of having a unilateral 
and formalistic approach. 
From an overall perspective and reading of the Guidance, a looser characterisation of 
the ‘exceptional circumstances’ to warrant mandatory sharing and interoperability 
suggests more discretion being left to the Commission, marking a contrast to the 
effects-based approach. The Commission, in assuming more discretionary power, 
particularly concerning the refusal cases, might have considered the possibility of 
having to deal with cases similar to Microsoft, which cut across EU case law with 
uneven criteria. This however does not disperse the uncertainty, even potentially 
increasing it concerning the antitrust treatment of prospective refusal cases. Against 
the uncertainty as to what extent the effects-based approach is applicable in the 
analysis of abusive conducts, harmful consequences would emerge, along with 
irrevocable outcomes regarding the dominant undertakings’ incentives towards 
innovation and efficiency.525 
5.4. Merger regulation 
5.4.1. General overview 
Mergers and acquisitions (M&As), or broadly speaking ‘concentrations’, have since 
the mid-1980s been subject to the Commission’s scrutiny because of their potential to 
 
524  See the Commission Guidance, para 90, reading; “In particular, it falls on the dominant 
undertaking to demonstrate any negative impact which an obligation to supply is likely to have on 
its own level of innovation”. See also Philip Marsden, ‘Some Outstanding Issues from the 
European Commission’s Guidance on Article 102 of the TFEU: Not-so-faint Echoes of 
Ordoliberalism’ in Federico Etro and Ioannis Kokkoris (eds), Competition Law and the 
Enforcement of Article 102 (OUP 2010) 69. 
525  See also Yannis Katsoulacos and David Ulph, Optimal Enforcement and Decision Structures for 
Competition Policy: Economic Considerations in Federico Etro and Ioannis Kokkoris, 
Competition Law and the Enforcement of Article 102 (OUP 2010) 77. 
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affect both the structure and functioning of the relevant markets.526 However, this 
monitoring was limited due to the lack of a particular provision tailored for controlling 
M&As under the TFEU. Uncertainty could not be resolved fully despite the 
Commission’s efforts to use Article 101 and 102, albeit with the preference to use the 
latter. This preference did not help so much as the pre-requisite to apply Article 102 to 
the existence of a dominant position in the relevant market. In the light of such 
restraints, a Merger Control Regulation (MCR) was issued by the European Council 
and Parliament in late 1989.527 
The so-called first Regulation (MCR) has set out procedural and substantive tests to 
evaluate the changes of control on a lasting basis by means of M&As and structural 
type (concentrative) joint ventures. With regards to the jurisdictional thresholds, it was 
set out that all concentrations with an EU (Community) dimension were required to be 
notified to and approved by the Commission.528 Regarding the appraisal of the 
concentrations, the ‘dominance test’ was adopted under the MCR.529 This rule 
 
526  Broadly speaking, while horizontal mergers would potentially have anti-competitive effects when 
they lead to concentration through a lessened number of players and reduced competition between 
them; the vertical mergers may raise competition concerns should there be a risk of foreclosing 
downstream competitors. For detailed legal and economic analysis through case-law see Nicolas 
Petit, ‘Innovation, Competition, Unilateral Effects and Merger Control Policy’ (SSRN, 29 January 
2018) <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3113077> accessed 9 October 2020; Mrudul Dadhich, 
‘Regulation of vertical mergers under European Union Law: Lessons to be Learnt by Other 
Jurisdictions’ (2015), Europea Colleg Hamburg, Study Paper No. 3/15 <https://europa-kolleg-
hamburg.de/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Study-Paper_Dadhich.pdf> accessed 9 October 2020. 
527  Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the control of concentrations 
between undertakings, OJ L 395, 30/12/1989 (‘Merger Control Regulation’ or ‘MCR’). 
528  A concentration is considered to have a Community dimension where; 
a) the aggregate worldwide turnover of all the undertakings concerned is more 
than ECU 5000 million, and 
b) the aggregate Community-wide turnover of each of at least two of the 
undertakings concerned is more than ECU 250 million, unless each of the 
undertakings concerned achieves more than two-thirds of its aggregate 
Community-wide turnover within one and the same Member State (MCR, art 
1(2)). 
529  Under MCR it was set out as follows: 
A concentration which creates or strengthens a dominant position as a result of 
which effective competition would be significantly impeded in the common market, 
or in a substantial part of it, shall be declared incompatible with the common market 
(MCR, art 2(3)). 
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(dominance test) had not been changed until the introduction of the new regulation, 
namely the ‘European Union Merger Regulation’ (EUMR).530 A new substantive test 
called the ‘Significant Impediment of Effective Competition’ (SIEC) has been adopted 
as the new rule for appraisal of the concentrations. This test is reflected in the Article 
2(3) of the EUMR as follows: 
A concentration which would significantly impede effective 
competition, in the common market or in a substantial part of it, in 
particular as a result of the creation or strengthening of a dominant 
position, shall be declared incompatible with the common market.531 
The new test focuses on the effects of notified concentration on competition, in 
combination with the structure of the market, and prohibits mergers that “significantly 
impede effective competition”, not necessarily but “in particular as a result of the 
creation or strengthening of a dominant position”. This latter emphasis on ‘dominance’ 
still incorporates consideration of the market structure; yet it apparently leaves room 
for a divergent interpretation based on the SIEC test.532 While representing a 
compromise solution between the dominance test and the new SIEC; the EUMR 
included many other improvements, i.e. facilitation of the referral procedures, 
increased flexibility concerning the filing date and the commitment procedures, which 
all together earmarked the modernization of EU competition law based on the so-called 
‘effects-based approach’. 
 
530  See supra note 223. 
531  EU Merger Regulation, art 2(3). 
532  Regarding the details of this new test (SIEC), see Petit (n 526). 
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Having said that, the Commission’s approach in dealing with the concentrations is by 
and large focused on assessment of potential anti-competitive outcomes from the 
would-be M&As, investigating whether there is a risk of market tipping towards 
potential products to be created, or creation or strengthening of a dominant position 
with the concentration. Such concentrations, either horizontal or vertical, are assessed 
usually against the counter-factual scenarios, in order to establish and analyze the 
potential outcomes that would arise out of M&As. Because EU merger control 
normally takes place prior to the implementation of the merger, the counterfactual in 
merger cases is usually the status quo ante, i.e. the situation that exists at the time when 
the Commission reviews the merger.533 This approach would sometimes come up with 
some costs such as disregarding the counter-functioning efficiencies, i.e. given the 
potential short-term anti-competitive effects.534 Remarkably, the theoretical 
presumptions along with hypothetical scenarios have been noticeably leading the 
decision-making processes with regard to the possible consequences of the 
concentrations at the EU level.535 
In this context, the achievement of interoperability does not constitute an aim of EU 
merger control policies and mechanisms, just like other competition law tools i.e. 
Article 101 and 102. Nevertheless, interoperability-centric M&A concerns and 
remedies find a significant place to themselves within the broader context of EU 
competition law aims, incorporating follow-on innovation, amelioration of network 
effects and enhancing competition. Having said that, the most significant and relevant 
M&A cases are examined below. 
 
533  Competition Policy International, ‘The Counterfactual Analysis in EU Merger Control’ (21 
November 2013) <https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/the-counterfactual-analysis-
in-eu-merger-control/> accessed 9 October 2020. 
534  See also supra note 526. 
535  See Competition Policy International (n 533). 
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5.4.2. Interoperability related merger cases 
5.4.2.1. First set of case law 
Cisco/Tandberg536 represents a merger case between two entities i.e. Cisco and 
Tandberg horizontally competing in the market for video communications solutions 
(VCSs). The relevant markets regarding VCSs were found to consist of ‘dedicated 
room’ and ‘multi-purpose room’ and ‘executive office/desktop solutions’ as three 
separate downstream markets, while an upstream market regarding multi-point control 
units (MCUs) was also included into the investigation. The Commission did not find 
any serious doubt that the vertical link between upstream MCUs and downstream 
VCSs would give rise to foreclosure concerns because of the proposed merger.537 
However, Commission’s investigation revealed potential entry barriers in the VCS 
space in relation to the dedicated room solutions market, in particular regarding the 
absence of multi-screen to multi-screen interoperability.538 The Commission’s 
concerns surrounded the risk that interoperability between the VCS products of the 
merging parties and those of their competitors would be degraded in a post-merger 
period. This horizontal concern was also accompanied by the fact that market shares 
of the merged entity in the relevant markets would be approximately double of that of 
its next competitor.  
In order to respond such concerns, Cisco proposed a set of commitments, including 
divestment of its IPRs on the Telepresence Interoperability Protocol (TIP) to be 
 
536  Case COMP/M.5669 - Cisco/Tandberg [2010] (‘Cisco/Tandberg decision’). 
537  Cisco/Tandberg decision, paras 114 and 124. 
538  Cisco/Tandberg decision, para 53. According to Commission, “interoperability for VCS can refer 
both to the possibility for different endpoints (different brands or models belonging to different 
segments) to communicate with each other, and to the possibility for an endpoint to function 
correctly on a given network infrastructure” (Cisco/Tandberg decision, para 55). 
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assigned to an independent industrial body.539 By this means, other manufacturers 
were permitted to participate in the process of updates over the TIP, which was 
credited as the essential standard to be applied to videoconference communication 
services. Until the divestiture was to be completed, royalty-free third-party licenses 
were committed to by the merging parties, concerning the current and future patents 
that would be essential during implementation of the Protocol. More crucially, 
according to the commitments which were conceded by the Commission, competitive 
endpoint vendors and their customers would be able to interoperate with virtually all 
the merged entity’s installed base of multi-screen systems.540 Cisco/Tandberg reveals 
an interesting example since the case involved the divestment of intangible assets as 
well as an extensive set of complex commitments in order to ensure interoperability in 
the market for videoconferencing solutions.541 
In Intel/McAfee,542 the Commission’s review was regarding a conglomerate merger 
between Intel and McAfee which were active in the markets, respectively, for the x86 
central processing units (CPUs) and chipsets and for the security software products. 
Intel consistently held very high market shares in excess of or around 80% in an overall 
x86 CPU market, while security software market was found to be more competitive 
whereby McAfee was the second ranking software security vendor (SSV) following 
Symantec.543 While conglomerate mergers mostly do not give rise to competition 
problems, Commission has had concerns about the risk of preferential treatment or 
 
539  Cisco/Tandberg decision, para 147. 
540  Cisco/Tandberg decision, para 147. 
541  See Thomas Hoehn and Alex Lewis, ‘Interoperability Remedies, FRAND Licensing and 
Innovation: A Review of Recent Case Law’ (2013) 34(2) European Competition Law Review 101, 
109. 
542  Case COMP/M.5984 - Intel/McAfee [2011] (‘Intel/McAfee decision’). 
543  Intel/McAfee decision, paras 69-82. 
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positive discrimination within across the merged entities’ products in contrast to the 
pre-merger period.544  
One of the Commission’s concerns was regarding degradability of cross-interoperability 
between the merging parties’ products with those of their rivals, while possibility of the 
products of Intel and McAfee being technically tied was also raised as another reason 
for serious doubts as to the compatibility of the transaction with the internal market. In 
order to meet these concerns, Intel committed to ensure that instructions and 
interoperability information for new functionalities in Intel CPUs and chipsets were 
documented and available for use by independent SSVs on a royalty-free basis.545 This 
ensured competing SSVs to be able to compete on a level playing field against the 
endpoint security services to be offered by Intel in the post-merger period. With regards 
to the interoperability of Intel endpoint security solutions with hardware developed by 
Intel competitors, Intel committed not to take affirmative steps to degrade its software 
performance when operating on a personal computer containing a non-Intel CPU.546 
Thereby, independently developed security solutions by SSVs would interact with the 
CPUs manufactured by Intel’s competitors under the same conditions that they were 
already working with Intel chipsets and CPUs. As regards the technical tying concerns, 
in the case where Intel would add any endpoint security software e.g. malware detection 
engine to Intel CPUs and chipsets, Intel would offer to license independent SSVs to 
 
544  Commission particularised that “Intel could optimise the APIs between its chipsets/CPUs and 
McAfee’s security solutions, its compilers or its software development kits (“SDKs”) according 
to McAfee’s design preferences, while the integration with the solutions of competing SSVs would 
be altered. This would result in McAfee’s security solutions running better on Intel’s CPUs than 
the endpoint security of the other vendors” (Intel/McAfee decision, para 131). 
545  Intel/McAfee decision, para 298. 
546  Intel/McAfee decision, para 300. 
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interoperate with such software such that the subscription services offered by them 
would be able to utilize Intel’s underlying software.547 
Intel’s commitments covered future products to be jointly developed by the merging 
parties for a five-year period, during which other original equipment manufacturers 
would replace Intel’s tied security products (switch-off mechanism).548 These 
remedies committed on a royalty-free basis are argued to go beyond previous case law 
e.g. Microsoft, whereby the related undertakings were required to update information 
for new versions of relevant products created by the individual undertakings, but not 
of the joint products.549     
The abovementioned case law demonstrates the Commission’s readiness to intervene 
into the proposed mergers with the view to create sufficiently competitive ICT markets 
along with pro-interoperability measures. If the findings denote a likelihood of 
effective competition being significantly impeded subsequent to a merger/acquisition, 
a variety of remedies including enhancement of interoperability could be at the 
disposal of the Commission, as happened in the given merger clearances. As long as 
potential degradability of interoperability is at stake in the post-merger period, this 
might be considered as an anti-competitive risk so as to be deterred with some 
remedies. Such remedies would include divesting IPRs, e.g. attached to a proprietary 
protocol set, to an independent industry body such as in Cisco/Tandberg and making 
the interface specifications, including those of future products, available to 
competitors such as in Intel/McAfee. 
 
547  Intel/McAfee decision, para 301. 
548  Intel/McAfee decision, para 341. 
549  Hoehn and Lewis (n 541) 110. 
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In view of Cisco/Tandberg and Intel/McAfee, competition law tools such as demand-
side substitutability and the SIEC test seem to have been used in combination, if not 
from a long-term perspective. Post-merger market concerns usually stem from an intra-
platform point of view, appearing to have had a significant role during the course of 
investigations conducted. From this viewpoint, both in Cisco/Tandberg and 
Intel/McAfee, the services and products focused on by the Commission did not 
embrace the whole marketplace, but those of the merging parties. In this regard, 
judging whether an effects-based approach or the SIEC-based evaluation was pursued 
for the above cases would not dismiss the overall concerns. Albeit with the intent of 
enhancing interoperability, intra-platform perspective being held in such decisions 
brings these M&A decisions closer to the case law in the pre-modernisation period, 
i.e. when the Commission’s interventions shaped the ground for the mergers between 
technical platform providers, e.g. CAS owners, and multimedia (pay TV) companies. 
In the referred to earlier cases,550 which mostly related to vertical concerns, the EU 
Commission intervened into the notified mergers and joint ventures mainly with a view 
to deter exclusion of competitors via exclusively controlled technical platforms, 
premium content or through comprehensive multi-media service packages. 
Considering the market foreclosure risks, the EU Commission defined narrow 
markets, and made the clearances with a variety of conditions, particularly mandated 
interoperability at the level of intra and inter platform - predominantly with an 
 
550  See Case COMP/M.2876, Newscorp/Telepiù, Commission decision of 2 April 2003, OJ L 110 of 
16 April 2004; Case No.IV/M.2050, Vivendi/Canal+Seagram, Commission decision of 13 
October 2000, OJ C311/3; Case IV/M. 0037, BSkyB/KirchPayTV, Commission decision of 21 
March 2000, OJ C 100, 15 April 2000; Case IV/M.0048, Vodafone/Vivendi/Canal+, Commission 
decision of 20 July 2000, OJJ C 11, 20 May 2003; Case IV/M. 993, Bertelsman/Kirch/Premiere, 
Commission decision of 27 May 1998, OJ L 53, 27 February 1999; Case IV/M. 1027, Deutsche 
Telekom/Beta Research, Commission decision of 27 May 1998, OJ L 53, 27 February 1999; Case 




emphasis on the former because of the would-be vertically integrated multimedia 
firms. Facing the risk of double control by the same undertaking which would 
potentially have digital gatekeeper positions, led the Commission to make the related 
facilities, i.e. set-top boxes/CASs, available to downstream competitors, stimulate the 
adoption of common interfaces and bring limitation to the “first windows rights”551 as 
well as to the duration of premium content transmission rights. Thereby, not only 
vertical and horizontal interoperability but also transmission of premium content was 
secured to be in an open, transparent and non-discriminatory manner. What is more, 
providing fair and non-discriminatory CAS access to competing companies was 
acknowledged as crucial for ‘media diversity and pluralism’, as reflected in the EU 
sector-specific regulation as well.552 
As the first set of case law reveals the similar aspects of the earlier cases, it could be 
argued that presumed competitive and pro-interoperability concerns continued to lead 
the decision-making processes for the concentrations later on. This also means 
considering merger controls as an implicit tool or leverage for market regulation, if not 
precluding the so-called effects-based approach under the EUMR. Under this mixed 
approach, interoperability was reflected in a large number of the Commission’s M&A 
decisions, having significant implications such as in the first set of case-law i.e. 
Cisco/Tandberg and Intel/McAfee decisions. 
 
551  Rights holders try to extract maximum value from their programming rights by a variety of 
commercial practices. One of the referred practices is selling movies several times, being called 
the ‘windows system’ in common business language (See Geradin and Layne-Farrar (n 91) 70). 
552  See the section ‘6.2.1.2. Conditional access obligations’. 
 
196 
5.4.2.2. Second set of case law 
While EU merger controls demonstrate similar consequences regarding 
interoperability, a more lenient approach and less stringent conditions could be 
identified in post-modernization period. Reflecting these features, the Commission’s 
two landmark decisions responding interoperability needs, i.e. Microsoft/Skype,553 and 
Facebook/WhatsApp,554 could be featured as the second set of case law, as analysed 
below. 
In Microsoft/Skype, the notified transaction was related to Skype being acquired by 
Microsoft, with the conglomerate and horizontal effects under scrutiny. The 
Commission assessed post-merger effects on the relevant markets, namely ‘consumer’ 
and ‘enterprise’ communications markets, including the related services like voice and 
video calls, instant messaging messages, and found no serious doubts regarding the 
so-called effects. Marking a contrast to the previous case law, the Commission’s 
findings revolved around the ephemeral character of large market shares, which were 
reaching to 80-90%,555 a stark dominance in the rapidly growing consumer 
communications market. The Commission found the notified merger would cause no 
harm based on the acknowledgement that “consumer communications services are a 
nascent and dynamic sector and market shares can change quickly within a short period 
of time”.556 Likewise, consumers were found to be “sensitive to innovative services or 
products” and would be able to switch to new services/applications if the service 
 
553  Case COMP/M.6281 - Microsoft/Skype [2011] (‘Microsoft/Skype decision’). 
554  Case No COMP/M.7217 - Facebook/WhatsApp [2014] (‘Facebook/WhatsApp decision’). 
555  The Commission concluded that, albeit with a large market share (80-90%) in the scenario of the 
narrowest market definition, namely in the Windows based PC market, different scenarios in case 
of broader markets would not affect the ultimate assessment (See Facebook/WhatsApp decision, 
para 110).  
556  Microsoft/Skype decision, para 78.  
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providers “are unable to offer users new and innovative functionality”, implicating that 
‘consumer lock-in’ should not be deemed as a matter of concern.557 
Under the assessment of horizontal effects, interoperability was highlighted 
concerning the ‘enterprise communications market’, where Microsoft’s Lyn product 
being merged with Skype was questioned in terms of preferential interoperability. 
However, it was stressed by the Commission that Skype was already interoperable 
with Lyn (for instant messaging and voice calls). Even in the case of full integration, 
preferential interoperability was not featured as a problem since Skype’s services were 
not suitable for the entities that use call centres, which was considered as a key 
factor.558 Furthermore, no negative effect was found likely in the subsequent three 
years, considering Lyn’s small percentage of market share in the enterprise 
communications market.559 Based on given counter-balancing facts, no condition was 
imposed on the parties, and the proposed merger was approved by the Commission. 
Facebook/WhatsApp represents another concentration unconditionally approved by 
the Commission. The Commission dismissed the competition concerns regarding 
relevant markets, namely the markets for ‘consumer communication services’, ‘social 
networking services’ and ‘online advertising services’ that would be affected by the 
proposed acquisition. In finding no harm, analysis was devoted to the potential 
horizontal overlaps within the market for the consumer communication services as 
well as to the vertical effects in relation to the other two markets. In the former market, 
both of the merging parties, namely Facebook and WhatsApp were found active with 
their apps respectively called “Facebook Messenger” and “WhatsApp”. On the other 
 
557  Microsoft/Skype decision, paras 121-122.  
558  Microsoft/Skype decision, paras 215-216.  
559  Microsoft/Skype decision, para 221.  
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hand, in the latter two markets, just Facebook was found to have been providing 
relevant services e.g. social networking, photo/video sharing, online advertising. 
In relation to the market for consumer communication services, no competition concern 
was raised, based on the findings similar to those in Microsoft/Skype. In this regard, large 
market shares and network effects were not considered to create a barrier to market entry 
or expansion in the presence of disruptive innovations,560 multi-homing561 and freely 
downloadable apps that occupy little space on devices.562 These factors, according to the 
Commission, would eliminate the switching costs and lock-in risk, even though both of 
the merging parties were active in the market for consumer communication services. 
Likewise, no competition concern was raised with regard to the markets for ‘social 
networking services’ and ‘online advertising services’, as the merging parties were 
regarded as ‘distant competitors’ in the former563 and ‘non-competitors’ in the latter.564 
In terms of targeted advertising, the existence of many service providers competing with 
Facebook, with them having access to internet user data through alternative means, 
seems to have had weight within the Commission’s assessment.565 
 
560  According to the Commission, “Consumer communications apps are a fast-moving sector, where 
customers’ switching costs and barriers to entry/expansion are low. In this market any leading 
market position even if assisted by network effects is unlikely to be incontestable. (…) Also, 
competing consumer communications apps are able to grow despite network effects, both over 
time and following disruptions in the market (Facebook/WhatsApp decision, para 132). 
561  [T]his means that, when customer try new consumer communications apps, users do not generally 
stop using the consumer communications apps they were previously using (Facebook/WhatsApp 
decision, para 110). In other words, “the use of one consumer communications app (for example, 
of the merged entity) does not exclude the use of competing consumer communications apps by 
the same user (Facebook/WhatsApp decision, para 133). 
562  [M]ulti-homing is facilitated by the ease of downloading a consumer communications app, which 
is generally free, easy to access and does not take up much capacity on a smartphone 
(Facebook/WhatsApp decision, para 133). 
563  Facebook/WhatsApp decision, para 158. 
564  Facebook/WhatsApp decision, para 165. 
565  See Facebook/WhatsApp decision, para 189, reading; “The Commission notes that, regardless of 
whether the merged entity will start using WhatsApp user data to improve targeted advertising on 
Facebook’s social network, there will continue to be a large amount of Internet user data that is 
valuable for advertising purposes and that are not within Facebook’s exclusive control.” 
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Although interoperability has been the subject matter of scrutiny from the views of 
third parties, no critical concern was raised on that. The Commission firstly noted that 
interoperability was not available on the part of merging parties’ main competitors on 
smartphones, and in particular it was not an element that sustained the entry and 
expansion of WhatsApp, Facebook Messenger or other popular consumer 
communications apps.566 Crucially, in the Commission’s view, interoperability would 
not be considered to be a matter of concern “unless Facebook decide to merge two 
platforms or to allow cross-platform communication”.567 Notably, technical hurdles 
against such an integration, i.e. automated matching between Facebook and WhatsApp 
user accounts, seems to have reduced possible post-merger emergences in the 
Commission’s eyes.568 
However, strikingly, in August 2016 WhatsApp announced updates to its terms of 
service and privacy policy, including the possibility of linking WhatsApp users’ phone 
numbers with Facebook users’ identities as opposed to the notification by the parties 
in 2014.569 Finding this was an issue which Facebook was aware of at the time of 
notification, The Commission imposed a fine of €110 million on Facebook for 
providing incorrect or misleading information during the 2014 investigation.570 The 
Commission has not reversed back or launched a reassessment for the 2014 merger 
 
566  Facebook/WhatsApp decision, para 122. 
567  See Facebook/WhatsApp decision, para 123. 
568  See Facebook/WhatsApp decision, paras 159-162. See also Vicente Bagnoli, ‘The big data relevant 
market as a tool: For a case by case analysis at the digital market’ (12th Ascola Conference 
(Competition Law for the Digital Economy) 12 June 2017), 29-34 
˂https://ssrn.com/abstract=3064795˃ accessed 9 October 2020. 
569  European Commission, Press Release, ‘Mergers: Commission fines Facebook €110 million for 
providing misleading information about WhatsApp takeover’, 18 May 2017 
<https://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1369_en.htm> accessed 9 October 2020.  
570  Ibid. 
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clearance, saying that the “clearance decision was based on a number of elements 
going beyond automated user matching”.571 
Considering the developments following the Facebook/WhatsApp decision, data 
protection aspects seem to have an impact in the future decision making processes of 
the Commission. From a broader perspective, while the interoperability and 
integration aspects were found not to have crucial impact in the post-merger period, 
this rather flexible approach should not be taken as a permanent basis particularly in 
the light of the subsequent decisions made by the national authorities.572 As a matter 
of fact, the opportunity cost of hindered (or limited) interoperability would bear more 
complicated results and tensions, reaching out to data protection laws and rules. This 
situation would suggest a more intrusive approach regarding interoperability and 
related issues, i.e. integration of merging parties’ apps, in prospective M&A decisions. 
Regardless of the data protection aspect, it is worth noting that horizontal relationships 
do not seem to have created a significant tension for the Commission in this second 
set of case law. Had the post-merger interoperability been put under risk because of 
market power and/or network effects as to be not mitigated by counter-balancing facts, 
this would have been deemed as a reason for a possible intervention. Besides, the 
Commission not emphasizing network effects in this caselaw demonstrates that it is 
considered that many emerging ICT markets do not reveal serious concerns regarding 
 
571  Ibid. 
572  Since the closure of the Facebook/WhatsApp case with unconditional approval, the relationship 
between competition law and data protection re-emerged in three cases at the national level. In 
Italy the Autoria Grante della Concorrenza e del Mercato (AGCM) in May 2017 considered 
WhatsApp guilty for having forced its users to share their personal data with Facebook. Whereas 
in Germany, Bundeskartellamt, after an investigation launched in March 2016, found that 
Facebook abused its dominant position in the social networks market, infringing data protection 
legislation via imposition of unfair unlawful terms and conditions towards users (Bagnoli (n 501) 
30).     
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market foreclosure, and with reduced vertical concerns. Summing up, a remarkable 
change in the decision making processes over time is note-worthy, given the 
Microsoft/Skype and previous Microsoft cases i.e. Microsoft, Microsoft Tying.573 
5.4.2.3. Microsoft/LinkedIn: Revisiting the interoperability concerns 
Microsoft/LinkedIn574 represents one of the few conglomerate merger cases that were 
assessed on the basis of various aspects including Big Data, as well as the 
interoperability relationships. While Microsoft was found to have a strong market 
position in the markets for ‘PC operating system (OS)’ and ‘productivity software’, 
LinkedIn was found to exist in a number of markets including ‘social networking’, 
‘online advertising’ and ‘recruiting tools’. Relevant markets that would be impacted 
were defined as the markets for ‘professional social networking (PSN) services’, 
‘customer relationship management (CRM) software solutions’ and ‘online advertising 
services’. After the Commission’s evaluation, a number of conditions were attached to 
the merger clearance after the finding of potential anti-competitive effects i.e. market 
foreclosure, seen as likely to happen in the markets where LinkedIn was active. 
The proposed acquisition was assessed not only for the conglomerate effects, but also 
horizontal and vertical effects. In this regard, markets for ‘online advertising’ and ‘CRM 
software solutions’ were reviewed by the Commission through an investigation of 
potential anti-competitive effects including Big Data related aspects. The assessment 
 
573  See also Zhang (n 148) 92, reading; “A real distinguishing feature the Commission could have 
focused on is that due to the rapidly changing nature of technology enabled markets, the way that 
consumers use personal computing technology has changed from what it was when WMP and IE 
were being considered”. As rightfully said by the author, consumers are increasingly using their 
tablets and smartphones and Windows is not the dominant operating systems on tablets and 
phones, that market instead belongs to Android and iOS, so even if Microsoft were incentivised to 
tie Skype to Windows and with the action of network effects, the competitive effect of this tie may 
be different to the tying of WMP and IE to Windows (Zhang (n 148) 92). 
574  Case M.8124 - Microsoft/LinkedIn [2016] (‘Microsoft/LinkedIn decision’). 
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relating to the so-called two markets was focused on a likelihood of a combination of 
user datasets for online advertising and bundling of data access or restriction of them 
to the CRM software solutions. These concerns were dismissed as the merging parties 
were found not to have sufficient market power and the ability to foreclose their 
competitors in the relevant markets.575 In fact, both of the merging parties were not 
active in any of the relevant markets except for the market regarding ‘online non-search 
advertising services’, and unilateral post-merger effects were not seen likely because all 
investigated markets were considered as exposed to competitive forces. 
While anti-competitive effects were found unlikely in the markets for ‘online 
advertising services’ and ‘CRM software solutions’, some concerns were raised for the 
market regarding PSN services. Concerning this market, a number of scenarios were 
assessed with regards to potential conglomerate and vertical anti-competitive effects. 
Such scenarios were refined as; the ‘pre-installation of LinkedIn into the PC OS’, 
‘integrating LinkedIn features into the Microsoft productivity software i.e. Outlook 
and other Office products and the refusal to have access to Microsoft’s APIs’ and 
‘bundling/tying LinkedIn applications with Microsoft’s productivity software’. The 
main questions marks were put on the queries of whether ‘pre-installation’ and 
‘integration’ scenarios would hamper effective competition in the market for PSN 
services.576 Following the counter-factual analysis, the scenario of ‘bundling/tying 
LinkedIn applications with Microsoft’s productivity software’ was found unlikely 
given the presumption that tying was not revealed as a plan through Microsoft’s 
internal documents. Furthermore, it was highlighted that any anti-competitive tying to 
be done by Microsoft would be challenged under Article 102.577 
 
575  Microsoft/LinkedIn decision, paras 179-180 and 192-193.  
576  Microsoft/LinkedIn decision, para 302. 
577  Microsoft/LinkedIn decision, para 304.    
 
203 
On the other hand, in relation to the ‘pre-installation’ scenario, the Commission found 
that this strategy would give LinkedIn a greater visibility along with an increased 
membership base and user activity.578 Furthermore, Microsoft would easily agree with 
the manufacturers for pre-installation, and they might not have an incentive to install 
a second PSN application.579 According to the Commission, competing PSN service 
providers were likely to face a potential market tipping and foreclosure, as consumers 
would have difficulty switching to competing providers.580 Similar concerns were also 
raised for the ‘integration’ scenario, which would enable LinkedIn to have access to 
the contacts in Outlook, resulting in an expanded network.581 Moreover, in this 
scenario, third party access to the Microsoft Office software suite, particularly 
Outlook, would be risked and access to relevant APIs would be denied to the 
competing PSN suppliers.582 This possibility would discredit rival PSN services and 
put them in a disadvantaged position against the more advanced features of LinkedIn 
being integrated into Microsoft productivity software, particularly Microsoft Outlook 
or the Office suite.583 
Across these scenarios, ‘multi-homing’ was not acknowledged by the Commission as 
counter-balancing the foreseen competition concerns. What is more, the Commission 
considers the given post-merger scenarios “can require significant time on the part of 
PSN users, [and] can in some cases act as a disincentive to multi-homing between PSN 
platforms”.584 This feature of the analysis underlies the Commission’s ‘tipping’ 
concerns in Microsoft/LinkedIn, as opposed to Microsoft/Skype and 
 
578  Microsoft/LinkedIn decision, paras 315-316.    
579  Microsoft/LinkedIn decision, para 320.    
580  See Microsoft/LinkedIn decision, para 320.    
581  Microsoft/LinkedIn decision, para 328.    
582  Microsoft/LinkedIn decision, para 329.    
583  See Microsoft/LinkedIn decision, para 330.    
584  Microsoft/LinkedIn decision, para 345.    
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Facebook/WhatsApp. At this point, it is noteworthy that market tipping was found 
unlikely for the consumer communications services in the context of Microsoft/Skype 
and Facebook/WhatsApp. According to these decisions, competition concerns were 
dispelled not only for multi-homing but also because of the presumption that a wider 
audience were sought by the applicants, respectively Microsoft and Facebook. 
Conversely, in the Microsoft/LinkedIn case, the Commission was concerned that the 
market for PSN services would be irremediably “tipped” in favour of LinkedIn, 
ultimately carrying the risk of foreclosure of other PSN providers in that market, such 
as Xing, GoldenLine and Viadeo, which are LinkedIn’s main competitors in Poland, 
Germany and France, respectively.585 With regard to the Commission’s concerns, 
Microsoft proposed a number of commitments, specifically responding to the concerns 
related to the ‘integration’ and ‘pre-installation’ scenarios which are given below. 
Integration commitments include; 
(i) access to all APIs for all core Office products, along with a unified gateway 
enabling developers to build applications and services that can access data 
from Microsoft’s cloud services,   
(ii) making available the Office Store for distribution and downloading of 
Outlook add-ins for third-party PSN Services, 
(iii) ensuring that the so-called Outlook add-ins are run independently of LinkedIn 
features to be included in Office, 
(iv) allowing EEC users to disable LinkedIn features for the entire Office suite.586  
 
585  Federico Marini-Balestra and Riccardo Tremolada, ‘Digital markets and merger control: balancing 
big data and privacy against competition law – a comment on the European Commission’s decision 
in the Microsoft/LinkedIn merger’ [2017] 38(7) European Competition Law Review 337, 341. See 
also Microsoft/LinkedIn decision, para 343. 
586  Microsoft/LinkedIn decision, paras 414-417, 437.    
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Pre-installation commitments include;   
(i) ensuring that PC OEMs and distributors are free not to install any LinkedIn 
branded application, Start tile or Taskbar button for Windows OS on their 
PCs that are distributed in the European Economic Area, 
(ii) allowing users to remove LinkedIn from Windows if PC OEMs and 
distributors decide to pre-install it, 
(iii) not reiterating in any way against PC OEMs and distributors for developing, 
using, distributing, promoting or supporting a Windows PC application 
and/or a Windows PC tile for third-party PSN providers, 
(iv) granting users the ability to remove the LinkedIn from their Windows PC OS, 
(v) not offering or prompting users to install or including LinkedIn through 
Windows PC OS or its updates.587   
With an overall assessment, it is possible to conclude that both sets of commitments 
not only respond to the relevant scenarios but also aim to ensure a level playing field 
in the post-merger PSN market. The Commission demonstrates it can use merger 
control mechanisms to the extent that relevant markets are revisited and revitalized 
with none or the minimized possibility of competition problems. Microsoft/LinkedIn, 
representing this very end-target, unwraps a package of commitments, revealing a 
semi-regulatory vision. Intervening in the area of behavioural economics, the 
Commission opted for a remedy that encouraged users to make a choice as to which 
PSN to use,588 and aimed to create equal footing amongst the rival companies. 
 
587  Microsoft/LinkedIn decision, paras 419-421, 438.    
588  Michele Giannino, ‘The appraisal of mergers in high technology markets under the EU merger 
control regulation: from Microsoft/Skype to Facebook/WhatsApp’ (SSRN, 12 January 2015) 14-15 
˂https://ssrn.com/abstract=2548560˃ accessed 9 October 2020. 
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Remarkably, the Commission’s interventions in several antitrust and merger cases 
pose a divergence, if not an inconsistency overall. For instance, while tying up 
Windows Media Player with Windows OS was challenged under Article 102 in 
Microsoft,589 Microsoft’s tying Internet Explorer with its OS did not receive the same 
reaction later on.590 On the other hand, scenarios apart from tying e.g. based on 
integration and pre-installation, clearly appear to have raised concerns on the part of 
the Commission. 
From this viewpoint, interoperability-based behavioural remedies inspired by 
Microsoft seem to have been drawn on in Microsoft/LinkedIn. Yet, the 
Microsoft/LinkedIn decision did not specify a unique obligation, e.g. disclosure of 
interface specifications, and contended with the maintenance of the former level of 
interoperability between Microsoft’s products and those of competitors. Also, 
remarkably, while interoperability concerns were met and responded to, other 
concerns such as tying/bundling were dismissed under Microsoft/LinkedIn. Given this 
fact, the antitrust and M&A interventions of the Commission could be said to 
complement each other, including from the interoperability perspective. 
However, this does not reflect the case at all. Interestingly, in Cisco/Tanberg, Cisco 
has already been licensing its essential patents (SEPs) on a royalty-free basis and 
permitting its competitors to implement TIP in their products, namely 
videoconferencing solutions. The Commission nevertheless opted to clear the 
acquisition with the structural and behavioural conditions to ensure the interoperability 
 
589  See supra note 498. 
590  In December 2009, the Commission accepted the commitments offered by Microsoft finding them 
capable to address competition concerns related to the tying of its web browser, IE, to Windows. 
In this regard, the Commission considered Microsoft’s screen choice acceptable, as opposed to its 




between its products and those of competitors is not impaired.591 Not only in 
Cisco/Tandberg, even throughout EU history, creating a pro-interoperability 
environment on the basis of equal footing among the players has functioned as a 
subordinate goal of merger control mechanisms. Except in circumstances when the 
interoperability concerns are mitigated via multi-homing and other factors, e.g. the 
ephemeral nature of market power, the Commission’s interventionist approach should 
be noted against the potential risks of impaired interoperability, as the 
Microsoft/LinkedIn decision signifies clearly.   
5.5. Assessment of EU competition law 
EU competition law offers a variety of tools to cope with the anti-competitive 
behaviours and accompanying risks that would accompany different market settings, 
including via collaborations, concentrations and abuse of dominant position. In this 
context, ensuring vertical and/or horizontal interoperability stands out as an important 
objective, usually subordinated to broadly set competition law goals. From this point 
of view, in the absence of vertical and/or horizontal competition concerns, remedial 
tools are not invoked to enhance the level of interoperability under EU competition 
law. Nonetheless, many EU precedents demonstrate the readiness of the Commission 
to intervene in the case of potentially impaired or absent interoperability. 
First and foremost, the Microsoft judgement demonstrates that the Commission could 
enforce Article 102 with a view not only to restore but also to further the level of 
interoperability, even sometimes going beyond the established lines of case law, i.e. 
 
591  It should however be noted that this scenario of any impairment or degradability of 
‘interoperability’ could hardly realise, as a dominant company’s withdrawal of interface 
information that was already supplied to third parties would easily be challenged by the European 
Courts as happened previously in the Microsoft case. 
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regarding ‘exceptional circumstances’. It is undeniable that Microsoft caused some 
erosion of the legal standards applicable to ‘refusal to license’ behaviours, leaving an 
open and unsecure area for intervention based on the lack of interoperability. The 
absence of a well-established ‘theory of harm’ albeit with the elaboration of the 
underlying facts in Microsoft592 would mean future cases could be dealt with on a 
looser ground that is supposedly to be directly linked to the TFEU rules i.e. Article 
102(b) on the basis of literal reading instead of a meticulous interpretation invoking 
the substantiated consumer welfare criteria for intervention, i.e. through the lens of the 
effects-based approach, as opposed to the Commission Guidance. 
Having said that, competition law tools seem to be stretched to ensure interoperability, 
even at the expense of consumer welfare. Thus, it is remarkable to add that pro-
interoperability competition law remedies would pose uncertainty as to how to 
implement the applicable tools, particularly the ‘exceptional circumstances’ test. 
Under this unpredictable environment, competition law practitioners would be 
expected to act more flexibly, whereas the market players could then face up to risks 
of infringement and punishment easily. On this note, it should also be emphasized that 
narrowing the room for the market players in terms of the refusal to supply e.g. 
interoperability information to third parties, would suggest an expanded duty to deal, 
resulting in chilled innovation and investment motives. Closely related to this, 
boundaries between competition law and sector-specific regulation would seem to be 
 
592  See Valentine Korah, Intellectual Property Rights and the EC Competition Rules (Hart Publishing 
2006) 166, reading; “I would have liked to see a longer discussion of the earlier cases on refusal 
to supply or license and more economic theory. I would have liked the decision to have been based 
more clearly on the danger of the adjacent markets tipping in favour of Windows”. For the contrary 
views see Michele Messina, ‘Article 82 and the New Economy: Need for Modernisation?’ [2006] 
2(2) The Competition Law Review 73, 95. 
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blurrier following Microsoft and comparable interventions, which favour a formalistic 
and pro-competitive approach regardless of proven consumer harms. 
As far as Article 101 is concerned, a similar set of consequences could not simply be 
reached since a more rule-based, technical and detailed proceeding is followed for the 
scrutiny of agreements and concerted practices. Moreover, a 30% market threshold in 
this context means a safe harbour that does not exist in antitrust and/or merger cases. 
Particularly from the perspective of horizontal concerns, market collaborations are 
often found to be pro-competitive when the market players tend to reach out to an 
industry-wide solution that would reinforce openness and interoperability. 
Standardisation agreements illustrate this as they often force their members to share 
their IPRs when they are essential to the standards to be adopted in the end. 
Notwithstanding, from a wider viewpoint, many standards do not necessarily reflect 
on the industry-wide needs for interoperability and innovation, given the fact the SSOs 
are often strategically used by the stakeholders to stimulate their ecosystem-centric 
viewpoint incorporating complementary markets.593 Thus, post-SSO scenarios would 
incur conflated long-term consequences involving a possibility of market tipping 
towards certain products, appealing to potential interventions based on Article 102. 
Such situations would result in a market landscape which might have already gone 
through a competition law scrutiny yet still posing interoperability problems because 
of the isolated digital gateways and semi-structural entry barriers, which might fall 
outside of the reach of both Article 101 and 102.594 Such digital gateways could be 
 
593  For a discussion on how and why ICT firms participate in standardisation processes and how 
different standards are forged based upon various tools and tactical factors pursued by the 
participants, see Kai Jacobs, ‘Corporate standardization, management and innovation’ in Richard 
Hawkins, Knut Blind, Robert Page (eds), Handbook on Innovation and standards (Edward Elgar 
2017) 377-397.  
594  See also the section ‘7.2.4.2. Interoperability in the IoT ecosystems’. 
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illustrated by the IoT based examples like Google (Brillo), Microsoft (Azure), 
Samsung (SmartThings), Apple (HomeKit), Amazon (Alexa) as well as technical 
(CAS) platforms which authenticate and transmit the digital signals to TV screens. 
Going beyond the economics-based understanding from competition policy 
perspective, interoperability has a social value which remains difficult to measure.595 
Surfacing particularly in hindrance of information flows, cultural productions and 
democratic culture for the access and interoperability gaps and related problems e.g. 
often based on proprietary models that occupy public domain, this social value is not 
easily recognisable and does exceed the outer limits of the competition law tools and 
analysis. As highlighted at the outset of this study, major interoperability concerns are 
not limited to the consumer welfare, and are closely related to civic virtue embedded 
in the so called social value which would require a broader perspective. 
The above snapshot signifies both a dilemma and shortcoming of EU competition law, 
which increasingly has a regulatory tendency as opposed to its original roots and 
principles. As implied by a recent report, EU competition law tools are not capable 
enough to cope with the digital era problems,596 as particularly surfacing in 
conjunction with the gatekeeping roles and functionalities. This is more visible in 
interoperability related cases, whereby the Commission wishes to exceed the 
established case law and not to confine itself with the concept of ‘consumer welfare’ 
having to find consumer harm by weighing up benefits and costs. 
Alongside these deficiencies, the lengthy and complicated enforcement procedures 
should particularly be underlined. While M&A and Article 101 assessments look to 
 
595  Perzanowski (n 40) 113. 
596  See supra note 500.  
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the future with no requirement of retrospectively evidencing the findings, antitrust 
assessment under Article 102 differs since it relies on qualitative/quantitative evidence 
demonstrating likely anti-competitive effects as well as scanning through the previous 
case law to find out the most appropriate rule. This situation does not promise a stable 
and predictable pathway, as could be implicated from the Microsoft decision, which 
sorted the encountered interoperability problem with uneven criteria and tests, i.e. the 
incentive balancing test, after a five-year period following the claimant’s application. 
The expense and complexity of an order to disclose interface information was 
remarkably high in Microsoft, rendering a striking example for the regulatory costs of 
an antitrust intervention of this kind.597 In Microsoft which first came up with a 
Commission decision in 2004 that covered an investigation based on a five-year 
period, the GC has rendered its judgement in 2007, being followed by further conflicts 
and statements of objectives including a non-compliance decision issued by the 
Commission in 2008. The enforcement process has been complicated by a great many 
issues, i.e. royalty rates, (in)sufficiency of interoperability information, which ended 
up with another GC’s decision dated 27 June 2012 upholding the Commission’s non-
compliance decision.598 Such a lengthy process, while compromising the credibility of 
the antitrust investigations, does not result in an effective solution against the time-
sensitive, imminent and sometimes structural/architectural interoperability 
problems.599 Besides, Microsoft type foreclosure-based findings might not stimulate, 
 
597  Unver (n 30) 113; Weston (n 13) 189. 
598  Hoehn and Lewis (n 541) 107-9. 
599  This is particularly convincing as structural and behavioural aspects increasingly meet in ICT 
markets and behavioural solutions tend to have more structural characteristics in effect (See also 
A. Van Rooijen, ‘Devising Ex ante Interoperability Rules: Lessons from the Court of First 
Instance’s Microsoft Judgment’ [2011] 14 International Journal of Communications Law & Policy 
1, 2-3, reading; “Although all the specific facts of a case can be taken into account under Article 
102 TFEU procedure and it is thus very flexible, a more structural regime may be welcome to 
ensure that the benefits of interoperability are reaped on a broader scale”.   
 
212 
even maintain, the innovation and dynamic efficiency, given the short-cut 
formulations running short of a well-advanced ‘theory of harm’. In this vein, there 
arises a discrepancy and gap between the EU competition law goals and the formulas 
pursued in implementation i.e. particularly under Article 102 of the TFEU. 
6. Sector-specific regulations: Electronic communications law  
6.1. Main elements of the ECRF 
6.1.1. Main pillars and evolution of the ECRF 
While IPR and competition law measures have a horizontal or generic nature and 
applicability over any industry or sector, sector-specific rules are industry-oriented 
characteristically. Among EU sector-specific rules, those governing the 
telecommunications industry reveal the most prominent and established set of 
regulations, including interoperability rules and principles. Whereas the main concern 
of this study is the analysis of ICT-centric interoperability concerns, 
‘telecommunications’, or more broadly speaking ‘electronic communications’, needs to 
be paid particular attention since it underlies a great many ICT services, including cloud 
computing, the IoT, etc. Crucially, electronic communications networks and services 
constitute the backbone infrastructure upon which not only ICTs but also a globalizing 
digital economy thrive. Regulations related to the electronic communications sector 
therefore go beyond a simple sector-specific framework, extending to other ICT spheres 
along with significant spill-over effects for the economy and society. 
From the beginning, the liberalization and regulation of the electronic communications 
sector have been underscored by European policy makers, with an emphasis on the 
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‘natural monopoly’600 characteristics of the sector. Avoiding duplication of facilities, 
particularly duplication of the fixed costs of the network system, has been an important 
component of the ‘natural monopoly’ argument for access regulation under the 
philosophy of sector-specific rules.601 Not only in telecommunications but also in other 
network industries, many industry segments were considered non-competitive and 
opened to third parties’ access for similar reasons. For instance, in the rail transportation 
sector, tracks and stations were found to be non-competitive or a natural monopoly, in 
contrast to passenger and freight services, as with considering electricity and 
transmission grids as non-rivalry bottlenecks along with an access regulation. 
Remarkably, policy makers considered liberalization of the state monopolies insufficient 
to ensure a competitive market running free from any legal, infrastructural and economic 
constraints,602 and made extra effort to pursue open access and interconnection policies 
towards enabling effective competition and consumer benefits. 
Hence, the idea of opening up the network industries to competition has driven the 
regulatory policies in this area for over two decades across the EU and globe. The 
Commission’s 1987 Green Paper603 represented the baseline towards this end, setting 
 
600  ‘Natural monopoly’ means a situation in which any amount of output is always produced more 
cheaply by a single firm: the cost of production is lowest when one firm serves the entire market 
(Daniel F. Spulber, ‘Competition Policy in Telecommunications’ in  M. Cave, Sumit K. Majumdar 
and I. Vogelsang (eds), Handbook of Telecommunications Economics (Elsevier Science B. V. 
2002) 486-7). It is acknowledged that in natural monopoly industries that denote scale and scope 
economies, a firm is presumed to construct and operate the underlying networks more efficiently, 
e.g. with lower costs, than it would be with more than one firm. 
601  Ibid.  
602  This fact is enunciated as follows under the Commission’s 1998 Access Notice: 
The mere ending of legal monopolies does not put an end to dominance. Indeed, 
notwithstanding the liberalisation Directives, the development of effective 
competition from alternative network providers with adequate capacity and 
geographic reach will take time (Commission Notice on Application of Competition 
Rules to Access Agreements in the Telecommunications Sector [1998] OJ C 265/02, 
recital 64).  
603  European Commission, Towards a Dynamic European Economy: Green Paper on the development 
of a Common Market for Telecommunications Services and Equipment [1987] COM (87)290 
(‘1987 Green Paper’). 
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out an EU-level program incorporating ‘liberalization’ and ‘harmonization’ of the 
telecommunications markets. While the former aimed at fully liberalized markets with 
no special or exclusive rights, the latter meant adoption of regulatory standards in 
terms of access, interconnection and ensuring competition. Not only liberalization and 
harmonization of the relevant markets, but also the co-application of competition law 
to the telecommunications sector was also acknowledged as one of the principles 
underlying the 1987 Green Paper. Within the framework of these goals, a Resolution604 
was agreed by the European Council and published on 30 June 1988. Since then, 
European legislative authorities have responded to both hard law i.e. regulations and 
directives, and soft law i.e. recommendations and guidelines, in order to realize the 
articulated policy objectives. 
Such legislative measures aimed to transform the telecommunications sector from a 
state-led monopoly to a competitive marketplace. To that end, liberalization directives 
were first put into force to ensure removal of all the exclusive and special rights in 
relevant areas of services, e.g. terminal equipment, wireless and wired services and 
fixed voice telephony, in a gradual manner. The first step on this pathway was the 
Terminal Equipment Directive605 that entered into force in 1988, being followed by 
1990 Services Directive.606 While the former was aiming at withdrawal of legal 
monopolies in the terminal equipment markets, the latter liberalized provision of 
telecommunications services, apart from ‘voice telephony’, in the Member States. 
 
604  Council Resolution of 30 June 1988 on the development of the common market for 
telecommunications services and equipment up to 1992 [1988] OJ C 257/1. 
605  European Commission, Commission Directive (EU) 88/301 of 16 May 1988 on competition in the 
markets in telecommunications terminal equipment [1988] OJ 1988 L 131/73. 
606  European Commission, Commission Directive (EU) 90/388 of 28 June 1990 on competition in the 
markets for telecommunications services [1990] OJ 1990 L 192/10.  
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The Commission took the initiative under Article 106 (formerly 90(3)) of the TFEU, 
which facilitated the liberalisation process with no requirement to submit these 
directives before the approval of the European Council and Parliament, as opposed to 
the procedure under Article 116 (formerly 96) of the TFEU. The CoJ upheld in two 
respective judgements607 in 1991 and 1992 that the Commission was entitled to directly 
enact and implement such directives. Being backed by the CoJ’s judgements, the 
Commission adopted a series of directives amending the 1990 Services Directive to 
encompass a broader range of telecommunications services: satellite communications, 
use of cable television networks, mobile and personal communications.608 The final step 
was the enactment of the Full Competition Directive, which required Member States to 
remove all exclusive and special rights for the supply of telecommunications services, 
including voice fixed telephony, by the 1st January 1998, at the latest.  
Liberalization directives were accompanied by the harmonization directives which 
constituted and laid out an Open Network Provision (ONP)609 programme that 
essentially aimed at harmonization of the national measures regarding access to and 
use of public telecommunication networks and services. The scope of the ONP 
programme was initially limited to issues of access to the network infrastructure and 
 
607  Court of Justice, Judgement of the Court of 19 March 1991 in Case C-202/88: French Republic v 
Commission of the European Communities – Competition in the markets in telecommunications 
terminal equipment, [1991] ECR-I-01223; Court of Justice, Judgement of the Court on 17 
November 1992 in Joined Cases C-271, C-281/90 and C-289/90: Kingdom of Spain, Kingdom of 
Belgium and Italian Republic v Commission of the European Communities – Competition in the 
markets for telecommunications services, [1992] ECR I-05833.  
608  Athanasios Psygkas, From the “Democratic Deficit” to a “Democratic Surplus”: Constructing 
Administrative Democracy in Europe (OUP 2017) 37. 
609  ONP was defined in the ONP Framework Directive as “the harmonisation of conditions for open 
and efficient access to and use of public telecommunications networks and, where applicable, 
public telecommunications services and the efficient use of those networks and services” (Council 
Directive (EU) 90/387 of 27 June 1990 on the establishment of the internal market for 
telecommunications services through the implementation of open network provision [1990] OJ L 
192/1, art. 2). 
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‘reserved services’ provided by the incumbent operators,610 including postal, telegraph 
and telephone (PTT) agencies. However, along with gradual liberalization, the idea 
has been expanded to cover the privately governed networks and services as they 
succeeded the public incumbents (monopolies). To ensure that such markets thrive in 
a competitive manner, EU authorities spread the ex-ante regulation to many network 
components, including the local network or local loop which represents the “end mile” 
before the end-users. This would be considered as a final step to allow new entrants to 
compete with incumbent operators under the same or comparable conditions, with no 
sunk costs to be met by the former.611 
Following the abovementioned steps being taken, market players were confronted by 
diverse and wide-ranging measures. Regulatory measures incorporating the ONP 
Directives during the 1990s, usually called the ‘1998 regulatory framework’, were far 
from giving a clear signal towards a dynamic, competitive and convergent 
marketplace. Given this fact, the Commission lauched a review process in 1999, 
aiming at consolidating and revising the existing directives. Lack of an effective and 
flexible legal framework that is adaptable to the changing needs of the global 
information society motivated the review process. Ultimately in 2002, EU legislators 
adopted a comprehensive and technology-neutral framework, by which all 
transmission networks and services are covered under the same concept of ‘electronic 
communications’. The 2002 regulatory framework had five aims: (i) to react to 
 
610  Ian Walden, ‘Access and Interconnection’ in Ian Walden and John Angel (eds), 
Telecommunications Law and Regulation (2nd edn, OUP 2005) 126. 
611  By this means of not incurring capital expenditures for building a new infrastructure, new entrants 
would be able to compete with the incumbents and reach out to the same customer base. Not only 
such micro, company level benefits, but also macro, EU-wide benefits, including global 
competitiveness, had a driving force behind such policies, ending up with local loop unbundling 
(LLU) in each Member State. The Commission, following the Lisbon Summit in 2000, issued a 
Regulation (2000/2887) mandating LLU across the EU. 
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technological and market developments; (ii) to promote more effective competition; 
(iii) to remove unnecessary regulation and simplify associated administrative 
procedures; (iv) to strengthen the internal market and (v) to protect consumers.612 
Introduction of the 2002 regulatory framework enabled a more stable and consolidated 
regulatory structure, which has so far been kept up albeit with necessary modifications 
and overhauls. Given this fact, while a number of hard and soft laws have been issued 
by the EU legislature in the following years, the 2002 framework has set the main 
pillars for the ‘ECRF’, up until now. Having said that, for the purpose of this study, 
the concept of  the ‘ECRF’ is preferred because a number of additional regulations and 
directives have been put into force further to the 2002 regulatory framework. An 
important and recent development happened with the enactment of the 2018 European 
Electronic Communications Code (EECC)613, which signifies an overhaul for the 
ECRF. Under the EECC Directive, or simply the EECC, is incorporated an expanded 
set of regulatory mechanisms, procedures and remedies, based on a more forward-
looking blueprint. 
As far as the historical background is concerned, it should be remembered that the 
EECC is a part of the Digital Single Market (DSM) process which was initiated by the 
Commission in 2015.614 At that time, EU authorities considered that a more consistent 
and harmonized regulatory structure across the Member States was a pressing need for 
 
612  Arnold Porter, European Telecommunications Practice Group, ‘Introduction to the New EU 
Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communications’ (2002) 6. 
613  See supra note 239. 
614  The Digital Single Market traces back to the initiative of the Digital Agenda (Communication from 
the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions, ‘A Digital Agenda for Europe’, COM (2010) 245 
final/2). The so-called Agenda specified 101 specific policy actions across 7 domains: the digital 
single market; interoperability and standards; trust and security; fast and ultra-fast internet access; 
research and innovation; digital literacy, skills and inclusion and ICT-enabled benefits for the EU.  
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the creation of a fully-fledged digital single market. Given this fact, the DSM initiative 
was launched in May 2015,615 incorporating electronic communications regulations as 
well as copyright, standardisation, data privacy, taxation and consumer protection 
rules. A review process was initiated in September 2015, ending up with a proposal 
published in September 2016616 and finally the EECC Directive put into force in 
December 2018. Targeting a wider and deeper harmonization across the EU, the EECC 
has streamlined and consolidated the applicable regulatory framework, as explained 
below. 
6.1.2. Regulatory structure and policy objectives 
The 2002 regulatory framework, which underlies the so-called ECRF, originated from 
the five main directives given below:617 
1- Framework Directive (2002/21/EC), OJ L 108, 24.4.2002.618 
2- Access Directive (2002/19/EC), OJ L 108, 24.4.2002.619 
3- Authorisation Directive (2002/20/EC), OJ L 108, 24.4.2002.620 
 
615  European Commission, ‘Digital Single Market: Bringing down barriers to unlock online 
opportunities’ ˂http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/digital-single-market_en˃ accessed 9 October 2020.  
616  It was set out by the Commission that the review of ECRF would focus on measures that aim to; 
- provide incentives for investment in high-speed broadband networks, 
- bring a more consistent internal market approach to radio spectrum policy and management, 
- deliver conditions for a true internal market by tackling regulatory fragmentation, 
- ensure effective protection of consumers, a level playing field for all market players and 
consistent application of the rules, as well as 
- provide a more effective regulatory institutional framework (EECC Directive, recital 3). 
617  For more detailed information see European Commission, ‘Digital Single Market: Electronic 
Communications Laws’ <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/telecoms-rules> accessed 
9 October 2020.  
618  Amended by the Better Regulation Directive (2009/140/EC) OJ L 337, 18.12.2009; repealed by 
the EECC Directive (2018/1972) OJ L 321, 17.12.2018. 
619  Amended by the Better Regulation Directive (2009/140/EC) OJ L 337, 18.12.2009; repealed by 
the EECC Directive (2018/1972) OJ L 321, 17.12.2018.  
620  Amended by the Better Regulation Directive (2009/140/EC) OJ L 337, 18.12.2009; repealed by 
the EECC Directive (2018/1972) OJ L 321, 17.12.2018. 
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4- Universal Service Directive (2002/22/EC), OJ L 108, 24.4.2002.621 
5- E-Privacy Directive (2002/58/EC), OJ L 201/37, 31.07.2002.622 
These Directive were maintained with some modifications until the adoption of the 
EECC in December 2018. The EECC made a consolidation of these directives, except 
for the E-Privacy Directive, which was put into another review process.623 So far, a 
number of regulations have also been issued that should be comprehended within the 
context of the ECRF. Among these, the three regulations given below are note-worthy 
as having a key role with regards to regulatory governance of electronic 
communications networks and services.    
1- Regulation on the Body of European Regulators of Electronic Communications 
(BEREC), OJ L 321, 17.12.2018. 
2- Regulation 2015/2120 on open internet access and net neutrality, OJ L 310, 
26.11.2015 (EU Net Neutrality Regulation). 
3- Regulation on roaming on public mobile communications networks, OJ L 172, 
30.6.2012. 
Built on the above directives and regulations, the ECRF means a comprehensive set of 
rules, rights and obligations which need to be transposed by the Member States.624 
While the EU Directives usually address Member States for the transposition, 
 
621  Amended by the Citizens’ Rights Directive (2009/136/EC) OJ L 337, 18.12.2009; repealed by the 
EECC Directive (2018/1972) OJ L 321, 17.12.2018. 
622  Amended by the Citizens’ Rights Directive (2009/136/EC) OJ L 337, 18.12.2009; repealed by the 
EECC Directive (2018/1972) OJ L 321, 17.12.2018. 
623  See the European Parliament, ‘Review of the ePrivacy Directive’ (Think Tank, 03/02/2017), 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_BRI(2017)58734
7> accessed 9 October 2020. 
624  However, the EU Regulations constitute an exception to this rule as they are directly applicable in 
the Member States with no requirement for transposition.   
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enforcement of the transposed rules rests on the independent NRAs in each country. 
While Member States, in practice the NRAs, enjoy the primary responsibility of 
implementing the ECRF, the Commission has the role of guiding, updating and 
monitoring implementation.625 This means a ‘decentralized’ system, being managed 
by means of a number of tools and mechanisms, i.e. market review, spectrum 
allocation and dispute resolution, which require interaction and collaboration between 
the parties, i.e. the Commission and NRAs.626 Also, an increasing number of soft laws, 
i.e. guidelines, recommendations and decisions, have thus far been issued by the 
Commission, shedding light on how to enforce the ECRF.627 
Within the regulatory structure of the ECRF, ‘convergence’ is the key and leading 
concept to be taken into account.628 Convergence is a more important compass for policy 
making in Europe and in Asia than in the US, where a broader view prevails that 
recognizes that there are several other trajectories of change, e.g. divergence, 
differentiation and fusion.629 According to the notion of convergence, all the 
transmission networks and services need to be treated in an equal and same manner for 
regulatory purposes. That is to say, the ECRF is designed to apply to all 
telecommunications networks, fixed or wireless, as well as broadcast networks i.e. 
terrestrial, satellite and cable, so that equivalent rules will apply to all these networks.630 
 
625  See also Psygkas (n 608) 38. 
626  For detailed information regarding the check and balances between the NRAs and the 
Commission, particularly under the market review process, see the section ‘6.1.3. SMP regime and 
market remedies’. 
627  See the 2002 Guidelines; Commission Recommendations on relevant product and service markets 
within the electronic communications sector susceptible to ex ante regulation in accordance with 
Directive 2002/21/EC. 
628  See the EECC Directive, recital 7. 
629  Johannes M. Bauer, ‘The Evolution of the European Regulatory Framework for Electronic 
Communications’ (2013) IBEI Working Papers Telefonica Chair Series, 2013/41, 14. 
630  Porter (n 612) 11.  
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Following the spirit of ‘convergence’, the ‘electronic communications service’ (ECS) 
was originally defined under the 2002 Framework Directive to mean “a service normally 
provided for remuneration which consists wholly or mainly in the conveyance of signals 
on electronic communications networks”.631 Repealing this Directive, the EECC defines 
the ‘ECS’ as a "service normally provided for remuneration via electronic 
communications networks, which encompasses, (…): (a) 'internet access service' as 
defined in point (2) of the second paragraph of Article 2 of Regulation (EU) 2015/2120; 
(b) 'interpersonal communications service'; (c) and services consisting wholly or mainly 
in the conveyance of signals such as transmission services used for the provision of 
machine-to-machine services and for broadcasting".632  
The abovementioned change by the EECC, responds to the intensifying convergence 
between the ICT networks and services. Although not covering a great many ICT 
networks and services, the EECC included some of the online communications 
services (OCSs) within the definition of the ECS, as detailed below.633 In this revised 
structure, convergence still represents the backdrop for the regulation of the ECSs, yet 
more enhanced objectives and remedies are added to the existing framework, making 
the ECRF more streamlined and responsive to the digital era. 
 
631  Framework Directive, art 2(c). 
632  EECC Directive, art 2(4). ‘Electronic communications networks’ is also a related key concept in 
implementation of the ECRF. Under the EECC, ‘electronic  communications  network’ is defined 
as “transmission  systems,  whether or not based on a  permanent infrastructure or centralised 
administration capacity,  and, where applicable, switching  or routing equipment and other 
resources, including network elements which are not active, which permit the conveyance of 
signals by wire, radio, optical or other electromagnetic means, including  satellite networks, fixed 
(circuit and packet-switched, including the internet) and mobile networks, electricity cable 
systems, to the extent that they are used for the purpose of transmitting signals, networks used for 
radio and television broadcasting, and cable television networks, irrespective of the type of 
information conveyed.” (EECC Directive, art 2(1)). 
633  See the section the section ‘6.2.2.2. Introduction of new ECS categories’. 
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Crucially, policy objectives of the ECRF have also been expanded with the enactment 
of the EECC, which stipulates that the competent authorities, e.g. NRAs and the 
Commission, shall:  
1) promote connectivity and access to, and take-up of, very high capacity 
networks, 
2) promote competition in the provision of electronic communications networks 
and associated facilities, 
3) contribute to the development of the internal market, and 
4) promote the interests of the citizens of the Union.634 
Notably, “promot[ion of] connectivity and access to, and take-up of, very high capacity 
networks” was not stated as a policy principle under the Framework Directive 
(2002/21/EC). This principle has been included by the EECC, which underscores the 
deployment of and access to high speed and quality broadband networks by bringing 
about a comprehensive set of access remedies, incorporating both access related 
obligations and certain incentives for the deployment of high capacity networks.635 
Against this background, it should be noted that the policy objectives to be pursued 
under the ECRF, in general, are comprehensive and multi-dimensional. While 
regulatory obligations concerning connectivity and competition denote the main path 
of the ECRF, underlying rules and remedies should be fulfilled in conjunction with 
two other objectives, namely protection of consumers and contribution to the 
development of the internal market, which incorporate subordinate objectives such as 
 
634  EECC Directive, art 3(2). 
635  EECC Directive, Part II, Title II (Access), art 59-83. 
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ensuring end-to-end connectivity, universal service, protection of personal data and 
privacy, media diversity and pluralism. 
6.1.3. SMP Regime and market remedies 
The ECRF, from the beginning, builds upon the co-existence of sector-specific and 
competition law rules. According to the ECRF, ex-ante regulation should exist where 
generic competition law measures do not suffice for the policy goals. From this point 
of view, sector-specific rules are of a complementary and ideally temporary nature. On 
the other hand, sector-specific rules having an ex-ante character makes these rules 
directly applicable, e.g. without the need to await any anti-competitive effect, and are 
implicitly pre-emptive over the competition law rules. This enables wider room for ex-
ante regulatory intervention, compared to competition law.636 
Albeit with potential conflicts, implementation of each body of law is bound up with 
certain pre-conditions and requirements, resulting in a ‘complementary’ relationship 
between the two. EU case law, as manifested in the Deutsche Telekom637 judgment 
dated 14 October 2010, demonstrates that regulated sectors, such as electronic 
communications, are not legally immune from competition law, even in the case that 
 
636  Arguably, regulatory authorities have wider control rights than competition authorities, because 
competition law rules challenge the lawfulness of conduct, while regulatory authorities engage in 
detailed regulation of wholesale and retail prices, profit sharing, investments, etc. (Jean-Jacques 
Laffont and Jean Tirole, Competition in Telecommunications (4th edn, The MIT Press 2002) 277). 
637  See Judgment of the Court of Justice of 14 October 2010 in case C-280/08 Deutsche Telekom v 
Commission. Deutsche Telekom (DT) judgment concerns DT’s leaving a disproportionate margin 
between wholesale charges and retail charges for access to the local network. Although wholesale 
and retail prices were subject to sector-specific regulation, DT has had the commercial discretion 
allowing itself to restructure the tariffs by reducing the so-called margin. Considering this fact, the 
Commission concluded that Deutsche Telekom has abused its dominant position in the market for 
the provision of local access to fixed telecommunications networks via margin squeeze between 
the wholesale local access (LLU) prices and retail access prices, with the unfair selling prices 
within the meaning of Article 102(a) of the Treaty. The CoJ upheld the Commission’s decision, 
affirming that such conducts might be subject both to the competition rules and to national or 
European sector-specific measures (co-existence principle). 
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an ex-ante approval mechanism is in place. As this judgement demonstrates, despite 
the similarities between each other, competition law and the ECRF measures have 
remarkably different natures and functionalities.638 
Primarily, the part played by sector regulation that deals with market power mainly 
aims to ensure efficiency by favouring a competitive market structure or by mimicking 
the results of a competitive market structure.639 On the other hand, in order to guide 
the regulators with regards to remedying market failures, the necessary steps to be 
taken, i.e. from the market definition to the remedies, are set out under the ECRF and 
related guidelines, recommendations, etc.640 From a broader point of view, application 
of the ECRF is envisaged only in cases when there is no effective competition in the 
relevant market. This is expounded in the EECC as follows: 
Considering that the markets for electronic communications have 
shown strong competitive dynamics in recent years, it is essential that 
ex ante regulatory obligations are imposed only where there is no 
effective and sustainable competition in the markets concerned.641 
To formulate this in a rather simplified manner, it was acknowledged by the 2002 
Framework Directive that the presence of “significant market power” (SMP) in an 
electronic communications market would mean a lack of effective competition with 
the requirement of imposing a set of access remedies, e.g. access, non-discrimination, 
 
638  Regarding the similarities and differences between the two legal bodies of EU law, see Alexiadis 
(n 237). 
639  Alexandre De Streel, ‘The Relationship between Competition Law and Sector Specific Regulation: 
The case of electronic communications’ [2008] 1 Reflets et perspectives de la vie économique 53, 
56. 
640  See also infra note 651. 
641  EECC Directive, recital 29. See also EECC Directive, art 3/4(f). 
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cost orientation and accounting separation, on the SMP undertakings.642 While this is 
not phrased in the same way, the SMP is still conferred a key role in the determination 
of the appropriate level of ex-ante regulation, under the EECC.643 It could thus be said 
that the SMP-based access remedies constitute the backdrop of the ECRF in pursuing 
the goal of promoting competition. 
Through the SMP regime under the ECRF, it is intended that “overall analysis of the 
economic characteristics of the relevant market” is conducted on the basis of 
competition law terms and criteria.644 Crucially, the concept of SMP defined under the 
EECC is equivalent to ‘dominance’ as defined in the case law of the CoJ.645 Not only 
in designating SMP undertakings but also in imposing access remedies on such 
undertakings, namely in all steps of ‘market analysis’ defined under the EECC, 
competition law terms and methods are invoked. Nonetheless, hybridisation of the 
SMP regime with competition law methodologies should not be understood as 
allowing antitrust to be stretched beyond its reasonable limits and replacing sectoral 
regulation.646 This approximation is just an attempt to ensure that regulatory decisions 
are more flexible and closer to the economic reality of the market,647 as well as 
responding to the more complex and dynamic markets.648 
 
642  Framework Directive, recital 27. See also the Framework Directive, art 8/5(f). 
643  See the EECC Directive, recital 163 and art 67-68. 
644  2002 Guidelines, para 78. 
645  See the EECC Directive, recital 161. See also the EECC Directive, art 63(1) reading as follows: 
An undertaking shall be deemed to have significant market power if, either 
individually or jointly with others, it enjoys a position equivalent to dominance, 
namely a position of economic strength affording it the power to behave to an 
appreciable extent independently of competitors, customers and ultimately 
consumers. 
646  Alexandre De Streel, ‘The New Concept of “Significant Market Power” in Electronic 
Communications: The Hybridisation of the Sectoral Regulation by Competition Law’ [2003] 
24(10) European Competition Law Review 535, 542. 
647  Ibid. 
648  See the Framework Directive, recital 25. 
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The steps to be followed under the SMP regime are respectively prescribed as ‘market 
definition’, the ‘SMP assessment’ (identifying SMP operators) and ‘market remedies’ 
(selecting and imposing appropriate remedies in order to eliminate market failures). 
As specified in Article 67 of  the EECC Directive (formerly Article 16 of the 
Framework Directive), which sets out procedure for ‘market analysis’, NRAs shall 
take the utmost account of the Commission Recommendation and the Guidelines when 
applying the prescribed 3 step-procedure.649 On top of these three more apparent steps, 
should be added a further step, the ‘evaluation of market remedies’, which is implicitly 




Figure 6: SMP regime 
Source: Constructed by the author 
Regarding the first step, namely market definition, the Commission’s 
recommendations have a key role in guiding NRAs in their decisions. Notably, the 
Commission has so far issued three Recommendations, respectively in 2003, 2007 and 
2014, distinguishing certain markets that are susceptible to ex-ante regulation.651 To 
 
649  See De Streel (n 646) 537. 
650  EECC Directive, art 68-74 and 76-81. 
651  Commission Recommendation of 9 October 2014 on relevant product and service markets within 
the electronic communications sector susceptible to ex ante regulation in accordance with 
Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on a common regulatory 
framework for electronic communications networks and services (2014/710/EU) [2014] OJ L 295; 
Commission Recommendation of 17 December 2007 on relevant product and service markets 
within the electronic communications sector susceptible to ex ante regulation in accordance with 
Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on a common regulatory 
framework for electronic communications networks and services (2007/879/EC) [2007] OJ L 344; 
Commission Recommendation of 11 February 2003 on relevant product and service markets 
within the electronic communications sector susceptible to ex ante regulation in accordance with 
Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on a common regulatory 













remove such a market from ex-ante regulation, or to add a new market on top of those 
enlisted by the Commission, the relevant NRA has to fulfill the ‘three criteria test’.652 
Under this test, the conditions of (i) the ‘presence of high and non-transitory barriers 
to entry’, (ii) ‘absent market structure tending towards effective competition’ and (iii) 
the ‘insufficiency of competition law to address market failures’ should exist to justify 
ex-ante regulation for the relevant market.653 
In any case, demand and supply substitution of the relevant products e.g. networks and 
services, as well as potential competition, need to be evaluated for each market being 
defined. When price elasticities point to a set of products that are non-substitutable 
with others, a separate market could be mentioned to exist. To arrive at such a 
conclusion, NRAs often invoke the hypothetical monopolist (SSNIP) test,654 which 
represents a widely acknowledged competition law tool. Market definition which 
needs to be recurring every five years for the purpose of sector-specific regulation655 
always needs to be done on a forward-looking basis,656 depending on the existing 
market data.657 
Following market definition, NRAs are charged to assess SMP (dominance) to 
evaluate whether any undertaking has a dominant position (SMP) in the relevant 
market. In so doing, market shares are taken into utmost account as the primary factor 
 
652  See the EECC Directive, art 67(1). 
653  Ibid. The three-criteria test being met simply gives way to an NRA imposing a number of remedies 
on the SMP undertaking(s), including modification and/or withdrawal of the remedies already 
imposed. However, the three criteria test does not directly conclude with this result, but allows the 
NRA to carry out the market analysis with the next step(s), namely designation of the SMP 
undertakings and the appropriate remedies. 
654  Regarding details of the hypotethical monopolist test, see the section ‘5.1. Market Definition’. 
655  According to the ECRF rules, NRAs are required to carry out analyses of the relevant markets at 
least every five years (See the EECC Directive, Article 67(5/a)). 
656  2002 Guidelines, para 27. 
657  NRAs should determine whether the market is prospectively competitive, and thus whether any 
lack of effective competition is durable, by taking into account expected or foreseeable market 
developments over the course of a reasonable period (2002 Guidelines, para 20). 
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to determine whether there exist SMP undertaking(s) in the relevant markets.658 Being 
not solely based on the market shares, any SMP assessment should build on “a 
thorough and overall analysis of the economic characteristics of the relevant market” 
reflecting on further criteria such as; ‘overall size of the undertaking’, ‘control of 
infrastructure not easily duplicated’, ‘technological advantages or superiority’, 
‘economies of scale’, etc.659 
Following determination of the SMP undertakings, market analysis should carry on 
with the designation of remedies. According to Articles 67 and 68 of the EECC 
Directive, NRAs should impose appropriate remedies on SMP operators at the end of 
the market analysis procedure. In this regard, if the relevant market is found not to be 
effectively competitive, e.g. signifying potential anti-competitive behaviours, those 
SMP players should then be subject to ex-ante obligations. The key point here is that 
the NRAs should select the remedies in view of the potential market failures, “based 
on the nature of the problem” and complying with the ‘proportionality’ principle.660 
Imposition of the most appropriate remedies thus entails analyzing whether and to 
what extent SMP players could affect potential competition through various factors, 
i.e. retail prices and availability of services.  
From this point of view, ‘evaluation of market remedies’ is as important as other steps 
given the fact that NRAs should not react to every potential anti-competitive effect in 
the same manner. While the toolbox in the hands of NRAs is comprised of wide-
ranging access obligations, including structural remedies i.e. functional separation, 
 
658  According to the 2002 Guidelines, single dominance concerns normally arise in the case of 
undertakings with market shares of over 40%, although very large market shares - in excess of 
50% - are in themselves, save in exceptional circumstances, evidence of the existence of a 
dominant position (2002 Guidelines, para 75). 
659  2002 Guidelines, para 78. 
660  EECC Directive, art 68(4). 
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such remedies are supposed to be selected against the market structure, price levels 
and potential abusive behaviours in the relevant market. It seems that, according to 
73(1) of the EECC, access remedies could be imposed in case a consumer harm is 
likely to attend a potential anti-competitive threat. More explicitly, when “emergence 
of a sustainable competitive market at the retail level” is at risk of hindrance due to a 
SMP firm’s potential denial of access, that firm may be subject to ex-ante access 
remedies should the NRA consider such a denial “would not be in the end-user’s 
interest”.661 It is noticeable that the network component or service in question should 
not necessarily be ‘indispensable’ or ‘essential’ for the third parties to compete in the 
relevant market. Therefore, the threshold for intervention under the ECRF seems to be 
easier and more accessible when compared to EU competition law.    
6.1.4. A deeper look at the ECRF: Critical review of the regulatory mind-set   
Electronic communications’ regulations both at the EU and national level aim at 
eliminating monopolies and building up competitive markets through access and 
pricing obligations mainly directed at dominant players. Hence, the SMP regime and 
underlying EU regulatory system envisages that access to the bottleneck, essential 
facility type network components e.g. local loop, or services e.g. interconnections, will 
ensure the achievement of the targeted policy objectives. Behind this regulatory system 
lies the notions of ‘sunk costs’ and ‘entry barriers’ which are conceived to support 
each other,662 warranting coercive regulations. Barriers to entry in the 
 
661  EECC Directive, art 73(1).  
662  When interconnection is at stake, the notion of ‘sunk costs’ is by and large replaced with the notion 
of ‘network externalities’, which is considered to be harmful unless mitigated by an 
interconnection obligation. Indeed, the presence of an externality may lead to under-consumption 
in the case of a positive externality and over-consumption in the case of a negative externality (De 
Streel (n 571) 66). For instance, less than the optimal number of customers may decide to join a 
network if new customers are not compensated, when joining the network, for the increase of 
welfare they create to the already existing customers (Ibid).  
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telecommunications sector are related to both size and lack of flexibility in 
investments,663 which are often echoed by a ‘natural monopoly’.664 
Although sunk costs, as well as natural monopoly features, pave the way to access 
remedies to a certain degree, sector-specific regulations particularly in the field of 
electronic communications would need to be dealt with from a deeper and broader 
perspective. First of all, it is worth criticizing those ECRF rules and measures targeted 
at, or mainly invoked to, eliminate structural barriers so as to stimulate new entries to 
the market. So often, regardless of the behavioural aspects, network components run 
by the incumbents are considered to threaten would-be competitive services and 
consumer welfare unless they are made available to third party access. Despite the 
plausibility of this approach, the infrastructure-intensive narrative would be 
challenged for it lacks an in-depth analysis with respect to the behavioural aspects,665 
from a broader ICT viewpoint. 
The implicated need for a broader ICT perspective should be considered in parallel 
with IP convergence and accompanying developments. IP convergence has long been 
driving the development of communication means, demand and network structures. 
Innovations such as fibre optics, digitalisation and packet-switching changed 
completely not only the technical, but also the economic environment of 
telecommunications.666 Consumer demand, stimulated by technological advances, 
 
663  William H. Melody, Telecom Reform: Principles, Policies and Regulatory Practices, (Private 
Ingeniørfond, Technical University of Denmark 1997) 114. 
664  See also Unver (n 100) 74. 
665  Remarkably, since the decline of the Structure-Conduct-Performance paradigm in industrial 
economics, it is now recognized that non-strategic and strategic market failures are closely linked 
together and that structure influences conduct as much as conduct influences structure (Alexandre 
De Streel, ‘Efficient Regulation of Dynamic Telecommunications Markets and the New 
Regulatory Framework in Europe’ in Ralf Dewenter and Justus Haucap (eds), Access Pricing: 
Theory and Practice (Elsevier B.V 2007) 359). 
666  Larouche (n 475) Introduction. 
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leads the way to how electronic communications networks are governed and services 
consumed, and at this point IP convergence functions as the catalyst of both the 
demand and supply of ICT networks and services. The locus where demand and supply 
meet each other is moving from the legacy telecommunications networks to ‘digital 
platforms’ that are run based on the internet and wide-ranging ICTs. 
Here, two focal points need to be elaborated. First and foremost, the legacy networks 
have extensively been, and are still currently being, replaced with next generation 
networks (NGNs), which mean software-governed and fibre-equipped networks 
capable of meeting ever-increasing ICT-based needs. As the proliferation of NGNs 
come about within certain quality parameters, e.g. regarding high speed and reduced 
latency, they require enhanced investment and returns from the employed sunk cost, 
though the same does not work equally for the software companies running over these 
networks. Given also the shifting locus mentioned above, the legacy ECRF regulations 
which are heavily focused on fixed/mobile/broadband network access are 
controversial and possibly with negative consequences because of their unpredictable 
effect over NGN investment and long-term consumer benefit.667 
It is important to note that interactions among ICT players increase and spread across 
the technological layers of an IP stack, being not limited to the telecom operators. As 
the digital platforms have an extra-territorial reach, along with a globalising digital 
economy, firms and individuals increasingly need to communicate with other firms 
and individuals. In this context, electronic communications’ operators increasingly 
collaborate with the upper layer e.g. software management and content players and the 
 
667  See Mehmet Bilal Unver, ‘Is a fine-tuning approach sufficient for EU NGA policy? A global 
review around the long-lasting debate’ [2015] 11(39) Telecommunications Policy 957, 970-972. 
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lower layer e.g. terminal equipment players, in order to maintain and reinforce their 
controlling power over the users with diversified and enriched products. This tendency 
largely stems from the fact that the distance between conventional telecommunications 
companies (telcoes) and consumers vanishes and turns into a fast-track direct link 
when the latter have a relationship with the upper layer companies. Not only these 
companies e.g. Google and Facebook type software companies, but also cloud and IoT 
providers get closer to the consumers by providing substitutive as well as 
complementary services alongside the so-called telcoes.668 These developments 
surrounding IP convergence pose some legal and regulatory challenges particularly for 
the ECRF. 
From a broader point of view, the increasing synergies between the internet;  TCP/IP, 
the IoT, the transition from IPv4 to IPv6 and cloud computing, and the revolutionary 
changes in other technological and social arenas are leading to a new era of global 
development with the use of NGNs, EDGE technology and the move to store local 
content nearer to the consumer, can all be seen as constituting a ‘fourth industrial 
revolution’. Having said that, it is also visible that the abovementioned shift of locus, 
while taking place from the bottom to the upper layers, entrusts more controlling power 
to the consumers. At the same time, computing and computer networks contributed 
heavily to the splintering of network infrastructures, by permitting fine-grained, 
swifter and more sophisticated management of large enterprises.669 
 
668  Regarding the technical and economic characteristics of cloud computing and IoT services, see the 
section ‘7. Case studies: Internet of Things and Cloud Computing’. 
669  Jean-Christophe Plantin, Carl Lagoze, Paul N. Edwards and Christian Sandvig, ‘Infrastructure 
studies meet platform studies in the age of Google and Facebook’, [2018] 20(1) New media & 
society 293, 301, referring to Manuel Castells, The Rise of the Network Society (Blackwell 
Publisher 2000).  
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However, for the time being, sector-specific regulations in the field of electronic 
communications have an increasing pace and density at the EU level. EU regulatory 
policies, largely putting aside the natural monopoly and related considerations, pursue 
a pro-competitive approach and contemplating the short-term benefits to be derived 
from network access regulations. Proliferation of NGNs and the landscape enabling 
the provision of equivalent services through a myriad of converging networks do not 
appear to pre-empt the Commission from pursuing legacy rules for ex-ante regulation. 
As implied above, the burden of proof for sector regulation to intervene in the selected 
markets is already lower than in antitrust law,670 and the Commission endeavours to 
further lower the threshold to intervene.671 However, this would mean a regulatory 
policy that fails to explicitly consider the investment effects of regulation,672 also 
having the potential to affect consumer welfare contrary to expectations. 
Crucially, if the technology is dynamically evolving and where both interdependencies 
and indirect effects are important, then a more dynamic and systemic approach will 
need to be adopted, taking direct and indirect effects of an intervention into account.673 
Lacking this perspective, the EU system, while elaborating on the potential market 
failures and entry barriers in the designated electronic communications’ markets, does 
 
670  De Streel (n 639) 68. 
671  While the EECC gives some hints on this i.e. through a double lock system as envisaged under 
Article 33(5/c) regarding inconsistent market remedies, the Commission’s 2013 Proposal for the 
Telecom Single Market (TSM) Regulation in its original draft was far more overbearing. Under 
the TSM Proposal was placed a number of new issues, such as veto power on spectrum 
management decisions, as well as market remedies, single authorization and mandatory virtual 
broadband access, which all denoted a more centralized yet less substantiated decision-making 
process at the EU level (See Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament 
and of the Council laying down measures concerning the European single market for electronic 
communications and to achieve a Connected Continent’, COM(2013) 627 final, (COD) 
<https://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/news/regulation-european-parliament-and-council-
laying-down-measures-concerning-european-single> accessed 9 October 2020. 
672  Bauer (n 629) 15. 
673  Johannes M. Bauer, ‘Governing the Mobile Broadband Ecosystem’ [2015] 22(2) International 
Telecommunications Policy Review 1, 16.   
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not look at cross-market relationships from an overall ICT viewpoint. Hence, the 
ECRF’s limited remit and focus on regulatory micromanagement over electronic 
communications’ networks and services risks interdependencies and indirect effects 
being overlooked. 
To sum up, the ECRF, albeit with its early emphasis on convergence, over-emphasizes 
the regulation of electronic communications i.e. fixed and mobile networks and 
broadband, leased line and voice) services, by excluding other ICT services from the 
regulatory scope. While the so-called networks and services are covered by the ECRF, 
a great many software governed services and underlying networks, including digital 
platforms, are not comprehended, despite the strong and dynamic interplays between 
them. Regardless of this approach’s shortcomings, it is fair to say that 
interdependencies between the bottom and upper layers, which reveal new formations 
of digital ecosystems e.g. surrounding the IoT and cloud networks, appear to be an 
absent part of the EU regulatory approach. In this context of the so-called regulatory 
micromanagement focused on the lower layers, it should be reminded that software-
governed ICT networks and services are given an advantageous leeway from the 
regulatory viewpoint. Overall speaking, pursuit of a multi-layered and holistic 
perspective is likely to reduce the potential legal and social costs that would come 
about with over or early regulation i.e. reduced investment. 
6.2. Interoperability under the ECRF 
6.2.1. Interoperability concerns and obligations 
ICT markets characterise well ‘network industry’ features, particularly network 
effects. The absence or presence of interoperability impacts the extent to which 
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network effects are influential over the market players. As explained above, the degree 
of interoperability prevailing in an ICT market has an influence on the competitive 
dynamics of the marketplace. As far as electronic communications’ markets are 
concerned, ‘end-to-end connectivity’ and other interoperability-based concerns 
accompany network effects in shaping the regulatory solutions. Having said that, 
interoperability is meant to be a self-evident public policy goal of the ECRF, so often 
independent from competition related concerns and remedies. Below, it is examined 
whether and to what extent interoperability is instrumentalised and regulated ex-ante, 
with a focus on specific areas of ECRF.  
6.2.1.1.Interconnection 
‘Interconnection’ means “the physical and logical linking of public electronic 
communications networks used by the same or a different undertaking in order to 
- allow the users of one undertaking to communicate with users of the same or 
another undertaking, or 
- to access services provided by another undertaking where such services are 
provided by the parties involved or other parties who have access to the 
network”.674 
Not only the physical and logical connection of networks but also consumers using 
such networks to communicate with each other is encompassed by interconnection, 
which is illustrated in the Figure 7. As shown in this figure, the disparate network users 
 
674  EECC Directive, art 2(28). For detailed information regarding definition, types and functioning of 
interconnection (agreements), including related competition law precedents and sector specific 
rules, see Kariyawasam (n 131) 136-223.  
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become able to communicate with each other and benefit from joining a more valuable 
network by means of interconnection, which is represented by the dashed line. 
 
Figure 7: Interconnection  
Source: Jonas Holm, ‘Regulating Network Access Prices under Uncertainty and Increasing 
Competition: The Case of Telecommunications and Local Loop Unbundling in the EU’ (MSc Thesis, 
University of Copenhagen 2000) 4. 
Lying at the heart of liberalization and open access policies, ‘interconnection’ ensures 
‘network externalities’675 are spread across the networks connected to each other, 
instead of internalizing them. As a matter of fact, network industries may have a “start-
up” problem in that the initial networks may be so small that they are not sufficiently 
attractive to potential customers, so competing firms may have an incentive to 
interconnect so that the industry as a whole is more attractive to customers.676 In order 
to prevent network externalities from being internalized by the incumbents and pre-
empt anti-competitive behaviours, interconnection is usually mandated as a remedy 
for SMP undertakings.677 Alongside this, non-SMP operators could also be subject to 
 
675  Network externalities represent direct network effects, in that consumer utility directly depends on 
the market size, independently of the price system (John-Hee Hahn, ‘Nonlinear Pricing of 
Telecommunications with Call and Network Externalities’ (2002) 2 
˂https://krannert.purdue.edu/centers/ijio/Accepted/1720.pdf˃ accessed 9 October 2020).  
676  Gerald R. Faulhaber, ‘Access ≠ Access1 + Access2’ [2002] 3 Law Review of Michigan State 
University, Detroit College of Law 677, 689. 
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the interconnection obligation in certain cases, if this is necessary to ensure end-to-end 
connectivity, namely any-to-any communication. 
For end-users to communicate with each other, not only physical but also logical, 
software-level interconnections need to be secured, to which ‘interoperability’ is key. 
Having said that, interconnecting parties need to use the same protocols with each 
other to ensure ‘end-to-end connectivity’. At this point, ‘interoperability’ meets 
‘interconnection’ and ‘end-to-end connectivity’ which also relates to and enables the 
achievement of other goals, i.e. the ‘contribution to development of the internal 
market’. Here it is important to state that, regardless of the policy objective of 
‘promotion of competition’, interoperability of the networks and services needs to be 
secured, within the broader context of the ECRF. Reflecting this, a number of 
provisions are covered in the EECC, as explained below. 
First and foremost, the EECC Directive establishes the basic rule that anyone operating 
a communications network available to the public has both a right to negotiate 
interconnection with other operators, and when requested, an obligation to enter into 
such negotiations with other network providers “in order to ensure provision and 
interoperability of services throughout the Union”.678 This link between 
interconnection and interoperability could be discerned from Article 61(2/a) of the 
EECC Directive, according to which NRAs shall be able to impose: 
to the extent necessary to ensure end-to-end connectivity, obligations 
on undertakings subject to general authorisation that control access to 
 
678  EECC Directive, art 60(1). 
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end-users, including, in justified cases, the obligation to interconnect 
their networks where this is not already the case.679 
Given this fact, ‘interconnection’, whilst inhering as one of the key SMP remedies, 
could also be the subject matter of basic, generic, or non-SMP ECRF obligations, when 
this is necessary to ensure end-to-end connectivity. The vision of ensuring 
interoperability in this context, aims at ensuring ‘interconnection’ incorporating end-
to-end connectivity. Overall, it could be argued that a subordinate place is conferred 
to ICT ‘interoperability’ within the context of the ECRF.  
6.2.1.2. Conditional access obligations 
Conditional access systems (CASs) are used to mean set-top boxes which function to 
translate digital signals into analogue signals for television sets, adding intelligence to 
them and allowing them to have some interactive capabilities.680 Set-top boxes, with 
underlying elements of hardware e.g. a smart card and software e.g. an encryption 
system and subscriber management functions, constitute CASs681 that enable 
authorised end-users to receive and view the content delivered to the users’ terminals 
e.g. TV sets. For over two decades, CASs have become so popular and influential over 
the behaviours of consumers by enabling them to select their choice of TV 
 
679  EECC Directive, art 60(1). According to the EECC Directive, control of means of access may 
entail ownership or control of the physical link to the end-user (either fixed or mobile), and/or the 
ability to change or withdraw the national number or numbers needed to access an end-user’s 
network termination point. This would be the case for example if network operators were to restrict 
unreasonably end-user choice for access to internet portals and services” (EECC Directive, recital 
144). 
680  Nikos Nikolinakos ‘The New Legal Framework for Digital Gateways - The Complementary 
Nature of Competition Law and Sector-Specific Regulation’ [2000] 9 European Competition Law 
Review 408, 409. 
681  Natali Helberger, ‘Access to technical bottleneck facilities: the new European approach’ [2002] 
46 2nd Q Communications & Strategies 33, 34.  
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programmes, use their TV sets as computerised devices to browse and surf through the 
internet, as well as viewing specialised content e.g. video on demand. 
As the content flows through CASs and related components, including APIs and 
electronic programming guides (EPGs), CAS platforms have long been considered to 
function as one of the gatekeepers to control access to the end-users. This consideration 
was driven by two main points: Firstly, as proprietary technologies are chosen by the 
platform owners with regard to APIs and EPGs, consumers could be locked into the 
platforms because of the network effects and switching costs. Secondly, the potential 
limitation or denial of access to alternative content resulting from such control 
mechanisms would cause the monopolisation of the consumer base(s) along with 
public policy problems, in particular ‘media diversity and pluralism’. 
In response to the abovementioned problems, European policy makers followed a mid-
way approach through which proprietary solutions are allowed with an intensive ex-ante 
and ex-post scrutiny over the relationship between the upstream i.e. pay-TV and 
downstream i.e. CAS, markets. Whilst enabling faster development of the industry on the 
basis of proprietary platforms, EU authorities did not allow the relevant parties to 
collaborate on an anti-competitive basis and/or to exclude potential competitors from the 
market(s). On the one hand, the EU Commission closely monitored concentrative i.e. 
merger and acquisition based and collaborative i.e. joint venture based actions, by means 
of imposing conditions for clearances, including mandated third party access to technical 
platforms and/or premium content. On the other hand, CAS providers are obliged to grant 
all broadcasters access to their technical platforms through FRAND terms, under the 
ECRF (formerly 2002/19/EC Access Directive, now under the EECC).682  
 
682  See the EECC Directive, art 62(1), with reference to Annex II, Part I of the Directive which 
requires “all undertakings providing conditional access services” to: 
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While the first type of conditions under the merger clearances represent regulatory 
actions promoting both inter and intra-platform competition, the latter generic, ex-ante 
conditional access obligation mainly aims at intra-platform competition.683 Crucially, 
all the related remedies embody ensuring interoperability as the key requirement. In 
M&A cases,684 the Commission investigated whether comprehensive service packages 
and deals between the parties would foreclose effective competition in emerging and 
traditional markets, as well as whether notified concentrations or joint ventures would 
exclude competitors via either exclusively controlled technical platforms or privileged 
access to premium content. When compared to the generic CAS obligation enshrined 
under the EECC, this means a broadened viewpoint incorporating both intra and inter 
platform competition. 
Nonetheless, the CAS obligation set out under the EECC specifies a unique regulatory 
path by which all broadcasters are enabled to have their content received and viewed 
by the analogue TV users who rely on set-top boxes, namely the CASs. This ECRF 
obligation contemplates a remedy with no burden of proof for anti-competitive effects. 
Notably, this generic and symmetric obligation is applicable to all transmission 
providers, the technical platform, irrespective of their market powers.685 The CAS 
obligation is a remarkable example of an interoperability-centric remedy within the 
 
(…) offer to all broadcasters, on a fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory basis 
compatible with Union competition law, technical services enabling the 
broadcasters’ digitally-transmitted services to be received by viewers or listeners 
authorised by means of decoders administered by the service operators, and comply 
with Union competition law (EECC Directive, Annex II, Part I). 
683  See also Natali Helberger, Controlling Access to Content - Regulating Conditional Access in 
Digital Broadcasting (Kluwer Law International 2005) 153. 
684  See supra note 550. 
685  Non-SMP operators being covered by this obligation signifies the key role attributed to the CASs 
under the EECC, which explicitly acknowledges “Competition rules alone may not be sufficient 




intersected area of the telecommunications and media industries, also featuring CAS 
providers out of the two industries’ convergence.686 
While transmission through a CAS platform, as well as broadcasting, is managed 
usually by content providers, this dual role position being assumed by the same 
stakeholder potentially poses a strain over media diversity and pluralism, as well as 
potential competition. The CAS obligation enshrined under the EECC is conceivable 
as a response to eliminate this by offering an intra-platform interoperability-based 
solution. Besides, APIs and EPGs are also covered within the additional obligations 
that are envisaged to be imposed by the NRAs under certain, limited circumstances.687 
Last but not least, while the Commission is empowered to determine a common API 
across the EU, this last-resort regulatory step would be unnecessary in the absence of 
horizontal concerns and risks threatening a competitive marketplace.688 
6.2.1.3. NGN based implications  
As mentioned above, there exist certain areas where interoperability constitutes a 
subject matter of regulation under the ECRF. Considering no distinction could be 
mentioned as to the underlying networks and services from the interoperability 
viewpoint, NGN interoperability could be said to be embodied within conventional 
areas of regulation. Notwithstanding, the transition from legacy networks to NGNs 
undoubtedly brings about new issues and requirements which need to be paid 
 
686  On the other hand, it is remarkable that the envisaged obligations are limited to the CAS technical 
platforms, but not to other interactive service applications, devices and platforms. 
687  According to Article 61(2/d) of the EECC Directive [with reference to Annex II, Part II of the 
Directive], NRAs shall be able to impose obligations on CAS providers to provide access to APIs 
and EPGs on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms “to the extent necessary to ensure 
accessibility for end-users to digital radio and television broadcasting and related complementary 
services specified by the Member State”. 
688  Unver (n 27) 166.  
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particular attention to. Below, starting with the generic interoperability provisions, the 
EECC is examined with a focus on the NGN related challenges.   
As formulated under various articles of the EECC, i.e. Articles 61, 62, 72 and 73, 
access and interconnection remedies lie at the centre of the ECRF. Under Article 
61(2/b) of the EECC, which represents a generic and symmetric provision, it is 
stipulated that NRAs be able to impose “in justified cases and to the extent that is 
necessary, obligations on undertakings that control access to end users to make their 
services interoperable”.689 As opposed to this rather widely formulated measure, 
Article 73(1) of the EECC entails a set of remedies focused on SMP undertakings. 
Within this framework, it is established that SMP undertakings might be subject to a 
number of interoperability-centric remedies, as given below:  
“(f) to grant open access to technical interfaces, protocols or other key 
technologies that are indispensable for the interoperability of services or virtual 
network services; 
(…) 
(h) to provide specific services needed to ensure interoperability of end-to-end 
services to users, or roaming on mobile networks; 
(i) to provide access to operational support systems or similar software systems 
necessary to ensure fair competition in the provision of services” 
The SMP remedies stated above might be argued to cover NGN-based intelligence and 
functionalities, as featured via a service-neutral network design. Although not 
 
689  It is note-worthy that this remedy addresses all “undertakings that control access to end-users” 
regardless of the market power of the undertakings in question. 
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reflected in the finalised version, a stronger NGN-based implication could be derived 
from the EECC Proposal, which envisaged that SMP undertakings could be required:  
“to provide specified services needed to ensure interoperability of end-to-
end services to users, including facilities for software emulated networks 
intelligent network services or roaming on mobile networks.”690 
As ‘software emulated networks’have a self-standing nature and outreach the virtual 
network services or software systems referred to under the EECC, one could interpret 
the Commission proposal not being reflected in the EECC as a missed opportunity. 
This is particularly true as prospective NGN players would no longer act just as a 
telecom operator, but potentially as the controller of an IP ecosystem embodying 
software-governed service layers e.g. access, cloud and CDN, and in collaborations 
with content providers. Hence, intelligence in this context relates to a privately 
governed IP network, going beyond the conventional wisdom of interoperability or 
‘end-to-end connectivity’ which the ECRF is primarily focused on. 
On the other hand, the regulatory focus in the NGN context, would mean sharing of the 
SMP operators’ proprietary protocols that govern their network functionalities. As a 
globally standardized IP-based multimedia communications system replacing circuit-
switched networks seems to be a far-fetched possibility, it is important to both stimulate 
the development of NGNs and have some safeguards to pre-empt the anti-competitive 
effects that would result from market imbalances. Incorporating NGN interoperability 
within this broader context emerges to be a part of the regulatory puzzle.  
 
690  EECC Proposal, art 71(1/f). 
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In the NGN based transition, market players will face lessened number of 
interconnection nodes,691 whereas they might experience new digital gateways which 
are less standardised and much more controlled by the incumbents. Therefore, both the 
European Commission and NRAs may have to ensure that interconnection is possible 
at specific functional levels i.e. transport and service levels, in a reasonable, non-
discriminatory and transparent manner. In fact, they ought to consider that operators 
having market power may not have an incentive to open up their networks to 
competition at the service level, with a view to limiting the use of emerging NGN 
capabilities, which potentially affects the ability of independent service providers to 
integrate their services into the NGN platforms.692 
Against this background, a broader perspective ideally needs to be upheld concerning 
ICT interoperability, encompassing not only physical and logical interconnection 
requirements but also more complex vertical/horizontal interconnectivity problems. 
However, neither the EECC nor broadly speaking the ECRF, mirrors this viewpoint. 
Although acknowledging that “[i]nteroperability is an evolving concept in dynamic 
markets”,693 the ECRF’s perspective is mainly concerned with how to solve the 
infrastructural problems. Having said that, the ECRF appears to consider‘
interoperability’ as a subordinate problem to be managed through the available tools, 
i.e. standardisation, access and interconnection remedies, with an emphasis on the 
bottom layers in the IP stack. 
 
691  See Reichl and Ruhle (n 143) 50. 
692  See the ERG, Final Report on IP Interconnection, Project Team on IP - Interconnection and NGN, 
(2007) ERG (07) 09, 23-25, ˂https://www.berec.europa.eu/doc/publications/erg_07_09_rept_on_ 
ip_interconn.pdf˃ accessed 9 October 2020. 
693  EECC Directive, recital 305. 
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6.2.2. Introduction of new ECS categories and the reach of interoperability 
problems  
6.2.2.1. OTT Impact and a new carve-out under the EECC  
As mentioned above, the EECC has introduced new categories of electronic 
communications’ services (ECSs), and this new categorisation reaches out to internet-
based over-the-top (OTT)694 services. Having said that, the EECC revitalised the 
existing regulatory structure along with a rather light-touch regulatory treatment of the 
OTT services. While the introduction of new service types might not be conceived of 
as a revolution because of the limited expansion, the EECC addressing the long-
debated OTT issue and related interoperability challenges is worth being elaborated. 
OTT apps and business models, taking advantage of the global internet, are offered 
mostly by the global companies i.e. Facebook, Microsoft and Google and, albeit to a 
small extent, by local companies which often target niche markets and limited 
customer bases. OTT companies, while serving their customers increasingly on the 
global scale, pose a competitive threat over the telco companies (telcoes). In contrast 
to the latter, the former have no physical network infrastructure and offer their services 
through broadband access networks which are run over the nationally managed 
electronic communications networks. The big contrast between the telcoes and the 
OTTs is in consumers being charged with no or a minimum fee by the latter. While 
they offer their apps and services often with no cost to the end-users, they run ads over 
their one, or usually multi-sided, platforms. They make a profit through the strategy of 
 
694  OTT refers to “video, voice and other services provided over the Internet rather than solely over 
the provider’s own managed network” (OECD, Communications Outlook 2013 (2013) 




making each side of the platform meet, namely the consumers on the one hand and 
advertisers / businesses on the other. 
Despite the OTTs having no infrastructure deployment, the wide-ranging 
communication,695 entertainment696 and social networking services being offered by 
these players increasingly arouses a tension between such OTT players and the telcoes. 
The so-called tension mainly results from the fact that OTT business models potentially 
affect the traditional revenue streams and profit levels of the telcoes. To illustrate, OTTs 
like WhatsApp threaten the SMS revenues of mobile operators, and Voice over Internet 
Protocol (VoIP) services like Skype or Viber threaten their voice revenues.697 
It is widely acknowledged that the ubiquity of OTT apps for communications, 
messaging and social media has made the traditional revenue model for telcoes 
unsustainable.698 Combining internet access, communications and media services in a 
more valuable manner, these apps, while replacing the formerly vertically integrated 
services by telcoes,699 also raise the risk of obsolescence of the current regulatory rules. 
Against the dynamic needs of ICT users and new business models including OTTs, 
the regulatory focus on the traditional carriers has been debated for over a decade, with 
some regulatory implications concerning OTT players as well. This global agenda has 
also influenced the European regulatory politics, ending up with some reflections on 
 
695  Communication services by OTTs may partly replace services by traditional providers of 
electronic communications, but also offer new and differentiated services such as voice calls, 
which are not part of the conventional package of services offered by traditional providers (Peitz 
and Valletti (n 94) 899).   
696  Real-time entertainment by OTTs contains on-demand entertainment involving viewing or 
listening, whereby audio and video may be streamed or buffered (Peitz and Valletti (n 94) 899).   
697  Richard Feasey, ‘Confusion, denial and anger: The response of the telecommunications industry 
to the challenge of the Internet’ [2015] 39(6) Telecommunications Policy 444, 445.    
698  Peitz and Valletti (n 94) 901. A recent study produced for incumbent telecommunication operators 
suggests that, for example, cashflow within the European telecommunications industry will almost 
halve, falling from €44bn to €23bn by 2020 (Feasey (n 697) 446).    
699  Peitz and Valletti (n 94) 907. 
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new regulatory burdens to be imposed on the online communication service (OCS) 
providers, namely OTT players.700 
European legislators, considering that a growing convergence between OTT players 
and ECS providers exists, seems to have triggered a more equivalent regulatory 
response between them. Not for all the regulatory purposes, but mainly from the 
consumer protection viewpoint, a number of modifications were covered by the EECC. 
Based on not purely technical but more on economic reasons i.e. substitution, ECS and 
OCS providers were considered to have comparable features. Notwithstanding, OCS 
providers, e.g. WhatsApp, Skype and Viber, cannot fully control access to the end-
users. More explicitly, they cannot fully control the signal when it is carried over the 
‘best-effort’ access network.701 Despite these technical points, OCS providers are 
widely acknowledged to offer equivalent communications services with ECSs, as 
reflected in the EECC. 
According to the EECC, not only ECS but also OCS based voice communication 
services are covered within the definition of ‘inter-personal communications services’ 
(ICSs).702 Thereby, both of these services have been exposed to regulatory control, 
 
700  These reflections could be found in several recent reports. See ECORYS and TNO, A study on 
future trends and business models in communication services (Final Report: A Study prepared for 
the European Commission DG Communications Networks, Content & Technology, 2016) (‘2016 
OTT Report’) 141-9; ITU Telecommunications Development Sector, Regulatory Challenges and 
Opportunities in the New ICT Ecosystem (Regulatory and Market Environment, 2018) 25-26 and 
51. See also CERRE, ‘Market Definition, Market Power and Regulatory Interaction in Electronic 
Communications Markets’ (CERRE Study, 2014) 53-55 <https://www.cerre.eu/sites/cerre 
/files/141029_CERRE_MktDefMktPwrRegInt_ECMs_Final.pdf> accessed 9 October 2020. 
701  2016 OTT Report, 28. OCS providers can, to a certain degree, control the conveyance of their 
signals with a combination of CDN servers and client software on client terminals; however, the 
actual degree of control depends on the degree of congestion in the ‘best effort’ access networks 
(2016 OTT Report, 28).  
702  Under the EECC, ‘interpersonal communications service’ is defined as “a service normally 
provided for remuneration that enables direct interpersonal and interactive  exchange of 
information via electronic communications networks between a finite number of persons, whereby 
the persons initiating or participating in the communication determine its recipient(s) and does not 
include services which enable interpersonal and interactive communication merely as a minor 
ancillary feature that is intrinsically linked to another service” (EECC Directive, art 2(5)). 
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albeit with significant differences. That is to say, a more light-touch regulation is 
envisaged for the OCSs, whereas ECSs are meant to be regulated under heavy-handed 
access regulations, as mentioned above. Before delving into the details of the newly 
envisaged obligations of OCS providers, it is important to draw the whole picture of 
ECSs, including different types of OCSs i.e. number-based and number-independent. 
6.2.2.2. Introduction of new ECS categories 
In the original (2002) form of the ECRF, an ‘electronic communications service’ was 
defined as a service normally provided for remuneration which consists wholly or 
mainly in the conveyance of signals on electronic communications networks.703 
According to this definition, an ECS simply meant “conveyance of signals on 
electronic communications networks” in return for a remuneration, reflecting on the 
distinction between ‘transmission’ and ‘content’. As described above, the main thrusts 
and access remedies were designed according to this distinction by which an 
infrastructural vision is embedded within this framework. 
 While this regulatory mindset is still being kept on, an important change has taken 
place regarding the definition and categories of an ECS. According to the EECC, an 
‘electronic communications service’ (ECS) means a “service normally provided for 
remuneration via electronic communications networks, which encompasses, with the 
exception of services providing, or exercising editorial control over, content 
transmitted using electronic communications networks and services, the following 
types of services: 
 
703  Framework Directive, art 2(c). This definition “exclude[s] services providing, or exercising 
editorial control over, content transmitted using electronic communications networks and services; 
it does not include information society services, as defined in Article 1 of Directive 98/34/EC, 




(a) ‘internet access service’ as defined in point (2) of the second paragraph of Article 
2 of Regulation (EU) 2015/2120; 
(b) interpersonal communications service, and 
(c) services consisting wholly or mainly in the conveyance of signals, such as 
transmission services used for the provision of machine-to-machine services and for 
broadcasting”.704 According to this renewed definition, an ECS will contain; 
(i) internet access services (IASs), 
(ii) inter-personal communications services (ICSs), encompassing two sub-
categories of number-based and number-independent, and 
(iii) services consisting wholly or mainly of the conveyance of signals, e.g. 
M2M transmissions.   
The abovementioned new categorisation reveals a diversion from the criterion 
‘conveyance of signals’ in defining an ECS. While the formerly acknowledged ECSs 
supposedly meant IASs, number-based ICSs and M2M broadcasting transmissions 
based on the referred criterion, the EECC includes number-independent ICSs into the 
scope of ECSs as well. While M2M transmission is worth being elaborated separately, 
it is important to emphasize here that ICSs are grouped into two, by looking at whether 
end-users are assigned numbers by the service provider. ICSs being offered to customers 
on the basis of the assigned geographical or non-geographical numbers means a lower 
threshold for ex-ante regulation, compared to number-independent ICSs.705 
 
704  EECC Directive, art 2(4). 
705  See the EECC Directive, recital 18, reading as follows: 
Number-independent interpersonal communications services should be subject to 
obligations only where public interests require that specific regulatory obligations 
apply to all types of interpersonal communications services, regardless of whether 
they use numbers for the provision of their service. It is justified to treat number-
based interpersonal communications services differently, as they participate in, and 
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Another key aspect of the new classification is the issue of ‘remuneration’ that diverges 
from the classic monetary relationship between the parties. According to this, it is 
acknowledged that ECSs “are often supplied to the end-user not only for money, but 
increasingly and in particular for the provision of personal data or other data. The 
concept of remuneration should therefore encompass situations where the provider of a 
service requests and the end-user knowingly provides, personal data within the meaning 
of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 or other data directly or indirectly to the provider.”706 
Finally, as long as “the interpersonal and interactive communication facility is a minor 
and purely ancillary feature to another service and for objective technical reasons 
cannot be used without that principal service, and its integration is not a means to 
circumvent the applicability of the rules governing electronic communications 
services”, one could not mention about a number-based ICS, or broadly speaking an 
ECS.707 This is to pre-empt all types of OCS-enabled services and products from being 
taken as an ECS, although many of them would make it possible for their users to 
communicate with each other through VoIP. While the thrust behind this delimitation 
seems to create a boundary between the mainstream OCSs and others that make use of 
‘interpersonal and interactive communication’ as “a minor ancillary feature”, it seems 
hardly possible to set out the intended boundaries against the dynamic nature of future 
communication means, technologies and devices. 
 
hence also benefit from, a publicly assured interoperable ecosystem.” (EECC 
Directive, recital 18). 
706  EECC Directive, recital 16. 
707  EECC Directive, recital 17. 
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6.2.2.2.1. Number-independent inter-personal communications services 
As mentioned above, if an undertaking provides ICSs based on the numbers assigned 
according to a national or international numbering plan, then it is assumed to provide 
number-based ICSs within the meaning of the EECC. On the other hand, all of the 
online communications services (OCSs) provided by ICS providers are not necessarily 
affiliated with a geographical or non-geographical number. Whereas number-based 
ICSs are usually provided by conventional telcoes, Skype, WhatsApp and Viber and 
many other OCS and OTT providers could be assigned numbers as they wish within 
the context of a national or international numbering plan. 
According to the EECC, number-based ICS providers are to be treated the same as 
other ECS providers, e.g. telcoes, concerning a number of issues relating to consumer 
protection, which incorporate certain contractual, technical and administrative 
standards. For instance, according to Article 109(2) of the EECC, providers of number-
based ICSs have an obligation “to provide access to emergency services through 
emergency communications to the most appropriate PSAP [public safety answering 
point]”.708 Bundle-related requirements, e.g. relating to the extension of subscription 
periods, are likewise imposed on number-based ICS providers, as well as IAS 
providers, according to Article 107 of the EECC. Last but not least, it is established 
that providers of number-based ICSs should respect the end-users’ decision when 
making data available to directory service providers.709 Exceptionally, information 
 
708  EECC Directive, art 109(2). See also the EECC, recital 286. NRAs are supposed to require 
number-independent ICS providers to provide emergency services insofar as a PSAP is accessible 
to such service providers. See ibid, reading; “Where such standards and the related PSAP systems 
have not been implemented, network-independent number-based interpersonal communications 
services should not be required to provide access to emergency services except in a manner that is 
technically feasible or economically viable” (EECC, recital 286). 
709  EECC Directive, recital 300, art 112. 
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requirements for contracts are arranged as to address all the ICS providers comprising 
both providers of number-independent ICSs and IASs.710 
As stated above, number-independent ICS providers are treated more lightly than 
number-based ICS providers are treated under the EECC. Except with a few 
contractual obligations mentioned above, i.e. information requirements, number-
independent ICS providers are only subject to generic security obligations as per 
Article 40 of the EECC.711 Number-independent ICS providers do not have any other 
ex-ante obligation directly imposed by the EECC, apart from those specified above, 
i.e. under Articles 40, 102 and partially 109. On the other hand, an exceptional remedy 
is envisaged under Article 61(2/c) of the EECC. According to this provision, such 
undertakings could be subject to an obligation: 
“in justified cases, (…) to make their services interoperable, namely 
where access to emergency services or end-to-end connectivity 
between end-users is endangered due to a lack of interoperability 
between interpersonal communications services.”712 
 
710  EECC Directive, art 102. Service providers addressed in Article 102 of the EECC are phrased as 
“providers of publicly available electronic communications services other than transmission 
services used for the provision of machine-to-machine services”. 
711  Article 40 of the EECC Directive titled ‘Security of networks and services’ reads as follows: 
1. Member States shall ensure that providers of public electronic communications networks or of 
publicly available electronic communications services take appropriate and proportionate 
technical and organisational measures to appropriately manage the risks posed to the security 
of networks and services. 
2. (…) 
3. Member States shall ensure that in the case of a particular and significant threat of a security 
incident in public electronic communications networks or publicly available electronic 
communications services, providers of such networks or services shall inform their users 
potentially affected by such a threat of any possible protective measures or remedies which can 
be taken by the users. 
712  EECC Directive, art 61(2/c).  
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Hence, in the event of an actual threat to end-to-end connectivity or to effective access 
to emergency services, the Commission and where necessary the relevant NRA, may 
identify a need for measures to ensure interoperability, for instance through a 
standardisation process.713 This regulatory prospect means that OCS and OTT providers, 
e.g. Skype, WhatsApp and Viber, will potentially be exposed to the abovementioned 
measure(s) should their consumers face problems with regards to “access to emergency 
services or end-to-end connectivity”resulting from the lack of interoperability. This is 
a note-worthy regulatory step towards ensuring the interoperability of upper layer 
applications and services, going beyond traditional telecommunications networks714 and 
the conventional wisdom of infrastructural regulation. 
Against this background, ensuring ‘end-to-end connectivity’ appears to be the main 
policy driver for ICT interoperability, being adjusted and expanded in view of 
accompanying reasons, i.e. access to emergency services, that would warrant public 
policy interventions. Notwithstanding, this expansive step would be deemed 
incomplete in view of the ever-growing convergence between the OCSs and OTTs and 
conventional ECSs. As a matter of fact, around 3% of the global OCS users are 
encompassed by the definition of inter-personal communications services,715 and the 
multiple criteria for interoperability-centric interventions would not effectively 
comprehend the everyday expanding ICT world with all its constituent dynamics. 
 
713  EECC Directive, recital 150. 
714  Unver (n 30) 108.  
715  Cornelia Kutterer, ‘Future Models for Service Regulation - Implications for OTTs, Telcoes and 




6.2.2.2.2. M2M transmission services 
As mentioned above, M2M transmission represents another new ECS category within 
the meaning of the ECRF. Under the EECC, “services consisting wholly or mainly of 
the conveyance of signals, such as transmission services used for M2M 
communications and for broadcasting” are set out as the third ECS category, alongside 
ICSs and IASs.716 If not the same as ICS or IAS providers, undertakings which offer 
M2M transmission to the consumers, e.g. either using mobile numbering codes 
(MNCs) assigned to themselves or relying on third party MNCs, are subjected to ex-
ante regulation for certain purposes, e.g. network security. This new service cluster 
comes up with not only responsibilities but also with more rights, along with a more 
IoT (M2M) friendly legal environment. 
This EU approach seems to have arisen in view of the challenges as well as the 
opportunities brought about by the IoT services, which rest on broadband connectivity 
as well as other inputs, e.g. smart devices, clouds and microprocessors. Usually, 
Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) cards are distributed by the mobile operators to M2M 
providers, e.g. gas and electricity suppliers, thermostat manufacturers and smart car 
producers, which do not normally capture the management of SIMs that are embedded 
into the M2M devices, e.g. smart meters. Based on the idea of transferability of this 
management to M2M providers, the EECC’s policy approach envisages that M2M 
providers will be able to manage MNCs, according to the numbering plans of the 
relevant countries. By then, it is expected that M2M providers can easily manage their 
subscribers, have a closer contact and marketing approach from having the ability to 
differentiate their products e.g. with possible advantages like multi-network roaming.  
 
716  EECC Directive, art 2(4/c). 
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Going beyond the management of MNCs, M2M providers might step forward having 
their virtual networks. In such a case, they will be able to act as authorised ECS 
providers as long as they meet the required standards under the ECRF. This means 
M2M providers, which represent the IoT providers utilising cellular networks, will 
then be an ECS provider of a separate status, according to the EECC. This is a real and 
would-be common scenario as the IoT networks will potentially become more 
prevalent in our daily lives with a greater interplay with electronic communications 
networks and services. Given this fact, the IoT/M2M providers might consider running 
separate networks as a feasible option and opt to have and govern their network 
facilities rather than relying on a hosting network.  
Although having a physical or even virtual (hosted) network offers the full potential 
to solve numbering related problems, such problems would not be fully dismissed 
under other scenarios where the IoT service providers have limited management 
capabilities over their subscribers. In the scenarios where M2M providers do not have 
fully-fledged MNC management i.e. because of contractual and/or network-related 
constraints with the network operators, their customers will eventually face switching 
difficulties while they wish to port their SIMs across the mobile networks. Another 
noticeable fact behind this situation is that number portability is not possible on a 
technically convenient and widely applicable basis in such scenarios, unlike the mobile 
number portability which individual mobile users currently benefit from. 
Against this background, the EECC implicates a solution called ‘over-the-air (OTA) 
provisioning of numbering resources’ based on industry implementations.717 OTA 
 
717  The GSMA89 has specified a mechanism for the remote provisioning and management of 
embedded SIMs, allowing OTA provisioning and enabling the change of subscription from one 
connectivity service provider to another. This mechanism has been designed to answer the IoT 
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provisioning of numbering resources enables the reprogramming of communications 
equipment identifiers without physical access to the devices concerned.718 By this 
means, switching would no longer be a problem for the M2M providers and users when 
they opt for changing their connectivity (ECS) providers. According to the EECC, 
Without prejudice to Article 106, Member States shall promote over-
the-air provisioning, where technically feasible, to facilitate switching 
of providers of electronic communications networks or services by end-
users, in particular providers and end-users of machine-to-machine 
services.719 
Should OTA provisioning be adopted widely as encouraged by the EECC, M2M 
providers would easily have their SIMs changed across the mobile network operators 
with remote controlling. Assuming many M2M providers will not have their networks, 
this solution would be helpful for them switching with no or minimum cost. This will 
undeniably help the development of M2M services on a larger scale although 
infrastructural, legal and regulatory conditions would differ among Member States. On 
the other hand, this solution, which seems to be a technologically oriented measure, 
does not cover non-cellular network options. It also seems that data-related constraints, 
e.g. portability of the IoT data, and interoperability problems, e.g. compatibility of the 
IoT hardware and software, are kept outside of the regulatory vision contemplated by 
the EECC. 
 
needs where SIMs may not easily be changed manually (BEREC Report (n 31) 31). See also 
OECD, The Internet of Things: Seizing the benefits and Addressing the Challenges (Background 
report for Ministerial Panel 2.2, 2016) 43.  
718  EECC Directive, recital 249. 
719  EECC Directive, art 93(6). 
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While M2M providers or users switching between connectivity service providers, e.g. 
mobile operators, is envisaged by the EECC, facilitating migration of IoT 
providers/users from one software-governed platform to another is not mandated or 
encouraged. In this regard, lack of common standards enabling interoperability 
between the IoT platforms would be a barrier for competition, having the potential to 
prevent or delay new entries to the market. In addition to this, data portability 
constraints that would hamper transferability of the IoT data from one platform to 
another should be added as another problem closely associated with interoperability. 
Summing up, the ECRF seems to be incomplete and potentially overridden by the 
running pace and dynamics of the IoT markets, considering that the abovementioned 
problems surrounding the lack of interoperability would affect a competitive 
marketplace, despite the envisaged solutions, e.g. OTA provisioning.       
6.3. Assessment of the ECRF 
The ECRF, starting from the liberalisation period in the nineties, was built on the idea 
that elimination of monopolies, either public or private, would ensure a competitive 
market resulting in the benefits to be reaped by the end-users. To that end, European 
policy makers mandated Member States to remove the special and exclusive rights 
conferred onto the legal monopolies and enacted harmonization directives with a view 
to ensure a competitive telecommunications landscape. Until the adoption of the 2002 
regulatory framework, the main concern was related to ensuring adequate and effective 
interconnection along with the required level of interoperability being achieved 
towards pan-European networks and services. This perspective, while being kept on, 
has been extended to other areas of ex-ante regulation, including conditional access to 
the set-box systems. Access to wide-ranging network facilities, e.g. local loops, civil 
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engineering ducts and inbuilding wiring, are incorporated within the potential access 
remedies to be imposed by NRAs for competition purposes. 
Albeit with the acknowledgment that “interoperability is of benefit to end-users and is 
an important aim of this regulatory framework”,720 the ECRF’s vision was to date, and 
still is, far more elaborated regarding the assessment of infrastructural problems. 
Although having a deepening perspective, the regulatory approach pursued by the 
European authorities is by and large kept within the boundaries of access, 
interconnection and leased lines markets.721 Mainly based on the SMP regime, this 
regulatory vision aims at creating more competitive markets by means of access and/or 
price obligations formulated and designed according to the new entrants’ needs. While 
interoperability-centric remedies also have a stake in this context, such remedies 
appear narrow and limited largely because of the infrastructural perspective envisioned 
by the ECRF. Notably, it appears that achievement of interoperability is viewed as 
more of a supplementary remedy towards the ascertained goals of the ECRF, i.e. 
promotion of competition, promotion of the interests of the EU citizens, end-to-end 
connectivity, and to a lesser extent, media pluralism and cultural diversity. 
The last milestone towards the so-called policy objectives has been set out by the 
EECC, through an overhaul over the ECRF in a number of ways, including by 
expanding the regulatory vision towards software-governed, mainly online 
communications, services. First and foremost, it is proposed that ECSs are re-
 
720  EECC Directive, recital 148. 
721  In this regard, the number of retail markets susceptible to ex ante regulation denotes a decreasing 
trend, whereas wholesale markets to be regulated have kept their importance revolving around 
broadband or local access, leased lines, mainly terminating segments and interconnection, mainly 
call termination, which are assessed to far better demonstrate enduring entry barriers, etc. The so-
called trend could be observed throughout the period from 2003 to 2014 when 3 recommendations 
were issued by the Commission (See supra note 651). 
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categorised as to cover ICSs and M2M transmission in which the former is subdivided 
into two: (i) number-based ICSs, (ii) number-independent ICSs. Plus, according to this 
new categorisation, number-independent ICSs as usually being offered by the OTT 
players such as Facebook, Skype and Viber will be the subject matter of a limited 
number of obligations. In this regard, OTT interoperability is earmarked as one of the 
front-line topics, revealing a potential area of intervention, i.e. by means of 
standardisation, to respond to the end-user needs based on ‘end-to-end connectivity’ 
or ‘access to the emergency services’.  
Given the fact that number-based ICSs constitute a very small percentage of the 
software-governed OTT services,722 OTT-based regulatory expansion denotes more of 
a fine-tuning rather than a radical change. Furthermore, a serious and elaborated 
regulatory response to NGN including interoperability aspects could hardly be found 
under the EECC. Nor such a repercussion could be mentioned with regards to many 
other ICT networks and services, including cloud computing that entails many 
significant aspects of ICT service provisioning, i.e. virtualisation, multi-purpose 
capacity allocation and data processing. On that point, it is note-worthy that European 
policy makers still consider lack of interoperability and accompanying problems as a 
subordinate topic within the overall regulatory structure. Not only the ECRF’s limited 
scope, but also the partial and limited interoperability obligations thereunder point to 
a narrow-minded perspective. 
Having said that, the ECRF continues to have a regulatory vision focused on the 
bottom infrastructural layers. However, handling infrastructural problems under the 
ECRF, but putting other, upper-layer problems aside would not be in harmony with 
 
722  See supra note 715. 
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the real-life challenges surrounding IP-based convergence. The ECRF’s vision comes 
from the past experiences of ex-ante regulation revolving around how to liberalise 
formerly monopolised markets and make them competitive. A deeper analysis should 
be done that incorporates other ICT services than ECSs and notwithstanding the 
regulatory expansion brought with the EECC. In so doing, a layered and holistic 
approach encompassing all the IP layers and refraining from the infrastructural focus, 
needs to be considered first and foremost. It is noticeable that upper layer markets have 
undergone their infancy and were kicked-off to grow, while telecommunications 
(lower layer) markets have so far been under heavy regulation. While developmental 
difference between the former and latter is in favour of the former,723 their 
convergence has remarkably increased in time, also with greater implications for 
interoperability. 
In the so-called IP world, the convergence process has in reality been dominated by a 
process of the delivery of more and more communication services in the internet,724 
often led by the upper-layer, the IT-intensive, software-governed services. With OTT, 
the internet is seen as the generic platform for the provision of broadcast content and 
the associated advanced services, regarding for instance the integration with social 
networking and community services taking advantage of the proven dynamics and 
huge innovation potentials of the internet.725 That is to say, internet-driven software 
markets, or broadly speaking the upper layers, have a transformational power over the 
 
723  See also Plantin, Lagoze, Edwards and Sandvig (n 669), 299-301. This situation made the so-
called upper layer ICT markets unfettered from any regulatory burden and arguably enabled them 
to grow more rapidly in comparison with the electronic communications or telecom markets 
(Anders Henten and Reza Tadayoni, ‘The dominance of the IT industry in a converging ICT 
ecosystem’ in Hitoshi Mitomo, Hidenori Fuke and Erik Bohlin (eds), The smart revolution towards 
the sustainable digital society: Beyond the era of convergence (Edward Elgar 2015) 31. 
724  Henten and Tadayoni (n 723) 19. 
725  Henten and Tadayoni (n 723) 28. 
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convergence process ongoing between telecom, media and IT markets. While IT 
markets predominantly lead the IP convergence,726 the increasing interdependencies 
and interrelationships between the infrastructural and software-governed markets 
should drive new paradigmatic thinking to be translated to the regulatory sphere. 
Considering the case studies below will help re-examine the convergence process and 
the interoperability dynamics, suffice it to say here that the IP convergence, based on 
the cross-layer relationships, has an increasing role to play in ICT regulation including 
interoperability aspects. Having said that, the so-called interdependencies between the 
IP layers require more attention, as they would potentially pave the way for review of 
the conventional wisdom concerning ex ante regulation. 
Summing up, interoperability-centric problems, with some regulatory exceptions 
given above, are happened to fall under the realm of competition law in the EU legal 
system. This would automatically mean that market stakeholders will have to await 
the results from the competition law decisions, and relevant problems will have to be 
worked out in between such results and industry led solutions. While the current 
situation under the ECRF whereby a secondary role is conferred to interoperability 
should not self-evidently justify expanding the regulatory vision, the 
interdependencies and interrelationships between the ICT markets and players require 
a more elaborate and in-depth analysis. Given this fact, the chapter below is dedicated 
to the case studies based on cloud computing and the IoT reflecting on the real-life 
scenarios, industrial solutions and interdependencies. 
  
 
726  Henten and Tadayoni (n 723) 30-32. 
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7. Case studies: Cloud computing and the Internet of Things  
7.1. Cloud computing 
7.1.1. Definition, main characteristics and featured models  
Cloud computing denotes a modern IT infrastructure in which part of the software or 
hardware resources are not in the hands of the user but are located on some remote 
servers and accessible through the internet.727 Such servers are placed in the cloud 
centres, which host third parties’ data, software and applications, comprising the cloud 
resources that constitute ‘cloud computing’ along with the  necessary deployment, 
maintenance and management. A common definition of ‘cloud computing’ made by 
National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) describes ‘cloud computing’ 
as a “model for enabling convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of 
configurable computing resources e.g. networks, servers, storage, applications and 
services, that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort 
or service provider interaction”.728 
Cloud computing applies a utility model to produce and consume computing resources, 
in which the cloud abstracts all types of computing resources, including storage and as 
services i.e. cloud services.729 The cloud user, either application developer or 
consumer, can access the cloud services over the internet, and the cloud users pay only 
 
727  Bartolini, Santos and Ullrich (n 332) 361. 
728  National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST), US Department of Commerce, The NIST 
Definition of Cloud Computing (Recommendations of the National Institute for Standards and 
Technology, Special publication 800-145) 2011, 2. 
729  Jiehan Zhou, Teemu Leppänen, Erkki Harjula, Mika Ylianttila, Timo Ojala, Chen Yu, Hai Jin, 
Laurence Tianruo and Yang Huazhong, ‘CloudThings: A Common Architecture for Integrating 
the Internet of Things with Cloud Computing’ (2013 IEEE 17th International Conference on 
Computer Supported Cooperative Work in Design, 27-29 June 2013) 651. 
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for the time and services they need.730 Geographically dispersed users’ requests, 
including for the necessary software updates, are met by the cloud (computing) 
providers in an efficient and customised manner. Resource pooling and rapid elasticity 
brought by the cloud computing respond to various demands in numerous settings i.e. 
big data management, the IoT and/or AI-driven services. Accordingly, from basic IT 
needs e.g. data storage, security and reducing the upfront costs, to advanced levels of 
utilisation, cloud computing has become a significant driver and part of running 
businesses in the digital world.   
In an increasing fashion, cloud computing constitutes an integral part of the current 
ICT ecosystems, underlying a significant sphere of the digital economy. As an ever-
faster-growing trend, enterprises rely on cloud computing in building and/or running 
their businesses, considering this either as a way to more efficiently provide their 
services and/or for storage and/or back-up purposes. This intensive demand is clearly 
shown by Cisco’s forecast that by 2021, 94% of workloads and compute instances will 
be processed by cloud data centres, whereas 6% will be processed by traditional data 
centres.731 It is also note-worthy that, cloud networks and services have a significant 
role in retrieving, processing and analysing data from various resources in the era of 
big data.  Based on the diversification of user needs, a number of service and 
deployment models have so far emerged along with key and distinctive features. 
Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS) and Software as a 
Service (SaaS) are the main categories that denote service models. Among these, IaaS 
 
730  Ibid.  
731  Cisco, Cisco Global Cloud Index: Forecast and Methodology (2016–2021 White Paper, 
November 19, 2018) (‘Cisco 2018 Global Cloud Index’) ˂https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/ 
solutions/collateral/service-provider/global-cloud-index-gci/white-paper-c11-738085.html˃ 
accessed by 9 October 2020. 
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is the most flexible model for the cloud users who are allowed to optimise their IT 
needs based on the networking, virtualised servers, OS, security and storage offered 
by the cloud (IaaS) provider. In this model, all physical servers and networking 
elements are virtualised, allowing the users to deploy their software tools, applications, 
databases, etc. These computing powers are increasingly embedded into the software 
infrastructure of the clouds, when moving to PaaS and SaaS. In the PaaS model, cloud 
users are offered web servers, development tools and databases through which they 
can run their own applications. Such cloud resources are also-called the ‘system 
middleware’, giving users the flexibility to manage the application parameters, while 
the control of the underlying infrastructure e.g. OSs and networking is kept on by the 
cloud provider. In the SaaS model, all the computing resources e.g. from the 
underlying hardware and software to the running applications, are purchased from the 
cloud provider. SaaS providers install, maintain and update software within the cloud 
back-end, and users’ access to the software is managed through the internet, or intranet, 
via client devices, PCs, etc.732 Therefore, in this model, the maximised control of the 
cloud providers is exchanged with the lessened flexibility on the part of the users.733 
Alongside the service models, four types of deployment models are widely 
acknowledged that reflect the global needs of the users and enterprises. ‘Private 
 
732  Below are given the examples for cloud providers that rely on particular service models:  
- SaaS examples: Google Apps, Dropbox, Salesforce, Cisco WebEx, Concur, GoToMeeting, 
- PaaS Examples: AWS Elastic Beanstalk, Windows Azure, Heroku, Force.com, Google App 
Engine, Apache Stratos, OpenShift, 
- IaaS Examples: DigitalOcean, Linode, Rackspace, Amazon Web Services (AWS), Cisco 
Metapod, Microsoft Azure, Google Compute Engine (GCE) 
(Stephen Watts, ‘SaaS vs PaaS vs IaaS: What’s the difference and how to choose?’ (BMC Blog, 
22 September 2017) ˂https://www.bmc.com˃ accessed 9 October 2020). 
733  For further details of the service models, see Christoph Fehling, Frank Leymann, Ralph Retter, 
Walter Schupeck and Peter Arbitter, ‘Cloud Computing Patterns: Fundamentals to Design, Build, 
and Manage Cloud Applications’ (Springer, 2014) 42-59; Kai Hwang, Geoffrey C. Fox and Jack 
J. Dongarra ‘Distributed and Cloud Computing: Form Parallel Processing to the Internet of Things’ 
(Elsevier 2012) 191-206. 
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clouds’ are operated on the basis of meeting individual client demands with the 
dedicated hardware and software, whereas ‘public clouds’ are managed to meet the 
general public’s demands. In the case of ‘community clouds’, the cloud infrastructure 
is shared by several organizations and supports a specific community that has shared 
concerns e.g. mission, security requirements, policy and compliance considerations.734 
Finally, the ‘hybrid cloud’ infrastructure is a composition of two or more clouds, 
private, community or public, that remain unique entities but are bound together by 
standardized or proprietary technology that enables data and application portability 
e.g. cloud bursting for load-balancing between clouds.735 
7.1.2. Technical and economic underpinnings 
While the existing platforms, software and applications could be run by the users more 
efficiently and easily in the cloud environment, behind the scene lies a very 
complicated back-end. In this back-end, lies an assembly of the hardware and software 
elements from different resources, ending up as a distinct composition and 
organisational structure. These architectural components also refer to the economic 
underpinnings of cloud computing. 
Technically speaking, the essential concept of cloud computing is that IT resources are 
made available within an environment that enables them to be used, via a 
communications network, as a service.736 Having said this, cloud-based storage, 
security, processing, messaging and reporting are offered to the users by the cloud 
 
734  Ahmed Shawish and Maria Salama, ‘Cloud Computing: Paradigms and Technologies’ in F. Xhafa 
and N. Bessis (eds), Inter-cooperative Collective Intelligence: Techniques and Applications, 
Studies in Computational Intelligence (Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2014) 49. 
735  Ibid. For further details of the deployment models, see Hwang, Fox and Dongarra (n 665) 192-
194.  
736  The Open Group, ‘Cloud Computing Portability and Interoperability’ ˂http://www.opengroup. 
org/cloud/cloud_iop/p3.htm˃ accessed 9 October 2020. 
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provider, whereas the physical link between the user and the cloud provider is secured 
by the ECS providers (ISPs). Furthermore, cloud-based content is often delivered to 
the end-users through content delivery networks (CDNs) that are deployed in premises 
closer to the end-users with the aim of high-speed delivery of content to the 
geographically-dispersed end-users.737 These external elements underlie and 
complement the cloud infrastructure, assuring the intended usages and benefits from 
cloud computing. Representing the constituents of evolving supply structures and 
ecosystems, such internal and external elements are analysed below. 
7.1.2.1. Cloud layers and components (internal elements)  
While cloud providers mainly aim for the provision of cloud resources to third parties 
e.g. individual users, commercial enterprises and software developers, each constituent 
layer has a key role, like a building block, in the supply of cloud services. For instance, 
the web servers, databases and development tools function as the core of the cloud 
platforms without which software developers could not create and manage their own 
applications in the cloud environment. Likewise, in the absence of ‘virtualisation’, 
which enables multiple users being served via the same servers, the intended results 
from clouds e.g. scalability and efficiencies could not be achieved. Virtualised servers, 
along with the related networking, mechanical and electrical facilities, constitute the 
‘infrastructure’ layer that internally lays the ground for upper layer cloud services, 
namely the provision of platform and applications, including the necessary 
maintenance and upgrades. On top of the platform and application layers exists the 
application layer, which hosts the applications running for various purposes i.e. 
 
737  CDNs allow large content providers to bypass internet backbone networks when sending their 
content to users and have ushered in profound changes to how data flows over the internet (Daly 
(n 23) 42). For further details see infra note 743. 
 
267 
customer relationship management (CRM) and e-mailing. For such applications, when 
purchased by users, it is usually not known that they already rely on cloud computing. 
These internal elements not only represent the benefits unique to cloud computing but 
also constitute the key inputs used to create the cloud services offered to third parties 
and in drawing up the service models specified above. In Figure 8 can be seen these 
internal elements that constitute the cloud layers as well as the service models. 
 
 
Figure 8: Cloud layers (internal elements) 
Source: Constructed by the author 
As can be seen in Figure 8, cloud computing consists of several layers functioning as 
the internal elements. This means a supply structure being managed by a single 
company, namely the cloud provider. Cloud providers offer services at different layers 
of the resource stack, simulating the functions performed by applications, operating 
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systems, or physical hardware.738 However, these functions are internalised and 
abstracted within the service provision, and many of these are not visible to the cloud 
users. 
While these internal elements are organised and managed by the cloud provider, this 
single-handed management does not mean lack of distributed expertise along the 
layers. That is to say, cloud components do not necessarily have to be created by the 
cloud provider and could be purchased from third parties and sometimes be outsourced 
as well. This usually happens because of different companies’ expertise in the 
provision of related ICT services, i.e. virtualisation, networking (routers, switches) and 
security (anti-malware services), which are combined in the cloud environment in the 
end. The cloud supply structure is therefore argued to have been constituted from an 
array of firms whose products and services are complementary to each other.739 While 
‘complementarity’ has a role to define the relationships between the providers of such 
services, this is overshadowed by the single management over the internal elements on 
the part of the cloud provider.    
7.1.2.2. Cloud ecosystem with external elements 
While generation of the value chains in the cloud ecosystem depends on the effective 
combination of the cloud layers and components, the emergent cloud models could not 
be isolated from the underlying network elements. That is, the internal elements, the 
cloud layers and components, are complemented by the external elements, namely 
broadband network access and CDNs. As ubiquitous access to the cloud services is 
 
738  Christopher S. Yoo, ‘Cloud Computing: Architectural and Policy Implications’ [2011] 38 Review 
of Industrial Organization 405, 408.  
739  Tim Cowen and Annabelle Gawer, ‘Competition in the Cloud: Unleashing Investment and 
Innovation within and across Platforms’ [2012] 85 1st Q Digiworld Economic Journal 45, 47. 
 
269 
key to any viable cloud model, clouds inevitably rely on fixed e.g. fiber optic, cable 
and PSTN, and mobile e.g. GSM, UMTS and LTE networks. When the software and 
data reside in the cloud, the absence of a network connection has more serious 
consequences, effectively preventing end-users from running the cloud-native 
applications at all.740 Although intranet-type closed models are imaginable, what 
makes the cloud’s offerings much more appealing than its predecessors e.g. traditional 
data centres is the ability of the cloud users to have access to the cloud’s resources 
over the internet, regardless of geographical and time-related constraints. 
On the other hand, cloud computing is likely to increase the demands being placed on 
the local access network that is run by the ISPs, and the access network might not have 
sufficient bandwidth to support the mass utilization, particularly at the times of 
unanticipated spikes.741 This latter issue confers a key role on the CDNs which 
complements the role of ISPs. Not only to deal with such traffic bursts and load 
balancing, but also to provide premium, seamless, uninterrupted, quality-guaranteed 
content delivery. CDNs are extensively used by the cloud, as well as content 
providers,742 creating another layer underlying the cloud services.  
A CDN takes content from a content provider (CP) and caches it on those distributed 
servers, which has two effects: first, content is brought closer to the end-user without 
passing through inter ISP peerings, thus making its delivery faster;743 second, the CDN 
 
740  Yoo (n 738) 414.  
741  Yoo (n 738) 413. 
742  In 2017, approximately 52% of all internet traffic crossed CDNs; and just in 2021, that number is 
expected to jump to 71% (Briana Lassig, ‘CDN Technology: How Net Neutrality Will Affect 
Global CDNs’ (CDNetworks Americas, 21 February 2018) ˂http://nl.cdnetworks.com/en/ 
news/how-net-neutrality-will-affect-global-cdns/6811˃ accessed 9 October 2020). 
743  Delivery of IP traffic occurs either through transit or peering agreements among the internet 
backbone operators and/or ISPs. While transit between these operators generally occurs because 
of the sizeable differences among the parties, peering takes place between two networks, mostly 
small ISPs’, that have roughly the same size. For the definitions of transit and peering, along with 
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has a contractual relationship with the ISP as the former often needs to terminate 
traffic.744 In this emergent ecosystem, along with additional value chains, clouds have 
an increasing role to play; yet this role is unthinkable without taking account of these 
external elements. For connected consumers, content and applications must be 
seamlessly accessible via a diverse range of mobile devices, and this requires ‘cloud-
delivered CDNs’ as well as ‘packet-optical infrastructure’.745 While the former is 
realised by cloud services, the latter could be achieved via high-speed broadband 
access networks i.e. fiber-optic based NGA networks. 
CDN providers e.g. Akamai and Limelight, while serving content providers according 
to their specific needs, would be collaborating with the upper or lower layer operators, 
namely cloud providers or ISPs. By collaborating with and/or purchasing services from 
the former, CDN providers would gain added values e.g. cloud security solutions and 
functionalities e.g. data analytics, to be incorporated into their distribution networks.746 
These complementary services have become more important as the marketplace for 
basic content delivery services has become more competitive and diverse.747 On top 
 
their regulatory implications concerning internet interconnection, see Rohan Kariyawasam, 
‘Telecoms Regulation - Peering and Transit Over TCP/IP Networks’ [2001] 17(1) Computer Law 
& Security Report, 36-40; Kariyawasam (n 131) 185-204. While CDNs bypass these networks and 
agreements by delivering the content directly to the ISPs, they usually face the termination fees to 
be paid, which is comparable to the ‘paid peering’ option that is usually done between content 
providers and ISPs.      
744  Thorsten Hau, Dirk Burghardt and Walter Brenner, ‘Multihoming, content delivery networks, and 
the market for Internet connectivity’ [2011] 35 Telecommunications Policy 532, 535. 
745  Camille Mendler, CDNs, the Cloud and Carrier Ethernet: The new golden triangle (Informa, 
2012) 9. 
746  Thus, CDNs have a wide-ranging variety according to the services and functionalities offered by 
them. Not only web delivery and content caching but also distributed denial-of-service protection, 
web application firewalls and bot mitigation; web and application performance and acceleration 
services; streaming video and broadcast media optimization; and even digital rights management 
for video might be incorporated in differentiated CDN models (Margaret Rouse, ‘CDN (content 
delivery network)’ (TechTarget, 31 July 2014) ˂https://searchnetworking.techtarget.com/ 
definition/CDN-content-delivery-network˃ accessed 9 October 2020. 
747  Volker Stocker, Georgios Smaragdakis, William Lehr and Steven Bauer, ‘The growing complexity 
of content delivery networks: Challenges and implications for the Internet ecosystem’ [2017] 
41(10) Telecommunications Policy 1003, 1006. For example, in 2015, Akamai generated more 
than half of its revenues from “Performance and Security Solutions” and cloud security solutions 
alone accounted for more than 11% of total revenues (Ibid). 
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of this, collaboration between CDN providers and ISPs i.e. through licensing 
agreements would enable new channels of scalability, traffic routing and network 
resourcing for the former.748 These collaborative acts also support the ISPs expanding 
their networking capabilities. For example, ISPs with a limited geographic footprint 
cannot implement a CDN to serve global content providers unless they partner with 
other CDNs or ISPs.749 
While CDNs are spread across the globe, ISPs’ networks are restrained within 
geographical (national) territories. Their unmatchable scopes, as well as other 
distinctive functionalities, make these networks collaborate as well as competing 
indirectly with regard to content delivery and termination. As the clouds host a 
significant portion of the IP traffic750 which transcends CDNs and broadband 
networks, there is an inherent link between such networks and cloud-based content 
delivery. From a broader perspective, transactions between these stakeholders are a 
reminder of the “symbiotic” relationships among the players across the layers, as 
argued by Fransman.751 According to Fransman, the ICT ecosystem consists of six, or 
a simplified four, “layers” that interact with each other through symbiotic 
relationships.752 From this viewpoint, the interdependencies between the internal and 
 
748  Ibid, 1013. 
749  Ibid, 1016. 
750  According to Cisco’s forecast for the period of 2016 to 2021, global cloud IP traffic will account 
for 95% of total data center traffic by 2021, and will be more than triple (3.3-fold) over the next 5 
years with a 27% increase rate (CAGR) (Cisco 2018 Global Cloud Index). 
751  Fransman (n 118) 13. 
752  Ibid. The layers embedded in the ICT ecosystem are classified by him as to include ‘networked 
elements’, ‘network operating’, ‘connectivity’, ‘middleware platforms’, ‘content, applications and 
services’ and ‘consumption’. Such layers, which are simplified by Fransman as to cover 
‘networked elements’, ‘network operating’, ‘middleware’ and ‘consumption’ layers, have been 
refined by some scholars ending up with several regulatory models. See Rohan Kariyawasam, 
International Economic Law and the Digital Divide: A New Silk Road (Edward Elgar 2007) 87-
117; Kariyawasam (n 107) 581-594; Werbach (n 118) 59-95; Joshua L. Mindel and Douglas C. 
Sicker, ‘Leveraging the EU regulatory framework to improve a layered policy model for the US 
telecommunications markets’ [2006] 30 Telecommunications Policy, 136-148; Richard S. Whitt, 
‘A horizontal leap forward: formulating a new public policy framework based on the network 
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external elements of the overall (cloud) ecosystem play a key role in understanding 
cloud computing and the possible inroads to regulatory pathways in cloud computing 
and broader contexts. The Figure 9 demonstrates all the relevant layers that encompass 
the overall (cloud) ecosystem. 
 
Figure 9: Cloud ecosystem (with internal and external elements) 
Source: Constructed by the author 
7.1.2.3. The differences and relationship between the organisational (supply) 
structures   
As manifested in Figure 9, not only the cloud components, namely the ‘internal’ 
elements themselves, but also the ‘external’ elements which constitute the ‘access 
 
layers model’ [2003] 56(3) Federal Communications Law Journal, 587-672. For further 
information and literature regarding layered models see supra note 118. 
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layer’ denote a multi-layered structure. This structure is comprised of access and cloud 
layers including sub-layers and services, which all together constitute an ecosystem. 
Given this fact, the supply structure of the cloud environment, based on the internal 
elements, differs from that of the cloud ecosystem, based on both internal and external 
elements. 
First and foremost, in the first structure solely based on the internal elements, the 
demand and supply equilibrium depends on the ‘coordination’ of the mainstream and 
complementary cloud services. More explicitly, SaaS, PaaS and IaaS type cloud 
services are offered by the cloud providers that create the environment whereby 
various software and hardware are coupled and managed by means of the so-called 
‘coordination’. To couple these internal elements, the cloud provider identifies the 
networking, storage, processing, maintenance, security and other needs and makes 
‘make-or-buy’ decisions accordingly. In this vein, the relationship between the 
mainstream and complementary services is defined and managed by the cloud provider 
themselves. Upstream and downstream market relationships could emerge out of this 
coordination and management. Albeit with the difficulties regarding dynamic and 
allocative efficiencies in solving potential competition and regulatory problems, the 
decision-making processes could still be built on the traditional concepts and 
precedents i.e. market definition.     
On the other hand, the same could hardly be concluded for the broader setting, namely 
when the external elements are embedded into the cloud environment. Primarily, the 
competition/regulatory lens in this setting needs to be more comprehensive and 
inclusive, not being limited to the cloud components. When including the external 
elements into the supply structure, the setting turns out to be an ecosystem and could 
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hardly be restrained with a two-sided market relationship. Considering the 
coordination of the internal elements rests on the cloud provider’s decisions, one-sided 
decisions based on single cloud management would no longer suit ecosystem 
relationships in the second broader setting. When passing to the ecosystem setting, the 
complementarity is replaced with the interdependencies. Then, the demand and supply 
equilibrium would hardly be truly found because of the emerging complexity and the 
so-called coordination problem, which often comes up with multiple equilibria.753      
This problem is indirectly pointed out by some authors e.g. Cowen and Gawer (2012), 
who refer to the organisational innovation in the cloud because of the multi-party 
structure.754 While such arguments rest on the cloud computing market itself, the 
cloud-based interdependencies reach out to other markets e.g. content, broadband and 
CDNs in the ecosystem setting, marking a stark distinction from the first setting of the 
cloud environment. While the self-supply and outsourced cloud components are 
matched and coordinated across the board in the first setting, a broadening set of 
transactions and exchange decisions between ISPs, CDNs, cloud and content providers 
are made in the second setting of the cloud ecosystem.            
From the ecosystem perspective, as members continuously innovate and try to create 
value, they also attempt to gradually gain bargaining power vis-à-vis other members 
of the ecosystem.755 In an interdependent ecosystem, as a form of supply chain, it is 
not only rivals that can exploit the innovation and capture its value: it can be the firm’s 
buyers, suppliers, or complementors.756 This point, namely the heterogeneity of 
 
753  Regarding the scope and the conditions under which ‘multiple equilibria’ takes place, see Richard 
W. Cottle, ‘Multiple Equilibria’ (International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 2008) 
<https://www.encyclopedia.com> accessed 9 October 2020. 
754  Cowen and Gawer (n 739) 47. 
755  Cowen and Gawer (n 739) 47. 
756  Cowen and Gawer (n 739) 47. 
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players and their differential capabilities to interpret their environment and respond to 
it, marks the main difference between the ecosystem approach and the traditional 
economics approach which focuses on micro-level decision making processes largely 
based on linear processes.757 Given this fact, the ecosystem approach would be 
appropriate and more relevant for the second broader setting that includes the external 
as well as internal (cloud) elements, when compared to the first setting.   
7.1.3. Interoperability debate in the cloud context 
External and internal elements that constitute the cloud ecosystem have some layers 
interdependent and interconnected to each other. These inter-links between the cloud 
layers are achieved by means of interoperability. The cloud components, including 
applications, platforms and infrastructure elements, should speak to each other for the 
cloud services to be run across the board. This denotes the narrow(est) viewpoint 
which could be compared to ‘intra-operability’ based on one provider cloud 
management, should we disregard the outer space of the cloud environment.   
However, just as with the components in the cloud speaking to each other, equivalent 
elements of different clouds should ideally interoperate with each other. For instance, 
virtual machines in the infrastructure layers of distinct clouds that are running third 
parties’ platforms or applications, should be able to be moved from one cloud to 
another. When they are integrated into a cloud environment, they should operate 
towards the same goal of service provisioning along with other components. Not only 
virtual machines, but also platforms and applications should be replaceable, exchange 
data and information across the clouds. From this viewpoint, it is argued that cloud 
 
757  See Johannes M. Bauer, ‘Platforms, systems competition and innovation: Reassessing the 
foundations of communications policy’ [2014] 38 Telecommunications Policy 662, 667.  
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interoperability refers to the ability of customers to use the same management tools, 
server images and other software with a variety of cloud computing providers and 
platforms.758 All these refer to an understanding for cloud interoperability, which 
suggests that the users’ applications, data and software in the disparate clouds be able 
to work together based on the mutually agreed specifications. Hereby the aim is to 
enable the cloud users and providers operating across and within different layers of the 
supply chain, to interact and exchange data and instructions.759  
However, neither intra-operability in one cloud nor interoperability between the clouds 
could be isolated from the underlying external layers. One should consider that the 
internal elements of the cloud layer, and the external elements of the access layer are 
constituents for a cloud ecosystem, setting out a broadened need for multi-layered 
interoperability. The physical link between a cloud infrastructure and an ISP means 
that the already established standards yielding the intended interconnectivity between 
the former and latter, includes software interoperability. The same is true for the 
interlinks between the clouds and CDNs. Thus, the cross-layer protocols that ensure 
interoperability play a key role across the cloud-CDN-ISP interdependencies. To these 
interdependencies, content layer would be added as content providers (CPs) are always 
in interaction with cloud, CDN and internet service providers.760 Through the 
 
758  Claybrook (n 152).  
759  See Niamh Gleeson and Ian Walden ‘‘It’s a jungle out there’?: Cloud computing, standards and 
the law’ (2014) 5(2) European Journal of Law and Technology ˂http://ejlt.org/article/view/ 
363/460˃ accessed 9 October 2020, 2; W. Kuan Hon and Christopher Millard, ‘Control, Security 
and Risk in the Cloud’ in Christopher Millard (eds), Cloud Computing Law (OUP 2013), 26-27. 
See also European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI), Version 1.0. (Cloud Standards 
Coordination, Final report, 2013) ˂https://www.etsi.org/images/files/Events/2013/2013_CSC_ 
Delivery_WS/CSC-Final_report-013-CSC_Final_report_v1_0_PDF_format-.PDF˃ accessed 9 
October 2020, 7, reading; “The cloud service customer should be able to use widely available ICT 
facilities in-house when interacting with the cloud services, avoiding the need to use proprietary 
or highly specialized software”. 
760  As content provision does not underlie the cloud networks and services, the content layer has not 
been examined within the context of cloud settings. However, from the perspective of ecosystem 
interdependencies, CPs have a stake and role to play, which goes beyond the scope of this study. 
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interfaces across the value or supply chain, these ecosystem players coordinate and 
interoperate with each other. 
Given this fact, interoperability comes up as one of the most significant threads across 
the emergent cloud ecosystems, as well as the cloud environments, which are the 
supply structures analysed above. Below, interoperability is examined in view of these 
settings and the attendant needs and problems.       
7.1.3.1. Interoperability in the cloud environment  
Similar to the traditional legacy networks, such as the internet that builds upon TCP/IP 
protocols, interoperability in the cloud environment will occur at the various layers, 
starting with the infrastructure layer e.g. through the Open Virtualization Format 
(OVF), an industry-wide standard and moving to the upper layers that are mostly 
designed via proprietary interfaces.761 Cloud components are run on the dedicated 
software components which represent the so-called layers, although they might not be 
typified as a modular layered system. Cloud management provides a complete 
framework for managing all aspects of the infrastructure i.e. provisioning, deployment, 
monitoring, securing, messaging, reporting etc., as well as the cloud applications 
working on these infrastructural elements.762 As cloud APIs provided by the cloud 
management layer also allow applications to take control of the infrastructure they run 
on,763 it may be argued that a modular theory does not fit well to the cloud context.764 
 
761  Renda (n 153) 28-29; Unver (n 27) 4. 
762  M. Zaid Ahmed ‘How Cloud Computing Application Architecture is Different from Traditional 
Application Architecture?’ (2015) ˂https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/how-cloud-computing-
application-architecture-different-muhammad-ahmed/˃ accessed 9 October 2020. 
763  Ibid. 
764  It is acknowledged that cloud computing infrastructure virtualization seems to violate key 
principles of modularity theory (Reuel Edison Ocho, ‘Architectural evolution through 
softwarisation: On the advent of software-defined networks’ (PhD Thesis, The London School of 
Economics and Political Science, 2016) 77). 
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Given the fact that management of the cloud components is performed by the cloud 
provider, interoperability confronts new problems i.e. tight coupling in the cloud.    
Tight coupling refers to a strategy of pursuing coupling between the essential 
components in the cloud environment. By contrast, loose coupling means that cloud 
components make few assumptions about each other e.g. regarding the format of 
exchanged data or the communication channels used.765 Coupling strategies indirectly 
demonstrate the extent to which the cloud provider wants to centralise the application 
programming and processing within the cloud environment.766 This could also be 
interpreted to show the level of the elasticity of cloud management against the third-
party applications vis-à-vis cloud-native ones.  
Coupling strategies are also supplemented by the fact that a few common standards 
are in place to govern the cloud computing industry. While the greatest level of 
interoperability is likely to be found for IaaS cloud services, where functionality is 
often broadly equivalent and there are a number of standard interfaces, some of which 
are formally standardized such as the CDMI and others like the OVF being de-facto 
standards in the marketplace, PaaS and SaaS cloud services have lower levels of 
interoperability.767 Except with these few standard interfaces that ensure 
interoperability at the infrastructure layer, common standards at the upper layers do 
not exist in the cloud environment.768 Therefore, undertakings may exploit the fact that 
their customers have been locked into their cloud service and impose the use of their 
 
765  Fehling et al (n 733) 152. Loose coupling might be compared to the internet layers that 
communicate with each other through the interfaces which do not prescribe or interfere with the 
protocols running each layer. 
766  See Fehling et al (n 733) 151-159. 
767  Cloud Standard Consumer Council, Interoperability and Portability for Cloud Computing: A 
Guide (Version 2.0, 2017) 7 ˂https://www.omg.org/cloud/deliverables/CSCC-Interoperability-
and-Portability-for-Cloud-Computing-A-Guide.pdf ˃ accessed 9 October 2020. 
768  See ibid; Claybrook (n 152); Gleeson and Walden (n 759) 14-16.  
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own software.769 This snapshot of the cloud environment would enable the cloud 
providers to establish an installed customer base and to heighten the switching costs. 
In the case of the vendor lock-in scenario, when one cloud customer relying on a PaaS 
or SaaS wishes to migrate from one provider to another, they would face technical 
and/or financial challenges resulting from this lack of interoperability. Such challenges 
primarily relate to the portability of applications, software tools and datasets, although 
mandated data portability alleviates these problems to an extent. 
Under the GDPR (Article 20) was introduced a new right called the ‘right to data 
portability’ (RtDP) enabling individual users to move their data across the data 
controllers.770 According to this new statutory right, data subjects (natural persons) 
have the right not only to extract their personal data from the cloud provider but also 
to have that data transferred from one cloud provider to another. However, this right 
is subject to various limitations. Firstly, the GDPR allows usage of this second part of 
the RtDP, namely transmission of personal data “where technically feasible” (GDPR, 
Article 20(2)). Secondly, the RtDP is limited to natural persons and does not cover the 
data of businesses i.e. regarding management, analytics and marketing, that might be 
hosted by the cloud providers.   
On the other hand, EU Regulation 2018/1807771 that was put into force under the DSM 
initiative, paves the way for the elimination of data portability constraints. Aiming at 
removal of the obstacles against the free flow of data across the EU, Regulation 
2018/1807 adopted a self-regulatory process to ensure the portability of non-personal 
 
769  Luciano and Walden (n 152). 
770  For further details regarding data portability see the thesis section ‘3.2.4. Data protection rules: 
Right to data portability’. 
771  Regulation (EU) 2018/1807 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 November 2018 




data,772 alongside other policy objectives i.e. prevention of data localisation. To that 
effect, “a principle-based approach that provides for cooperation among Member States, 
as well as self-regulation” is laid down under the Regulation,773 whereby the 
Commission will be monitoring and issuing guidance and evaluation reports throughout 
the period.774 In the end it is targeted by means of self-regulatory codes of conduct, so 
users can port data between cloud service providers and back into their own IT 
environments.775 Before the entry into force of this Regulation, major stakeholders like 
Google, Microsoft, Facebook and Twitter had started to collaborate under an open 
source project to facilitate data portability between competing services.776  
In the light of these recent legislative and industry-led developments, vendor lock-in 
concerns might be argued to have dispersed thanks to the emerging data portability 
tools and safeguards. However, such measures aim at portability of ‘data’, not the 
applications and software tools that are hosted by the clouds. A distinction should be 
drawn between the data that is subject to data portability measures and the applications 
and software, including databases, which are not. Applications, including databases, 
will have their own individual design and structure, be it processes, specific formats, 
 
772  “[S]pecific examples of non-personal data include aggregate and anonymised datasets used for big 
data analytics, data on precision farming that can help to monitor and optimise the use of pesticides 
and water, or data on maintenance needs for industrial machines” (Regulation 2018/1807, recital 9). 
773  Regulation 2018/1807, recital 11. 
774  According to Article 6, the Commission shall “[e]nsure that the codes of conduct are developed in 
close cooperation with all relevant stakeholders, including associations of SMEs [Small and 
Medium-sized Enterprises] and start-ups, users and cloud service providers” and “encourage 
service providers to complete the development of the codes of conduct by 29 November 2019 and 
to effectively implement them by 29 May 2020”. 
775  European Commission, ‘Digital Single Market: Free flow of non-personal data’ (2019) 
˂https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/free-flow-non-personal-data˃ accessed 9 October 2020. 
776  John Leonard, ‘Google, Microsoft, Facebook and Twitter team up on data portability project’ 
(Computing, July 23, 2018) ˂https://www.computing.co.uk/ctg/news/3036306/google-microsoft-
facebook-and-twitter-team-up-on-data-portability-project˃ accessed 9 October 2020. The 
companies involved are developing tools that can convert any service’s proprietary APIs to and 
from a small set of standardized data formats that can be used by anyone (Taruka Srivastav, 
‘Google, Microsoft, Facebook and Twitter collaborate for Data Transfer Project’ (The Drum, July 
21, 2018) <https://www.thedrum.com/news/2018/07/21/google-microsoft-facebook-and-twitter-
collaborate-data-transfer-project> accessed 9 October 2020. 
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behaviours and outputs.777 This is what differentiates one from another and a legal 
move to standardise actual applications might have negative implications for 
innovation and competition.778 On the other hand, the emergent fragility and 
fragmentation, along with absent common standards, would harm interoperability at 
the application and/or platform layers, in spite of data portability. 
Against the insufficiency of data portability and standardisation efforts, there might be 
a need to resort to sector-specific and/or competition law remedies in order to respond 
to interoperability and accompanying problems. Remarkably, EU legal rules and 
remedies based on IPR, and sector-specific and competition laws, have different 
perspectives to deal with the interoperability problems, including vendor lock-in. That 
is, invoking interoperability-centric tools would require a background scenario of 
either an abusive behaviour e.g., refusal to supply, or of an imminent harm to ex ante 
principles or rules i.e. end-to-end connectivity. In the case of such scenarios, available 
tools and remedies including data portability measures could address the potential 
problems to be confronted in the cloud environment. 
7.1.3.2. Interoperability in the cloud ecosystem 
Interoperability, from an industry-specific perspective, is destined to be dealt with 
through standardisation, in the way the European Commission envisions the picture. 
This approach could be compared to the narrow-minded approach dedicated to the 
cloud environment described above. However, an in-depth analysis seems inevitable 
when one looks at the cloud ecosystem that relies upon the underlying and external 
 
777  Begoña González Otero, ‘Mandating Portability as a Strategy to Achieve Interoperability between 
On-line Platforms: Pros & Cons’ (12th International Conference on Internet, Law & Politics, 
Barcelona. 7-8 July 2016) 217. 
778  Ibid.  
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elements of the broadband and content delivery networks that constitute the access 
layer and has interlinks with the content value proposition. From this broader point of 
view, issues regarding interoperability could not be separated from, and need to be 
analysed with, the associated layers or external elements within the overall ecosystem. 
Here, the interactions between the ecosystem players should be reemphasized as they 
reframe the collaborative as well as competitive relations between the players. For 
instance, operators of the access layer, namely CDNs and ISPs, aim to enhance and 
differentiate their services against the newly emerging IP multimedia services, which 
are not heavily regulated and have a closer connection with the end-users. To that 
effect, both CDN and broadband operators are on the one hand collaborating and/or 
merging their powers with the content and application providers,779 and on the other 
hand they strive to provide their own virtualisation and platform services, to gain a 
competitive edge.780 To capture more frontiers against their competitors, as well as 
operating more efficiently, access providers would attempt further actions, including 
network slicing.781 In its fullest realization of this strategy, the ISP can offer multiple 
tiers of cloud services ranging from wholesale access to core cloud resources i.e. 
computing, storage, and transport.782 Such a scenario could be compared to CDNs 
deploying their networks to closer areas to the end-user termination points, to gain a 
favour in their relationship with the ISPs. From a broader viewpoint, CPs’ investments 
 
779  Comcast’s acquisition of NBC Universal and Verizon’s acquisition of EdgeCast and Yahoo! could 
be given as recent examples of such mergers. 
780  See Stocker et al (n 747) 1006. Many of the largest operators of full-service networks such as 
Telefonica, AT&T, and Telecom Italia, are investing heavily in Network Function Virtualization 
and Software Defined Networking technologies to “softwarize” their networks, in order to gain 
finer-grained, flexible and dynamic control over network resources Stocker et al (n 747) 1006. 
781  See Stocker et al (n 747) 1006. In this operation, the network infrastructure can be virtualized and 
then sliced into logical partitions that may support different levels of QoS and network 
functionality.  
782  See Stocker et al (n 747) 1006. 
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into deployment and management of CDNs should be underscored,783 albeit with the 
difficulty for them to have a comparable coverage with CDNs. All these facts while 
demonstrating the natural, technical and territorial limitations of each ICT players, also 
denote the very ecosystem where the players do rely on myriad interactions between 
each other, mostly characterised with multiple equilibria.  
Under these circumstances, we are confronted with the term ‘coopetition’, which is 
depicted as to comprise cooperation and competition between competitors at the same 
time.784 This term suggests no serious contradiction between competition and 
collaboration, but an enriched relationship built on both. According to this idea, as 
theorised by Adam M. Brandenburger and Barry J. Nalebuff, in order for the firms to 
have a sustainable development, they need to collaborate with other firms and 
organizations, including competitors, to address social, environmental, and economic 
needs.785 Coopetition is rapidly becoming a key success factor for enterprises 
operating in the contemporary business world, along with an increased importance in 
parallel with the globalization process.786 This snapshot of ‘coopetition’ well matches 
with the cloud ecosystem which could be compared to broader ICT settings.787 From 
 
783  Companies such as Google, Youku, Tudou and, more recently, Netflix, use their own CDNs – 
either wholly or in conjunction with “pure play” providers – other major players such as Hulu, 
Facebook and Amazon continue to partner with one or more of the leading Internet CDNs – 
including Akamai, Limelight Networks and Level 3 (Giles Cottle, CDNs could help smaller OTT 
players disrupt the content hierarchy (Informa, 2012) 7). 
784  For detailed analysis of this concept, see Keith Walley, ‘Coopetition: An Introduction to the 
Subject and an Agenda for Research’ [2007] 37(2) International Studies of Management & 
Organisation, 11-31. 
785  Joanna Cygler, Włodzimierz Sroka, Marina Solesvik and Katarzyna Debkowska, ‘Benefits and 
Drawbacks of Coopetition: The Roles of Scope and Durability in Coopetitive Relationships’ 
[2018] 10(8) Sustainability 1, 2. 
786  Ibid, 19. 
787  Broadly speaking, the complex value of network of the internet economy, in which   
complementarity and platform relations between firms abound, compels coopetition (Volker 
Schneider and Johannes M. Bauer, ‘A network science approach to the Internet’ in J. M. Bauer 
and M. Latzer (eds), Handbook on the Economics of the Internet (Edward Elgar 2016) 72, 72). 
According to many scholars, these developments change the nature of competition in ambiguous 
ways, often requiring companies to compete and cooperate with their rivals (Ibid). 
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this viewpoint, ‘complementarity’ or ‘substitutability’ are destined to be replaced with 
broader and more complex relationships, coupled with multi-layered 
interdependencies. Against the cross-layer interactions, it would be highly 
questionable to pursue market-centric approach, particularly based on predefined 
markets and potential remedies to be imposed on dominant (SMP) players. Along the 
same lines, conventional tests to measure the elasticity of demand and supply in the 
relevant settings potentially lose their ground in defining the competitive relationships 
between the ICT players against the overarching interdependencies.  
Crucially, interoperability stands out as one of the threads for the coopetitive 
relationships in the ecosystem context. Closely related to the interdependencies, 
interoperability would come about as part of the overall strategies of ecosystem 
players, including cloud providers. While one could comprehend intra or inter-cloud 
interoperability on the basis of standards, consortia, etc., these relationships changing 
into complex interdependencies in the ecosystem makes any regulatory process much 
harder. In an era when the defined markets become outdated and blurred, lack of 
interoperability and accompanying problems i.e. vendor lock-in or other related issues 
i.e. efficiencies, would not be easily attached to certain market(s) and/or harm theories. 
In this light, a possible solution for the lack of interoperability from the conventional 
legal perspectives might be patchy and narrow-minded. Given this fact, an ecosystem-
based approach seems persuasive for interoperability and its accompanying problems, 
across the interdependent layers and players.    
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7.1.4. Analysis of cloud settings under the EU legal framework  
Against the background information above, it is apparent that interoperability could 
not be singled out as a self-standing problem, but rather needs to be analysed along 
with other dynamics of the cloud settings. Having said that, based on the narrow and 
broad settings analysed above of the cloud environment and cloud ecosystem, the 
evaluation of several parameters i.e. interdependencies, complementarity and 
substitution, competition, cloud management, interoperability and standardisation is 
reflected in the table below. 
Table 1: Evaluation of parameters for cloud settings 
Source: Constructed by the author  
Parameters Cloud environment 
(internal elements) 
Cloud ecosystem (both internal 
and external elements) 
Interdependencies 
Interdependencies are 
limited, with the internal 
elements being governed 
by the cloud provider 
Interdependencies turn out to 
have a core and determinant 






shape out the markets 
Lessening impact of market 
based relationships 
Competition 
Competition depends on 
the intra and inter-cloud 
links and interoperability 
Competition is accompanied by 
cooperation between ecosystem 
players (resulting in coopetition) 
Cloud 
management 
Single cloud management 
dominates the 
relationships in the cloud 
Multi-layered relationships 
supersede layer or platform 
based cloud management 
Interoperability 
Strong link exists between 
competition and 
interoperability 






have a pro-interoperability 
and competitive impact 
Standards’ role is diminished 




Interoperability could be mapped and figured out across the given settings as 
summarised above. Given the inputs in the table, ICT interdependencies have a 
prominent effect, likely to supersede the market and/or platform based relationships, 
within the ecosystem context. Accordingly, ‘substitutability’ and ‘complementarity’ 
which define the markets and underlying products are not destined to be very 
influential in contrast to the role they played traditionally in competition/regulatory 
processes. The overarching interdependencies and underlying coopetitive 
relationships take over intra and inter-platform (cloud) competition when moving to 
the ecosystem setting. This ecosystem-based trajectory is clearly being shaped out by 
cross-layer interactions instead of a single management discourse which take place in 
the cloud environment. 
In the light of the above information, it would be an incoherent and narrow-minded 
approach to crystallise ‘interoperability’ as a market or platform specific problem.  
Along the same lines, standardisation, although it might need to be encouraged, should 
not be considered as self-promising given the fact that standards are focused on 
narrower industrial settings which ostensibly match the cloud environment but not the 
ecosystem. It should be remembered that when moving from the cloud environment to 
the cloud ecosystem, standards’ role decreases given the more space opening up for 
innovation, along with the interdependencies.           
While cloud computing is underlined as one of the five most significant areas that need 
standardisation by the European authorities,788 the possible solution(s) to be found out 
should ultimately have a cross-layer nature. Whereas technically a potential solution 
 
788  European Commission, ICT Standardisation Priorities for the Digital Single Market, COM (2016) 
176 final, 5 ˂http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2016/EN/1-2016-176-EN-F1-1.PDF˃ 
accessed 9 October 2020. 
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i.e. a common standard, would be fit for purpose from the perspective of the cloud 
environment, such a solution would no longer have an overarching effect from the 
ecosystem perspective, considering the interdependent layers including both internal 
and external elements. As clouds do not work alone but in tandem with other layers 
i.e. CDNs and broadband access networks, a cloud-specific interoperability solution 
would be incomplete and partial against the cross-layer interdependencies and 
accompanying issues, problems, etc. 
Given this fact, the status quo under EU legal framework, particularly in view of the 
competition law and ECRF rules, do not offer promising and sustainable solutions 
against the cross-layer settings and problems. To emphasize, interoperability-centric 
problems within this framework might undergo a kind of regulatory 
micromanagement. However, this might turn out to be narrow-minded since 
exclusionary practices e.g. a dominant player’s refusal to supply APIs might be 
deemed as abusive under certain ‘exceptional’ circumstances. This rests on the 
presumption of a central and dominant product, usually to be found via market shares, 
whereas centralised market products no longer depict the underlying coopetitive 
relationships. Furthermore, a cloud provider’s relationship with other ICT players in 
the ecosystem context are crucial also in the sense that efficiencies are usually spread 
across the interdependent layers. As these issues i.e. efficiencies, and problems i.e. the 
refusal to supply, need to be analysed within the broader context of interdependencies, 
a wider regulatory lens comprising multi-layered interoperability, would rather be 
followed.            
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7.2. The Internet of Things 
7.2.1. General Overview 
The Internet of Things (IoT) is a natural extension of the internet.789 The Internet of 
Things (IoT) is defined as “A global infrastructure for the information society, 
enabling advanced services by interconnecting physical and virtual things based on 
existing and evolving interoperable information and communications 
technologies”.790 This term denotes a trend whereby myriad devices and sensors 
employ communication services, data exchange and processing towards certain 
results. At the centre of the IoT lies the connected devices or smart objects, including 
cars, refrigerators, health care devices and wearable things such as wrist bands and 
watches, which communicate and exchange data with each other on the basis of end-
to-end connectivity that is ensured by certain protocols and standards. 
Consumer products, durable goods, cars and trucks, industrial and utility components, 
sensors, and other everyday objects are being combined with internet connectivity and 
powerful data analytic capabilities that promise to transform the way we work, live, 
and play.791 The IoT can generate an incredibly powerful breadth of data which can 
then be translated into a product cloud or networked system, out of which users’ 
information is clustered, filtered and managed. Alongside cloud computing, the IoT 
serves as one of the leading technologies that stimulate and transform big data into 
innovative products and new avenues of wealth generation.792   
 
789  Hwang, Fox and Dongarra (n 733) 576. 
790  International Telecommunications Union (ITU), Overview of the Internet of Things (ITU-T 
Y.4000/Y.2060, 2012) <https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-Y.2060-201206-I> accessed 9 October 
2020. 
791  Internet of Things: An Overview (n 154) 4.  
792  The IoT is considered to be the most disruptive technology for industries and business models, and 
is the one having the highest investment amongst others like artificial intelligence, robotics, 3-D 
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Projections for the impact of the IoT on the Internet and economy are impressive, with 
some anticipating as many as 100 billion connected IoT devices and a global economic 
impact of more than $11 trillion by 2025.793 Behind this big transformational impact 
lies the combination of ubiquitous network access, the processing power of 
microchips, miniaturised devices, cloud computing and big data analytics. The IoT 
enables a very broad range of applications – from more efficient agriculture, 
manufacturing, logistics, counterfeit detection, monitoring of people, stock, vehicles, 
equipment and infrastructure, to improved healthcare, retailing traffic management, 
product development and hydrocarbon exploration.794 All these point to a hyper-
connected world of smart devices, applications and value-added services spreading 
across to every corner of our daily lives, as manifested below (See Figure 10).  
 
printing, augmented reality, virtual reality, drones  and blockchains) (Miguel Dias Fernandes, 
‘Internet of Things’ (PwC Partner, 2018) <https://www.pwc.pt/pt/temas-actuais/pwc-
apresentacao-iot.pdf> accessed 9 October 2020. 
793  Internet of Things: An Overview (n 154) 4.  




Figure 10: Proliferation of the IoT services, devices and applications 
Source: Paula Fraga-Lamas, Tiago M. Fernández-Caramés, Manuel Suárez-Albela, Luis Castedo and 
Miguel González-López, ‘A Review of the Internet of Things for Defense and Public Safety’ (2016) 16 
Sensors <https://www.mdpi.com/1424-8220/16/10/1644> accessed 9 October 2020 
Although distinguishable from each other on industrial grounds, each manifestation of 
the IoT has similar building blocks. For a viable IoT model, the stakeholders, from 
manufacturers to application developers, should cooperate in order to match and 
optimise their resources, both technically and commercially. In this regard, in all the 
IoT settings i.e. home appliances, smart cars, wearable devices, smart energy and 
telemedicine, the stakeholders’ software and hardware solutions should speak to each 
other, which echoes IoT interoperability. Below, first the technical and economic 




7.2.2. Technical and economic underpinnings 
The IoT brings out an important degree of efficiencies and innovation based on the 
M2M communications and internet connectivity, ending up with reformation of the 
industries and sectors. Following the invention of ‘computers’ and the ‘internet’, the 
IoT represents the next biggest wave of transformation, along with large-scale 
economic implications. It has driven the creation of new business models as well as 
modernisation of existing businesses, by utilising new software and microprocessors, 
etc, lessening the need for human resources and reducing operational costs.795   
Web 2.0 has changed usage of the WWW by providing more intuitive interfaces for 
user interaction, social networking and the publication of under-generated content, 
without requiring fundamental changes to the design and existing standards of the 
internet.796 Conversely, the IoT, along with other emerging technologies i.e. cloud 
computing, machine learning and AI, is destined to bring a new industrial revolution 
(Web 4.0) together with socio-economic repercussions. At the heart of such 
paradigmatic change lies the IoT connectivity, which takes three forms as follows:   
- One-to-one: An individual product connects to the user, the manufacturer, or 
another product through a port or other interface - for example, when a car is 
hooked up to diagnostic machine. 
- One-to-many: A central system is continuously or intermittently connected to 
many products simultaneously. For example, many Tesla automobiles are 
 
795  For instance, new business models include car and truck rental clubs, whose members can book 
and use vehicles parked around their neighbourhood almost on-demand; or “pay-as-you-drive” 
insurance based on precise driving patterns, behaviour and risk (Brown (n 7) 6-7). 
796  Dieter Uckelmann, Mark Harrison, Florian Michahelles, ‘An Architectural Approach Towards the 
Future Internet of Things’ in Dieter Uckelmann, Mark Harrison and Florian Michahelles (eds), 
Architecting the Internet of Things (Springer 2011) 6. 
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connected to a single manufacturer system that monitors performance and 
accomplishes remote service and upgrades. 
- Many-to-many: Multiple products connect to many other types of products and 
often also to external data sources. An array of types of farm equipment are 
connected to one another, and to geolocation data, to coordinate and optimise the 
farm system. For example, automated tillers inject nitrogen fertiliser at precise 
depths and intervals, and seeders follow, placing corn seeds directly in the 
fertilised soil.797 
The IoT hubs and connections explained above create new product chains, which 
manifest new ecosystems in effect.798 At present, the IoT ecosystems are formed 
around technological innovations focusing on a specific application domain, such as 
RFID solutions in retail, mobile M2M communications in remote automated meter 
reading (AMR), or ZigBee communications in smart home.799 Albeit with nuances 
from business perspectives, these nascent ecosystems reveal similarities in terms of 
architectural aspects, which are detailed below. 
7.2.3. Architectural elements and layers in IoT    
Albeit with the differences pertaining to the industries and sectors, all the IoT settings 
depend on end-to-end connectivity and interoperability enabled by interfaces and 
protocols. That is, in all cases, IoT devices which are embedded to the objects: 
 
797  Michael E. Porter and James E. Heppelmann, ‘How Smart, Connected Products Are Transforming 
Competition’ (2014) Harvard Business Review <https://hbr.org/2014/11/how-smart-connected-
products-are-transforming-competition> accessed 9 October 2020. 
798  See Oleksiy Mazhelis, Eetu Luoma, and Henna Warma, ‘Defining an Internet-of-Things 
Ecosystem’ in S. Andreev, S. Balandin and Y. Koucheryavy (eds), Internet of Things, Smart 
Spaces, and Next Generation Networking (Springer 2012) 2. 
799  Ibid. 
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- should speak to other connected devices; 
- should exchange data streams (instructions) with each other and/or convey 
necessary messages to the service provider, usually via an IP cloud enabling 
data pooling, reporting, analytics; and 
- communicate with the users who aim to control the so-called devices through 
various applications i.e. via tablets, mobile phones or other personalised 
devices. 
For instance, a smart thermostat should have a set of functionalities, according to 
which, it should; 
a) control temperature and humidity, and inform its consumer about the 
temperature changes, 
b) aim to keep a stable temperature in a room, 
c) learn the consumer’s usage pattern and adjust the temperature accordingly, 
d) notice if there are people present in a room, 
e) communicate with the nearby devices and notice if devices that may affect the 
temperature are turned off/on,  
f) be able to be controlled through dedicated remote or wall-mounted controllers, 
as well as through smartphones, tablets or laptops, 
g) show how long a desired temperature is reached, and enable the consumer to 
set the temperature away from home, and 
h) aim to save power and guide the consumer on how to save energy.800 
 
800  Oen (n 65) 7-8. 
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While some of the above functionalities relate to ‘user interfaces’ that enable 
consumers to instruct and get feedback from the thermostat, some others are managed 
from the central cloud system on the part of the IoT service provider - which however 
could partially be distributed and embedded into the devices and applications at the 
edge, to some extent. Also, an IoT device’s interaction, in the given case, a 
thermostat’s, with other IoT devices e.g. moisture sensors and windows, denotes 
another functionality, without which the ultimate benefits could not be fully reaped 
from these technological innovations. 
While the devices and applications are visible to the users, the underlying architecture 
of the IoT systems depends on a widely acknowledged three layers. These 
interdependent layers are classified as (i) perception layer, (ii) network (access) layer 
and (iii) application layer801 as illustrated below.          
 
801  See Vivek Kumar Sehgal, Anubhav Patrick and Lucky Rajpoot, ‘A Comparative Study of the 
Cyber Physical Cloud, Cloud of Sensors and the Internet of Things: Their Ideology, Similarities 
and Differences’ (IEEE International Advance Computing Conference (IACC) 2014) 711-712; 
Elena de la Guía, María D. Lozano and Víctor M. R. Penichet ‘Interacting with Objects in Games 
through RFID Technology’ (2012) Intechopen <https://www.intechopen.com/books/radio-
frequency-identification-from-system-to-applications/interacting-with-objects-in-games-through-




Figure 11: IoT architecture and layers 
Source: De la Guía, Lozano and Penichet (n 801) 330 
The perception layer consists of embedded devices that have sensors aiming to 
recognise, perceive and aggregate the data from the things surrounding them.802 They 
 
802  Today’s sensors can monitor temperature, ambiance, soil makeup, pollution in the air, noise, 
presence of objects or movements, amongst other actuating functionalities and triggered based on 
some sensed information (Mahmoud Elkhodr, Seyed Shahrestani and Hon Cheung ‘The Internet 
of Things: New Interoperability, Management and Security Challenges’ [2016] 8(2) International 
Journal of Network Security & Its Applications 85, 87) These sensors collect varied information 
about the environment, such as mechanical data e.g. position, force and pressure, thermal data e.g. 
temperature and heat flow, electrostatic or magnetic field, radiation intensity e.g. electromagnetic 
and nuclear, chemical data  e.g. humidity, ion and gas concentrations, and biological data e.g. 
toxicity and presence of bio organisms (Swaroop Poudel, ‘Internet of Things: Underlying 
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might interact with peer devices, usually via standardised protocols like Radio 
Frequency Identification (RFID), Near Field Communication (NFC) and Bluetooth, to 
capture related data and comprehend them. This bottom layer takes the sensed data 
and perceives intelligent information, using possible means of energy efficiency i.e. 
low power, low cost.803 The perceived information is carried through the network 
(access) layer, which transfers the relevant data to the end-users, namely their hand-
sets, PCs or tablets. 
The network (access) layer consists of the internet, public or private networks, wired 
or wireless communication and integrated networks for transferring perceived data to 
the application layer, using various communication protocols like LTE, 3G, Wi-Fi, 
Wi-Max, Zigbee etc.804 Along with data transfer, this layer may also perform the tasks 
of data processing, knowledge discovery and data storage with the help of the cloud 
computing environment.805 The data aggregated by the perception layer and processed 
by the network layer is conveyed to the application layer, which is visible to the end-
user. Similar to the internet stack, the application layer resides at the top of the IoT 
architecture. Likewise, it uses the layers below itself as the underlying services. In the 
end, the end-users are communicated to with the apps, usually uploaded in PCs, 
smartphones and tablets, and are given the ‘predictive analysis’ including the 
feedback, suggestions and choices across the real-time scenarios. The figure below 
illustrates the layers that constitute the IoT architecture.   
 
 
Technologies, Interoperability, and Treats to Privacy and Security’ [2016] 31(2) Berkeley 
Technology Law Journal Annual Review 997, 1003). 
803  Sehgal, Patrick and Rajpoot (n 801) 711. 
804  Sehgal, Patrick and Rajpoot (n 801) 711. 




Figure 12: IoT layers (with cloud layer) 
Source: Constructed by the author 
In the context of the IoT, clouds have a fundamental role to play. This particularly 
stems from the need for pooling, processing and analysing the big data on the part of 
the entrepreneurs who aim to invest in the IoT systems. The variety of granular data 
aggregated from smart objects is transmitted, usually through gateways and pooled 
into the clouds which serve as the additional layer and sometimes called the ‘common 
services layer’, to store, process and analyse the data as well as enabling the 
personalised data to be accessed by the end-users. In the case of the thermostat, the 
device transmits data to a cloud database where the data can be used to analyse home 
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energy consumption.806 Further, this cloud connection enables the user to obtain 
remote access to their thermostat via a smartphone or Web interface, and it also 
supports software updates to the thermostat.807 Data management, comprising filtering 
bulk data, translating it into logical clusters and predicting long-term and massively 
applicable results, is essential in the context of the IoT. As this could not be performed 
by any other layer, devices usually offload processing and automation capability to 
cloud-based software.808 Last, but not the least, diverse management tools and 
software in the cloud could enable data transmitted from a variety of sources (IoT 
devices) be filtered and processed through protocol translation. This functionality is 
sometimes being extended to the edge layers, namely devices and/or the gateway that 
serve as the intermediary between the devices and the cloud. For example, the 
SmartThings hub is a stand-alone gateway device that has Z-Wave and Zigbee 
transceivers installed to communicate with both families of devices, namely bridging 
the interoperability gap between the devices before transmission to the cloud.809 
From this viewpoint, edge layering is sometimes compared to cloud layering as both 
would have comparative advantages and disadvantages. Particularly because of 
network latency resulting from location e.g. remote cloud sources, that might affect 
real-time IoT data transmission, more computing power located nearby the end-user 
devices is highlighted, echoed by the term, ‘fog networking’. Not only enabling real-
time data transmission, but also reducing data to a more manageable form, enhancing 
 
806  Internet of Things: An Overview (n 154) 19. 
807  Internet of Things: An Overview (n 154) 19. 
808  Alternatively, a sensor web combines “distributed network” – the sharing of data collected by all 
sensors across the entire network - and “embedded intelligence” - the system acting on its own 
without communicating to an end user or an external control system for analysis and decision-
making (Poudel (n 802) 1007). 
809  Internet of Things: An Overview (n 154) 20. See also Samsung, ‘SmartThings – Featured 
Products’ <https://www.smartthings.com/gb/products> accessed 9 October 2020. 
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reliability and lowering privacy and data security risks from the transmission of 
granular data over the network, are linked to fog networking.810  
While every business model, for several reasons i.e. security, reliability and latency 
depends on various protocols and/or standards, whether with cloud or edge layering, 
the decisions made by the stakeholders ultimately need to take into account the 
interoperability to be achieved along the layers, from the bottom to the top. Discourse 
about such decisions leads to another crossroads with regards to having an ‘open’ or 
‘proprietary’ system. All these parameters make interoperability more puzzling than it 
seems at the outset.       
7.2.4. Interoperability debate in the IoT context  
7.2.4.1. IoT interoperability in general: Overview of different settings 
Interoperability is crucial for the IoT and even more importantly than for other ICT 
systems. This stems from the nature of the distributed network and devices, which 
serve similar to nerves connected to and fed back by the brain, that should allow a 
seamless and uninterrupted flow of data and information from the sensors to the 
platforms, applications and people and vice versa. While this in the first instance 
encompasses the intra-platform data flow and exchanges and could be compared to 
intra-operability, IoT interoperability should be understood broadly and considering 
distinct, proprietary IoT systems and their interoperation. 
In this light, IoT interoperability could be considered both from a narrow and broader 
perspective. Comprising both perspectives, the European Research Cluster on the 
 
810  Poudel (n 802) 1007. 
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Internet of Things defines ‘interoperability’ as “[t]he ability of two or more systems or 
components to exchange data and use information”.811 From the narrow perspective, 
the typical three or four layers of the IoT architecture are considered for 
interoperability. Accordingly, the perception, network and application layers, along 
with the cloud layer, should be able to ‘exchange data and use information’ to bring 
out the intended benefits to the users. From a broader perspective, IoT interoperability 
means a comprehensive outlook comprising both inter-system as well as intra-system 
approaches. That is, not only the components within an IoT ecosystem but also the IoT 
ecosystems themselves need to communicate and exchange data with each other.   
Hence, IoT interoperability entails compatibility of the products and services offered 
by the IoT stakeholders i.e. manufacturers, software developers and sensor/chipset 
suppliers, among each other. This means cross-layer interoperability for and within the 
IoT ecosystems. Thus, should one manufacturer’s devices e.g. lightbulbs, glucose 
meters and thermostats not work and be incompatible with one of the third parties’ 
software e.g. switch and control systems, this means an interoperability gap for the IoT 
ecosystem in question. For instance, interoperability in the market of smart ‘home 
appliances’ means lightbulbs, windows, thermostats and other smart appliances 
speaking to each other, even though they are produced by different manufacturers. 
This could be extended to the broader industrial settings like the ‘connected (smart) 
home’ market which includes not only connected appliances but also automated 
lighting, HVAC (heating, ventilation and air conditioning), entertainment and 
security.812 In the broadest setting, which could be described as a hyper-connected 
 
811  European Research Cluster on the Internet of Things, ‘IoT Semantic Interoperability: Research 
Challenges, Best Practices, Recommendations and Next Steps’ (2015) 9 <http://www.internet-of-
things-research.eu/pdf/IERC_Position_Paper_IoT_Semantic_Interoperability_Final.pdf> 
accessed 9 October 2020. 
812  Porter and Heppelmann (n 797). 
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marketplace, smart homes and the integrated devices, appliances, etc. are supposed to 
be interoperable with the smart cars, smart city components etc. Given this fact, IoT 
interoperability could be compared to the progressive industrial circles such as 
enlarging and overlapping loops manifested below. 
 
 
Figure 13: IoT loops showing different industrial settings 
Source: Constructed by the author  
While it is possible for smart applications e.g. RFID to be built on close-loop 
processes, namely monolithic business information systems, the conception of the IoT 
is principally and increasingly based on the idea of end-to-end connectivity in an 
‘anytime, anywhere’ fashion, calling for open, scalable, secure, and standardised 
infrastructure.813 Hence, the call for interoperability starts with the close-loop 
processes e.g. in  the ‘home appliances’ setting and is augmented with the conception 
of ‘smart home’ and widened towards ‘smart city’. For these concepts to come true, 
there should be a fulfilling response to the need for multi-layered interoperability. 
Notably, along the transition from the smallest circle to the bigger ones, 
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‘interoperability’ becomes more compelling across the uses’ needs, which are destined 
to push the boundaries of societal life as opposed to having a direct impact just over 
individuals.       
As implied above, these expansive IoT spheres come about with a complexity along 
with a pressing need for interoperability. As with the two previous IT waves of 
computers and the internet, the difficulties, skills, time, and costs involved in building 
the entire technology stack for smart, connected products is formidable and leads to 
specialisation at each layer.814 Just like Medtronic glucose meters, Philips lightbulbs 
and Tesla smart cars being specialised in their own fields of manufacturing, Intel has 
specialisation in the production of microprocessors, Oracle in databases and Cisco in 
underlying hardware. 
Thus, it is apparent that every stakeholder in the IoT settings and ecosystems have 
more unique and distributed roles to play, with the view to maximise the profits to be 
reaped from their attempted actions. While striving for a more competitive advantage 
and further commercial frontiers, cooperation as well as competition among the 
stakeholders becomes of more importance, particularly from the ecosystem 
perspective. Along the same lines, the need for interoperability points to a crucial and 
multi-faceted aspect of all the IoT settings.  
7.2.4.2. Interoperability in the IoT ecosystems   
Architectural elements and layers of the IoT systems constitute the gateways for the 
IoT players, specifically from the interoperability perspective. For a successful and 
 
814  Porter and Heppelmann (n 797). 
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thriving IoT ecosystem, all the constituent layers and elements should interoperate 
with each other. Otherwise, competitors would face entry barriers because of the lack 
of interoperability and the technologically erected walls. In an effort to generate 
network efficiencies, some IoT products are designed to be interoperable with other 
devices used in a particular location e.g. home, office, and with factory control panels 
that interact with multiple products used for distinct applications, and use standard data 
formats to facilitate aggregation into databases for analysis.815 
On the other hand, dominant IoT service providers and manufacturers tend to build up 
a proprietary ecosystem by closing off the so-called gateways to third parties, so as to 
maximise the profits to be reaped from an installed consumer base and their aggregated 
data. As recently identified by the European project Unify-IoT, there are more than 
300 IoT platforms in the marketplace, among which Amazon (AWS), Cisco (Jasper), 
IBM (Watson), Apple (HomeKit), Google (Brillo), Microsoft (Azure), and Qualcomm 
(AllJoyn) represent the forerunners.816 Each of these service or platform providers 
promotes its own IoT infrastructure, proprietary protocols and interfaces, incompatible 
standards, formats, and semantics which creates closed ecosystems or truly speaking 
‘walled gardens’, sometimes called ‘stove pipes’ or ‘silos’.817  
Commercial strategies to increase the consumer loyalty, along with featured brands 
based on network effects, would effectively drive the leading companies to pursue a 
closed approach, although a trade-off is always at stake because of the potential data 
 
815  Wrobel (n 252) 63. The potential for network effects may be more apparent in some IoT products; 
for example, traffic monitoring systems may benefit all users by generating real-time data for 
drivers, or eventually for driverless vehicles, and the benefits of these systems may grow as more 
vehicles are equipped with sensors, etc. (Wrobel (n 252) 63-64). 
816  Mahda Noural, Mohammed Atiquzzaman and Martin Gaedke, ‘Interoperability in Internet of 
Things: Taxonomies and Open Challenges’ [2019] 24 Mobile Networks and Applications 796, 
796.  
817  Ibid. 
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to be included into the IoT value proposition.818 Restrictions over the disclosure of 
APIs would as well result from the security and privacy concerns across the expansive 
chains of data aggregation.819 The data streams and user specificity afforded by IoT 
devices can unlock incredible and unique value to IoT users, but concerns about 
security and privacy might hold back the IoT service providers from adopting an 
interoperable and/or open approach.820 
From this point of view, the degree of interoperability has significant implications for 
the third parties e.g. software and application developers, in terms of having a 
restricted or open playing field. This playing field would get narrower or broader with 
the integration of additional layers i.e. intermediary layers into the IoT ecosystems. 
Sometimes, the addition of one layer would facilitate conversion of the non-native 
protocols into native ones that are applicable to the relevant IoT system. Yet it could 
end up as another wall by which third parties are excluded from the ecosystem. For 
instance, while full integration of a cloud platform into an IoT ecosystem would 
usually help bridge the interoperability gap as well as gathering data, this might have 
adverse effects when the IoT ecosystem creates network effects along with a walled 
garden structure. Last but not least, building up an IoT ecosystem also involves other 
 
818  In many public projects, the idea of embracing more software developers leads the IoT ecosystem 
to build on a non-proprietary and open source project. This is illustrated by the European 
CityService Development Kit (CitySDK) Project, which lets programmers write software that can 
access data and share IoT services via open APIs, to improve transportation, help report problems 
to the city council and guide tourists around places of interest (Brown (n 7) 18). 
819  Internet of Things: An Overview (n 154) 32. There would be many harms sourced from the poorly 
secured IoT devices, including; (i) serving as entry points for cyberattacks by allowing malicious 
individuals to re-program a device or cause it to malfunction, (ii) exposing user data to theft by 
leaving data streams inadequately protected, and (iii) creating security vulnerabilities (Ibid). 
Privacy arises as a sensitive issue in the IoT context, considering smart phones and apps that allow 
the flow of a significant amount of personal data. Researchers have found that smartphone sensor 
data can be used to infer information about users’ personality types, demographics and health 
factors, such as moods, stress levels, smoking habits, exercise levels and physical activity – even 
the onset of illnesses such as Parkinson’s disease and bipolar disorder (Brown (n 7) 27). 
820  See Internet of Things: An Overview (n 154) 6. 
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concerns i.e. privacy, security, velocity and efficiency creating multidimensional 
consequences, which would compromise interoperability. Hence, these concerns are 
potentially augmented when moving from an intra-system setting to an inter-system 
one, along with more complicated trade-offs, as detailed below. 
7.2.4.3. Analysis of interoperability related problems from the ecosystem 
perspective  
While the analysis above suggests that interoperability reflects one of the main threads 
of the emergent IoT ecosystems, an in-depth look into the ecosystem relationships 
would be useful to clearly understand the IoT interoperability from a broader 
perspective. As a starting point, it should be remembered that while an ecosystem 
builds on adaptive and dynamic relationships between the players, interoperability 
requires more technical and crystallised solutions, like standards. As the need and user 
expectations for ubiquity, latency, velocity, scalability, etc. change across the industry 
settings, a diversification process prevails as to the standards applied to different IoT 
settings. For example, while the environmental sensors use ZigBee based on IEEE 
802.15.4 standard, IoT devices such as Smart TV, printers, air conditioners support 
traditional ubiquitous Wi-Fi technologies and 3G/4G cellular communications.821 On 
the other hand, most recent IoT medical devices are based on ANT+ standard, while 
other wearable devices mostly support Bluetooth SMART and NFC.822 This 
diversified nature of the IoT solutions and standards823 causes a fragmented structure 
in terms of interoperability.  
 
821  Noural, Atiquzzaman and Gaedke (n 827) 798. 
822  Noural, Atiquzzaman and Gaedke (n 827) 798. 
823  It should also be noted that some of the IoT standards originate from broadcasting technologies, 
whereas some others are based on cellular (mobile) technologies. Under the first category exists 
the wireless standards for low-frequency, short-range and low-data transmission, such as ZigBee, 
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In conjunction with this fact, walled garden or proprietary systems are often preferred 
by the service providers, which limits the interoperability to only those devices and 
components within the brand product life.824 In the end, interoperability is usually 
compromised along with lock-in problems, although IoT stakeholders might tend to 
boast much more data across an enlarged set of devices and applications. This dilemma 
brings out a hard-to-solve trade-off problem between interoperability and innovation 
across the distinct IoT solutions. In the short term, it is therefore hard to imagine a 
hyperconnected marketplace against the trade-offs that entails potentially harmed 
interoperability. Against this background, demystifying the potential problems, 
particularly vendor lock-in, across the layers would be useful to understand the holistic 
picture. 
Starting from the bottom, the perception layer consists of numerous sensors attached 
to the IoT devices and running on the basis of numerous standard protocols, e.g. 
ZigBee, Z-Wave, ZigBee, WirelessHart or non-standard proprietary ones e.g. LoRa, 
Sigfox. As the standards adopted by the IoT providers are so diverse and have not 
ended up with a de facto one, interoperability solutions at this layer are fragmented. 
To illustrate, a lightbulb would not transmit data streams to the devices surrounding it 
e.g. windows, thermostat, etc., if they are based and run on different wireless standards. 
As the industrial developments manifest, a dominant supplier would opt to create a 
walled garden comprising a brand of family products which exchange data via the 
same protocol. The result then would be an outcome of vendor lock-in with the 
potential finding for abuse of dominance i.e. under ‘exceptional circumstances’.825 
 
Z-Wave, Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, NFC and Lower-Power Wide Area Networks; while the mobile (3G, 
4G) communication standards are comprised within the second category. 
824  Internet of Things: An Overview (n 154) 47. 
825  On the other hand, such a finding would require proven harms that would occur in the presence of 
exceptional circumstances as well as a dominant player’s refusal to supply the APIs which is 
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This is particularly relevant at the perception layer, as low-power transmission 
protocols are so diverse and even non-standardised on a truly common basis.  
At the access (network) layer, broadband access networks most often serve as the mere 
conduit for data transmission, which reduces the risk of vendor lock-in. The IoT 
systems and applications are run on fixed and wireless networks which serve end-to-
end connectivity. Cellular networks and standards e.g. GSM, UMTS and LTE, have 
an increasing share in the IoT ecosystems, considering the potential of mobile handsets 
and packages for the consumers. As 5G networks are much more promising for the 
IoT than its predecessors i.e. GSM, 3G and  4G, the deployment of 5G networks is 
expected to bring out significant benefits for wireless communications, such as high 
bandwidth, increased efficiency and less latency and have a positive impact on IoT 
applications.826 At this layer, common standards dissipate issues of interoperability, 
while other switching-related problems i.e. based on the remote configurability of 
SIMs, would prevail, risking the users being locked into their mobile carriers.  
As a matter of fact, problems surrounding the configurability of SIMs is an issue that 
not only creates the risk of vendor lock-in but also threatens the viability of the IoT on 
the 5G platforms. If the IoT/M2M companies and users running on 4G/5G networks 
are not able to transfer the SIMs, installed in their manufactured devices, from one 
mobile network to another, they would get locked to one mobile operator. A solution 
based on assignment of MNCs – as envisaged under the EECC – would give 
 
indispensable for the competition on the relevant market. See the section ‘5.3.1.3. Refusal to 
license/supply interoperability information’. 
826  By means of 5G networks, not only seamless low-power IoT communication with much more 
reduced risk of interference, but also moving analytics closer to IoT edge devices would be enabled 
(Brown (n 7) 15). Regarding the key features in 5G that will benefit the IoT, see also Vikrant 
Gandhi, ‘5G to become the catalyst for innovation in the IoT’ (Network World, 13 April 2018), 
<https://www.networkworld.com/article/3268668/internet-of-things/5g-to-become-the-catalyst-
for-innovation-in-iot.html> accessed 9 October 2020. 
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meaningful results; yet this needs to be checked for the presumably unforeseen 
implications.827 While there are other industrial solutions i.e. OTA provisioning of 
numbering resources, to deal with this switching problem,828 such solutions require 
industry-wide memorandum of understanding.829 
When going up, namely from the access layer to the cloud and application layers, new 
players come on to the scene alongside the IoT manufacturers, service providers and 
network operators. Usually, the IoT manufacturers and service providers purchase 
service from the cloud firms and software developers, which respectively operate in 
the cloud and application layers. Vendor lock-in risk is high at these layers because of 
the highly dependent nature of the IoT systems on the clouds and applications. 
In the case IoT applications are developed and run by a company as to interoperate 
with the underlying platform, cloud or device, IoT users would get locked into the 
featured/supported apps or software. For instance, an IoT health application connected 
to an only one or two platforms would not be capable of monitoring and conveying 
health related data e.g. glucose level, heart rate across other platforms, which will 
otherwise serve locating the person and sending an ambulance to him or her. In such 
 
827  In that case, MNCs are supposed to be controlled either by the connectivity provider (network 
operator) or IoT service provider. EECC envisages the latter as well as the former being able to be 
designated as ECS provider. Yet, this would bring about new rights and obligations to be imposed 
on such undertakings under ECRF. See the section ‘6.2.2.2.2. M2M transmission services’.  
828  OTA provisioning is envisaged as one of the regulatory measures to be invoked by the NRAs 
under certain conditions (See the section ‘6.2.2.2.2. M2M Transmission Services’). 
829  See the BEREC Report (n 31) 30-31. If an IoT user wants to make a change using OTA 
provisioning, it will always depend on the cooperation of mobile operators and it will certainly not 
be instantaneous for all devices, in part because it takes time to update devices, and because not 
all devices will be on at all times (OECD (n 717) 43–44). In addition, there is limited space on a 
SIM card and mobile operators do not want to reserve numbers for potential customers; so for 
customers that are roaming occasionally, the device may not be able to select a less expensive 
local offer, because the credentials have not been updated (OECD (n 717) 44). In the light of these 
information, key success factors for IoT switching process lie at the EU-wide application of a 
sound policy choice as well as enabling ‘permanent roaming’, which, however, are not reflected 
fully under the ECRF (See Unver (n 30) 111). 
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cases, unless users purchase and pay for a new IoT product/device, e.g. glucose meter, 
which is interoperable with the particularly chosen apps, they could not switch easily 
from one IoT platform/service provider to another because of such technical 
constraints. Lack of interoperability based on application layer would result in 
technical restrictions that potentially lead up to walled gardens in contrast to self-
regulatory ecosystems.  
Lack of interoperability could also be seen at the cloud (platform) layer, originating 
from implementation of diverse OSs, software architectures, data structures, 
programming languages, etc. There are currently many different OSs developed 
specifically for IoT devices such as Contiki, RIOT9, TinyOS and OpenWSN, each 
with several versions, to deliver services to users.830 For example, Apple HomeKit 
supports its own open source language Swift, Google Brillo uses Weave, and Amazon 
AWS IoT offers SDKs for embedded C and NodeJS.831 This fragmentation often 
results in a barrier that needs to be surmounted for the application/software providers 
in order to develop cross-platform IoT apps. A scenario would be in the case a smart 
city application, e.g. serving to find the closest grocery, recent movies, etc., would not 
exchange their users’ saved data and/or communicate with other apps, e.g. to make an 
order or booking with already chosen places, after one particular IoT platform has been 
opted for. This situation featured at the platform layer, whether resulting from a 
platform native language or data structure/formats, would cause or facilitate silo type 
IoT supply structures along with legal, economic and social costs for the society.  
 
830  Noural, Atiquzzaman and Gaedke (n 827) 799. 
831  Noural, Atiquzzaman and Gaedke (n 827) 799. 
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Walled gardens would be induced by motivations of profit maximisation e.g. out of 
network effects or purely quality and/or security concerns tracing back to the trade-
offs mentioned above. While every case needs to be analysed based on their 
characteristic features, fragility of each layer and accompanying interoperability gaps 
across the IoT settings would turn into unsolvable legal problems and irreparable 
harms in the absence of intensive and vivid coopetition which usually echoes with self-
regulatory ecosystems. 
7.2.5. Analysis of the IoT settings under the EU legal framework 
IoT interoperability, as the analysis above suggests, denotes an issue that could not be 
isolated from neighbouring issues and problems, whether relating to IPRs, competition 
law or sector-specific rules. On the one hand, a great many channels of collaboration 
and competition among the IoT players would result from the emergent complexity 
out of IoT ecosystems. On the other hand, industry stakeholders that invest in cutting-
edge technologies e.g. AI, machine learning and 3D printing, also deploy some of their 
resources into the IoT, aiming at advanced big data management including data 
gathering, processing and analysing, as well as modernising their operations.       
As the IoT products gain favour, an important focus of market analysis will be whether 
a product generates direct or indirect network effects, and if so whether these effects 
promote and thereby explain consolidation that may occur in markets for these 
products.832 Either network effects, or the potential efficiency increases may not be 
attributed to the IoT itself but to the overall ecosystem that it works in. Crucially, the 
interdependencies between the layers which underlie the IoT ecosystems have a key 
 
832  Wrobel (n 252) 64. 
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role in defining the competitive relationships across the layers and their players. The 
more determinant such interdependencies are, the less significant and reliable the 
market definition and accompanying remedies would be.833 Not only the complexity 
of the ICT interdependencies but also the efficiencies cutting across the layers - 
sometimes creating ecosystems – make the market definition an enormously difficult 
and painstaking exercise.834 This also means less justified regulatory interventions 
from the perspective of either EU competition law or ECRF rules.              
On the other hand, the prevalence of walled garden type IoT supply structures would 
affect the cross-layer relationships and diminish the very nature of the ecosystem that 
is normally built upon coopetition between the interdependent players across the 
technological layers. In the case of high number of vertically integrated IoT supply 
structures, walled gardens that are reminiscent of old type silos would not be dismissed 
at all. This focal point which directly affects the ecosystem characteristics needs to be 
taken into utmost account across all the industrial settings i.e. from the ‘home 
appliances’ to the ‘smart city’.  
From this viewpoint, many IoT settings, within their current forms, would not match 
an ‘ecosystem’, marking a contrast to many of the cloud computing settings. In fact, 
cloud computing often serves as the bottleneck and utility type facility for the many 
 
833  The IoT component could be considered a significant yet complementary service, for the 
mainstream services e.g. industrial products to be manufactured and offered more effectively and 
for less cost. However, as time passes with emerging needs and expectations, the IoT-based 
services would be regarded as stand-alone products creating their own market. For now, it would 
be speculative to draw definite boundaries regarding IoT-enabled services and products because 
of the emerging market features. See supra notes 422-423. 
834  For instance, wrist bands or tech shirts would create separate markets for many customers would 
opt for buying such products against SSNIP towards certain aims e.g. following up the calories 
burnt, the distance covered, movement intensity, heart rate. On the other hand, many other IoT 
products such as smart TVs that compete with non-smart LCD or Plasma TVs that do not have 
enhanced features e.g. user interaction on internet could be covered within the same market.  
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other services, including the IoT. The IoT depends on the clouds, which offer common 
or middleware services e.g. provision of platform, databases and OSs for the third 
parties, including the IoT service providers. Clouds therefore play an intermediary role 
between the third parties and bridge the interoperability gap between them i.e. through 
protocol translation. On the other hand, most IoT systems, when considered with the 
underlying standards and IPR-based restrictions, would not create or subsist within an 
ecosystem, while sustaining a multi-layered basis.  
Notably, stakeholders’ efforts to push their standards in the IoT environments, 
particularly in the low-power wireless domain,835 lead to a puzzled picture in terms of 
IPRs e.g. SEPs and interoperability relationships.836 While a number of open source 
initiatives e.g. AllSeen Alliance, AVnu Alliance (AVB/TSN), Open Connectivity 
Foundation (OCF) and the Hypercat Consortium prevail and contribute to the IoT 
standardisation, the fragmentation is remarkable because of the lack of coordination 
and collaboration between them.837 It should also be noted that such standardisation 
efforts lag behind the individual market forces based on the proprietary systems e.g. 
Google’s Home, Amazon’s Alexa and Samsung’s SmartThings, that are being 
commercialised and marketed very fast. IPR portfolios, along with the absent common 
 
835  See Elkhodr, Shahrestani and Cheung (n 802) 87; Stephanie Sharron and Nikita Tuckett, ‘The 
Internet of Things: Evaluating the Interplay of Interoperability, Industry Standards and Related IP 
Licensing Approaches’ [2016] The Licensing Journal 8, 10.  
836  Stakeholders’ power struggles over the standards that are applicable to the IoT environment 
effectively supersede the emergence of a common interoperability-enabling standard under SSOs, 
consortia, etc. Crucially, while companies might be willing to participate in standard-setting 
activities by disclosing and openly licensing their entire range of intellectual property, the tools 
deployed within the context of SSOs to promote that behaviour are currently limited, as they are 
generally focused on a small set of IPRs, or on a limited notion of interoperability (Zingales (n 62) 
29). 
837  Going through a collaboration, the OCF and AllSeen Alliance merged under the former’s (OCF) 
name and bylaws in October 2016 (See Open Connectivity Foundation, 10 October 2016 
<https://openconnectivity.org/announcements/allseen-alliance-merges-open-connectivity-
foundation-accelerate-internet-things> accessed 9 October 2020). While this exceptional merger 
is appraisable for many potential benefits including interoperability, whether or to what extent 
such benefits are to be passed on across the IoT industry is questionable. 
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standards, often affect the interoperability among the IoT systems. As 
interdependencies and underlying coopetition do not characterise such IoT settings, 
the lack or insufficiency of interoperability is able to threaten IoT competition and 
innovation in these settings. In such cases, regulatory/competition law interventions 
would be responded to cure the accompanying problems such as vendor lock-in or 
switching costs.838 
However, no one can exclude the possibility that an IoT setting can turn into an 
ecosystem structure. From the ecosystem perspective, would-be problems are 
supposed to be solved within the self-regulatory structure of the ecosystem.839 This 
presumption potentially leads up to the conclusion that it is more appropriate to adopt 
light-touch regulation and/or principles-based regulation for the ecosystems.840 
However, given the above analysis, a cautious and more robust approach would need 
to be followed within the fragility of the IoT settings. Hence, a regulatory approach 
ideally comprising ecosystem and non-ecosystem settings would rather be adopted. 
While ecosystems represent the widest supply structure of all, other structures e.g. 
narrow IoT settings and cloud environments also need to be embodied by any policy 
approach and would-be regulatory model. 
  
 
838  Notwithstanding, such interventions need to follow and build on ascertained conditions and 
circumstances. These pre-requisites, unravelling the loopholes as to each body of law as described 
above, demonstrate neither competition law nor ECRF remedies sufficiently cope with the 
interoperability problems. 
839  Cowen and Gawer (n 739) 49. 






8. Conclusion: Building up the appropriate policy approach and regulatory 
model  
8.1. Summary of the findings 
8.1.1. Assessment of the EU legal framework 
Interoperability is crucial for running ICT networks and services. It constitutes one of 
the threads for meeting the ICT-inclusive needs of society. It is remarkable that all the 
relevant disciplines i.e. IPR, competition and sector-specific rules in EU law have 
adopted interoperability-centric principles, although each body of law has distinctive 
goals, principles and instruments. Interoperability is attributed significant meanings 
and roles under these legal disciplines, albeit with different results and implications. 
From the IPR point of view, the debate revolves around whether and to what extent 
interoperability between the software systems needs to be considered as an exemption 
to the protected subject matter at stake. For instance, whether the interfaces of ICT 
services and products that are distributed in object codes should be covered by 
copyright protection is currently the most debated question in the copyright context. 
With regards to not only the copyrights, but also the patents, trade secrets and database 
rights underlying the ICTs, it is not unequivocally set out under the EU law as to the 
extent to what interoperability is warranted as a secure ground or given right for the 
third-party access seekers. 
The unclear boundaries of interoperability-based exceptional rights is a common 
concern in the academic scholarship, as over-protection of IPRs incorporating the 
interfaces is acknowledged to result in unpredictable or disproportionate impacts 
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regarding new entries to the marketplace, innovation and information flows. In 
practice, IPRs are spread across the ICTs, with a view to create a shield against third-
party access to the underlying software, including the interface specifications. This 
situation however aggravates the concerns based on the vendor lock-in, particularly 
when the rights holder has a dominant position in the relevant market(s) and is able to 
heighten the switching costs for the consumers and prevent third parties from creating 
derivative products. These concerns go beyond the permissibility of interoperability 
for ICT products and services i.e. software and hardware, and reach out to the 
informational barriers and cultural productions, and ultimately to participatory 
democracy.841  
As the IPR-based rules are not designed to and primarily aimed at, dealing with lock-
in and accompanying anti-competitive conducts, EU policy makers have thus far 
preferred to invoke competition law in the relevant cases. Not only technologically, 
but also on the contractual basis, the possibility of customers being locked into a 
dominant product is usually not welcomed by the EU competition rules, which are 
designed to keep the markets effectively competitive and to increase consumer 
welfare. 
Even in the markets which are subject to sector-specific or IPR-based measures i.e. 
copyright exemptions based on reverse engineering, EU competition law rules have an 
overriding effect and applicability should a breach of competition rules take place. 
Being not limited to the software-to-software compatibility, any market failure that 
needs to be solved across concentrative actions e.g. M&As and joint ventures, 
 
841  See the section ‘3.1.2. Main concerns surrounding lack of interoperability’.  
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coordinative undertakings e.g. agreements and concerted actions, and unilateral 
behaviours e.g. abuse of dominance, falls within the scope of EU competition law. 
Notwithstanding, EU competition law rules and remedies reveal several shortcomings, 
which need to be underlined. Firstly, high thresholds e.g. dominant position and 
uneven pre-requisites e.g. exceptional circumstances, are sought for the 
implementation of EU competition law. Secondly, while EU case law lays out a firm 
policy in favour of interoperability and effective competition, the enforcement 
procedures entail a lengthy process to be confronted by the related parties. The 
Microsoft case illustrates such an unbearably long process of enforcement, which 
lasted for nearly a decade subsequent to the Commission’s decision.842 While able to 
produce an interoperability-enabling and competitive result, such a lengthy process 
would not be sustainable, particularly in view of the deprived societal benefits, would-
be closed market(s) and further implications based on the affected information flows.   
Against this background regarding the limitations of EU IPR and competition law 
rules, the ECRF needs to be fleshed out as another source of law for enabling ICT 
interoperability. The ECRF means a regulatory framework under which 
interoperability is featured as a core value and a principle, particularly to ensure end-
to-end connectivity. Ex-ante tools of the ECRF partially respond to the problems 
unsolved by the EU competition rules, sometimes going beyond the ‘consumer 
welfare’ standard by not seeking a likely consumer harm and protecting the consumers 
regardless of the demand and supply parameters in the marketplace. While 
interoperability is also covered within the dominance-based rules of the ECRF e.g. the 
 
842  See the section ‘5.5. Assessment of EU competition law’. 
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SMP regime, this is subordinated to its consumer-oriented and end-to-end connectivity 
based approach. 
The interconnection policy of the ECRF illustrates this regulatory mind-set. In fact, 
while the SMP (dominant) players are obliged by the NRAs’ market analyses to 
provide interconnection e.g. call termination and origination through their networks, 
similar obligations comprising interoperability might also be imposed on non-SMP 
players under certain conditions e.g. when end-to-end connectivity is at stake. 
Likewise, according to the CAS obligation covered by the ECRF, interoperability 
between the CAS provider and broadcaster needs to be secured when the content 
transmission is to take place via the former’s conditional access system e.g. set-top 
box. Considering that consumers’ access to their intended content is crucial for media 
plurality and cultural diversity, the ECRF mandates access to and interoperability with 
the underlying technological platforms, without regard to any potential competition 
problem. Similarly, EU net neutrality regulations comprise all of the ISPs, regardless 
of their market power or any potential anti-competitive behaviour, considering the 
‘gatekeeping’ functionalities that could emerge.843 Having said that, although a great 
many concerns are well responded to within the context of the ECRF, the regulatory 
tools and instruments in it are of a non-holistic and disaggregated structure.  
 
843  According to EU Regulation 2015/2120, all ISPs are required to “treat all traffic equally, when 
providing internet access services, without discrimination, restriction or interference, and 
irrespective of the sender and receiver, the content accessed or distributed, the applications or 
services used or provided, or the terminal equipment used” (Regulation (EU) 2015/2120 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015 laying down measures concerning 
open internet access and amending Directive 2002/22/EC on universal service and users’ rights 
relating to electronic communications networks and services and Regulation (EU) No 531/2012 
on roaming on public mobile communications networks within the Union (‘EU Net Neutrality 
Regulation’) art 3(3/1).    
 
319 
Primarily speaking, the ECRF has a legacy aim of removing the monopolies and 
regulating the infrastructural elements of ICT services. While the broadly designated 
policy objectives844 warrant a wide range of regulatory means, NRAs are bound up 
with certain boundaries, primarily based on the ‘transmission’ and ‘content’ 
distinction. Focusing on the former, the ECRF allows NRAs to intervene in not every 
case of ICTs, but those related to the ECSs and not entailing IP-based data transmission 
and interconnection, nor covering many upper layer services – apart from certain 
exceptions e.g. number-based ICSs for consumer-protection reasons. Hence, an access 
or interoperability problem occurring in the domain of other ICT services than ECSs 
falls within the remit of EU competition law, but not the ECRF, principally. 
At this point, it needs to be emphasized that electronic communications networks and 
services representing the lower layer ICT services, may not be the source of the 
problem e.g. market failure or informational barrier, in every case. Other ICT services 
could equally be the cause of the related problems surrounding lack of interoperability. 
Thus, it is criticisable to leave out some ICT cases following the legacy viewpoint of 
the ECRF.  
The lack of interoperability does not automatically pose a threat by itself and all the 
ICT layers and services do not have to be regulated a priori. Nevertheless, regulators 
should be aware of the need to consider all the ICT layers and the interdependencies 
among such layers. While the interdependencies across the layers, particularly in an 
ecosystem environment, might reduce or eliminate the need to regulate 
interoperability,845 the legacy mind-set and remit of the regulations i.e. ECRF needs 
 
844  EECC Directive, art 3(2).  
845  See Cowen and Gawer (n 739) 49. 
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to be checked out in any case. Before elaborating the possible ways to revise this remit 
and concerning how to advance an appropriate regulatory model, findings from the 
case studies firstly need to be taken into consideration.   
8.1.2. Assessment through the lens of case studies    
As emphasised above, from the interoperability perspective, EU-based solutions have 
shortcomings in terms of completeness and coherency. The pertinent rules of the EU 
legal framework fall far from being fully responsive and effective against the lack of 
interoperability and accompanying problems across the ICT layers. To evaluate the 
multi-layered aspects of ICT interoperability and delve into policy elaboration, along 
with an appropriate, holistic regulatory design in the end, cloud computing and the IoT 
have been examined as the case studies of this thesis. The case studies, having both 
explanatory and exploratory nature for technical and economic assessment of such 
layers, have led to important findings on how to restructure regulatory pillars in a 
holistic way.   
Cloud computing denotes an environment whereby a great many stakeholders e.g. 
software developers, security firms, virtualisation companies and network operators, 
collaborate and/or compete. Under the management and coordination of the cloud 
provider, cloud computing services, which include hosting, processing and updating 
relevant software and data, are offered to the users. While cloud architectures rely on 
three components, or internal elements, consisting of ‘infrastructure’, ‘platform’ and 
‘application’ layers, this tripartite structure expands with the underlying external 
elements, namely content delivery and broadband access networks, which constitute 
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the ‘access’ layer.846 When considered with these external elements, cloud computing 
architectures most often turn into ecosystems, which inhabit players i.e. ISPs, CDNs, 
CPs, coopeting with each other via their respective strategies and means.847 This 
transition from the cloud ‘environment’ to the cloud ‘ecosystem’ provides us with an 
in-depth outlook, allowing us to revitalise the interoperability debate. 
Primarily, the interdependencies within the cloud settings of the ‘environment’ and 
‘ecosystem’ have different breadths. While in the cloud environment interoperability 
is limited to the interlinks between the ‘infrastructure’, ‘platform’ and ‘application’ 
layers being governed by the cloud provider, such interlinks expand and deepen in the 
cloud ecosystem. In the ecosystem setting, the volume and intensity of the 
interdependencies culminate in the ‘coopetition’ among the players, namely cloud 
providers, the CDNs, ISPs and CPs. This ‘coopetition’ minimizes the need to regulate 
interoperability gaps as they are being governed and filled through the cross-layer, 
even sometimes ‘symbiotic’, relationships. 
This does not mean ecosystem-wide ‘openness’, as opposed to the proprietary systems, 
but rather it denotes the self-sustainability based on the interoperability channels 
neutralizing the effect of walled gardens.848 This situation is comparable to 
‘contestable’ markets, which are depicted by low barriers to entry and exit along with 
 
846  See the section ‘7.1.2.2. Cloud ecosystem with external elements’. 
847  Notably, the term ‘ecosystem’ is used with differing meanings and purposes e.g. describing a 
plethora of software apps surrounding a ‘platform’ – platform ecosystem, within the literature. 
While having some overlaps with such definitions, the approach used in this study entails 
‘coopetition’ in itself as the core component. According to this approach, ‘complementarity’ and 
‘substitution’ are not as influential as ‘coopetition’ which come about with the interdependencies 
of the ecosystem players (See the section ‘7.1.3.2. Interoperability in the cloud ecosystem’). 
848  Within the context of those channels, should be noted the industry-led findings and solutions to 
achieve interoperability, whether based on standardisation e.g. NIST’s effort to create vendor-
agnostic technologies, or architectural solutions e.g. microservices, containers. See Sandeep 
Shilawat, ‘Cloud Interoperability and Portability’ (Forbes, 22 June 2018) 
<https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2018/06/22/cloud-interoperability-and-
portability/#5512c41f4577> accessed 9 October 2020. See also Unver (n 27) 164. 
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short-term prices and price-sensitive consumers.849 Across such a potential for 
competition e.g. when switching is easy and fast, lack of interoperability no longer has 
the effects of preventing new entries and/or innovation. However, in such situations, 
competition dynamics shift from the market or platform level to the ecosystem level, 
whereby no classic “silos” could survive without a competitive threat across the layers. 
What is more, not only competitive but also co-operative relationships exist at the same 
time, heightening the difficulty to designate the boundaries for any ICT market.   
In this broader setting of a cloud ecosystem, crystallising a lack of interoperability 
based on a one or two-sided market relationship, would mean isolating a problem from 
a narrow-minded perspective with potentially negative implications for the cloud users 
e.g. by chilling innovation and affecting competitive equilibrium(s). Most potential 
efficiencies that are engendered by the cloud-based competition and innovation and 
would emerge in the larger industry settings e.g. ecosystems would also be dismissed 
in the case of smaller scale definitions e.g. based on a market or platform.850 
The IoT, similarly, entails various settings and different organisational supply 
structures based on several layers and components. IoT systems, while having unique 
architectural elements, including devices, sensors, microprocessors, etc., depend on 
clouds and broadband access networks, which all constitute interdependent layers 
underlying IoT applications and services. Constituent IoT elements are widely 
acknowledged to comprise the ‘perception’, ‘access (network)’ and ‘application’ 
 
849  Alberro and Shcwabe (n 155). 
850  The limitedness of the market-based approach across the efficiencies and interdependencies could 
also be caught from the Microsoft decision. While the Microsoft-formulated ‘incentives balancing 
test’ has not been applied fully in the Microsoft finding, the Commission’s reference to ‘the level 
of innovation of the whole industry’ instead of market-wide innovation remarkably hints on the 
limits of the market-based approach. See also supra note 506.  
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layers, albeit with absent classifications for the internal or external elements.851 These 
layers represent not only the technological components interlinked by the interfaces 
but also the value chains demarcated by the economic activities of the IoT players e.g. 
IoT platform/service provider, connectivity provider and software/apps developer. The 
IoT layers comprising wireless LANs (WLANs) and broadband access networks and 
clouds that serve as the middleware layer for the IoT service provisioning, interact 
with each other creating the cross-layer interdependencies. As a result of such 
interdependencies, an ecosystem setting would emerge insofar as they build on the 
coopetition between the IoT players. 
From this point of view, IoT settings resemble the cloud’s ‘environment’ and 
‘ecosystem’ settings in terms of the cross-layer interdependencies, which potentially 
refashion the competition and innovation dynamics. However, differing from the 
clouds, IoT systems are not functioning as bottleneck intermediary services for ICT 
connectivity and usage. Additionally, IoT settings e.g. smart city, smart energy, public 
transport, telemedicine and industrial processes, being so diverse and fragmented, 
drive the respective SSO processes on an unintegrated basis. Furthermore, 
stakeholders are pushing their own standard and/or protocol for IoT systems, trying to 
gain a significant advantage from the potential markets. As a result, silo type walled 
garden structures and vendor lock-in cases are far more confrontable in IoT settings, 
compared to the cloud environments and ecosystems. As a matter of fact, coopetitive 
and symbiotic relationships could not be attributed to many IoT driven settings or 
sectors, e.g. transport, smart city and telemedicine. This, however, creates significant 
challenges for the emergence of ecosystem characteristics.  
 
851  See the section ‘7.2.3. Architectural elements and layers in the IoT’.    
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Given this fact, many IoT settings boast far more interoperability problems and gaps, 
when compared to the cloud settings. While both cloud and IoT settings are fraught 
from the absent multi-layered common standards, clouds are typified by utility and 
bottleneck characteristics, which bridges the interoperability gaps as the major hubs 
for the ICT interconnectivity and usage. This and other aspects of cloud computing 
e.g. ever fast increasing cloud adoption by the entrepreneurs,852 and its closer interlinks 
with the external elements e.g. CDN, broadband access networks, bring out the result 
that clouds are far more depicted with the ‘ecosystem’ characteristics, e.g. coopetition 
among the players.    
On the other hand, it is always possible that walled garden structures including IoT 
silos could turn into ecosystems ensuing intensive and pervasive cross-layer 
interdependencies. Having said that, in response to the diverse possible scenarios to be 
faced by the regulators, the legal system should be flexible enough to entail ecosystem 
and non-ecosystem settings, just as it needs to be holistically designed. Given the fact 
that the EU legal system is of an inflexible, fragile and non-holistic nature, an overhaul 
based on a wider outlook seems compelling, particularly from the perspective of ICT 
interoperability. Alongside the ecosystems that represent the widest supply structure, 
other supply structures or settings also need to be comprehended and included within 
the regulatory model to be designed. 
 
852  See supra notes 731 and 750. 
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8.2. Policy refinement and elaboration for the EU legal framework  
8.2.1. Refining the assessments: Setting out the baseline policy approach  
Under the EU legal framework there is no holistic treatment for ICT interoperability. 
Notwithstanding the pressing need to have a wider outlook, to evaluate the ICT 
services and layers, the EU system is built on disaggregated instruments, which cause 
some significant gaps and overlaps. Not only to deal with the lack of interoperability 
but also to have a sustainable and holistic regulatory framework, the EU legal 
framework needs to be revitalised with broadly and appropriately designed new rules. 
To emphasize, the EU’s predominantly market-based approach relies on a narrow-
minded approach by which some parts of the ICT ecosystems are dealt with via 
regulatory rules, whereas others are not. Although one should refrain from a 
simplification that all ICT services be regulated, as this would not automatically 
remedy the access and interoperability problems. Instead, filtering the ICT layers from 
a holistic regulatory lens arises as a necessity for the evaluation of the regulatory and 
competition problems, including the lack of interoperability. Flowing from this, a 
holistic and fulfilling regulatory analysis across the ICT interdependencies should be 
possible, as opposed to the status quo.  
In the current ICT ecosystems, systemic interrelatedness goes beyond 
complementarity and substitutability; complex patterns of feedback and non-linear 
developments arise, and micro-level decision making becomes uneasy with the 
multiple dynamic equilibria of such systems.853 Regarding the ICT supply structures 
 
853  Bauer (n 757) 666. 
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as ‘static’ by narrowing them down into markets does not well respond to the cross-
layer interdependencies. In fact, neither the underlying concepts for market analysis 
i.e. complementarity and substitution, nor the accompanying instruments i.e. the 
SSNIP test, are inclusive and holistic enough as they aim to segment the ICT landscape 
into markets, leaving out the cross-layer efficiencies, innovation and competition. 
In view of the interdependencies, a potentially new regulatory approach needs to 
embrace all the supply structures including ecosystems and non-ecosystem settings, 
given the cases of the IoT and cloud computing. From the perspective of these case 
studies, it is clear that various settings would tend to regulatory and competition 
problems. Although many other settings could be found leaning towards ecosystems, 
this should not be taken as reflecting all the scenarios in which the ICT networks and 
services are supplied. Thus, a purely ecosystem-based approach would overlook 
narrower ICT settings and not fit well with many situations e.g. where silo-type 
vertically integrated firms exist. In such a situation, as represented by many IoT 
settings, absent controlling or mitigating tools would result in augmented 
interoperability gaps and problems e.g. vendor lock-in. For instance, when a dominant 
IoT-based software management system has a partnership with certain applications 
and devices, it could be considered to create a market and/or a platform, but not an 
ecosystem. 
This contrasts with the cloud-type ecosystems where ex-ante regulation is no longer 
needed for self-regulatory functionalities e.g. coopetition across the layers. The 
concept of ‘coopetition’ is of a key role for acknowledgement of an ‘ecosystem’, 
involving both cooperative and competitive relationships, and existing horizontally 
and vertically, e.g. between the IoT platform/service providers, manufacturers and the 
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software developers. These vertical and horizontal relationships, echoing layer 
interdependencies and denoting the ecosystem features, has also the key potential to 
dissolve the interoperability-based problems. 
Against this background, the layout on which the regulatory design will be shaped out 
needs to be flexible and holistic enough to reach out to ecosystems, as well as to non-
ecosystem structures. In other words, both self-perpetuating ecosystems and other 
settings that warrant regulation need to be comprehended and covered by the 
regulatory model that is to be built up. Having said that, technologically neutral, widely 
applicable and interdependent layers would provide the appropriate layout or the ideal 
building blocks for a regulatory model.  
Overall, a well-designed layering-based approach, by which ICT layers are regulated 
to the appropriate extent, seems to be sustainable and widely applicable as this 
approach will provide the regulators with the necessary dynamic ground for defining 
and remedying the related interoperability problems. Before delving into regulatory 
design of the appropriate model, it needs to be clarified whether the ex-ante or ex-post 
approaches need to be followed within this context. 
8.2.2. Policy choices between ex ante and ex post 
Although interoperability has so far figured as one of the important policy items of the 
EU agenda, it has not been translated into the ICT regulations at the equivalent level. 
While the ICT-based transformation, which is echoed in the fourth industrial 
revolution or Web 4.0 paradigm, has unraveled new challenges e.g. AI, cloud 




EU IPR rules and safeguards, which are privately enforced, are of a limited role in this 
respect and hence ICT interoperability becomes much more of an issue to be solved 
by means of competition law and sector-specific ECRF rules. While under EU 
competition law there is no such a self-standing interoperability rule, the ECRF 
attributes a key underlying role to interoperability. Not only this stark distinction, but 
also the very nature of the ECRF e.g. more detailed, target-based and ICT-enabling 
character, would promise more responsive solutions to interoperability problems. 
From a broader point of view, NRAs being equipped with wide-ranging roles and 
responsibilities i.e. authorization, monitoring, dispute resolution, access, tariff and 
competition measures, provides a comparative advantage over EU competition law, 
which mainly consists of ex-post remedies. While some competition law tools e.g. 
merger control entail ex-ante measures, these are applicable to the concentrative and/or 
cooperative relationships at hand, being limited to the related parties. For instance, the 
Commission’s Microsoft/LinkedIn decision, whilst entailing a detailed and pro-
interoperability intervention, is not applicable to the parties outside of the merger. 
Arguably, competition law interventions such as the Commission’s 2004 Microsoft 
decision could have far-reaching implications, exceeding the boundaries of an ex-post 
remedy. Any super-dominant firm like Microsoft, subsequent to this decision, would 
have to either refrain from withdrawing the interfaces in order not to be considered as 
abusing its market power, or envision a long-term policy to not disclose any of their 
proprietary interfaces from the beginning.854 For substantiating and evidencing an 
abuse of dominance, resources to be deployed by the competition authorities would be 
enormous, considering the decade-long Microsoft case. Not only the duration but also 
 
854  Unver (n 27) 162. 
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the uneven standards applied in Microsoft pose a hazy ground for any intervention of 
this kind and elevates the uncertainty for the market actors. Remarkably, the emergent 
uncertainty would easily disrupt the uneasy balance between the short-term and long-
term competition in favour of the former along with potentially lessened innovation. 
From this viewpoint, establishing and maintaining the trade-off between these two 
goals is hardly achievable under the EU competition law precedents.    
On the other hand, at the disposal of NRAs which are in charge of implementing the 
ECRF, are timely and directly applicable rules and remedies. To emphasize, 
‘interoperability’ is attributed a key role under the ECRF, although designed as 
subordinated to interconnection, end-to-end connectivity, etc. When certain harms e.g. 
regarding end-to-end connectivity and access to emergency services are at stake, 
access and interoperability remedies could be applied without regard to ‘consumer 
welfare’, which requires elaboration of likely costs and benefits in case-by-case 
analysis. While the latter, basically competition law grounded, approach promises 
more elaborate and substantiated findings, this would come up with undeniable costs 
e.g. ineffective and belated solutions, for it looks at the entirety of the circumstances 
through long-lasting investigations. All the underlying circumstances being considered 
in each case, is ironically deemed to be an important aspect of competition law; 
however, not only the accompanying cost for this but also the inadequateness of the 
underlying notion of ‘consumer welfare’ is compelling for a broader regulatory 
thinking.855  
 
855  Regarding inadequateness of the notion of ‘consumer welfare’ see the section ‘5.5. Assessment of 
EU competition law’. See also José van Dijck, David Nieborg and Thomas Poell, ‘Reframing 
platform power’ (2019) 8(2) Internet Policy Review, 4-6 <DOI: 10.14763/2019.2.1414> accessed 
9 October 2020. 
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A good harmonisation of static and dynamic rule making, is implicated in many areas 
of DSM initiative,856 reflecting this broader thinking, if not sufficiently, and having 
the potential to promise effective and timely results in terms of consumer satisfaction 
and interests. Likewise, representing a consumer-oriented regulatory framework under 
which both dynamic and static elements co-exist, ECRF incorporates a set of effective 
and responsive tools if not from a holistic perspective. Through such a combination 
based on a wider perspective, certainty and flexibility could exist and be harmonised 
under ex-ante regulation, as needed to be reflected in the intended regulatory design.  
It is remarkable that EU authorities, having regarded the competition law tools as 
insufficient to achieve such objectives, focused on the enhancement of the ex-ante 
tools and considered the DSM process as a significant leverage for this. While the 
legislative measures regarding cross-border content delivery, (un)interrupted data flow 
and portability and the transparency of the platform-to-business relationships857 
illustrate these recent steps made in this regard, it is note-worthy that their added value 
primarily stems from their ex-ante nature in the first instance.  The EU’s recent attempt 
to regulate the digital platforms for their wide-ranging economic powers and 
capabilities, should also be read from the same outlook.858 
On the other hand, EU legislative measures have a patchy and complicated nature, 
which might sometimes have the opposite effect to what is intended. This flip side of 
the coin could worsen the situation of the ICT actors and diminish the so-called 
advantages to be gained from the ex-ante regulations. Therefore, while the main 
 
856  See supra notes 615-17.  
857  European Parliament, ‘Legislative Train Schedule’ ˂http://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-
train/theme-connected-digital-single-market˃ accessed 9 October 2020. 
858  See supra note 193. 
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regulatory path would ideally be ex-ante, it is equally important to strike the right 
balance between flexibility and predictability. 
Ostensibly, the ever-faster-growing nature of the ICTs has driven the fast-paced 
development of the ex-ante tools and measures under the DSM in recent years, and 
this seems to go on further. However, it is debated as to whether such safeguards would 
alone suffice to respond the multi-layered regulatory problems surrounding 
interoperability. Thus, would-be ex-ante rules and regulations had better aim to filter 
the interoperability-based problems for the interdependent layers, seeking out coherent 
solutions in the field of ICTs. Reflecting this, details of the ex-ante regulatory model 
that is to be proposed by this study are elaborated below.   
8.3. Layering theory and regulatory implications 
After concluding that interoperability and accompanying problems could be better 
addressed with an ‘ex-ante’ and ‘layering-based’ regulatory model, the next task is to 
determine the main pillars and contours of the model. Having said this, it first needs to 
be reemphasized that the intended regulatory model should have a holistic and flexible 
nature. The layering perspective and approach should thus be fit for purpose. Given this 
the starting point will be the investigation of the layering theory that is built upon, via 
elaboration of the IP layers, to design a regulatory approach. Based on this, the proposed 
framework and necessary details of the intended regulatory model will be set out. 
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8.3.1. Layering theory and models in general  
The internet layers and governing protocols i.e. developed under Open Systems 
Interconnection (OSI) or TCP/IP stacks859 lay the ground for development of the 
‘layering theory’, which generally means adapting the IP layers to policy and 
regulatory approaches. The vital role of the protocol layering within the IP ecosystem 
came to the fore in the late 1990s and had a remarkable influence on the literature with 
regards to the reconstructing of the regulatory policies. IP-based convergence, along 
with the layer-based internet structure, led scholars to revisit the conventional sector-
specific policies focused on the regulation of certain infrastructures e.g. the PSTN, 
which were considered as natural monopolies or essential facilities at the time. 
This conventional regulatory establishment in the 1990s was criticised as being 
technologically biased and adopting a single-minded approach concerning the 
communications networks and services. As a response, particularly in the USA, 
layering theory was found to pave the way for an environment whereby regulatory 
rules against different networks, e.g. cable, the PSTN and services, for example VoIP 
and voice telephony, were to be filtered on the basis of convergence across the internet 
layers (TCP/IP) on a technologically neutral basis. The effective outcome of adopting 
the layering theory mainly incurred challenging the regulatory rules that were designed 
to regulate certain vertically integrated networks, so-called ‘silos’.860  
The layering-based approach is usually credited, as it allows that each module or layer 
of the whole ICT system could be analysed in a self-contained division, whilst 
 
859  See the section ‘2.2.1. Architectural underpinnings of the internet: Layered IP Stack’.  
860  See the section ‘2.2.2. Convergence’. 
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acknowledging the interdependence among the layers,861 namely the ‘physical’, 
‘logical’, ‘application’ and ‘content’ layers, as widely accepted.862 Having regard to the 
cross-layer interdependencies, Fransman, developed business and innovation models 
built upon the layering theory and fleshed out its implications for the industrial 
dynamics. While acknowledging the distinct natures of the layers, Fransman underlined 
the interdependencies between them and reached the conclusion that there exists a 
symbiosis between the ICT layers and players, invoking the ‘ecosystem’ approach at the 
core of his narrative and proposition.863  
Overall, layering theory and its approach was first intended as a tool for examining 
policy implications on technology and later evolved into a policy model intended to 
promote a technically neutral view of the various emerging network platforms.864 On 
the techno-political ground cultivated by this, several ‘regulatory models’ have thus 
far been developed, inspired by the theory.865 The main arguments of the policy 
proponents for layering models evolved on the; (i) differentiated treatment for each 
horizontal layer along with a lighter regulation in the higher layers and866 (ii) adoption 
of a more technology-neutral and refined regulatory treatment for the ICT networks 
and services.867 
 
861  Nuechterlein and Weiser (n 96) 164; Whitt (n 752) 592. 
862  See also supra note 752 and infra note 869. 
863  Fransman (n 118) 37-38. Fransman invokes the biological concept of “ecosystem” to analyse the 
developmental pathways of the ICT layers that implicate six symbiotic relationships. The focal 
point of his study concerns how to enable and develop innovation potential across the layers, with 
important implications for the European ICT sector. 
864  Mindel and Sicker (n 752) 140. 
865  See Kariyawasam (n 752); Kariyawasam (n 118); Werbach (n 118); K. Werbach, ‘A Layered 
Model for Internet Policy’, [2002] 1 Journal on Telecommunications & High Technology Law, 
39-54; Whitt (n 752); Mindel and Sicker (n 752); D. Sicker and J. Mindel ‘Refinements of a layered 
model for telecommunications policy’ [2002] 1 Journal on Telecommunications and High 
Technology Law, 69-94.  
866  Sicker and Mindel (n 865) 79; Werbach (n 865) 59-60; Whitt (n 752) 632. 
867   Sicker and Blumensaadt (n 130) 302; Werbach (n 118) 58-60; Sicker and Mindel (n 865) 79-81. 
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Scholarly perception of the theory led to the idea that heavy regulations were to be 
attributed to the bottom physical and transport layers, whereas the upper application 
and content layers were to be subject to zero or minimum sector-specific regulation 
because of their very characteristics e.g. being conducive to innovation and no serious 
upfront costs for operation with no bottleneck aspects. As an exception, Kariyawasam 
suggested a broader and systemic approach called the “layered policy model”, in which 
layers are configured enabling a more homogenous and holistic regulatory treatment 
and pertaining to ECSs, in the broadest sense.868 
Rather than describing each layer as strictly representing the providers of the services, 
Kariyawasam argues that an ECS could either fall in its entirety into one of the access, 
transport, application, or content layers,869 or will have component parts that will fit 
into any one, or several of the layers, simultaneously.870 In a systemic approach, 
Kariyawasam suggests to regulate the operators that run their multi-layered activities 
based on the type and amount of the IP packets, namely the volume of the data traffic 
that transcends each layer - by means of deep packet inspection and allocating them 
into each layer via accounting seperation.871 
 
868  Kariyawasam (n 752) 100-104; Kariyawasam (n 118) 41-50.  
869  Albeit with nuances, the layering-based regulatory models depend on four distinct layers, 
comprising ‘physical or access’, ‘logical’, ‘application’ and ‘content’ layers (Whitt (n 752) 624, 
Werbach (n 865) 59), although the ‘logical’ layer is being replaced with the ‘transport’ layer by 
some others (Kariyawasam (n 752) 99; Sicker and Blumensaadt (n 130) 310). In these latter 
models, a more technical perspective is being reflected along the lines of the original internet stack 
i.e. the TCP/IP model. Despite this close matching, this study leans towards the former approach 
that incorporates the logical layer along with other layers i.e. access, application and content, 
because this far better reflects the economic and industrial realities. See also Derek Wilding and 
Ivor King, ‘Reviewing the Layered Model’ [2018] 46(1) InterMEDIA, 13-17, for the comparative 
analysis of the layering-based models, including the layers chosen by the developers.  
870  Kariyawasam (n 752) 101; Kariyawasam (n 118) 597. 
871  In so doing, Kariyawasam focuses on; (i) the definition of the relevant market and (ii) the 
establishment of market strength, but not further details i.e. regarding the remedies. Except with 
such details, Kariyawasam adapts the SPM regime and pillars to the layering theory, ending up 
with a unique ‘layered policy model’ developed by him.  
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Considering the ICT layers not in a self-divided manner but rather as components of 
ECSs, this proposed model ends up with new definitions regarding electronic 
communications network and services and criteria regarding market definition and 
market power, to replace the legacy ECRF rules, specifically SMP regime. While 
doing this, the volume of the traffic across the layer(s) is attributed a key role to 
determine market presence, with direct implications to determine SMP in the relevant 
layers, instead of markets. The established link between the amount of data 
transcending each layer and the market power makes Kariyawasam’s model a unique 
one and fully based on IP convergence and transmission, from a holistic viewpoint. 
Since then, no further model has been developed to refashion the regulation of the ICT 
networks and services based on the layering theory. 
8.3.2. Critical analysis of the layering models  
After an overall analysis, one could infer three common aspects that could be attributed 
to the layering models: (i) categorisation of the ICT networks and services under 
horizontal ‘layers’, (ii) technologically neutral treatment of the layered networks and 
services, and (iii) differentiated treatment of the horizontal layers. The most prominent 
aspect of the layering models is reconceptualising the ICT layers so as to identify the 
problematic areas where the market failures would occur. Targeted regulation based 
on the layering models is to ensure that market failures do not occur, that market power 
at lower layers cannot be levered into control of upper layers and that policy objectives 
are achieved in the face of market incentives.872 In this setting, the lower layers are 
believed to be kept under ex-ante regulation, whereas the upper layers are largely left 
 
872  J. B. Meisel and M. Needles, ‘Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) development and public policy 
implications’ [2005] 7(3) Info 3, 14. 
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to market forces, considering the innovation potential of the latter as opposed to the 
bottleneck aspects of the former. 
However, these presumptions are open to criticism under the light of the detailed 
analysis given in this study. As a matter of fact, the extensively voiced differences 
between the upper and lower layers in terms of innovation and bottleneck features 
faded away and are no longer relevant today. Notably, the undertakings that represent 
the lower layers i.e. traditional telcoes, have long been and are still under regulatory 
pressure, posing questions as to the equal footing between these and the upper layer 
firms i.e. software companies, which has appealed regulatory attention in a slower pace 
through the last decade. Existing regulations, i.e. net neutrality, being applicable only 
to the ISPs, signifies and exemplifies the distinctly marked boundaries between the 
lower and upper layers, in contrast to the ever fast increasing IP convergence.873 
By the same token, telecom operators, which represent the characteristics of the access 
layer, increasingly invest in network configuration, virtualisation and softwarisation, 
whereas the software companies have already expertise in these areas, taking this 
advantage to get closer to the users through data-driven software and apps, voice 
assistants, handsets or devices, smart watches, etc. As a matter of fact, the broadband 
access networks often serve just as the mere conduit for the users, who meet their ICT-
inclusive needs from the popular software companies e.g. the so-called FAGMA of 
Facebook, Apple, Google, Microsoft and Amazon. While FAGMA manipulate the 
users’ behaviours with a view to make them rely on their services, their already 
 
873  The upper layer companies could be argued to have taken these advantages in order to maximise 
the benefits flowing from the convergence. As a result, the locus of the central operations meeting 
the users’ ICT-inclusive needs appears to be shifting from the bottom layers towards the upper 
ones, mitigating the differences between the ICT players. 
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reserved areas for competition and innovation help this to be managed more 
thoroughly e.g. with the AI support and configuration.  
From this vantage point of view, a more neutral and homogenous treatment arises as a 
key component and to be attached to the layered regulatory model to be proposed by 
this study. Drawing a distinction within the layering-based models, Kariyawasam’s 
model suggests layers be treated in an equivalent manner, based on the measurement 
of IP data, as per the protocols used, to designate the SMP players. Hence, the model 
proposed by Kariyawasam diverges from other models for its advanced regulatory 
homogeneity across the layers. It is important to note that the homogenous and 
equivalent treatment of the layers, as featured in this model, arises as the key aspect of 
a regulatory model because of the reasons explained above.   
On the other hand, not only Kariyawasam’s model but also other layered models 
heavily focus on the IP layering and protocols, with no delving into the economic 
relationships between the layers and players. While IP convergence drives data 
transmission being considered as a common thread of the layers, the abovementioned 
locus of the users’ activities and the potential threats over them e.g. because of lacking 
interoperability, needs to be prioritised. Data transmission means the path, being 
represented by IP stack, along which the IP packets go and reach their destination. 
Notwithstanding, neither controlling power of the ‘gatekeepers’ across the layers nor 
their restrictive activities are well depicted within the so-called IP stack and related 
models. That is to say, the potential restrictions over this data transmission needs to be 
considered as equally important as the transmission path and calculation of data 
transmitted through the IP layers. 
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To illustrate, in the case of discriminatory traffic management e.g. blocking or 
throttling unaffiliated content by the ISPs, account is and ought to be paid to the 
gatekeeping activities and the attributable consumer harms, but not to the amount of 
the transmitted data. Likewise, in the case of access to the CAS facilities, CAS 
operators e.g. set-top box providers are required to provide access regardless of the 
amount of transmission, or market power, but just because of the CAS operators’ 
gatekeeping position. Other cases regarding access and interconnection could also be 
compared to the so-called gatekeeping functionalities, particularly when wide-ranging 
restrictions would make the users worse off in terms of the potential choices they 
would have, for example regarding connectivity, speed and quality. These concerns 
need to be extended to the absent free information flows and its techno-social 
underpinnings particularly in view of the restricted participatory democracy and 
cultural production. Summing up, rather than the volume of the transmitted data and/or 
market power, prevention and/or manipulation of data flow appears as the real 
determinant for the intervention, as reflected in the net neutrality and the CAS 
regulations. 
The intended outcomes of ECRF regulations, including net neutrality and for CASs, 
signify co-existence of the economics-based, mostly competition-oriented, aspects and 
the non-economic characteristics that are of mostly techno-social nature under the 
same regulatory framework. While both types of ‘competition’ and ‘techno-social’ 
concerns find a room under the ECRF, in parallel with the shifting locus from the lower 
layers to the upper ones, the latter concerns need to be prioritised because of the 
changing ICT dynamics. Online activities which are run by data-driven algorithms and 
manipulative AI technologies may cause access/interoperability restrictions and covert 
discrimination at the upper layers, which may not well match the typical activities of 
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the lower layers e.g. denial of access or interconnection, that are well responded and 
sorted under the ECRF. 
As the software-based manipulations, access or interoperability restrictions and 
discriminations supplant those formerly seen e.g. mostly overt and infrastructure-
based access restrictions, the attention primarily needs to be paid to the ‘gatekeepers’ 
along with their gatekeeping involving activities as are encountered at upper layers. 
Having said that, it becomes compelling to examine the ‘gatekeepers’ rather than 
dominant undertakings, across the layers, embracing access and interoperability 
restrictions and responding to them effectively and from a broader point of view. Given 
this fact, not a purely transmission-based or SMP-oriented perspective, but rather 
gatekeeping-centric and holistic perspective needs to be upheld in designing the 
layered regulatory model.  
8.4. Construction of the ‘layered regulatory model’ 
8.4.1. Main features of the model 
In building up a layered regulatory model that is both ‘holistic’ and ‘flexible’, the 
crucial point is to have a systemic approach along with the functional tools and criteria 
to be applicable across the layers. In so doing, the first task is designation of the layers. 
The layers to be adopted need to match and reflect both the technical and economic 
realities of the ICT networks and services. Whereas the protocol stacks analysed in the 
Chapter 2 represent the technical layers that were promulgated by the SSOs e.g. IETF, 
ISO, this thesis has not directly opted adopting any of these. 
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As implied above, scholarly adopted layers, if not the models, were found to better 
reflect the gatekeeper positions or the so called gateways across the widespread 
economic value chains.874 Given the need to consider the IP layers that truly represent 
such interdependent chains as well as the prevailing restrictive acts across them, the 
layering approach followed here aims to abstain from the technical restraints that were 
embedded with the formerly adopted layer stacks, particularly those of the SSOs. 
From the given standpoint, this study proposes that the ‘layered regulatory model’ be 
built on the following four layers: (1) Access Layer, (2) Middleware Layer, (3) 
Application Layer and (4) Content Layer. The main distinctive features of each 
proposed layer are explained below: 
1) Access layer: Includes both passive and active network elements that enable 
the conduit and the intelligence necessary to provide end-to-end connectivity. 
By means of the QoS and technical standards, the access layer offers the 
broadband connectivity which is key to all the other upper layers, including 
middleware, applications and content.    
2) Middleware layer: This denotes the layer where the software infrastructure, 
including OSs, management tools and data structures, resides and enables 
running of the applications. Serving as the medium to support the users, 
software developers, etc., this layer is employed by the platform owner or the 
cloud provider, the latter being the increasingly utilised option.       
 
874  Among these, the four-layer stack model containing access layer, middleware layer, application 
layer, content layer is preferred instead of more technical ones e.g. access, transport, application, 
content layers. At this preference lies the better exposition of the economic realities of the ICT 
activities being mirrored in interdependent value chains. See supra note 869. 
 
341 
3) Application layer: Includes apps and web services e.g. e-commerce, e-mail and 
instant messaging and is used for a variety of purposes such as entertainment, 
communication, transactions, etc. Often running from the clouds and being 
displayed on the devices e.g. tablets, laptops and smart phones, applications on 
this layer are highly interdependent with the lower middleware and upper 
content layers. 
4) Content layer: This layer comprises the content generated, either by the end-
users or producers and provided in TV channels e.g. Sky, online platforms e.g. 
Facebook, websites or apps e.g. Netflix, being subject to certain rules and 
conditions prescribed by state or EU agencies, as well as IPRs.         
The layers described above denote not only the transmission paths of IP data but also and 
even more importantly, the value chains that represent the activities of the ICT players. 
An ICT player may not operate only in a certain layer and could have different activities 
matching several ones. The interdependence between these layers, as analysed in the case 
studies above, unravels the players’ abilities and potential to collaborate and compete 
with each other. Thereby, symbiotic relationships might take place because of the open 
and/or interoperable channels across the layers, as are usually represented by the 
‘coopetition’ between the players. Such a situation means an ‘ecosystem’ already exists, 
eliminating or reducing the need for ex-ante regulation. However, an ecosystem may not 
be mentioned for the walled garden or silo type supply structures that are driven by the 
proprietary protocols and/or standards.   
Given this fact, an ideal strategy for the ‘layered regulatory model’ should embrace 
both settings, namely ecosystems where the players have coopetition along with 
widespread interoperability and non-ecosystem environments where walled gardens 
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or silos prevail along with access and interoperability restrictions resulting in lack of 
coopetition. Considering the need to embrace both type of settings since they will co-
exist, the regulatory criteria need to be coherent and flexible. To that effect, it is 
suggested that a neutral and broad concept of ‘gatekeeping’ be integrated into the 
multi-layered model with a view to respond to the access and interoperability 
restrictions. According to the proposed structure, as depicted in Figure 14, gatekeeping 
roles and functionalities have a key role to play across the layers. 
 
Figure 14: Main features of the layered regulatory model 
Source: Constructed by the author 
8.4.2. Revitalising gatekeeping and gatekeeping activities 
In a layered model, where the layers are to be dealt with on a homogenous basis, 
‘gatekeeping’ emerges as a crucial concept within the proposed model. While the 
above layers provide the necessary layout for ex ante regulation, the ‘gatekeeping’ 
refers to the activities that capture ‘competition’ and ‘techno-social’ concerns which 
need to be addressed within the layered regulatory model. At this chosen term and 
understanding lies its better reflection of the gateways (interfaces) and their 
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exploitation by the ICT players. Thus, ‘Gatekeeping’ morphs into a key technical term 
under this normative framework, marking a distinction from the rhetorical uses of this 
concept in the past.  
While ‘network gatekeeping’ was first developed by Barzilai-Nahon to mean “the 
process of controlling information as it moves through a gate (a network or its 
sections)”, a functional approach has been followed in which the ‘gated’ meant ‘the 
entity subjected to gatekeeping’.875 This definitional framework and the related 
scholarly work876 suggest existence of ‘gatekeeping’ in the case of directly or 
indirectly allowing or denying information flows through a ‘gate’. ‘Directly’ selecting 
and/or letting the relevant information to flow usually happens in the case journalists 
and publishers assume this role, whereas ‘indirect’ gatekeeping usually happens when 
the gatekeeper acts as ‘innovator, change agent, communication channel, link, 
intermediary, helper, adapter, opinion leader, broker, and facilitator’.877 In the latter 
case, intermediation comes to the fore, as legally acknowledged and reinforced by 
liability exemptions set out under DMCA878 and E-Commerce Directive of the EU 
(Directive 2000/31/EC).879  
The pervasiveness of gatekeeping activities should thus be noted against the everyday-
expanding ICTs and their usage for information gathering and communication. 
Usually, the potential for ‘gatekeeping’ lies much more in affecting the choices made 
 
875  See supra note 185. 
876  See the section ‘3.1.3. Brief analysis of major concerns on the cumulative ground of 
‘gatekeeping’’. 
877  See Laidlaw (n 179) 41.  
878  17 USCA § 512 (‘Limitations on liability relating to material online’). 
879  Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain 
legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal 
Market, OJ L 178 (‘E-commerce Directive’) art. 12-14. 
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by users who do not yet know what content to consume or where to find it.880 From 
the perspective of the original theory, it is argued that network gatekeepers “can choose 
which information they let flow and which information they withhold, and more 
generally they can choose the extent to which gatekeeping is exercised”.881 This core 
aspect of the ‘gatekeeping’ fits not only with the informational sources but also to the 
infrastructural elements, which enable comparable gatekeeping functionalities.   
These functionalities need to be considered broadly in view of the ever fast increasing 
information platforms and intermediary services, notwithstanding the limited number 
of examples referred to in this thesis e.g. the position held by the CAS operators and 
ISPs. Both of these undertakings are presumed to have gatekeeping positions and are 
obliged not to block third-party access and interoperability. Being not limited to these 
examples, rendering control measures over the information flows or the critical 
intermediary resources that would enable such flows potentially pave the way to 
gatekeeping activities. While it connotes controlling mechanisms e.g. TPMs, IPRs and 
their exploitation over the information flows, the scope and meaning of this key term 
would expand cutting through all across the IP layers, particularly when consumers’ 
online activities meet up with the AI-based manipulations.  
From this point of view, ‘gatekeeping’ would mean software-governed architectural 
codes enabling control over access and interoperability, from the bottom to the top 
layer. Such a key node or gateway does not mean holding an essential facility and/or 
 
880  Helberger, Kleinen-von Königslöw and Van der Noll, (n 190) 60.  
881  Dustin W. Edwards ‘Circulation Gatekeepers: Unbundling the Platform Politics of YouTube’s 
Content ID’, [2018] 47 Computers and Composition 61, 66, referring to Karine Nahon and Jeff 
Hemsley, Going viral (Polity Press 2013) 43.   
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an accompanying market power,882 rather it implicates various means to control 
consumer activities via prevention, manipulation, prioritisation or discrimination. At 
the infrastructural or bottom layer can exist non-neutral activities that target third 
parties’ non-subsidiary content, which might face delaying, blocking or throttling by 
the ISPs. Going to the upper layers, such activities would change their form, often 
obscured behind hidden and algorithmic ways, although having same or comparable 
restrictive aims. Remarkably, this way of data and operation management might have 
further consequences as it takes place in the upper layers addressing the content 
dissemination and consumption by the consumers. 
Importantly, such upper layer activities reach out to the consumers in ways they would 
not realise, like in the way they would be captured via personalised recommendations, 
prices, customised products, etc. Likewise, individuals’ participation on the social 
media and other information platforms would be captured and affected by the 
gatekeeping roles and functionalities as they are driven by AI and related algorithms. 
Furthermore, the democratic culture that is expected to be infused by the society 
through individuals’ participation to the information platforms and channels would 
also be affected as opposed to what the digital platforms would suggest.883 Hence, it 
is right to assert that gatekeepers not only filter and select information but also 
qualitatively alter the informational content, for better or for worse, through active 
accumulation, processing and packaging i.e. the gatekeeper adds ‘value’.884  
 
882  See also Orla Lynskey, ‘Regulating ‘Platform Power’ (2017) LSE Law, Society and Economy 
Working Papers, 1/2017, 10 ˂http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/73404/1/WPS2017-01_Lynskey.pdf˃ 
accessed 9 October 2020; Edwards (n 881) 66. 
883  See the section ‘3.1.3. Brief analysis of major concerns on the cumulative ground of 
‘gatekeeping’’; Laidlaw (n 179) 33, 46.  
884  Pieter Ballon, ‘The Platformisation of the European Mobile Industry’ [2009] 75 3rd Q 
Communications & Strategies 15, 23. 
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Against this background, ‘consumer welfare’ seems unharmed, whereas the access and 
interoperability channels get restricted and the consumer choices are affected, along 
with far-reaching consequences towards the democratic culture within the society.885 
Remarkably, in contrast to the legacy understanding of the abusive practices echoed 
with narrow-minded gatekeeping activities, ‘gatekeeping’ roles and functionalities 
have both an economics-based nature and a techno-social character; the former usually 
surfacing when effective competition is deteriorated and the latter in case of AI 
manipulations across the cross-layer activities.886  
Conventional regulatory focus would overlook these restrictive behaviours that would 
take place across the technological layers. In an era of far-reaching platformisation of 
the ICT markets,887 abusive behaviours and underlying markets need to be revitalised 
following the premise of gatekeeping and cross-layer gatekeeping activities. Platform 
leaders build up a business model around a set of crucial gatekeeper functionalities 
and roles that help them to exercise a form of control over the wider value network, 
and to add and capture significant value in the process.888 While controlling 
mechanisms underlying such functionalities should not necessarily be deemed abusive 
or illegal by themselves, access and interoperability restrictions need to be spotted as 
they widely capture gatekeeping activities.  
Within the framework of proposed model, it needs to be re-emphasized that 
‘gatekeeping’ entails not only controlling the media and information flow, but also 
access to infrastructural, physical and software interfaces. In understanding both 
 
885  See also Dijck, Nieborg and Poell (n 855). 
886  See the section ‘3.1.3. Brief analysis of major concerns on the cumulative ground of 
‘gatekeeping’’. 
887  Pieter Ballon and Eric Van Heesvelde ‘ICT platforms and regulatory concerns in Europe’ [2011] 
35 Telecommunications Policy 702, 704. 
888  Ibid. 
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aspects, it is crucial to put the ‘consumers’ at the centre, before considering the 
potential harms they are exposed. The so-called exposure does not only relate to the 
lessened consumer surplus resulted from the reduced price and quality choices, but 
also to the reduced opportunities of cultural production and democratic participation 
that are generated through information flows.889 Infrastructural elements are not 
featured for directly restricting free flows information; however, their role of mere 
conduit for the information platforms alike is most likely to capture interoperability 
related restrictions, and unlocking the underlying gateways is key to resolve would-be 
gatekeeping activities.    
Since ‘gatekeeping’ first and foremost means controlling access and interoperability 
through these gateways e.g. architectural codes, restrictive acts in granting third party 
access and interoperability should be deemed unacceptable. Whether relating to 
software sources e.g. middleware, including search engines, application stores and 
browsers, or to infrastructural elements e.g. network interfaces, the same criterion of 
‘restriction of access and interoperability’ should be followed with regards to these 
gateways or technically speaking ‘interfaces’. From the regulatory perspective, a wide 
spectrum of restrictive activities need to be comprehended within this context, 
incorporating discrimination, manipulation, prioritisation and quality deterioration, 
considering their restrictive nature over the consumers’ freedom to choose from across 
the alternative networks, platforms, apps, services or products. 
Against this background, ‘restriction of access and interoperability’ should be 
acknowledged to happen regardless of the market power. All the layers would be 
 




exposed to gatekeepers and their restrictive activities within the meaning of the 
proposed ‘layered regulatory model’. As a matter of fact, every ICT player that 
operates in one or more of the layers would potentially have a gatekeeper role insofar 
as they are positioned to be able to restrict the consumer choices via control over access 
and interoperability. In many cases, this role would allow the gatekeeper to leverage 
their gatekeeping position to favour their own activities in other layers. This means 
applying restrictions on the consumers that seek access to the gateways from other 
layers. The strong likelihood of the so-called access and interoperability restrictions 
should be deemed sufficient for the application of ex-ante regulation within the 
meaning of proposed model, along the same lines with the ECRF and its consumer-
oriented perspective. 
In the table below could be seen several examples regarding gatekeeping activities 




Table 2: Potential gatekeepers and gatekeeping activities across the layers 
Layers Potential 
gatekeepers 
Potential gatekeeping activities 
Content Content 
providers 
Providing premium content to affiliated ISPs, 
CAS or platform providers e.g. in exchange for 
priority placement. 
Application App providers Developing apps so as to interoperate only with 
the affiliated OSs, browsers, search engines, etc. 
Middleware Search engine 
providers 
Selective ranking favouring certain content, apps 
and web services. 
 OS providers Discriminatory supply of the functionalities to the 
CPs, app providers or network operators. 
 App store 
providers 
App prioritisation, delaying or blocking based on 
the app or app type. 
 Browser 
providers 
Selective or strategic browsing favouring certain 
web sites, their ads or ad-blocking strategies. 
Access CAS 
providers 
Denial of access to the set-top boxes, including 
APIs and EPGs, or discrimination in the ranking 
of the access-authorised content. 




Refusal to supply network e.g. NGN interfaces to 
the service providers. 
Source: Constructed by the author890 
 
8.4.3. ‘Gatekeeping’ from the perspective of underlying concerns 
 
As could be seen from the above examples, gatekeepers might have layer-specific or 
cross-layer activities. Their operations mainly target controlling the ‘gateways’, 
namely the ‘interfaces’, in and across the layers by which they allow new entries often 
 
890  Partly inspired by Robert Easley, Hong Guo and Jan Kraemer ‘From Network Neutrality to Data 
Neutrality: A Techno-Economic Framework and Research Agenda’ (SSRN, 8 March 2017) 26 
˂https://ssrn.com/abstract=2666217˃ accessed 9 October 2020. 
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in a selective way. Gatekeeping connotes more control than the term ‘intermediary’,891 
and in conjunction with this, controlling mechanisms incorporating IPRs, TPMs and 
AI based algorithms utilised by the ICT players are the main sources of concern in 
relation to the gatekeeping roles and functionalities. Underlaid by wide-ranging 
control features, ICT players’ activities having a ‘restrictive’ nature is key to defining 
the ‘gatekeeping’ that is reconceptualised in this study. From this point of view, every 
means of control over the layers and the interfaces would not be sufficient to qualify 
the ICT player at hand as gatekeeper.   
 
Restrictive activities pursued by the ICT players signify the existence of a gatekeeping 
activity, no matter whether it leads to losses in consumer welfare (surplus) based on 
distortion of competition, or harm or restraint to consumers in the sense that their 
informational choices are affected. In this context, restricted information flows come 
to the fore along with far-reaching implications over the individuals’ autonomy and 
dignity, often based on the discriminatory, biased, manipulative, unfairly selective 
architectural choices. To understand these causes and implications, it is worth 
reconsidering the competition and techno-social concerns from the perspective of 
gatekeeping. 
 
Notably, competition concerns would arise should the underlying restrictions have a 
long arm reaching out to the competitors and their ability to effectively compete in the 
relevant layer(s). As stated above, competition problems are supposed to create losses 
in consumer welfare which is the conventional harm theory. Mostly calculable and 
 
891  See the section ‘8.4.2. Revitalising gatekeeping and gatekeeping activities’. See also Emily B. 
Laidlaw, ‘Private Power, Public Interest: An Examination of Search Engine Accountability’ 
[2009] 17(1) International Journal of Law and Information Technology 113, 115.  
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well established within the EU competition law, consumer welfare losses represent 
most recognisable feature characterising an anti-competitive behaviour which would 
also capture a gatekeeping activity in conjunction with the competition concerns. 
 
On the other hand, in case of techno-social concerns, the restrictive act would not 
necessarily have an anti-competitive effect or cause a consumer welfare loss but often 
result in ‘unfair outcomes’ or ‘transformative effects’, as per the exposition put 
forward by Mittelstadt et al.892 While these outcomes/effects frame the two normative 
concerns surrounding algorithms,893 these could also be taken encompassing the 
relevant gatekeeping activities under the proposed model. Given the fact that AI-based 
operations tend to be the ‘norm’ all across the layers, one can conclude that these two 
normative categories, namely ‘unfair outcomes’ and ‘transformative effects’ explain 
the so-called techno-social concerns in association to the gatekeeping roles and 
functionalities.  
 
According to the framework drawn by Mittelstadt et al, unfair outcomes mean the 
consequences brought by the actions driven by the algorithms that can be assessed 
according to numerous ethical criteria and principles, and are found to have an unfair 
nature.894 Within this category are included not only indirect discrimination but also 
unfavourable results against neutrality and independence. Starting from the bottom 
 
892  See Brent Daniel Mittelstadt et al., ‘The ethics of algorithms: Mapping the debate’ July-December 
2016, Big Data & Society 1, 4.  
893  There are other literature analysing the concerns attributable to algorithms and AI. See Karen 
Yeung, ‘Why worry about decision-making by machine?’ in K. Yeung and M. Lodge (eds) 
Algorithmic Regulation (OUP 2019) 21-48; Teresa Scantamburlo, Andrew Charlesworth, and 
Nello Cristianini, ‘Machine decisions and human consequences’ in K. Yeung and M. Lodge (eds) 
Algorithmic Regulation (OUP 2019) 49-81; S. C. Olhede and P. J. Wolfe, ‘The algorithms ubiquity 
of algorithms in society: implications, impacts and innovations’ Phil. Trans. Royal Society 
<https://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsta.2017.0364> accessed 9 October 2020. 
894  Mittelstadt et al (n 892) 5 and 8. 
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(access) layer, one would come across non-neutral activities performed by the ISPs 
involving throttling, delaying and prioritising the net traffic ending up with filtered 
results to be conveyed to the end-users fall in this category. Google’s discriminatory 
ranking,895 and other online platforms’ exclusionary behaviours896 exemplify the 
gatekeeping activities from inside the middleware layer. Facebook filtering the news 
feeds to be featured in users’ customized account pages897 could be given as an 
example matching the upper layers. Notably, while these examples entail unfair 
outcomes within the meaning of techno-social concerns, the underlying gatekeeping 
activities are often scrutinised within the meaning of competition law by the European 
Commission or competition authorities. While competition concerns are well 
established and reflected through the EU precedents and legislation, there exist no 
holistic legal framework governing the unfair outcomes implicated through the 
 
895  Google’s discriminatory ranking in online shopping comparison services, as was found as an 
‘abuse of dominance’ by the EU Commission, illustrates a restrictive practice arousing techno-
social concern, to be qualified as a gatekeeping activity. In June 2017, Google was fined 2.4 billion 
EUR for abusing its dominant position in the ‘online search’ market, to hamper the competition 
‘online shopping comparison’ market during the years between 2008 and 2013. Google thereby 
was ordered by the Commission to ensure “equal terms” for all competitors in the online shopping 
comparison market based on the fact that they favoured their own services with the result being 
restricting the users’ freedom to choose among the available options. (See the European 
Commission, Press release, ‘Antitrust: Commission fines Google €2.42 billion for abusing its 
dominance as a search engine by giving an illegal advantage to its own comparison shopping 
service’, 27 June 2017 <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1784_en.htm> accessed 9 
October 2020).  
896  Platforms’ exclusionary behaviours would have far-reaching impact on the app providers and their 
services. Apple’s exclusion of the ‘Drone +’ application from its app store and exclusion of 
‘Disconnect’ from Google Play illustrate this (Luca Belli and Nicolo Zingales, ‘How Platforms 
are Regulated and How They Regulate Us’ Official Outcome of the UN IGF Dynamic Coalition 
on Platform Responsibility (United Nations Internet Governance Forum, 2017) 88-91). In the 
former instance, Apple’s rejecting launch of an app that would provide real-time alerts of drone 
strikes, called ‘Drone+’, in its app store, was the conflict between the parties. The app provider 
was given two reasons for this rejection, respectively for it was ‘not useful’ and on the ground that 
it was ‘objectionable and crude’. While not clear-cut unlike with the former, Google’s rejection of 
Disconnect, a privacy enhancing technology app provider, implicates an allegedly unfair 
discrimination among the software provided by them and Google’s subsidiary, also denoting a 
likely ‘unfair outcome’. While the first instance exemplifies a platform’s arbitrary reasoning for 
an exclusion, the latter instance would potentially be representative of an unfair discrimination in 
favour of a platform’s own software also creating a competitive advantage for himself. 
897  Stuart Dredge, ‘How does Facebook decide what to show in my news feed?’ (Guardian, 30 June 
2014) <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/jun/30/facebook-news-feed-filters-
emotion-study> accessed 9 October 2020; Nikki Usher-Layser, ‘Newsfeed: Facebook, Filtering 
and News Consumption’ (2016) 96(3) Phi Kappa Phi Forum, 18-21. 
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gatekeeping activities. In addition, sorting these outcomes and concerns separately 
from the competition concerns is uneasy and often unpromising as they are often 
intertwined.  
When it comes to transformative effects, two challenges emerge: 
(i) challenges to autonomy in the sense that (often personalisation) 
algorithms reduce the diversity of information user encounters by 
excluding content deemed irrelevant or contradictory to the user’s 
beliefs. The subject can be pushed to make the institutionally preferred 
action rather than their own preference. 
(ii) challenges for informational privacy in the sense that the individual’s 
informational identity is breached by meaning generated by algorithms 
that link the subject to others within a dataset.898  
The transformative effects might overlap the unfair outcomes and to a lesser extent the 
competition concerns. Competition concerns would not be manifest in this context for 
the very nature of the detriment caused by these effects. Here, information flows and 
adverse consequences to cultural production and ultimately participatory democracy 
surface as having crucial results in the wider context of data and traffic management. 
On the grounds of IPRs, TPMs and/or AI-based algorithms, information flows often 
become affected to be attended by the accompanying challenges, namely the 
challenges to ‘autonomy’ and ‘informational privacy’. Combination of these 
challenges has the potential to transform the data subjects that are exposed to the 
 
898  See Mittelstadt et al (n 892) 9-10.  
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underlying gatekeeping activities, i.e. restricted/filtered/manipulated information 
flows.899 
Acknowledgement of ‘gatekeeping’ activities is sourced from the techno-social 
concerns as equally as, even more, frequently than the competition concerns, 
considering the far-reaching implications depicted above. Competition law tools and 
enforcement focus on consumer welfare or deadweight losses, while the IPR rules 
encompass exceptional safeguards to protect the consumers against the controlling 
mechanisms that are of a restrictive nature. ‘Interoperability’ subsists within this 
environment as a subordinate tool or target with certain limitations. Although having 
a responsive and a consumer-oriented perspective, the ECRF does not have a nature 
all-encompassing the ICT layers and falls short of dealing with gatekeeping activities 
and addressing the related concerns. As a result, many of the gatekeeping activities 
and relevant concerns fall untouched or unaddressed under the available tools and 
safeguards of the EU legal system. Below, it is put forward how and through which 
tools and principles the layered regulatory model could respond the abovementioned 
concerns and the underlying gatekeeping activities.   
 
899  It could be argued that even in the presence of data protection tools and safeguards, the 
transformative effects at stake could not be mitigated easily for the persistent nature of the 
gatekeeping activity that reach out to individuals’ dignity. However, while the individuals grant 
their consent as an autonomous/independent person, this does not deter the possibility that the 
unfairly selective content being reached to themselves through the underlying algorithms. 
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8.4.4. Matching the gatekeeping roles and functionalities with the layered 
regulatory model 
8.4.4.1. Setting the governing principles  
As examined above, gatekeepers and their restrictions regarding access and 
interoperability could be witnessed across all the ICT layers. Crucially, the premise of 
homogeneous treatment of the ICT layers across the gatekeeping functionalities 
signifies the need to reconsider ex-ante regulation on the basis of the ‘layered 
regulatory model’. As the risk of over-regulation arises should all the ICT services be 
subject to ex-ante regulation based on a widely implemented ‘gatekeeping’ concept, 
filtering of this concept seems necessary. 
Filtering means an uneasy task, given the extraterritorial and quite wide nature of the 
multi-layered ICT networks and services. Regardless of how well-equipped a 
regulatory authority is, filtering and designating the gatekeeping roles and 
functionalities would go beyond the established regulatory limits of an NRA that is 
normally charged with electronic communications regulation in a national context. 
Further to this fact and the cross-border nature of the ICT landscape, ‘homogenous 
regulatory treatment’ is another thrust of the layered model that needs to be factored into 
an appropriate regulatory design. 
As a starting point, the proposed ‘layered regulatory model’ should not be seen as a 
milestone along the way of conventional regulatory wisdom that is heavily attributed to 
national territories. One could argue, EU regulatory thinking and design is of the utmost 
importance for properly interpreting and implementing the gatekeeping-centric 
approach. On the other hand, the long-lasting EU experience and its conventional mind-
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set would not be able to address the holisticness and flexibility required for the 
regulatory treatment of the ICT layers.                 
Against this background, form-based and top-down regulation needs to be replaced 
with a principles-based and bottom-up approach. Otherwise, the gatekeeping concerns 
from a layered perspective would not be met and dissolved in the long run. Ever fast 
changing ICT dynamics would not be captured by resource consuming, patchy and 
shortcoming regulatory safeguards of the EU legal system including those of the 
ECRF. Having said that, in lieu of adapting or modifying the ECRF’s tools and 
measures, its consumer-oriented perspective and more responsive ex ante approach 
would be transposed into the proposed layered model. In so doing, a dynamic 
regulatory course would rather be adopted by giving a leeway to collaboration as well 
as soft law principles that would eventually be enforced under certain conditions.  
This bottom-up approach partially reflects the solution recommended by the House of 
Lord’s recent Report regarding regulation of the ‘digital services facilitated by the 
internet’.900 To emphasise, after a long period of consultation, the House of Lords 
ended up with a set of ten principles to pave the way for the establishment of a 
rigorously designed, comprehensive and forward-looking framework. Setting the 
scene for the proposed Digital Authority to advance further guidelines, the Report 
clearly recommends that industry stakeholders be actively involved in the future 
process.901       
 
900  House of Lords, Select Committee on Communications, Regulating in a digital world (2nd Report 
of Session 2017-19, March 2019) 3-4. 
901  Ibid, 5. 
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From this point of view, it is considered that the ‘layered regulatory model’ would be 
better run by setting the governing principles which will lay down the main pillars and 
instructions for the ICT players, specifically gatekeepers, in the first instance. To 
commence with, it is proposed the core and main principle include a prohibition on 
“restricting access and interoperability at the expense of limiting consumer choices”. 
Further to this baseline principle, gatekeepers should also; 
- report their management of data and traffic across the layers to the 
regulator(s) (transparency), 
- refrain from biased or unfairly selective supply of services unless justified on 
an objective ground of technical reasoning (fairness), 
- establish that the software management e.g. AI-driven processes 
underlying the services supplied by them rely on ethical, accountable and 
democratically justifiable reasons (accountability).   
This fourpartite set of principles draw the main pillars of the layered regulatory model. 
In the emergent response echoes an oversight for the multi-layered ICT activities, with 
a view to address gatekeeping activities that arouse competition and/or techno-social 
concerns and posing a restriction over the consumers. Notably, the latter means 
informational, ethical and democratic concerns reflecting on the restrictions mostly 
based on the manipulative and algorithmically driven algorithms, which are often 
obscured from the end-users unlike with TPMs and most IPRs. 
Crucially, the above principles mean the key requirements which all the gatekeepers 
should adhere to. Accordingly, there is no need for a gatekeeper to have a market 
power in order to be subjected to these principles which are generic and ex ante. As 
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long as these principles are complied with, there would be no need to intervene on the 
part of the regulatory authority, namely European Commission at the EU level and 
NRAs at the national level. Conversely, in circumstances where the principles are 
breached and consumer choices are restricted, additional safeguards would need to be 
enforced. Having said that, the thesis also proposes the given principles be translated 
into enforceable obligations, as detailed below.  
8.4.4.2. Further regulatory steps and obligations 
Based on the governing principles explained above, evaluation of the ICT settings for 
any potential obligation needs to be supplemented by a finding as to the conditions 
under which ex-ante remedies need to be responded. As stated above, in view of the 
dynamic nature of the ICT layers and interdependencies, a bottom-up approach is the 
key for the successful implementation of the layered regulatory model. Pursuit of this 
approach will potentially unravel the extent to which further regulatory steps are to be 
taken in a self-perpetuating manner. 
For a better and constructive regulatory thinking, one could refer to the ecosystem 
characteristics from inside the case studies as such characteristics might prevail across 
the layers mitigating the need for any remedial situation. While all the gatekeepers 
could potentially be subject to ex-ante remedies as well as principles, finding 
ecosystem characteristics would lessen further regulatory steps to be taken. Further 
steps of ex-ante regulation, when considered with the dynamic nature of the ICT 
layers, requires a deeper insight into the investigated ICT settings. 
Principally, the main prohibition over “restricting access and interoperability at the 
expense of limiting consumer choices” would be assumed to have been fully or 
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partially met by the ecosystems. In case an ecosystem that is driven and characterised 
by coopetition exists, this situation should be taken into account as a significant reason 
to reduce ex-ante regulation for the layer(s) in question. Potentially, access and 
interoperability gaps will be bridged via the coopetitive relationships within the 
ecosystem, so that the need for extra regulation would be diminished, particularly as 
far as competition concerns are concerned. 
Notwithstanding, assessment of access and interoperability restrictions suggest 
elaboration of transparency, fairness and accountability, as reflected within the 
principles. This is compelling, because techno-social concerns would have an 
undiscernible yet potentially more legacy nature which might not be addressed via 
simply prohibiting restrictions over access and interoperability. Having said that, 
transparency, fairness and accountability should exist and be secured in the relevant 
layer(s), regardless of ecosystem characteristics e.g. coopetition, myriad interactions. 
More explicitly, according to an evaluation against the principles stated above, 
appropriate obligations might need to be imposed on the gatekeepers by the regulator. 
Such potential obligations include, but not limited to, the following: 
- Access and interoperability: Consumers’ access to 
infrastructural/informational resources  might be affected when a gatekeeper 
denies or delays the demands for access to and interoperability with the 
access, middleware, application and content layers controlled by themselves. 
In that case, access and interoperability remedies might be imposed on the 
gatekeeper(s) to make the relevant layers or layer elements accessible to the 
relevant consumers.    
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- Transparency: A gatekeeper might be subject to transparency obligations 
when the same-layer or cross-layer operations carried out by them reveal a 
gatekeeping activity in view of the restricted consumer behaviours and 
preferences, particularly as a result of hidden aspects of underlying software 
and algorithms. 
- Fairness: In case certain restrictions by means of discrimination and bias e.g. 
selective ranking, filtering, prioritising take place across certain layer(s) 
resulting in a gatekeeping activity, the gatekeeper could then be ordered to 
carry out their activities in an unbiased and ethically justifiable manner.       
- Accountability: In the case of consumers being manipulated towards certain 
content, apps, services, etc. the gatekeeper involved in that activity might be 
required to redesign their underlying software and algorithms in relation to 
the pertinent layer(s) or layer elements. 
These obligations denote the remedies that are presumed to keep the governing 
principles alive and enforceable. As gatekeeping activities usually happen across more 
than one layer, these obligations might need to be adjusted accordingly and should 
thus fit with the pertinent layers or layer elements, in view of the related restriction(s) 
at stake. Having said that, these remedies mark a distinction from those under the 
ECRF, which are only applicable to the access layer elements with certain exceptions 
and are thought of remedying competition problems with an infrastructural focus. 
Crucially, not only the nature, scope and extent of the obligations but also the way they 
are supposed to be imposed, differs in the ‘layered regulatory model’. 
Under the ‘layered regulatory model’, the ICT stakeholders’ collaboration with the 
regulators and among themselves is of a key importance in running the proposed 
 
361 
model. As this regulatory process primarily builds upon and commences with the 
governing principles, it has quite a dynamic nature, differently from the traditional top 
down ex ante regulation. In this dynamic process, roles and responsibilities would be 
reshaped based on the stakeholders’ multi-tiered collaboration, e.g. with the regulators, 
as well as amongst themselves. 
It is note-worthy that ecosystem characteristics could mitigate but not obviate the 
entire regulatory needs and obligations. Remarkably, ecosystem players could meet at 
an equilibrium point where they could continue non-transparent, unfair and non-ethical 
activities. Attention should still be paid to such kind of activities including the 
underlying algorithms, which would arouse further concerns going beyond access and 
interoperability. That is to say, even in case interoperability gaps and problems are 
diminished through self-regulatory ecosystems, additional remedies would need to be 
invoked for a sustainable ICT landscape.                   
According to the response taken from the ICT players and their level of commitment 
to the governing principles, further remedies may always be necessary. In this regard, 
a ‘one size fits all’ approach would not respond each layer’s distinctive gatekeeping 
activities, some of which could be addressed more easily or effectively than others. 
The principle of ‘homogenous regulatory treatment’ does not contradict with applying 
appropriately chosen and/or filtered remedies against the gatekeeping activities that 
are encountered in related layer(s).  
For instance, in the application layer would exist a self-regulatory ecosystem, within 
which access and interoperability problems are already resolved and only the need for 
certain remedies concerning transparency and accountability. On the other hand, in the 
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middleware layer the need for ex-ante regulation would embody more obligations, 
starting with access and interoperability and proceeding with further ones e.g. 
transparency and redesigning the underlying software and algorithms. It should also 
be underlined that many of the gatekeeping activities cut across the layers and would 
need to be dealt with by cross-layer remedies. While gatekeeping activities usually 
originate from one layer, their cross-layer nature would require regulators to formulate 
the obligations in a multi-layered fashion.     
Overall, implementing layer-specific or cross-layer remedies represent the final phase 
of this dynamic and bottom-up process, through which regulators would oversee and 
reconsider the applicable gatekeeping obligations, from a holistic perspective. Given 
the evolving nature of the ICT settings, these remedies would need to be reconsidered 
on a recurring basis i.e. at least every five years, or in case of a pressing need for re-





Figure 15: Key stages of the layered regulatory model 
Source: Constructed by the author  
8.4.5. Review of the institutional roles and responsibilities 
As could be seen above, the proposed model has a dynamic and evolving nature. For 
the smooth and better functioning of the model, top-down measures are avoided at all. 
Given the central tenets of the proposed model i.e. consumer-oriented perspective, 
holistic and multi-layered nature, there would no longer be a need to the existing access 
related measures of the ECRF e.g. SMP remedies, nor to the competition law remedies 
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that aim to designate and penalise the abusive behaviours in field of ICTs.902 
Therefore, it is suggested the proposed principles and remedies replace the competition 
oriented ECRF rules e.g. SMP remedies, and have precedence over the EU competition 
rules. Since both the EU competition law and the ECRF have other rules than those 
that target abusive conducts, these legal frameworks need to be maintained for other 
compelling reasons i.e. merger control under the EU competition law or universal 
service obligations under the ECRF. Notwithstanding, all the ICT-based competition 
concerns already captured by either EU competition law or ECRF need to be first and 
foremost dealt with through the ‘layered regulatory model’ for its wider scope and 
overarching nature.  
This proposition stems from the normative framework presented above, considering it 
all encompasses and addresses the behavioural aspects that are underlaid with 
gatekeeping roles and functionalities across the IP layers. Given the wide-ranging 
competition and techno-social concerns surfacing in this context and the response 
developed by the proposed model, this model should have an overreaching role to play 
against the existing ex ante and ex post competition rules, except for the dedicated 
areas to be ascertained. From this point of view, the complementarity between the 
sector-specific regulation and the EU competition law needs to be revised from a 
broader perspective, rendering a prioritised role to the former since the proposed model 
is constructed to deal with the related concerns from a holistic manner, replacing the 
ECRF.  
 
902  Having a novel character, it is envisaged that the ‘layered regulatory model’ will replace the 
entrenched terms e.g. ‘market’ and norms e.g. ‘market failure’ with new ones e.g. respectively 
‘layer’ and ‘gatekeeping’, and these radical changes would create new inroads for implementation 
of competition law alongside the proposed model. 
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The perspective upheld by the model expands based on the main thread of ICT 
interoperability, reaching out to the non-transparent, unfair, algorithmically biased or 
discriminatory, democratically unjustifiable cross-layer activities. Against such 
activities, the model develops its safeguards by instructing and forcing the ICT players 
to comply with the governing principles and remedies, and operationally not to 
perpetrate any restrictive e.g. discriminatory, biased, unfairly selective, non-
transparent, activity. Since this features a behavioural roadmap by and large, it might 
be argued the proposed model and its underlying normative framework should not 
affect any given right including IPRs.  
Notwithstanding, some IPRs as well as TPMs would enable overprotection on the ICT 
interfaces sometimes jeopardising the very nature of interoperability, which entails 
behavioural freedoms, innovation and information flows. This often comes up with the 
protective statutory rules and would result in a potential clash between the exploitation 
of IPRs/TPMs and application of the layered regulatory model. In case of such a clash, 
the broadened vision of the proposed model needs to step in for the encroaching rights 
and technological measures, should they intervene users’ freedom to choose 
disseminated content, applications, services and networks. This very notion is 
crystallised and rooted within the first governing principle of the model, which 
stipulates ICT players not to restrict access and interoperability at the expense of 
limiting consumer choices. Since this principle is a clear signal to the over-intrusive 
controlling mechanisms including the IPRs and TPMs, an ICT player needs to pay 
extra attention while exercising their IPRs as these would have the effect of limiting 
the consumers’ choices along with hindered interoperability. On the other hand, unless 
the utilised rights and technological measures restrict access and interoperability 
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across the layers, there would be minimum or no room for competition or techno-social 
concerns that potentially denote a gatekeeping activity.903    
From a broader perspective, the proposed model would accommodate libertarian views 
regarding information flows and scholarly calls for ‘information justice’.904 It 
underpins and aims to protect the consumers’ freedom to choose, communicate and 
access to the information, over which considerable control is exerted across the 
technological layers, increasingly by means of AI-based algorithms. While the onus is 
to enhance the access and interoperability links and channels, the driving reasons that 
need to be highlighted is to unlock the gateways against the consumer choices and give 
leeway to free information flows. Proposed model envisions informational barriers are 
removed across all the IP layers, where necessary by means of coercive tools and 
mechanisms, and supplanting contradicting statutory rules. It is noteworthy that this 
broadened vision reveals the flip side of the constitutional human rights including 
freedom of expression,905 which needs to be free of chains and reinforced as such. 
 
903  On the other hand, the proposed model envisages that the governing principles and remedies are 
enforceable also in the case access and/or interoperability is provided in an unfair, non-transparent 
or ethically unjustifiable manner. In such cases, further safeguards of transparency, fairness and/or 
accountability remedies would be applied even if there is no need to remedying 
access/interoperability, meaning that there are still legacy restrictions that need to be addressed. 
See the section ‘8.4.4.2. Further regulatory steps and obligations’. 
904  See Griffin (n 160) 59. Griffin, after comparing ‘economic justice’ and ‘information justice’ which 
has been conceptualized as a new notion by himself, concludes as follows: 
In the era of information justice, the shift moves towards the conception that the 
individual should be able to obtain access to information in order to encourage further 
information production. The invisible hand of Adam Smith that guides the capitalist 
process is the same hand that guides the information exchange process, namely, the 
idea that exchange should be a possibility (Griffin (n 167) 59) (…) To start to regulate 
information in a new way raises the possibility that regulation will stifle the use of 
information in a way that will impact the fundamental rationales and existence of 
exchange, that very notion of exchange which was central to the development of 
society. This is the ultimate paradox that information regulation brings, and it is why 
this regulation must also be subject to the notion of information justice. (Griffin (n 
160) 61-62). 
905  See Lessig (n 175) 186-187, 269; Boyle (n 174) 94-95.  
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While at the centre of the model lies the safeguards to enable ICT interoperability, its 
implications reach out to the democratic and free society whereby informational 
barriers are removed. As informational barriers embody over-intrusive IPRs, TPMs as 
well as AI based algorithms that manipulate the consumers by restricting their freedom 
to access to the information, and given the key nature of information flows against the 
gatekeeping activities, it is proposed that the proposed model have a superior role, 
ideally with a ‘meta law’ character, over the applicable laws and rights including IPRs 
in view of any potential conflict regarding implementation.   
Summing up, the layered regulatory model would offer an effective and overarching 
response to the interoperability based problems, going beyond the narrow-minded and 
fragmented European perspective. Among the examined EU bodies of law including 
competition law, IPR and ECRF rules, the ECRF appears as the befitting place for the 
integration of this model into the EU legal system in view of its ex ante and consumer-
oriented nature. This integration, meaning replacement of the core, mainly SMP 
oriented, principles of the ECRF, would give way to far-reaching implications in terms 
of regulatory governance and institutional structure of the EU. This study sets the 
ground for a potential debate along with the proposed model, whereby it is envisaged 
that how to transpose this model into the EU legal system and its far-reaching 
implications would be subject matter of further research. 
8.5. Concluding remarks: Brief summary and further research 
This thesis mainly examines the regulatory governance of ICT interoperability across 
a number of legal disciplines and is based on multiple case studies following the 
doctrinal analysis. While lack of interoperability raises several significant concerns, 
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incorporating vendor lock-in, switching costs, follow-on innovation and information 
flows, regulation of interoperability has differing reflections within the distinct areas 
of EU law i.e. IPR rules, competition law and ECRF. The lack of interoperability being 
dealt with on the disparate grounds of the EU law, often with shortcomings and partial 
solutions, signifies the absence of a coherent and holistic approach under the given 
legal disciplines against the so called concerns. It is also important to note that 
applicable legal tools under EU law, when providing insufficient and partial responses, 
do not keep pace with the ICT dynamics e.g. cross-layer interdependencies, pursue the 
traditional harm theories i.e. consumer welfare, and overlook the fast-evolving 
gatekeeping activities based on the controlling mechanisms including IPRs, TPMs and 
AI-based algorithms.   
From this point of view, this study endeavours to build up a normative framework 
focusing on the EU legal system and reaching out to broadly figured interoperability-
based concerns in the ICT field. After the multi-disciplinary doctrinal analysis, it is 
found that a holistic and multi-layered approach is lacking and appears a pressing need 
across and to the limitedness of the EU law. This need surfacing during the doctrinal 
analysis has become more apparent in the case studies conducted in this research. 
While the EU law does not have a holistic perspective and all-encompassing 
framework, gatekeeping activities being addressed to a limited extent e.g. under net 
neutrality and CAS regulations, also needs to be stressed, as elaborated while 
examining the ECRF. Following up on this analysis, multiple case studies have 
revealed that cross-layer interrelationships, whether fraught with walled gardens or 
not, would ideally be treated by a layering-based ex ante regulatory policy. In other 
words, layering approach has been found to offer the needed holisticness and 
 
369 
flexibility through which responsive tools could be designed against the major 
concerns and the surrounding gatekeeping activities.   
Against this background, the layers of the IP stack, from the bottom to the top, are 
revisited, elaborated and then adapted into an ex ante model called ‘layered regulatory 
model’. This model proposal constitutes the most remarkable ‘contribution to 
knowledge’ of this thesis. According to this proposed model, the ‘access’, 
‘middleware’, ‘application’ and ‘content’ layers build up the layout, which means the 
regulatory field for the technologically-neutral treatment of interoperability related 
problems. Crucially, it is considered that this ‘layered regulatory model’ is fit-for-
purpose in dealing with the related (competition and techno-social) concerns, with a 
holistic outlook encompassing both ecosystem and non-ecosystem settings.   
Based on this layered structure, the concept of ‘gatekeeping’ to which attention is 
drawn at the outset morphs into a key term particularly against the interfaces between 
the layers that are exploited to manipulate or filter the consumers’ online activities. 
Given the need for holistic and homogenous regulatory treatment, the thesis proposes 
that layered model be invigorated with a revitalised conception of ‘gatekeeping’ by 
which to comprehend and respond both ‘competition’ and ‘techno-social’ concerns. 
That is to say, ‘interoperability’ lying at the core of such layer interdependencies, 
should be elaborated with the surrounding ‘gatekeeping’ concept and related 
(gatekeeping) activities that capture the underlying concerns on a cumulative ground. 
This exposition based on the layering approach constitutes another major ‘contribution 
to knowledge’ of this thesis.   
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From this point of view, the concept of ‘gatekeeping’ is used to mean restrictive 
control features incorporating the IPRs, TPMs, and algorithmic design and preferences 
whereby discriminatory, unfairly selective, biased or democratically unjustifiable AI-
driven activities are encompassed. Based on a number of principles and corresponding 
remedies, the model aims that gatekeeping activities that restrict access and 
interoperability in the described ways are diminished. To that end, the proposed model 
brings out the major prohibition over “restricting access and interoperability at the 
expense of limiting consumer choices”. This representing the baseline principle, the 
further principles of ‘fairness’, ‘transparency’ and ‘accountability’ are integrated into 
the model by which to diagnose and deter the gatekeeping activities. Furthermore, a 
set of remedies translated from the principles are designed in view of the potential 
scenarios whereby gatekeeper(s) do not adhere to the governing principles. While it is 
ultimately proposed this model replaces the core (access and competition related) 
ECRF principles and remedies, its dynamic nature goes beyond the ECRF and reaches 
out to a broader vision capable of dealing with other problems e.g. hindered 
information flows, unfair outcomes and transformative effects conducive to ICT 
landscape. 
Reflecting these, sequential steps and milestones of this research are manifested in 
Figure 16 below. This figure also features the main findings and outcomes of the 




Figure 16: Key milestones of the research 
Source: Constructed by the author 
As the figure above demonstrates, the research outcomes entail a number of normative 
findings following the given milestones. While the main outcome and contribution to 
knowledge is the proposed ‘layered regulatory model’, this model’s interaction with 
many related themes and concepts e.g. gatekeeping activities, AI based algorithms and 
accompanying ethical concerns, also needs to be noted. While this interaction is 
elaborated in the thesis to a certain extent, this endeavour would better be 
complemented and pursued with further research. It is always welcome to see future 
efforts in this field of research delving further into the regulatory frontiers of the 
proposed model, particularly regarding un-ethical and democratically unjustifiable 
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